Only one short week ago, the prospects that Hassan Rouhani would win the presidency seemed remote. A moderate cleric who had served for 16 years as secretary of the National Security Council and three years as Iran’s lead negotiator on the nuclear file, he was booted out of this position in 2005 by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his erstwhile allies in the security establishment and the Office of the Leader (Rahbar).

Tehran satellite
Photo: GeoEye satellite image, from Talk Radio News Service

It is clear that this relatively liberal-minded cleric-politician is the very antithesis of the outgoing president.  But whether Rouhani can make a real difference when he assumes office this August remains the key question. Will he be a force for change at home and engagement abroad? Will he reverse years of political repression that came to a head after the contested 2009 presidential elections?

Before addressing these questions, it’s important to note that ultimate power in Iran rests with the Rahbar or Leader, known commonly in the West as the “Supreme Leader.”  A kind of Shiite Pope proclaimed leader by a special clerical council, the Leader possesses nearly unlimited powers that are enshrined in the Constitution. By contrast, the powers of Iran’s president, the only directly elected national figure, are not inconsequential but are far more limited.

This arrangement has always been a recipe for division within the executive. In 1981, Iran’s first president, Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr, fled the country after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini set about to impeach him.  Bani Sadr’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (who became Iran’s Leader in 1989), clashed with Khomeini on several issues, including the role of Islamic law. His successor, Hashemi Rafsanjani, had a good relationship with the Leader, in part because rebuilding Iran’s economy after eight years of war with Iraq demanded unity at the top.

But the 1997 election of Mohammed Khatami, which came as a complete surprise to his fans and detractors alike, greatly magnified tensions between the presidency and the Supreme Leader. After all, Khatami was a genuinely charismatic leader whose capacity to connect with Iranian youth far surpassed the contrived popularity of the Rahbar. Plus, Khatami led a reformist movement that suggested a new age of political openness. 

That age came to a close with the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad and the parallel efforts of the Revolutionary Guards to assume greater political and economic power. Ahmadinejad’s open efforts to establish authority independently of the Supreme Leader and even the Revolutionary Guards elicited Khamenei’s scorn. Viewing this dynamic, some Iran watchers predicted the abolishing of the presidency itself, the complete neutering of the parliament, and the supremacy of a security-Rahbar establishment that hence forth would never suffer the tensions and constant in-fighting of a “twin executive.”

It is in this particular sense that Rouhani’s election is surprising. While we cannot read the minds of Iran’s rulers, several explanations come to mind. First is the hubris that comes with power. With a tight grip on the system, the Leader and allies probably could little fathom a reformist like Rouhani overcoming candidates from the hardline “Principalist” camp. But that camp went into the 2013 elections with no less than three of its representatives competing for the electorate, whereas the reformists suddenly united around Rouhani and reignited political enthusiasm among the all-important Tehran voters.

This brings us to the second – and I would suggest far more elemental -- explanation: despite 10 years of the security establishment’s efforts to consolidate power, Iran’s multifaceted society has persevered. The enduring discourse of human rights, a multi-factional struggle over economic policy, persistent battles over public university education, a bruised but extant parliament that had retained some sense of its own institutional prerogatives, as well fractious debates within a “Green Movement” – all of this suggests that a capacity for political transformation from within the existing institutions of the Islamic Republicremains a real and live option.

It remains to be seen what a sustained transformation from within – as opposed to a full-fledged regime change – will look like. But it is precisely this kind of protracted, difficult and ultimately negotiated transformation that a Rouhani presidency might help advance. His insistence on “inclusion” and “reconciliation” are thus encouraging, even if it will be difficult to achieve, particularly with a security establishment whose leaders expect to reassert their control.

Knowing this, Rouhani must walk a fine line, maintaining credibility among his exuberant followers while not antagonizing hardliners in the Majles, in the Revolutionary Guards, and the Office of the Leader. Khamenei himself will have to decide whether to seek a real entente with Rouhani, or feign doing so while giving the slow green light to the hardliners. This second option may be very tempting. Still, Khamenei may have calculated –even before the election was finished-- that his interests and those of Iran might be well-served by a loyal and moderate cleric president who is ready to reach out to the opposition and even the West.

As for the United States, policymakers would be wise to follow the adage of “do no harm.” In practice, this requires refraining from making public statements that will inevitably be construed as interference in Iran’s internal politics. Such statements usually weaken the position of Iranian leaders most interested in engaging the U.S.

On the nuclear issue, Washington and its allies should resume efforts to reach a deal, once the new Iranian government is in place.  Pursuing this goal will be difficult for many reasons, including the simple fact that the nuclear file rests with the Supreme Leader. Thus, progress on the nuclear issue will partly hinge on the ability of Rouhani and Khamenei to find common ground. Yet, even if they do, the U.S. and its allies should not expect Iran to suddenly soften its basic positions or relinquish on what Tehran views as Iran’s basic rights. On the contrary, Rouhani will be under enormous pressure to show that his new government is not yielding to the U.S.  Still, Iran’s hardliners have used the ongoing conflict with the U.S. to sustain their grip on power. And that is one good reason to revive diplomatic efforts to transcend 30-plus years of conflict.

Daniel Brumberg is a senior adviser at USIP. He co-chairs the Iran Study Group of a dozen scholars conducting research and analysis on the complex internal dynamics and developments in Iran.

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