On the Issues: Somalia

 

Somali pirates attacked a U.S. cargo ship on April 8, taking the American captain for hostage.

The assault on the U.S.-registered Maersk Alabama began on Wednesday when pirates boarded the 17,000 ton vessel some 310 miles off the Somalia coast in the Indian Ocean. The 20-member American crew on board managed to fend off the would-be attackers, but the pirates escaped on a lifeboat with the captain, Richard Phillips, as their hostage. As the hostage standoff continued overnight, the U.S. Navy and FBI have been talking with the pirates to negotiate his release without military force.

This is the first attack by pirates on a U.S. vessel in African waters since modern times, but just the latest in numerous piracy incidents. Since January, pirates have staged 66 attacks and are currently holding 14 ships and 260 crewmembers as hostages, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

Raymond Gilpin [1], Associate Vice President and director of USIP’s Sustainable Economies Center of Innovation, talked about this new development, factors fueling Somali piracy, and offers policy options to address the problem.

• To begin with, what happened in this latest piracy incident off the coast of Somalia that began on April 8? [2]
• Is it unusual for a U.S. crew to be taken hostage, or even confront pirates, in these waters? [3]
• Is that a lot of money? [4]
• So, the piracy industry appears quite lucrative. But, how do pirates know which boats to attack? [5]
• Pouring acid…that’s pretty harsh. [6]
• What else do we know about the piracy industry? You said the pirates themselves were the "tip of the iceberg.” [7]
• What does that say about the situation inside Somalia? [8]
• If it’s an international problem – and given high traffic of important cargo going through this area, why is it so difficult to stop? [9]
• How much does poverty in Somalia have to do with piracy? What else is fueling the industry? [10]
• What has USIP done on this issue? [11]
• How would you advise the Obama administration on such policy options? [12]

 

To begin with, what happened in this latest piracy incident off the coast of Somalia that began on April 8?

A forty-foot boat approached the Maersk Alabama cargo ship, which was carrying relief supplies for Somalia, Uganda and Kenya. These pirates attached a grappling hook and scaled up the 508-foot long ship, and once they boarded, they took the crew hostage for ransom – which is standard in the piracy industry.
[13]

Is it unusual for a U.S. crew to be taken hostage, or even confront pirates, in these waters?

This is the first U.S. crew to be taken hostage in some 200 years, but far from being the first vessel to be overtaken by pirates. Last year, the International Maritime Bureau estimates that pirates seized upwards of 50 vessels and ransom payments ranged from $50 million to $130 million for a year.

But, you have to take those ransom figures with a grain of salt because the ship owners – which pay the ransom – will not say exactly how much. So, I think those ransom payments are probably a lot more.

Is that a lot of money?

If you compare it to the Gross Domestic Product of Somalia – about $5.8 billion -- those ransom figures are significant. Another comparison would be the general development assistance funds to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. In 2008, the European Union gave about $100 million.

So, the piracy industry appears quite lucrative. But, how do pirates know which boats to attack?

Yes, but the guys who are actually doing this – who are sent out to board the ships – are just the tip of the iceberg. The pirates themselves don’t just go outside and say, hey, nice weather – a great day for seizing a boat! And then just randomly try to find a boat.

Instead, they use sophisticated GPS and AIS (Automated Information Systems). The AIS is important because – every large vessel needs to send out a signal identifying its location and its cargo. The pirates have this technology and so they know the where and when.

They tend to look for soft targets.

Although ocean crews are not armed in general, but two things are happening in response to these pirate attacks. First, crews are increasingly hiring private security. Second, they are learning to use non-lethal means, like a water hose or pouring acid onto people trying to climb up the boat. And, crews are also learning to use a sonic boom to scare off the pirates.

Pouring acid…that’s pretty harsh.

Think of this – if they climb and board your ship, they have the AK-47s. You do not. So, that is one way to defend yourself if you are unarmed – and most crews are.

a name="tip">What else do we know about the piracy industry? You said the pirates themselves were the "tip of the iceberg."

Then are people directing these operations from the Somali coast. There are allegations that senior Somali government officials are directing the operations. In fact, the UN Special Envoy to Somalia said just that last December.

The government officials and others working in Somalia who direct, coordinate and send the guys out. But, it doesn’t end there.

When pirates board the ship and start demands for ransom payments, there are complicated negotiations involved with lawyers – Somali and international lawyers. And, I’ll be darned if the Somali lawyers are doing this work pro bono. So, they get a pay off from this activity.

Furthermore, both Yemeni and Somali businessmen are involved by funding the ships for the pirates, the technology they need, and fuel. They also bribe Somali politicians to arrange for docking fees and to look the other way. These businessmen get the largest share of the ransom.

And, the guys who actually climb up the side of the boat – they get the least amount. Still, in a country where the GDP per capita is about $600 – even a small portion of a ransom payment is significant. So, you now even have women flocking to the Somali coast to marry these guys because they make five times more than the honest Somali worker.

This industry exposes two things. One, that Somalia has been stateless for some time, so impunity is the order of the day. That makes it easy for people to perpetuate a monopoly of force because they know they can get away with it.

It also exposes the weakness of international maritime security. This is an area where about eleven percent of ocean-going oil – bound for Europe, the United States -- passes through the Gulf of Aden, and about 21,000 ships pass through every year.

So, this is not a Somali problem – this is an international problem.

If it’s an international problem – and given high traffic of important cargo going through this area, why is it so difficult to stop?

This is a huge area to patrol, and so there needs to be more than just eight or nine countries sending out a couple of boats to police that region. There needs to be more robust coordination among those countries.

And, though some piracy occurs in Somali waters, we’re increasingly seeing attacks – such as this one on the Alabama - occur in international waters, which is everything above 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast. When this takes place in international waters, the international law should come down hard on the perpetrators. But, there’s no consensus on international maritime law, partly because there’s not enough clarity and there is a lack of leadership in trying to get a consensus. For example, the U.S. decision to not ratify the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea is part of this problem.

A third reason is that piracy is usually a non-state issue because these pirates don’t fly a flag, or identified by nationality. So, if you apprehend a pirate on the high seas, where do you put him?

Some policy experts believe if you cannot rule the waves, then you must waive the rules. An example of waiving the rules is how the British signed an agreement with the Kenyan government in which Kenya agreed to prosecute pirates caught by the British.

How much does poverty in Somalia have to do with piracy? What else is fueling the industry?

One pirate leader gave an interview saying that he just wanted to earn enough money to eat and buy food for his family. Then, another pirate said this was a response – a protest – to the toxic dumping that goes on in these waters. It costs about $250 million to dump a ton of toxic waste in European waters, and only $2.5 million to dump a ton of waste in African waters. So there is something to his point.

Some say this is a pollution issue, some say it’s a poverty issue.

But, I disagree. Those are two compelling underlying reasons that need to be addressed. However, piracy does not address those issues. It’s about crime – not poverty or pollution. These people need to be prosecuted. And the money that goes back into Somalia from ransom payments is not used for any productive means, or for long-term economic growth, or sustainable development projects.

First, Somalia needs to work with its international partners to find a solution to its political mess. Because with a stronger central government, you’d have a stronger court system and less impunity. When the Islamic Courts Union took over the government for six months, piracy dropped dramatically. That’s because the Islamic Courts would go after the pirates and punish them. Of course, we don’t want draconian laws for Somalia, but we want to send the message that there is no more impunity for piracy crimes.

Second, the international community needs to pay closer attention to the problem of poverty in Somalia. You need a population that does not feel downtrodden or without economic opportunities – otherwise, they will turn to piracy.

Third, the businessmen involved in this industry – and the Somali diaspora working in Yemen and elsewhere – they are known. People know who these guys are. There should be more pressure put on these people by the international community – such as by stopping their ability to move their money around.

What has USIP done on this issue?

First, USIP has engaged the Somali diaspora [14] on Somalia.

David Smock’s program [15] has done a lot on peacebuilding.

And, last December, we held an event [16] looking at piracy and the economic ramifications of the industry – and highlighted practical ways to address it.

Finally, USIP could be more proactive in helping the Obama administration think through various policy options.

1. Apply "smart power”: The situation is complex and requires much more than an increased naval presence. Attacks have increased and become more brazen since the multi-nation armada amassed in the Gulf of Aden. The upsurge in piracy is linked to Somalia’s enduring political and economic problems. More strident diplomatic efforts and more targeted development assistance must complement security-related initiatives.
2. Adopt a balanced approach: Including non-kinetic elements of foreign policy is necessary, but not sufficient. Equal attention and resources must be devoted to defense, diplomacy and development in this context. The European Union’s Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia pledges €212 million for development assistance from 2008-2013, while the EU’s joint naval endeavor – Operation Atalanta – plans to spend an estimated $450 million in one year. Such imbalance must be avoided.
3. Reconsider UNCLOS: Since 1982 successive U.S. administrations have failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), which provides an international legal framework for dealing with criminal activity on the high seas. This convention, and international efforts to apprehend and prosecute criminals, have been somewhat weakened as a result. The U.S. should negotiate thorny issues (like Article XI) and find ways to forge consensus around an internationally-recognized legal framework.
4. Engage civil society and isolate criminals: Somali civil society should be sensitized that piracy is not a "foreign” problem; it has dire consequences for political and economic progress in Somalia. Change agents in society should be supported as they initiate and sustain improvements in human security. Training, mediation and capacity-building activities by institutions like USIP are vital. Civil society would also be crucial in helping isolate the leaders of criminal groups who organize and benefit from piracy.
5. Bolster sub-regional capacity: Work with Somalia’s neighbors to strengthen sub-regional capacity to police and prosecute effectively. Such an approach is not without precedence. A similar initiative by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has dramatically reduced piracy in and around the Straights of Malacca, the erstwhile global leader in piracy. The U.S. Navy is already working on multi-disciplinary initiatives like the Africa Partnership Station concept, the Gulf of Guinea maritime security communiqué and the East Africa and South West Indian Ocean program. Lessons from these initiatives could helpful.

 

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.