April 2002
Vol. VIII, No.3

The Threat from Biological Weapons

Kathleen Vogel and Jonathan Tucker

Biological agents that spread illness and death have become the weapons of choice in the 21st century for terrorists and some state actors, says David Heyman, senior fellow for science and security initiatives studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Biological agents are easy to produce, widely available, and easy to conceal," he warns. And in many instances, introducing them into the environment is relatively easy.

Some 12 countries are currently pursuing biological warfare programs, experts say. After the Soviet Union collapsed, evidence of an extensive biological weapons program there emerged, Heyman said. Today, Iraq still has the physical assets and scientific personnel capable of producing biological weapons and a leadership determined to produce them. Given the recent terrorist attacks on the United States, the vulnerability revealed by the mailed anthrax spores, and evidence that the al Qaeda terrorist network was seeking to acquire biological weapons, the prospects of a biological weapons attack seem greater today than they did a year ago, Heyman said.

He discussed the threat from bioterrorism and related issues at a U.S. Institute of Peace Current Issues Briefing on "Health and Security" held on March 14. Panelists included Dr. Kenneth W. Bernard, assistant surgeon general, U.S. Public Health Service; Kathleen M. Vogel, postdoctoral associate at the Institute for Public Policy, University of New Mexico, and Institute of Peace grantee; and Jonathan B. Tucker, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. Heyman moderated the event.

Health and Security

Bernard noted that the National Security Council created the first health and security position in 1998, to which he was appointed. At that time, the challenge was to convince other officials of the connection between health and security issues. Since then, the connection has become all too clear due to the AIDS epidemic and the recent anthrax attacks. Illustrating the increased awareness of the connection, the Department of Health and Human Services budget for bioterrorism has increased dramatically since 1987, when it was negligible, he said. The budget grew in 1999 to $59 million, in 2001 to $300 million, this year to $3 billion, and is slated for $4.3 billion in 2003.

Protecting national security involves not just guns and bullets, Bernard said, but economics, democracy, and human rights issues at home and abroad as well. The maxim, "Think globally, act locally" has been turned around. Today, the United States needs to act globally to protect its citizenry locally. "Our back yard has expanded to include everybody's back yard," he said.

David Heyman and Dr. Kenneth Bernard

For example, the nation's food supply is vulnerable to a bioterror attack, which could be perpetrated in other countries where much of the supply originates or en route here, he noted. Some 8 percent of the nation's vegetables are imported, 40 percent of its fruit, and 60 percent of its seafood. There aren't enough food inspectors to examine most imported food, Bernard said. "How much really gets looked at?"

Converting Biological Weapons Complexes

The threat from existing biological weapons production facilities in the former Soviet Union remains a concern, panelists said. According to estimates, 70,000 scientists worked on biological weapons programs at some 50 complexes in the Soviet Union. It is critical to help employ these scientists in more constructive work, lest they sell their expertise to rogue states or terrorist groups, panelists agreed.

For the past three years, Vogel has investigated one former Soviet biological weapons complex, the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, commonly called Vector, in Koltsovo, Russia, where the United States has helped to support an ongoing conversion to other scientific activities. The United States needs to give priority to such complexes to safeguard pathogen collections, reduce concerns about lingering offensive activities, and ensure transparency and access, Vogel said. Further, the United Sates and Russia can benefit from expanded scientific and technical cooperation on research projects at such complexes. The ultimate goal should be to downsize biological weapons facilities and help to design more appropriate programs to maximize the social, scientific, and economic benefits from work at complexes like Vector, Vogel concluded.

The Biological Weapons Convention

A strengthened international framework is needed to provide the moral and perhaps legal force to deter the development by states of biological weapons and to prevent them from getting into the hands of terrorists, Tucker said. The recent anthrax-tainted letters killed five people, infected several more, disrupted the operations of all three branches of government, and frightened millions of Americans, he said. This incident "demonstrated the deadly potential of bioterrorism and raised serious concerns about the nation's ability to defend against more extensive attacks," he said. "The more countries that acquire biological weapons, the greater the risk they will fall into the hands of terrorists through state-sponsored terrorism or rogue scientists."

Although the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of biological and chemical weapons in war, it is essentially a no-first-use agreement because many countries have reserved the right to retaliate in kind if attacked, Tucker said. In 1997, a number of countries began to negotiate a draft protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which bans the possession and use of biological weapons, but lacks measures to check or enforce compliance. The draft protocol would have created an inspection regime designed to enhance BWC compliance and deter countries from acquiring or using biological weapons. Last year a set of compromises failed to satisfy many countries concerned over the need to balance the intrusiveness required to build confidence in compliance against the need to protect sensitive national security information and industrial trade secrets.

The United States rejected the draft protocol, proposing in its place a series of voluntary measures for countries to follow. The measures, to be implemented by individual nations, would among other things criminalize activities related to production, use, and distribution of biological weapons. However, the lack of uniformity among national laws would undermine control efforts, Tucker said. The alternative package offered by the United States would provide a basis for developing multilateral agreements that could be effective, Tucker said. However, if the United States persists in opposing negotiated agreements, the consequences could be quite grave, he warned. The biological know-how and technology needed to develop and produce such weapons is available worldwide, spreading the capability to inflict mass injury, he concluded. "We must do everything in our power to prevent that."

For the complete audio webcast of this event please visit:
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