Philippine Facilitation Project

Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?

Zachery Abuza
Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace

Note: The following is adapted from a presentation given by Abuza as part of the February 8, 2005 Institute Current Issues Briefing: "Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?"

Murad's Gambit

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), and their negotiators from the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP), repeatedly announced last year that they expected a final peace accord to be signed soon. Some even suggested by the end of 2004. Now Silvestre Afable, the GRP's top negotiator, has stated that he expects a final agreement in the next six months--though the resumption of formal talks was delayed again. Why is the government so optimistic? The bottom line is that they believe that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) chairman Ebrahim el Haj Murad wants a peace deal. He is flexible, moderate, and personally determined to sign an accord. Their entire analysis is based on assumptions about a man who has said little publicly since being elected chairman in July 2003. Both GRP officials and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)/Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials whom I have interviewed, say that Murad is going to sign an accord that falls well short of the MILF's ideals: what they call a "retirement package" for the senior leaders so they can cash in and get rich. This seems unlikely.

Murad's desire to reach a durable peaceful conclusion to the war is not in question. The MILF leadership has always been committed to reaching a durable political solution that will ensure lasting peace. Yet, the GRP's public stance fails to take into account the MILF's internal politics and the fiduciary responsibility that Murad has for the organization and the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people. He is not going to abandon his ideals and a lifelong commitment to the struggle for the sake of reaching an MNLF-like autonomy agreement. In the MILF's eyes, this has been a dismal failure and has failed to address the root causes of the insurgency.

That said there have been subtle changes in the MILF negotiating position in the past year. They have, for all intents and purposes, abandoned their demand for an independent state and are pushing for "meaningful autonomy." Mike Mastura has called it a "New Formula." The reports that Benjie Midtimbang has retired from the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) so that he can return to his post as head of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) military academy to retrain the MILF fighters to take on a greater civilian peace-time role is fairly indicative that the leadership has abandoned any dream of a military victory. Recent MILF behavior suggests a shift towards a political struggle in the ultimate pursuit of a referendum.

At the same time, the formal talks have not resumed. There have now been six rounds of pre-negotiations, and the MILF's three preconditions for resuming talks--withdrawal of Australian Federal Police (AFP) troops from Buliok, dropping of criminal charges/bounties on MILF leaders, and introduction of third party monitors--have been met. The implementation of these three issues was slow, but was essential to the MILF because they have to be seen as equal partners and any return to formal talks without their implementation would discredit the MILF leadership. The MILF have a lot of reasons to mistrust the GRP side. Government negotiators boast that two of the three issues, peace and security and economic rehabilitation, but several factors suggest otherwise: (1) the AFP violated the cease-fire in 2000 and 2003 and are currently massing troops in Butig; and (2) in contravention with the May 2002 Kuala Lumpur agreement, the government has circumvented the Bangsamoro Development Agency and implemented aid projects unilaterally.

There is a battlefield stalemate. There is also considerable war wariness amongst the population that does alarm the MILF. While they enjoy considerable grassroots support, it is not unconditional. The human toll of the conflict, even from small skirmishes, in terms of lives, livelihood (crops and cattle), the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), etc., is considerable. The MILF leadership has always seen the conflict as a protracted one; and they see negotiations in a similar vain. The MILF does negotiate with the interest of their constituency at heart.

Yet, three other factors appear to be high in Murad's own calculus: (1) the loss of revolutionary zeal; (2) emerging factionalism especially over the issue of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Abu Sayyaf, kidnapping gangs and lost commands; and (3) generational issues.

The Loss of Revolutionary Zeal

The MILF has a sense of urgency in the negotiations that the government does not. The GRP really believes that time is on their side. One sees a lack of seriousness on their part, though such things as constant rotations of CCCH members and the gutting of the OPAPP. While some commentators suggest that the GRP's violation of the peace process and inability to implement signed agreements derives from the weak executive and the institutional frailties of the Philippine state, there is some evidence that they really are not serious about the peace process. The MILF is coming in from the jungle; their leaders are moving into the cities, reclaiming their family homes, and putting their children in state schools. They are establishing businesses and buying into the status quo. And the GRP is encouraging this. I have asked MILF commanders specifically about this issue, about the dissipation of the front's unity, and they have downplayed the problem. But it has to give Murad some cause for concern. This will alienate the leadership from the rank and file and cause a decline in morale.

Emerging Factionalism

The second key concern for Murad is factionalism. The Philippine press is constantly filled with reports of the factionalization of the MILF. The MILF completely denies this, and demands evidence of any challenge to Murad's control. I tend to side with the MILF on this position. There are ethno-linguistic divisions, but that does not necessitate challenges to his leadership. From his election to the chairmanship in July 2003 through the present, Murad has been in firm control of the organization. There were differences, to be sure, but the leadership spoke with one voice and decisions were more-or-less implemented down the chain of command. As many in the organization have noted to me, there is no one with anything near Murad's stature and popular appeal, who could effectively challenge him. But I have warned that the potential for factionalism was always there, and that a bogged down peace process and the issue of Jemaah Islamiyah and lawless elements would be the catalyst.

Were fault lines to appear, it is evident where they would come from: the 106th and 109th base commands (under Salamat Samir and Ustadz Umberil Kato, respectively) that stretch from the Liguasan Marsh through to Datu Saudi Ampatuan and Datu Piang. In the summer of 2004, Murad tried, but failed, to relieve Salamat Samir of his command of the 106th Base command and bring him into his headquarters as the head of the National Guard Division. Likewise, in January 2005, Ustadz Umberil Kato was moved to the Buliok region. The 106th and 109th base commands comprise the majority of ceasefire violations. They are also the two most likely to serve as spoilers if the Central Committee signs a peace agreement that they deem to be unacceptable.

The second issue regards internal debates over the MILF's relationship with criminal elements such as the Pentagon Group and terrorist organizations, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah. For example, the August 2004 attacks by the AFP on the Pentagon Gang's Alonto Tahir had nothing to do with kidnapping, and everything to do with Murad sending a signal to Salamat Samir, who is allegedly close to the nefarious gang. The attack (which failed) was done with Murad's blessing and based on intelligence the MILF provided to the AFP. Murad has spoken clearly on the need to eradicate lawless elements. The presence of the ASG's Khadaffy Janjalani and members of Jemaah Islamiyah in MILF territories is more problematic.

The MILF and ASG have had talks in the past, and U.S. commanders speak of some coordination between them in Basilan in 2002. Since the death of Abu Subaya and the capture of Ghalib Andang, Khadaffy Janjalani has consolidated power to a degree and sought to reorient the group from a kidnapping gang to a legitimate ethno-nationalist group. Moreover, the ASG is a Tausug grouping, the ethnic group that comprises the smallest element in the MILF, and a region where the MILF hopes to make substantial inroads. The ASG social network is an important factor in this regard. It is no surprise that some MILF elements have supported Janjalani, though there is no evidence to suggest that the senior leadership sanctioned ties. Reports continue to suggest that he is in MILF territory.

Regarding the highly sensitive issue of Jemaah Islamiyah, most MILF officials whom I have interviewed acknowledge past ties, but assert that either there are no "formal links" between the two groupings or that the links are highly qualified. This leaves a lot of wiggle room. While some in the organization see Jemaah Islamiyah as fellow travelers, brothers in need of protection, others are more pragmatic and see Jemaah Islamiyah as insurance should peace talks fail and a card to play at the peace talks. The MILF, however, has underestimated the seriousness to which the United States attaches to this issue and the degree to which any ties truly discredit their movement. The MILF's only concern seems to be that the government uses such allegations at strategic times to derail the peace process.

This raises several questions: Are these ties sanctioned by the leadership? Or does the leadership not exercise effective command and control? And which of the two is more disturbing and problematic for the peace process?

Lawlessness and terrorism hurt the Murad in another way. AFP attacks on an alleged ASG member Abu Sufyan in Palimbang in early January 2005, and on an alleged Jemaah Islamiyah-ASG meeting in Liguasan in late January 2005, serve to discredit Murad. The newly constituted Ad Hoc Joint Action Group was ignored, as was the prior agreement that 24-hour notice for operations would be provided. Murad losing face is only going to complicate the peace process.

Murad is still in control, but I would surmise that his position has been weakened by the fact that in a year and a half, he has not succeeded in resuming peace talks, while key issues are heating up internal debates. Members of the MILF community disagree, and have suggested to me that should talks fail, he will become even more popular in the eyes of the Bangsamoro, such as Yassir Arafat post Wye River.

Generations

The third and final issue that Murad must take into account is that of generations. It is not so much that the Central Committee is aging, but that there has not been a regular transition of leaders. Indeed, the MILF asserts that they have cultivated a successor generation, and point to the fact that younger members are in deputy positions and comprise "more than half of the members of the present Central Committee."

What is of grater concern is the frustration of the youth that the older generation has failed to achieve victory. Murad and other Front members whom I have interviewed have expressed concern about growing radicalism in the ranks. Frustration with the elder generation is high. There is a critical mass of young people trained in the Middle East, who are predisposed to more radical and intolerant interpretations of Islam, who believe they need to ratchet up the violence. They will look to outside leaders and models in pursuit of their agenda.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are considerable political constraints on Murad who is working to maintain effective control and to create a comprehensive negotiating strategy. The government seems to be hoping that the MILF will implode, so that they will accept nothing more than an agreement similar to that which the MNLF signed. The reality that confronts Murad is that an agreement for the sake of an agreement, one that falls far short of the MILF's stated goals, will cause the MILF to explode, sowing the seeds of the next conflict. While the MILF has always made the resolution of the "root causes of the problem" essential to any peace deal, the GRP side seems content to have stop gap measures, resolving one Moro uprising at a time, without searching for a durable political solution.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.