Institute Newsbyte examines regional issues, interests, and how Iraq's neighbors regard the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts within Iraq.

WASHINGTON—American-led reconstruction efforts in Iraq have intensified, but the current focus on internal issues neglects the important role Iraq's neighbors will play in determining the ultimate success and stability of postwar Iraq. Neighboring governments in Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have complex interests at stake in Iraq and varied concerns about the U.S. military presence.

The United States faces a two-pronged political challenge in Iraq: not only creating a new democratic government, but overturning a longstanding domestic balance of power between various ethnic and sectarian groups. In order to succeed at the latter challenge, America must attend to the views of Iraq's neighbors, who might use this interim period to press their advantages or protect their interests by fomenting discord among Iraq's diverse groups or by lending support to one or another faction.

Over the past several months, the U.S. Institute of Peace has held a series of informal meetings with expert analysts and diplomats from the countries bordering Iraq. The aim of these meetings was to understand regional issues and interests in Iraq, and how Iraq's neighbors regard the U.S. presence in Iraq and U.S.-led reconstruction efforts there. The views summarized below reflect the findings drawn from these meetings.

The views summarized below reflect the discussion at the meeting; they do not represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

 

Neighbors to U.S.: Don't Stay Too Long—But Don't Leave Too Soon

While each of Iraq's neighbors has its own interests in Iraq (summarized below), all are concerned about the U.S. military presence in Iraq and would prefer that it not be prolonged. This view is even stronger among general publics than among elites and governments.

At the same time, there is general recognition that a peremptory American withdrawal before a stable interim Iraqi authority is in place would be disastrous, not only for Iraq, but for the region as a whole. Moreover, given Iraq's history of tensions with its neighbors, and the parochial agendas each of the neighbors has pursued in the country, there is little question that an American-British occupation is more acceptable and less humiliating to Iraqis today than would be an administration run by Arabs or other Muslims.

 

Identify the Neighbors' Role in Reconstruction

The neighboring states would be more comfortable engaging with an interim Iraqi administration than with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), but each is busily identifying economic opportunities in postwar Iraq and seeking multilateral cover for engagement with a still-occupied Iraq. Concerns over potential meddling by the neighbors has made the United States hesitant to plan how these states could put their varied interests in Iraq to good use in the stabilization and reconstruction effort. But the CPA should exploit opportunities for constructive engagement. All the neighbors, for example, have strong interests in Iraq's territorial integrity, and their efforts can be harnessed to promote the success of intra-Iraqi negotiations on this delicate but crucial issue.

Recommendations:

  • The United States and the United Kingdom should intensify their engagement with Iraq's neighbors on reconstruction as well as long-term security concerns;
  • The new Iraqi Governing Council, which holds the authority to appoint ambassadors, should immediately establish communications with Iraq's neighbors;
  • The Coalition Provisional Authority should encourage and facilitate positive contributions by Iraq's neighbors to the reconstruction process;
  • The CPA should communicate clearly with neighboring governments regarding plans for Iraq's future military forces and security policies.

Turkey

Turkey's overwhelming concern in Iraq continues to be the status of Iraq's Kurds. Turkey has consistently opposed strong autonomy for a Kurdish area within Iraq, for fear that it would create unrest and independence aspirations among Turkey's own Kurdish population.

Both the Turkish military and the Turkish government wish to see the American military presence in Iraq diminished as quickly as possible, but for different reasons. The Turkish military is bearing the brunt of American ire for the lack of cooperation prior to and during the war. The military has responded to this breakdown in relations with the Americans by reasserting its traditionally fierce opposition to any Kurdish autonomy and by supporting the Iraqi Turkmen Front. The Turkish government, for its part, is less threatened by Kurdish autonomy because it has cultivated some support among Turkish Kurds in the Southeast. But the government is deeply uncomfortable with the presence of American troops in a Muslim state.

Despite the tension in U.S.-Turkish ties, and the resulting exclusion of Turkey from reconstruction efforts in the immediate postwar period, Turkey nevertheless stands to benefit greatly from a healthy and stable Iraq. The U.S. government has now requested that Turkey deploy some of its peacekeeping troops, who have proven their worth in the Balkans and Afghanistan, into Iraq. Turkey is mulling the request; the location of those troops, however, will be politically sensitive.

 

Iran

Iran took important steps to avoid hampering the coalition's efforts during the war, seeing Saddam Hussein's removal as a significant improvement in their regional position. But Iran's ruling establishment worries about a longer-term U.S. presence, fearing encirclement by an America that seeks an end to the Islamic Republic's theocratic regime.

Relations with the United States heavily shape Iranian actions with regard to Iraq. The ruling elites can be grouped into three broad categories:

  • Pragmatists, led by Expediency Council chairman and former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, want to ensure that the Shi'a rights in Iraq are well protected, that the refugees previously expelled from Iraq can go back to their homes, and that Iraq does not emerge later as a security threat for its neighbor to the east;
  • Reformers, led by President Mohammed Khatami, are eager to use Iran's influence in Iraq as leverage to advance Tehran's strained relations with Washington;
  • Radical conservatives are convinced that the U.S. seeks a regime change in Tehran and see Iraq as a theater in which to stymie U.S. ambitions.

Iran prefers to see a majoritarian democracy in Iraq, partly to ensure Shi'a dominance and partly to ensure that Iraq's central government will be weak and fractious, leaving Baghdad little energy to pursue international adventures. At the same time, Tehran seeks to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, because the substantial Kurdish population in Iran suggests the potential for similar irredentist demands there.

While some in Tehran might see postwar Iraq as presenting opportunities for spreading the Islamic revolution, this is not a widely held aspiration nor a likely scenario, since the Iraqi Shi'a are subject to multiple competing influences. There is also some concern that the reemergence of Shi'a theological centers in Iraq that are independent of Iranian influence might give shelter to dissident Iranian clerics and ultimately weaken the Islamic Republic.

 

Saudi Arabia

Saudis view Iraq as part of the Muslim 'umma (community) as well as part of the Arab heartland, and thus they want the country to be managed by Arabs, not Americans. Saudis also fear that the U.S. military presence in Iraq will have the effect of strengthening radical Islamist forces throughout the Middle East, including those inside the kingdom. Therefore, the Saudis wish to see the American role in Iraq shortened and no permanent American military presence there.

In the longer term, the kingdom wants to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity, it wants Iraq to remain within OPEC (where it will be harder for Baghdad to challenge Riyadh's dominance of oil pricing), and it wants to limit Shi'a dominance within Iraq and any potential Iraqi Shi'a influence over Shi'a within the kingdom. The Saudis fear a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq will make achievement of these objectives more difficult. Riyadh has stockpiled funds so as to be able to tide itself over if an oil price war is needed to force the coalition authorities to allow Iraq back into OPEC or to compel cooperative behavior by a new Iraqi government. Saudi Arabia will likewise resist privatization of the Iraqi oil sector and will seek contracts for Saudi companies in its reconstruction.

Saudi Arabia has significant capacity to aid in Iraqi reconstruction, whether in the petroleum or other sectors. In addition, Saudi-Iraqi trade in processed foods and consumer goods was high before the war, and Saudi Arabia would like to resume its profitable exports to Iraq as soon as possible.

 

Syria

Syria is concerned that the American invasion of Iraq will lead to a near-permanent U.S. troop presence there and the formation of a puppet Iraqi government that would shun Syria. Syria also fears that the U.S. presence will strengthen radical Islamist forces (it has waged its own battles against domestic Islamist opponents), and some Syrian reformists further see the invasion as setting back the possibilities for democratization in the region. This camp notes that the United States found Arab support for the Iraq war only among non-democratic regimes, whereas those Arab regimes that are more sensitive to public opinion staunchly opposed the war. They argue that only empowered Arab peoples can successfully resist foreign intervention such as took place in Iraq.

Damascus would welcome a democratic government in Baghdad, because it believes such a government would resist U.S. pressures and would establish close ties with Syria, Jordan, and Turkey (Syria views these states as forming a secular/progressive axis among Iraq's neighbors).

While historically Baghdad and Damascus had tense relations, economic ties had grown over the past several years. Syria will exploit existing business ties in seeking pragmatic political and economic advantages in postwar Iraq. First among these would be a new oil pipeline. However, Syria will find it difficult to do business with the coalition authorities and would more eagerly engage with an Iraqi interim authority.

 

Jordan

Jordan's economy depends heavily on trade relations with Iraq, and Jordan thus seeks an active role in reconstruction of Iraq. Even as political relations declined over the past decade, economic ties remained strong. Jordan can offer help in information technology, reconstitution of the legal system, medical training, and humanitarian assistance. Jordan's strong ties and solid business relationships with the Iraqi private sector place it in an advantageous position in this respect.

Jordan would like to see the coalition open the door to Arab participation in reconstruction, and believes that bringing the region's states into the reconstruction process is the best means of preventing them from interfering in less productive ways in Iraqi politics. It also views Arab involvement as a useful way of bridging the gap between postwar stabilization and the establishment of a credible Iraqi government.

Jordan would like to see an interim Iraqi authority as soon as possible, one dominated by internal figures and not by outside opposition groups who, Amman believes, have little support within Iraq (particularly Ahmed Chalabi). It would also like to see Arab states bestow legitimacy on this government. Islamists will unquestionably emerge as an important political factor in Iraq. Jordan believes that the coalition should accept this as inevitable and manageable in a democratic context. The Jordanian example of working with Islamist groups, they argue, sets a good precedent.

Jordanians, like many others in the region, regard the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as strongly connected to the situation in Iraq, mainly as an indicator of American intentions (whether the war and reconstruction are really meant to further Israeli interests). If the peace process goes well, the transition in Iraq will advance more rapidly. If the peace process goes badly, the situation in Iraq will become more difficult to manage.

 

Kuwait

Kuwait's concerns center on economics and security. Kuwaiti firms are already gearing up to exploit trade opportunities and want to participate in developing Iraq's oil sector. The Kuwaiti government and Kuwaiti companies still claim at least $69 billion in compensation is owed them from Iraq's 1990 invasion and occupation, and Iraq's regular debt to Kuwait is an additional $17 billion. But any prospective payments to Kuwait will rely on the swift and successful rebuilding of the Iraqi economy. Kuwait also remains concerned about Iraq's potential to reemerge as a regional power and expects close American attention to the size and structure of Iraq's new military.

This Newsbyte was prepared by Ylber Bajraktari, Daniel Serwer, and Tamara Cofman Wittes. For more information on USIP's Iraq and its Neighbors program, please see: www.usip.org/iraq/neighbors/. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

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