August 1998 
  Vol. IV, No. 5

“Warlords” or strongmen—high-level indigenous leaders in civil conflicts who are bent on obstructing international efforts to deliver humanitarian aid and advance peace—have posed serious dilemmas during recent peacekeeping operations, say representatives of the U.S. government, U.S. military, and national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

“These are impressive and capable people,” says U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David Meade (Ret.). “They fought to get where they are,

Warlords, strongmen, and other recalcitrant leaders seek to maintain the status quo that keeps them in power during a civil conflict.

and more than anything else, they want to maintain the status quo.”

Meade was one of more than 20 participants in a day-long workshop on “How to Deal with Obstructionist Leaders in Peace Support Operations” held in Washington, D.C., on June 17. The event was organized by Donald C. F. Daniel, director of the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, together with professors Bradd C. Hayes and Andrew Vaart. The U.S. Institute of Peace funded the meeting through a grant.

“Until very recently this issue [of obstructionist leaders] has been largely ignored as a subject for systematic policy-oriented analysis,” wrote Daniel and Hayes in their concept paper for the workshop. Because of the complexity of the issue, “perhaps all we can hope for is a typology of practices that serves as a menu of options from which policymakers might choose.”

In a broad-ranging discussion that covered topics from diplomacy to economics to military force, participants explored sources of leverage available to the international community in general and to the United States government in particular in dealing with obstructionist leaders.

They noted that international actors gain the most leverage through their own legitimacy, which in the case of military forces means having the backing of the United Nations Security Council. International actors also gain leverage if they coordinate their efforts so that obstructionist leaders don’t play them off against each other. Participants stressed that in the process of using a variety of strategies and options to move a recalcitrant leader toward cooperation, it is crucial not to humiliate him in front of his followers.

The Naval War College will use the workshop proceedings as a basis for further analytical research.

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