Philippine Facilitation Project

20 YEARS AFTER: Is the MILF Factionalized?

By Froilan Gallardo
NEWSBREAK Contributing Writer
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Wearing a blue shirt during an interview with NEWSBREAK, Jaafar looked like a retired businessman. In truth, he is a veteran of the separatist war in Mindanao and at present vice chair for political affairs of the MILF, which has an estimated 15,000 armed combatants in southern Mindanao. A good orator and propagandist, he is accessible to practically everyone: journalists, politicians, foreign visitors. For instance, during the time of President Ramos, Jaafar was seen often in the company of Ramos’s executive secretary, Ruben Torres, who had been tasked with persuading the MILF to return to the negotiating table. They looked like buddies so that the rumor soon circulated that Jaafar was getting too close to the government.

Compare this to the demeanor of another MILF leader, Aleem Abdulaziz Mimbantas, a quiet and intense ideologue who is rarely accessible to the media. Or to the late Salamat Hashim, the MILF’s revered leader, who lived an almost reclusive life in his last years. Or to Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, who is comfortable in fatigues, having been the military chief of the organization for a long time. It was Murad who replaced Salamat as chairman of the MILF (see Hot Seat).

The MILF leadership is indeed a mixed lot; members of its powerful central committee come from various Muslim tribes as well. These are often cited as basis for claims that the group is factionalized.

Various Hues

Sydney Jones of the International Crisis Group, a think tank based in Brussels, contended in a July 2004 paper that Salamat’s anointed successor was not Murad but Mimbantas, 59, who like Salamat graduated from the Al-Azhar University of Egypt in 1974.

A Maranao, Mimbantas was the most trusted of Salamat’s lieutenants, according to Jones. She asserts that while Mimbantas had the strong support of the ulama, his armed following could not match that of Murad, who has 5,000 armed men loyal to him. Jones suggests that the leadership transition after Salamat’s death in July 2003 had not been smooth. She cites problems about “rebel [MILF] commanders” as well as remote commands that act autonomously from the central command.

But other experts point to a cohesive central committee, the policymaking body of the MILF. In a paper marking the 20th founding anniversary of the organization last year, Dr. Zachary Abuza, an American academic who has done extensive research on armed groups in Mindanao, said that while the central committee members have “clearly differences of opinions over certain policies (Jemaah Islamiya, for example),” there is “no overt factionalism that hampers decision-making or threatens the organization as a whole.” He cites the fact that not one leader has his own armed faction that can “subvert or ignore the decisions” of the central committee. He acknowledged, however, that the “potential for factionalism is there, especially over a peace agreement with the government that falls short of full independence or a referendum.”

Central Committee members include Murad, Mimbantas, Jaafar, and Mohagher Iqbal. They are hardened mujahideen fighters who formed the leadership of the Bangsamoro rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s. The committee has one female member, who heads the sub-committee on social work and has been assigned to organize Muslim women.

Since the death of Salamat on July 13, 2003, the Central Committee has taken a more crucial role in setting the direction for the movement. And it has attracted more attention now than in the past because before, people considered Salamat to be the all-powerful, all-influential leader of the movement.

MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu said that the Central Committee rarely meets as a group; it does so only to discuss very important issues. But the members keep in touch regularly with each other through e-mail, mobile phone, and the old-fashioned courier system. Day-to-day operations are supervised by an executive committee, which is also chaired by Murad.

Most of the Central Committee members come from Maguindanao, the bailiwick of the MILF. However, Kabalu disclosed a plan to add another member from Western Mindanao, where he said the rebel group has expanded.

Jaafar: Breakaway

“Many of the central committee members fought with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in their early years. They practically grew up together so they know each other very well,” Kabalu said.

In 1977, the MILF broke away from the secular MNLF. This was a year after the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the Marcos government that was brokered by Libya. “We felt that we were not consulted by [MNLF] chairman Nur Misuari [on the peace agreement]. We decided to form a new bloc and continue the struggle,” Jaafar said.

It was only in 1984 that the organization officially became the MILF. It sought to establish an independent homeland for the Muslims that would be governed by the shari’a (Islamic law). “The split was peaceful. There was no bloodletting like what happened to other liberation groups. It was because we are Muslims,” Jaafar said. The two groups also broke up along ethnic lines. The MNLF is dominated by the Tausugs from Sulu, and the MILF by the Maguindanaoans and the Maranaws.

Of the central committee members of the MILF, Jaafar, who hails from Maguindanao, is the most visible and accessible. In his 60s, Jaafar often directs the political affairs of the rebel group from its field office in Barangay Simuay, Sultan Kudarat town in “pulpit.”

“Then the Jabidah massacre in Corregidor happened. The entire Bangsamoro people were galvanized into unity. We had to defend ourselves,” he recalled. The Jabidah massacre happened on March 18, 1968, on Corregidor Island. Young Muslim recruits were trained by the Philippine Army in a clandestine plan to seize a state of Malaysia, Sabah, to which the Philippine government had a claim. When they learned of the plot, the Muslim recruits refused to continue and were shot by their Army trainers. Moro historians see the Jabidah massacre as the trigger that launched the separatist war.

The MNLF agreed to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in 1976, thus the Tripoli agreement. However, the rebels said later that the government did not fulfill its commitment to the Tripoli pact, prompting them to declare war on the state again. Finally in 1996, it entered into another peace deal with the Ramos government.

For the MILF, there are many lessons to be learned from the MNLF. Mohagher Iqbal, MILF central committee member, has internalized these lessons; he is the head of the rebel group’s panel now negotiating with the Arroyo administration.

Iqbal: Struggle in cyberspace

Iqbal is no stranger to the tasks of negotiating peace with the Philippine government. He was part of the first panel that held talks with the government in 1997.

A writer, Iqbal heads the committee on information and is credited for bringing the MILF struggle to cyberspace. The MILF Web page www.luwaran.com is widely read for its articles on the Bangsamoro struggle and the ongoing peace talks.

Iqbal, 57, finished his political science degree at the Manuel L. Quezon University in Manila before joining the rebel movement. He holds a master degree in political science. His motto in the revolution is: “There is no rocky hill to an iron will.” Iqbal describes his role in the central committee as a consensus-builder. “I am very persuasive. I try to dialogue with people to win them over,” Iqbal told NEWSBREAK in an interview inside their rebel stronghold in Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat.

Members of the central committee discuss policy and strategic issues, arrive at a decision by consensus if there are differing opinions, according to Iqbal. “It is very rare for us to vote. Sometimes it takes a long time for the committee to decide but we are not like the Philippine Congress,” he adds in jest. Iqbal emphasized that the MILF is not dictated upon by any single leader. This would avoid the pitfalls of the MNLF, which centralized command on Misuari, he explains.

He said the executive committee, which is also headed by Murad, implements the policies and decisions of the Central Committee. The Executive Committee has three vice chairmen for political, external and military affairs. Asked why there was only one woman on the Central Committee, Iqbal said there were no other qualified female candidates. He said the committee would have accepted a female had there been a qualified candidate. He said that is also the reason the MILF does not have women mujahideen fighters on the battlefield.

“We do not resent having women combatants but generally their role is auxiliary. The role of women in our struggle is complementary,” Iqbal said.

Kabalu: The Rebels’ Voice

The responsibility of explaining the MILF to the public lies with Kabalu, its affable spokesperson who loves giving interviews under a big mango tree in his house in Cotabato City.

Kabalu joined the separatist rebellion in 1978, but was detained and tortured later, he claims, at the military headquarters in Camp Awang, Maguindanao. He was released in 1980. Kabalu said it was the horrors inflicted by a Christian paramilitary vigilante group, the Ilagas, that drove him to rebel. “I realized that we had to defend ourselves against the Ilagas. We did not have any choice,” he said.

Before becoming a rebel, Kabalu took up Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City. He later finished his Bachelor of Science in Criminology at the Philippine Harvardian College in Cotabato City. Kabalu finished law at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City.

Kabalu said he joined the MNLF and, like the others, was disillusioned with Misuari. The disillusionment grew until in 1979, he joined Jaafar and the others to help organize the MILF.

Since then Kabalu served the MILF as its spokesperson, engaging in a verbal tussle with the military and keeping up the propaganda against the government.

But for now, what the MILF is greatly concerned about is the political crisis facing President Arroyo. “We are concerned if there will be a leadership change. Naturally, it will delay the peace process between us and the Philippine government,” he said.