Philippine Facilitation Project

Ancestral Domain: The Key to a More Permanent Peace in Muslim Mindanao

Astrid S. Tuminez
Senior Research Associate, Philippine Facilitation Project

The following is adapted from a presentation given by Astrid Tuminez as part of the February 8, 2005 Institute Current Issues Briefing: "Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?"

Background

In 1996 the Philippine government and the largest Moro guerilla group at the time, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed a Final Peace Agreement. Shortly thereafter, the government began its overtures to the remaining Moro guerilla group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Initially, the MILF offered only one agenda item for talks with the government: resolving the "Bangsamoro Problem." What is the "Bangsamoro Problem"? It is the search for territorial, political, cultural, and economic arrangements that would redress long-term Moro marginalization and pave the way for economic development, political autonomy, and cultural renaissance for the majority of Moros.

From a single agenda item, MILF subsequently drafted nine sub-themes, which were eventually narrowed to three: (1) security, (2) rehabilitation, and (3) ancestral domain. Interim agreements have been signed on the first two agenda items and the parties are now set to tackle the third, ancestral domain.

Ancestral domain is the single most important and, arguably, the thorniest issue that is still to be negotiated by the MILF and the Philippine government before they can reach a political settlement. Ancestral domain refers to Moro demand for territory that will constitute a Moro homeland; sufficient control over economic resources on that territory; and a structure of governance that will allow Moros to govern themselves in ways that are consonant with their culture and with minimal interference from Manila.

The issues include: the territorial, governance, and economic (resources) aspects of ancestral domain, the prospects for a successful resolution of this matter, and policy recommendations for the United States.

Issues

Territory

Three brief statements on territory are warranted. First, land that belonged to the Moros since time immemorial has been taken from them unjustly. It only took about 60 years to minoritize the Moros demographically and territorially on Mindanao. A form of territorial compensation is required for a just peace. Second, the first peace agreement signed in Tripoli in 1976 promised the Moros autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities. But, since that time, the machinations of the government in Manila have succeeded in preventing the Moros from gaining true autonomy in these provinces and cities. The best they have been able to do is get the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which is comprised of five poverty-stricken provinces and one city. Moros feel that they have been cheated and now may be their final opportunity to get any kind of honest deal from the government. Third, MILF itself recognizes that the past cannot be restored. Its leaders have scaled back demands for ancestral domain encompassing all of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago, and Palawan and mainly talk now about territory covering only Muslim-majority areas. Territorially, they may settle for ARMM and additional Muslim-dominated territories, which may add up to 14 additional municipalities. At this point, nobody knows exactly what MILF will ask for and what the Philippine government is ready and able to give.

Governance/Self-Government

On governance, genuine devolution of political power will be needed. Manila needs to stop selecting the rulers of an autonomous Moro entity and must give the Moros space for true self-government. There will be obstacles to effective Moro self-government, but these are not insurmountable. They include:

• inter-ethnic Moro rivalry and divisions;
• insufficient administrative, technical and managerial skills among rising and current Moro leaders;
• lack of clarity on how Islamic law or shari'ah will be made operational while also preserving an open and democratic system on Moro territory;
• and that all-pervasive problem in the Philippines, corruption.

Culturally, a self-governing Moro entity will have much to do in education, including the improvement and standardization of madrasah curricula and the more rigorous preparation of their own youth to live and work more competitively within the country and in the region.

The MILF and its supporters like to emphasize that they do not want to repeat the MNLF's experience in governance. After the peace agreement was signed in 1996, MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and his cohorts proved quickly how their system of governance was corrupt, inefficient, and dependent on favors from Manila. Hence, nine years after that so-called "Final Peace Agreement," the deep-rooted grievances, needs and yearnings of the Moros remain unresolved.

Resources

Ancestral domain talks will have to address Moro control over natural resources on their ancestral territory, including forests, arable land, gas (perhaps), and others. No Moro system of self-government can survive and flourish unless it has a viable economic base; thus, control over resources is crucial. The problem with Moro autonomy up to this point—as embodied in the ARMM—is that it has never really had significant economic resources of its own and no fiscal independence.

Manila appears to be sincerely exploring ways that economic power may be devolved to Moro leadership. But assets—especially land and the resources thereon—that may be redistributed as part of ancestral domain have not yet been defined. It is likely that entrenched personal and corporate interests from Christian land-owning families in Mindanao and Manila will oppose government concessions to Moros in the realm of economic resources. Overcoming these obstacles will be a delicate and difficult task.

A word should also be said on the Liguasan Marsh, a swampy area comprising nearly 45,000 hectares which is rumored to have oil and gas deposits. MILF has claimed the marsh as part of their ancestral domain and they control significant portions of it. Because of the marsh's tremendous actual and potential resources, it is likely going to be a focal point of ancestral domain talks.

Problems And Prospects

What are the prospects for a successful resolution of ancestral domain and the likelihood of an effective political settlement? Prospects are dim to good. On the "dim" side of the equation are the following questions:

(1) WILL THE CEASEFIRE HOLD? Recent violent incidents between MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Mamasapano and the Butilan Marsh have punctured the year and a half old ceasefire. Although the ceasefire is not dead, it has been weakened. Add to this the ongoing skirmishes in Sulu between Misuari's followers and the Abu Sayyaf, on one hand, and the Philippine military, on the other, and you get a real sense of the volatility of the situation. If the ceasefire breaks down, progress and goodwill on negotiating ancestral domain may be seriously impaired.

(2) WILL A DRIVER BE FOUND? Who is in charge of this vehicle called the peace process? And why is it crucial to have a driver? At the tactical level: Will there be a real, permanent, empowered team on the GRP side that could pull off the job, including selling the merits of a settlement on ancestral domain to the Philippine congress, the Mindanao power brokers, the corporations, and so on? At the strategic level: Who will marshal public support for a Moro ancestral domain? Who will start and sustain a badly needed effort at national reconciliation—the inclusion of the Moro narrative into Philippine national history and the overcoming of deep-seated anti-Moro prejudice? In the GRP peace panel, there is some interest in precedents elsewhere where the ruling regime has apologized to its oppressed minority—for example, in New Zealand. An apology to the Moros from Manila would probably vitiate Moro resentment to a significant extent, but it is too much to hope for from the government.

(3) WHO WILL SHOW US THE MONEY? Who will fund the implementation of an ancestral domain agreement? What resources will be used to compensate parties whose interests may be compromised by concessions to the Moros on territory and resources? Who will fund the sustained training of Moro administrative professionals and a Moro technocratic cadre that can effectively manage and develop Moro ancestral domain?

Recommendations

Although USAID is extensively engaged in developmental protests in Muslim Mindanao, the U.S. has made clear that terrorism is its primary interest. This is understandable, but shortsighted. There are other helpful measures that the U.S. should consider.

Support the ceasefire. The ceasefire has been the single greatest success of the peace process, but it remains fragile. Monitoring mechanisms on the ground need to be bolstered with training, funds, and other support. As long as the ceasefire holds, the parties can keep negotiating thorny issues, and it is better for them to keep talking, even if it takes years. The problem is when shooting begins. Helping to support the ceasefire would be a relatively inexpensive endeavor for the U.S., but it could go a very long way in generating good will towards us, and enhancing our credibility on peace in Muslim Mindanao. Such good will and credibility could eventually enhance our interest in combating terrorism. We need good intelligence to be effective and people will talk to us only when we have earned their trust.

Make available to the parties the best available practices and lessons from other countries that have resolved issues similar to ancestral domain with their own minorities. The GRP and MILF, for example, have both expressed interest in the experiences of Northern Ireland, New Zealand with the Maoris, Sudan, and other countries.

Make a generous offer of post-agreement development assistance, more than the $30 million offered previously. It would not hurt now for us to work with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). It is a group run by competent individuals and they are focused on weeding out corruption early in the process of development training.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.