PrintReconciliation in Afghanistan
For the first time since the U.S.-led international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, there is a serious prospect of political dialogue among various combatants in Afghanistan aimed at the cessation of armed conflict. At the January 28, 2010 Afghanistan Conference in London, the Afghan government pledged to develop an official program to engage elements of the insurgency in negotiations, reconciliation, and reintegration.
For the first time since the U.S.-led international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, there is a serious prospect of political dialogue among various combatants in Afghanistan aimed at the cessation of armed conflict. At the January 28, 2010 Afghanistan Conference in London, the Afghan government pledged to develop an official program to engage elements of the insurgency in negotiations, reconciliation, and reintegration.
More than eight years after the initial invasion with rising insecurity and violence across the country and a continuously expanding international troop presence, the prospect of a negotiated settlement with some or all aspects of the insurgency is enticing. However, the successful path to a sustainable peace in Afghanistan remains far from clear. There are fundamental questions about the willingness and capability of key actors, inside and outside of Afghanistan, to reach and uphold agreements. Furthermore, the content of an agreement or series of agreements, as well as the process by which those would be established is also uncertain. And even if all essential parties are interested in a negotiated settlement, getting to yes is not assured.
Alongside political negotiations, the Afghan government has launched a new program, with international support, to coax insurgents off the battlefield and reintegrate them into Afghan society through both top-down and bottom-up approaches. While the Afghan government reaches out to the leadership through diplomacy, it will simultaneously engage foot soldiers through a newly created jobs program and a myriad of development projects. The program rests on the assumption that many combatants did not join the Taliban for ideological reasons and can therefore be persuaded to lay down their arms through financial and political incentives. As Afghan President Hamid Karzai said in Kabul in 2003, “a clear line has to be drawn between the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country, and those who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country.”
Both in its Washington, D.C. office and its Kabul office, USIP is actively engaged in reconciliation and reintegration efforts. In 2008, USIP Senior Fellow Mohammad Masoon Stanekzai published a Special Report entitled “Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation.” In the report, Stanekzai explains how the Afghan government can work with the international community to create a comprehensive and coordinated program that is guided by a clear set of principles and that complies with the Afghan Constitution. In 2009, USIP published Michael Semple’s “Reconciliation in Afghanistan,” which describes previous attempts at reconciliation and outlines approaches for moving forward. In Washington, Kabul, and the region, USIP is conducting a series of dialogues and advising policymakers on practical considerations of the peace and reconciliation process.