Waging Peace

Until the 1990s, the words "peacekeeping," "peace enforcement," or "humanitarian operations" were hardly even mentioned in U.S. Army training courses, says Col. J. Michael Hardesty, who has served in the military for 22 years and is the first Army fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. While at the Institute, he is examining the Army's integration of peace operations into doctrine and training materials. In August, he will assume command of the U.S. Army base at Fort Sam Houston in Texas.

Hardesty explains that for decades after World War II, the focus of the Army was to fight and win wars on the battlefields of Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, with the Soviet Union seen as the major threat. Between 1973 and 1986, the Army revised and modernized the overriding principles that guide the way it fights wars, published as Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The principles outlined there transformed the Army's war-fighting strategy from a defensive one, which had dominated military tactics through most of the 20th century, to an offensive one, which better integrated the various elements of the modern battlefield-- infantry, intelligence, air power, communications, and the movement of soldiers and equipment. The new doctrine was first tested in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, where U.S. and allied forces performed to near perfection, says Hardesty, who served there in charge of personnel with the 101st Airborne Division (air assault).

Since the end of the Cold War, Hardesty notes, the Army has engaged in an average of two peace operations a year. After the first two such operations--Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991 and Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-93, where he was in charge of personnel with the 10th Mountain Division in 1993--many in the Army leadership and among the ranks realized their forces required different skills if they were to conduct such missions successfully. "Commanders participating in the initial post-Cold War operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia discovered themselves in situations they had not trained for," Hardesty says. "Their lack of training could have led to inappropriate action."

Although there are still those in the Army who say war- fighting tactics and procedures can be easily modified for peace engagements, Hardesty and a majority of his colleagues argue that the differences are "significant." Failure to take these differences into account jeopardizes the troops and the mission. To respond to the changes in the post-Cold War environment, between 1991 and 1993--"a mere two years," Hardesty notes--the Army developed principles to guide peace operations and added them to the officially published doctrine. Since then, the Army has placed great emphasis on instruction to prepare its forces for peace operations, though some improvements are still needed, Hardesty says.

Above: J. Michael Hardesty, at the time a lieutenant colonel, in discussions with Col. Jim Maloney (far right), 101st Airborne Division (air assault) G1, during the Desert Storm ground war in the Persian Gulf.

Peace Operations

Hardesty notes that peace operations have many unique characteristics. Recent military interventions have occurred in locations where the United States had no preestablished intelligence network among the people. Thus, the initial deployments lacked necessary data to help prepare them for conditions and players on the ground. As a result, they sometimes were unaware they were dealing with unreliable, corrupt, or potentially subversive individuals or groups, Hardesty says.

Communication is another major area that has required special training. Perhaps most obvious is the need for soldiers to understand and communicate with local people whose culture and political environment are unfamiliar. Also, a vast range of individuals, organizations, and governments often work in countries or regions where peace operations forces are deployed. For example, over 130 nongovernmental organizations had registered with the United Nations as operating in Somalia during Restore Hope. The military has taken special measures to adapt its structure and modus operandi to be able to coordinate effectively with them, Hardesty says.

Also, because these operations occur in "low-threat" zones, as opposed to war zones, the media are often there in large numbers and have free movement throughout the area of operations. The Army has beefed up its training to help officers and enlisted soldiers work with reporters.

Most peace engagements are in countries where the judicial system has collapsed or is ineffective or corrupt (see The Lead Story). "Sheer anarchy perhaps best characterized the situations in Somalia and Rwanda," Hardesty says. "The military has proven to be the only institution to effectively perform law enforcement duties in the early stages of an operation." Handling these responsibilities is complicated by rules of engagement that have sometimes been unclear, are often complex, and have varied with each operation. Further, peace operations call for small, independent military units, which places enormous demands on young unit leaders, for it is their immediate responses to situations that usually determine the success of an operation, Hardesty says.

Peace operations also occur primarily in urban areas and require tactics the Army has not used extensively in recent times. Hardesty argues that more training in this area is needed.

He also stresses that the Army needs to take additional measures to enhance the negotiating skills of its personnel. "This applies to senior commanders as well as to the young platoon sergeants operating at checkpoints," Hardesty says, adding that in Somalia, leaders down to the platoon level were involved in direct negotiations with local clans.

"We are learning from every mission and constantly integrating new knowledge into our strategy and training," Hardesty says. "We want to make sure the United States Army remains the premier force for peace and security in the world."

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