Why Peace Agreements Succeed or Fail

Effective implementation is crucial to the success of a negotiated peace settlement process.

Right: Rwandan refuges stream out of the Mugunga refugee camp in eastern Zaire and head for the Rwandan border, November 15, 1996. (AP Photo)

he ongoing crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa involving over a million Rwandan refugees illustrates what can happen when a humanitarian intervention is not based on an effective political settlement process, warns Chester A. Crocker, chairman of the board of directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace and a specialist on African affairs. Without effective implementation of a peace agreement, what you get is a political "mess" and untold human suffering, he says.

Even when a settlement is negotiated, however, a simplistic, short-term view of how peace is achieved can undermine the success of an agreement, Crocker says. People assume incorrectly that after outright victory in a conflict or a negotiated settlement, things naturally wind down. Then, during the implementation phase of the agreement, "you can avert your gaze because you have more important things to do elsewhere," he says. "We are discovering in case after case that that isn't how the process works. Effective implementation of an agreement is a fundamental aspect of the settlement process." Crocker chaired a panel discussion of the conditions that make for successful implementation of peace agreements at an Institute current issues briefing October 29. Over 150 policymakers, journalists, and academics attended the event, which was held in conjunction with publication of a recent Institute Press book, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, by Fen Osler Hampson. Hampson, a panelist and senior fellow at the Institute in 1993-94, is professor of international affairs at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. Panelist Paul Hare, Institute senior fellow and former U.S. special envoy to Angola, discussed the implementation process in Angola, while panelist Iain Guest, an Institute senior fellow, discussed the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Successful Settlements

Left to right: Paul Hare, Fen Hampson, Chester Crocker, and Iain Guest.

The most successful recent peace implementations have been in Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia, and Mozambique, Hampson said. "In all these cases terms for a political settlement had been worked out in extensive, detailed negotiations. And most importantly, all the parties to the conflict agreed to them, as well as the major regional and global powers."

Another factor important to success is demobilization, disarmament, and restructuring of the armed forces. Hampson noted that the absence of comprehensive demobilization and disarmament provisions in the Dayton Accords allows for the continued existence of three armies in Bosnia, which could jeopardize the accords over the long-term.

Most civil conflicts leave a country unable to perform even the most basic administrative functions, Hampson added. Thus, third parties--including international organizations and nongovernmental organizations--can contribute to reestablishing a more stable political order by temporarily taking over these functions, while being careful not to compromise local sovereignty and authority.

Finally, implementation of a peace agreement requires establishing the rule of law, which includes holding elections, promoting human rights, and reforming the judiciary. Winner-take-all elections can generate a polarization that could undermine the efforts to build peace, Hampson cautioned. "Unless there is some form of compensation for those who lose at the ballot box, they will always have a strong incentive to take up arms (again) and resort to force to achieve their objectives." As for human rights, third parties need to advance their cause without undermining the settlement itself. Here it is important to foster institutional mechanisms that over time will advance human rights and democratic structures once the political situation has stabilized, Hampson said.

Paul Hare noted that the disarmament and demobilization phases of the peace agreement in Angola have not been implemented. "You need third-party monitoring and verification if a peace settlement is to be effective," he said, adding that more than 7,000 UN peacekeepers and observers are doing that in Angola today at a cost of over one million dollars a day. Without them, because of the military capabilities and resources of the factions, Angola would not have a chance of achieving greater stability, he said.

Iain Guest added that the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia is primarily a military agreement and neglects the civilian aspects of building peace. Most glaringly, Dayton is "totally ambiguous" on the key issue of the reintegration of the three ethnic groups. Consequently, "the real problem with the reconstruction effort in Bosnia is that it does not know what kind of a Bosnia it is trying to rebuild," Guest said.

"Are we forcing our vision of what Bosnia ought to be--a multiethnic society--down the throats of three groups who do not want to live together? Or are we accepting that there will be no return to a multiethnic culture, and we should thus start subsidizing separatism?" Guest argued that the international community needs to find something in between those extremes. Political will was lacking in the war, he said, and now its presence or absence in tackling this and related issues "is what is going to save or kill the Dayton peace agreement."

Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail is available from the Institute's press ($19.95, 1-878379-57-7). Call 1-800-868-8064 or fax 703-661-1501.