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MIDDLE EAST

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

A failure now to contain weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East jeopardizes prospects for long-term peace and security in the region, according to an Institute senior fellow.

Three panel members.
Left to right: Patrick Cronin, USIP; senior fellow Avner Cohen, USIP; and Marvin Miller, MIT.
Dropcap B ehind the stalled Middle East peace process looms a larger but related menace—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Iran and Iraq have long-standing nuclear weapons programs, and Israel has had an unacknowledged nuclear option since 1967. The region is also plagued by stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons.

Many observers say that serious negotiations on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should wait until the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved. However, the current impasse in dealing with these weapons increases regional rivalry and jeopardizes the prospects for long-term peace and security in the region, argues Avner Cohen, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace for the past year.

In particular, the nuclear programs of Iran and Iraq—neither country a party to the peace process that was initiated at the Madrid conference in October 1991—undermine regional arms control efforts, Cohen says. There is no way to monitor their nuclear activities over time without a regional commitment to nuclear arms control.

“I certainly agree that the nuclear issue is the most difficult item to integrate into a broader agenda of regional security, but I don’t think we have the luxury to postpone it indefinitely,” Cohen says. “A crisis in which Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction, faces a nuclear-armed Israel could be catastrophic. To talk about peace in the Middle East without talking about weapons of mass destruction is like ignoring an elephant in the room.”

Cohen, the former director of the Project on Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East at the Center for International Studies at MIT and author of many studies on nuclear weapons proliferation, discussed his fellowship project on “Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects” at a workshop on “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East” on April 22. Participants included policymakers, academics, and government officials. Their contributions to the discussion were off the record.

Cohen’s book Israel and the Bomb—forthcoming from Columbia University Press this fall—provides the first detailed account of Israel’s nuclear history. The book analyzes historically why Israel kept a low profile for its nuclear program—from concerns over Arab reaction and the negative effect the public debate over the program would generate at home, to consideration of America’s commitment to nonproliferation. The book is based on numerous recently declassified documents from the 1950s and 1960s.

Cohen said at the workshop that the present policy positions of both Egypt and Israel, which led to the current impasse on the nuclear question, are untenable. Egypt has demanded that Israel join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place its nuclear program under NPT safeguard procedures. Israel on the other hand, has refused to discuss nuclear matters until regional peace is firmly established.

Workshop participants explored the utility and feasibility of short- and long-term policy options for creating a weapons of mass destruction–free zone in the Middle East. As an interim measure, they discussed various possibilities for cutting off production of fissile materials that could be used in nuclear weapons. “A cutoff commitment, conducted under the right political and technical circumstances, would provide leverage for stronger future regional arms control arrangements,” Cohen said.

For the long term, workshop participants explored the notion of “virtual nuclear arsenals” as a means of moving away from actual weapons. A virtual arsenal would consist of retaining the knowledge and experience to produce nuclear weapons among those countries with nuclear programs, while disarming actual weapons. Whether such a scenario is possible, Cohen said, depends on progress in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and on political, social, and technological developments in the states currently outside the peace process, namely Iran and Iraq.

In the meantime, Cohen concluded, it is essential to continue monitoring Iraq and to stop the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. He added that ongoing dialogue with Iran—not isolation—is the best way to bring that country into a long-term weapons control process.


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