Muslim World E-Bulletin

January 2005

Elections in Zones of Conflict

Perspectives on Palestinian Elections
Scott B. Lasensky, United States Institute of Peace*

*Dr. Scott Lasensky, of the Institute's Research and Studies program, just returned from monitoring the Palestinian presidential elections. As an official delegate with the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center observer mission, Lasensky spent six days meeting with electoral officials, candidates, local observers, party officials, and members of Palestinian civil society. "The election was contested vigorously and administered fairly," the delegation said in a statement released January 10.

On election day, Lasensky was deployed to the Salfit district in the West Bank and visited 15 polling centers in 12 towns and villages. The delegation, co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter, former Governor Christine Todd Whitman and former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, was supported by a grant from USAID.

Initially, Abu Mazen's election as president of the Palestinian Authority was met with exuberance in all corners, including in Israel. It was as if outside observers expected this one event would lift Palestinians out of the spiral of poverty and violence that has stricken their society for the last four years and simultaneously re-ignite the peace process. Then, within days, renewed violence, recriminations from Israel, and accusations of electoral fraud turned much of this exuberance to dismay. Although Israelis and Palestinians may appear to be falling back into familiar patterns, don't be fooled. The equation has changed -- and for the better. This election was significant, not because it heralded immediate change, but because it was an unambiguous step forward down a long road of reform, recovery and renewed peace efforts. Although the news of the day may be ugly, let me suggest five reasons for hope and optimism.

First, Palestinians have taken a major step toward creating a political society where opposition voices flourish under democratic institutions. Not only did a quarter of all voters cast ballots for non-Fateh candidates, but local election observers from a variety of opposition parties were on hand at virtually every polling station I visited. Considering the current environment of intimidation and fear in the territories, it takes real courage for Palestinians to stand up and demonstrate publicly that they did not support the ruling establishment. Democracy without freedom, as crippling as that formula would be in any other setting, did not dissuade 1.2 million Palestinians from going to the polls. "Use it, or lose it," a poll worker in Deir Istiya told me.

Second, women played a critical role in this campaign, which could portend positive change throughout Palestinian society - and perhaps in neighboring Arab countries as well. Granted, all the presidential candidates were men - as were the senior electoral and party officials. But everything is relative, Palestine is not Sweden. At every polling center I visited, women served as directors, poll workers, and observers. Other delegates on my mission had similar stories to tell. Moreover, women did run in the December municipal balloting, and will likely run in the upcoming elections.

Third, Palestinians demonstrated a high level of professionalism and competence at every level. When traveling throughout the Salfit district, my partner (a former assistant registrar of voters in Los Angeles County) was deeply impressed by the careful planning, adherence to transparent procedures and general scrupulosity we witnessed.

Were these elections without irregularities? Certainly not, just ask the four dozen or so Central Election Commission officials who resigned last week. It is hard to understand why the PA and Fateh sought to intervene when Abu Mazen's margin was so great. But what is not hard to discern is that Palestinians have a formidable cadre of electoral professionals - a cadre confident enough to speak truth to power. When Israelis and Palestinians turn a corner, and renew peace negotiations, this cadre will be critical to sustaining the public institutions necessary for any lasting settlement.

Fourth, Arafat's long, heavy shadow is beginning to recede. It will take years, but the process has begun. It is unmistakable. Witness the opposition candidates. Witness the resignation of CEC officials. Witness the diverse slates that ran in the first round of municipal elections. Witness Abu Mazen's outstretched arm to Israel. Witness the young guard leaders eager to jump into the fray when legislative elections come around in July. Arafat's legacy will not be easy for the new leadership to escape, especially vis-à-vis the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians. But as the ferment and free-spirited debate of today gathers more steam, Arafat's chokehold on the Palestinian national movement will fade.

Fifth, I come away with renewed optimism that Israel will prevail - not over Palestinians, but over its own internal divides. Ariel Sharon's new government, even more than his previous one, is being challenged by the most strident pro-settlement elements in Israeli politics. These forces, despite their tiny numbers, have a proven capacity to bend Israeli politics to their will. As Sharon pushes ahead with his "disengagement" plan, a confrontation at home looms. First and foremost, a strategy of greater positive engagement is critical. (Bridging this internal Israeli divide is a subject the Institute is already working on, in partnership with the Project of Negotiation at Harvard Law School.) But engagement is only part of the equation. The Israeli state also needs to be assertive, as Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz was last week when he acted swiftly against a small group of IDF officers who announced their support for refusing orders to evacuate settlements. On this issue, Israelis stand with Mofaz, not the settlers.

I witnessed this tension up close. When trying to pass a checkpoint near Ariel, the largest Israeli settlement, my team was blocked by security guards from the settlement. They declared that no one would pass. An IDF unit soon arrived on the scene. The ranking officer reminded the settlers -- in no uncertain terms - that the army was the highest authority. Despite the settlers' protestations, the IDF unit facilitated our passage and escorted us to the nearby Palestinian village where we were headed. This is but one small, isolated incident. But it left me with a measure of more confidence that the Israeli state, and not the settlers, would have the last word as we move into this period of renewed hope.

It is difficult to over-emphasize the tremendous internal challenges facing both Israelis and Palestinians. These internal divides need to be addressed judiciously, but also with steely determination if the current window of opportunity is to remain open.

What do the Palestinian Elections Really Signify?
Amaney Jamal, Princeton University

The Palestinian elections, held on January 9, 2005, signify a historical moment to many observers. Within a six week window, two consecutive Palestinian elections—one at the municipal level, the other for the presidency—were held democratically and fairly. The transition of power from Arafat to Abbas was handled peacefully, and it was bounded by the rule of law. The elections were a momentous occasion for Palestinians and observers alike, and they demonstrate, to the outside world, that after four years of Intifada, most Palestinians are still committed to democratic ideals and processes. They also illustrate Palestinian aspirations for national unity in the face of arduous negotiations with Israel. The rank and file of Fateh backed Abbas’ candidacy, while Marwan al-Barghouthi withdrew his candidacy to bolster Palestinian national unity.

Nevertheless, as Palestinians lined up at polls, it was clear that they were practicing democracy in anything but a state. Under the continuing Israeli occupation, Palestinians exerted their democratic will for hope of improvement in their daily lives. As one Palestinian put it, “Voting is good, but freedom is better.” In interviews with al-Jazeera, Palestinians leaving polling booths expressed their optimism for the new period ahead, hoping that it will bring them a new era, an end to the ongoing violence, and movement towards peace as well as improvements in their daily living standards. The Palestinian vote of January 9th was not only a procedural democratic ritual; for Palestinians, the vote was about the desire for change and progress. “It was about hope,” said a leading Palestinian scholar.

The outcome was declared a decisive victory for Abbas, but in actuality he only won 62% of the vote, with only a 50% voter turnout rate. His major opponent, Mustafa al-Barghouthi, received 20% of the vote running as an independent without the support of a major party. The Islamists boycotted the election, so their actual electoral numbers did not factor in the electoral outcome. However, in the municipal elections, Hamas received 35% of the votes, making it a major political contender. If anything, Abbas’ “decisive” victory is precarious at best; not enjoying Arafat’s stature, he will attempt to rely more on consultation and careful navigation within the Palestinian scene. He will try to keep the many skeptics on board. He walks on extremely fragile ground. Abbas needs not only to improve Palestinian daily conditions, but also make progress on the peace front and address domestic problems like corruption within the ranks of the PA. Furthermore, Abbas will be looking ahead to the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, to be held in July of 2005. Hamas has expressed a willingness to run in these elections—and if Abbas is seen as inept during the next six months, Hamas will surely benefit.

Yet, in the weeks leading to the Palestinian elections, support for Hamas fell by 20 percentage points—as support for Fateh and Abbas increased. Abbas’ pragmatism, and his calls for an end to violence have resonated positively among Palestinians who have suffered through four years of Intifada. But to address the concerns and needs of his constituencies, Abbas must deliver. He must immediately improve their dire economic conditions and move the Palestinians towards their dreams of statehood. Without an end of the occupation, these two goals cannot be accomplished. Therefore, in many ways, Palestinians have elected Abbas to deliver certain goods that only Israel can offer. In some sense, then, Palestinians are speaking to Israelis with their ballots. If Abbas can not deliver, Palestinians will vote again, and they will demonstrate—again—that they are democratic. The hope is that democratic and moderate contenders will remain viable political choices for the Palestinian electorate. If moderate leaders are seen as incompetent, Palestinians will also lose faith in moderate strategies to resolve the conflict.

Thus, Abbas is in need of quick fixes to a dismal situation. To help rebuild the Palestinian economic infrastructure, Abbas is in desperate need of monetary resources from international actors. Additionally, he needs Israel to facilitate Palestinian movement within the West Bank in order to revitalize the Palestinian economy. Today, there are over 700 Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, all of which prevent Palestinians from moving between their own cities and towns and leave Palestinians confined to their immediate vicinities. Any failure to deliver on Abbas’ part is an immediate success for his opponents. There is an extremely brief window of opportunity here, and all sides should embrace it. Relevant parties should build on the successes of Oslo and not simply lament about the failures of the past decade. Oslo created a framework for mutual existence for both Israelis and Palestinians. It also produced the Camp David summit and subsequent meetings where Palestinians and Israelis came closer than ever to a final status agreement, with two states living side by side. In this new era, more should be done to build on the successes of Oslo.

Yet, less than one day after Abbas’ inauguration, a new wave of violence has overshadowed the electoral accomplishments in Gaza. Less than one day after Abbas’ inauguration, Sharon has declared that he will sever all ties to Abbas. Without dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, there will be no movement towards peace. In office less than a day, Abbas has been asked to take care of Palestinian insurgency without the necessary infrastructure and security to do so. In a monumental historic response, the PLO announced that it was calling for the cessation of violence against Israelis everywhere. Whether world leaders and Israel will aid the Palestinians in achieving their goals and aspirations is yet to be seen. Certainly, Abbas will not be able accomplish the numerous and tedious tasks alone without the help and support from the international community and Israel. 

The Palestinian elections produced a democratically elected leader, but the elections in and of themselves will not accomplish the larger goals of the Palestinian people. If the elections represent anything, they signal to the world that the Palestinians want peace and not war. Abbas won the elections on a platform of peace and a call to end violence against Israel. The Palestinians have rallied behind him. And now movements towards peace require Israeli reciprocity and determination. Palestinians and Israelis committed to peace are on the same side of the “wall.” Not the physical wall that divides the West Bank, but in the same camp, fighting the same battle, and hoping for a better future for their children and loved ones.

Iraqi Elections: What is at Stake?
Phebe Marr, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace

Enormous attention has been focused on the forthcoming elections in Iraq, creating expectations—both good and bad—that are unrealistic. Elections are a process, not an end in themselves. The forthcoming Iraqi poll will not solve the problem of governmental “legitimacy”, as is often claimed; nor will it end the insurgency, though it may help in both tasks. To understand the elections and their significance for Iraq and the region, they must be set in the context of the monumental transformation that Iraq is undergoing and implications of that transformation for the region.

The chief problem with the election, as is well known, is the virulent and growing insurgency, concentrated in key Arab sunni areas, which will prevent many sunnis (some 15 to 20 percent of the population) from voting. As a result, sunnis are likely to be underrepresented in the new parliament which is to draw up a permanent constitution.

Unfortunately, there are few good options to remedy this situation. If the security situation could be improved in some reasonable time frame, postponement would be worthwhile, but there is little evidence that a few months will accomplish that aim. Disruption of elections is the clear goal of the insurgents. A postponement risks giving them a psychological boost, but more important, there is no evidence that they will not escalate attacks again as soon as the new election cycle begins.

In the present political environment, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis—the Kurds in the north (17-20% of the population) and the shi’ah in Baghdad and the south (some 60 %) are likely to vote because both have political agendas they wish to accomplish. Their political and religious leaders have exercised remarkable discipline over dissidents and potential violence in their own community and developed effective organizations for participation. If most of their constituents go to the polls, they would constitute some 70 to 80 percent of the Iraqi population. While both of these communities have serious disagreements with each other and concerns over their place in a future Iraq, they have chosen the ballot box, not violence, as the means to meet their desires. That decision should be rewarded, not discouraged.

The Sunni Problem

What to do about the underrepresented sunnis? Many—possibly most—sunnis do not support the insurgency and a respectable portion might want to participate in the election. Should they wish to do so there will be an array of parties with sunni members to vote for, although most are running on political platforms, not communal identity. (These include the Iraqi List, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, himself a secular shi'ah; the Iraqis, led by President Ghazi al-Yawar; the Movement of Independent Democrats, headed by veteran sunni politician, Adnan Pachachi; the National Democratic Party, headed by Nasir Chadirchi; the Constitutional Monarchy movement led by Shrif Husain bin Ali, and the list goes on).  The problem for these sunnis is that events—most notably the insurgency but also the election itself—is encouraging ethnic and sectarian “identity” politics, with which many sunni candidates do not agree. Whatever distribution of power emerges from the election, sunnis will be left in a minority position, providing them with less incentive to vote. Under these circumstances, it is better to go ahead with the election, and try to make certain that sunni voices are heard, later, during the discussion on the constitution. This will depend on the wisdom and pragmatism of the newly elected majlis, which should have a major stake in courting moderate sunnis, the better to help subdue the insurgency.

Iraq’s Transformation: the Real Issues

Iraq is going through a radical transformation of its social, political and ideological structure. This will be reflected in the composition of the parliament and the deliberations on the constitution. But representation is not everything. The outcome of deliberations will also depend on the moderation and experience of the delegates and their willingness to compromise, a point often forgotten in election coverage.

A number of critical issues are at stake. One is the continued existence of the state itself, called into question by strong separatist tendencies among the Kurds, who have established de facto independence in the north and would like to keep it. If, as is likely, the state maintains its territorial integrity, a highly decentralized political system is likely to emerge, a total innovation in Iraq and the region, and one likely to entail continual political struggles and redistributions of power. Developing a flexible constitutional instrument to allow for peaceful readjustments over time will be critical to peace in the future.

Iraq has also moved further in the direction of  “communal” politics and away from the model of a unified, highly centralized polity. After decades of domination by a sunni minority, Iraq is now likely to be governed by its shi’ah majority, although what that will mean is unclear, since the shi’ah community is diverse. Iraq’s ideological direction is also at stake. The role of religion in the state must also be negotiated. This, too, will be contentious since Iraq has strong secular elements and its Islamic population is divided between shi’ah and sunnis. Last but not least, Iraq’s relations with the outside world, especially the West, is also at issue. It will be years—even decades—before these existential issues can be resolved. Iraq’s elections, while important, must be set in this broader political context.

Interests of the Regional Powers:

Iraq’s transformation—and its election—are also complicated by its intense new involvement with the outside world, and its regional neighbors, all of whom have a huge stake in the outcome. Iraq borders six states, all with different foreign policy orientations and interests that must be accommodated. Most of the neighbors have ties to ethnic and sectarian groups inside Iraq that they can manipulate. This regional environment must be well managed if the transformation is to be peaceful.

All of the neighbors regard Iraq’s transformation with ambivalence and some trepidation. All, however, share some common goals. First among these is the return of a modicum of stability to Iraq. Hence, a government with control over the country and its borders is the first desiderata. Second is keeping Iraq’s territorial integrity intact. A break-up of the state (Yugoslavia)—even a high degree of decentralization and localism (Lebanon)—is anathema to most neighbors, who would view this as the start of the unraveling of the state system imposed on the region at the end of World War I. Third, most want U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq as soon as effective government can be established.  But the election outcome—and more important, the subsequent deliberations on the constitution—will be of intense interest to Iraq’s neighbors. Here is where unanimity ends and differing interests emerge. Of the six neighbors, four will be critical.

Turkey will view the election and the constitutional deliberations almost wholly through the prism of the Kurdish issue. The two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, have organized a strong, unified ticket, which will go into the election as a “Kurdish bloc” designed to achieve Kurdish “national” interests. Chief among these is an expansion of the territory incorporated into the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), to include Kirkuk, Khanaqin and other regions in which Kurds maintain they have a majority, and which they intend to govern almost as a semi-independent entity.  Included in this territory is a substantial Turkman minority, which the Turks are supporting, as an ethnic wedge against Kurdish domination. While Turkey will modify its behavior toward the Kurds in response to EU pressures for admission, there are limits on its tolerance. Turkey will work with the new government in Iraq only as long as it constrains Kurdish separatism; otherwise it can follow destabilization policies in the north.

Iran poses the most intricate balancing act for the Iraqi government and the U.S. As is well known, Iran has strong links with Iraqi shi’ah political parties, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wah (Islamic “Call”).  It also has close ties with religious scholars in Najaf and Karbala, many of whom are of Iranian origin. Many Iraqi shi’ah exiles (possibly over 500,000) have lived in Iran for years, where they may have been influenced by the ideology of the Islamic Republic.  Many of these Iraqis have returned, along with an unknown number of Iranians; they are reportedly buying up land, settling down, and in general, funneling funds to their supporters.

At the moment, the shi’ah in Iraq stand to gain enormously from the election. Shi’ah will undoubtedly win a plurality, and possibly even a majority. Iran has the most to gain from the projected shi’ah majority; hence Iran’s passive acquiescence in events. But if that majority does not fulfill Iran’s expectations or satisfy its interests—or if US policy turns against Iran on other issues, such as WMD-- Iran’s acquiescence could turn to active resistance—using its human assets inside Iraq.

Saudi Arabia faces challenges from several sides in Iraq. While traditionally leading the conservative forces of sunni Islam under the banner of  “Wahhabism”, the Saudis now find this position backfiring. Inside Iraq, a virulent form of sunni extremism, connected with al-Qa’ida, is participating in some of the worst forms of terrorism against the Iraqi population and the multilateral forces. It receives some support from elements in the Kingdom. Worse, these same forces have now turned against the Saudi regime at home. Hence, a growth in the sunni insurgency in Iraq is likely to spill over into Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the most likely outcome of the election—a new shi’ah majority in Iraq with stronger ties to Iran-- also poses challenges for the Saudis. An ascendancy of radical shi’ism (such as that espoused by Muqtada-l-Sadr) or increasing evidence of Iranian influence in Iraq would cause problems. Thus Saudi Arabia must tread warily in the degree of support they give the new Iraq government.

Syria has the most to lose from the election—it has already lost much—and is taking the most ambivalent position on Iraq. Kurdish separatism has already spilled over into Syria causing unrest which had to be put down by force. The emergence of a religiously oriented shi’ah movement in Baghdad, would deeply impact its own secular society. Most important of all, the sunni element in Iraq most supportive of  Syria’s Arab nationalist, anti-Israeli and anti-American posture, is now gone and likely to suffer a greater loss in the election. While Syria does not want Iraqi instability or a break down of the country, neither does it want continued US troops on its border; a successful new regime in Iraq beholden to the US; or an example of popular participation in government. Hence, Syria has an interest in “containing” US influence and the new experiment in Iraq.

All of these complexities indicate that while elections will be a positive step forward, it is best to view them with a sense of realism. The hardest job—resolving fundamental issues and keeping neighbors at bay-- lies ahead. The real question may not be whether shi’ah, sunnis or Kurds are adequately represented in the new assembly, but whether the process has produced some seasoned and realistic politicians willing to forego their maximalist positions and compromise on fundamental issues. In this sense, the raging insurgency may help concentrate their minds.

Commentary on Iraqi Constitution-Building:
Jonathan Morrow, Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace

Creating a Constitution for and by Iraqis: Legitimacy will ride on a vigorous debate among all the populations.

December 14, 2004

Bertolt Brecht, in his famous 1953 poem "The Solution," mocked Soviet powerbrokers as they bemoaned the East German people's lack of faith in their government:

The grim point of the poem, of course, is that imposed political solutions are fanciful at best, and at worst, murderous. And Iraqis are no different from the people of East Germany in 1953 or any other place: Imposed solutions won't work.

Iraqi political problems should be resolved by the Iraqi people. The elections in Iraq scheduled for January will be a start, but no one can expect those elections to magically change the political dynamics of the Sunni insurgency, the legacy of the Muqtada Sadr uprising, Kurdish separatism or women's suffering.

For signs of hope, we must instead look beyond the elections, to next year and the negotiation and drafting of the Iraqi constitution. That will provide the testing ground for the viability and identity of an Iraqi state.

Will Iraq fracture into its ethnic, sectarian and communitarian components? Will it become an Islamic republic? Will the rights of women be protected? Neither the counterinsurgency nor the election results will answer these questions.

Instead, a serious and robust constitution-drafting process is the best hope yet for Iraqis who wish to find common ground and thrash out a real — rather than imposed or stage-managed — accommodation among the country's divergent groups and interests.

What does "serious and robust" mean? First, the Iraqi constitution must be — and be seen to be — decided and drafted by elected Iraqis.

This was flouted last year when the United States announced that an outside expert would write it. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani was prompted to issue ahukum sharii— a religious ruling of greater strength than afatwa— against that idea, mobilizing the majority Shiite population and winning a more representative process.

Second, Iraqis must be given a free choice as to how to structure their state. Iraq's constitutional process will be a crucial test of the nonintervention pledges made by delegates from the Group of 8, the United Nations, the Arab League and others at the Sharm el Sheik conference last month. Outsiders should not, for example, seek to prevent Shiite parties from advancing models for an Islamic republic; nor should outsiders force the Kurds in the north to accept a centralized Iraqi state. This applies not only to the U.S. and Europe but also to Turkey, Iran and other neighboring states.

Third, as the elected members of the National Assembly create a constitutional assembly, they must also devise a means of including ordinary Iraqis throughout the county in the discussion. The international community, and in particular the U.S. and the U.N., must help them fund and organize that effort. Television programming must be devised, town meetings organized and public hearings conducted throughout the country.

Finally, the back and forth of negotiating a constitution should be treated by observers and participants not as divisive and risky but as the best way to bring about peace. In South Africa, Albania and Afghanistan, transparency in drafting a constitution and vigorous public debate and education about its contents built legitimacy and minimized ethnic, racial and sectarian violence.

There are no easy answers to the divisions in Iraqi society, especially the Sunni insurgency. But already some Shiite leaders are proposing regional/federal representation models that might give Sunnis a stake in an Iraqi constitution and give political voice to the large numbers of Sunni moderates. An Iraqi form of federalism may also allow the Kurds to have sufficient autonomy without splitting the larger Iraqi state.

And although the dialogue has already begun in some quarters, it must be extended as far and as fast as possible, even in advance of the January elections. If the drafting timetable outlined by former civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer III holds, the constitution will be written by the end of next summer. It is a very tight time frame that risks excluding all but the elites and their handpicked advisors, when what is required is a constitution supported by Iraqis of all descriptions.

Nor should it be assumed that a delay in elections would buy needed time: Indeed, the electoral boycotts announced by many Sunni Arab parties, the most likely cause for a delay, only underline the fact that a national constitutional dialogue is urgent.

We cannot transform the faith of Iraqis in their leaders by Brecht's ironic expedient of electing another Iraqi people. But we can hope that the Iraqi people, if given an opportunity to speak honestly and openly about their constitution, will transform themselves.

Copyright 2004 Los Angeles Times

Update from the U.S. Institute of Peace Grants Program: Grants related to Muslim World Elections

In recent months, the USIP Grant Program has provided support for a range of programs addressing elections, electoral processes and democratic participation in the Muslim world. 

A USIP grant to Professor Sultan Tepe at the University of Illinois is supporting research examining how the inclusion of Islamic parties in competitive electoral processes in the Muslim world affects the promotion of democracy.   This study probes the relationship between Islamist and secularist institutions, with a particular focus on Turkey.  A grant to Emory University is enabling Professor Carrie Rosefsky Wickham to undertake a comparative study of Islamic opposition groups and leaders in six Middle Eastern countries—Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia and Algeria.  Her research is exploring the kind of political participation that is most likely to trigger “democratic learning” by Islamist opposition leaders and identifies the policies and domestic institutional arrangements that foster the moderation of Islamist rhetoric and practice.   With USIP support, Professor Janine Astrid Clark of the University of Guelph is researching the internal dynamics of Islamist political parties in Jordan and Lebanon.  She is examining the extent to which the parties cooperate with secular forces, including the state and other opposition groups, and the motivation for such cooperation. 

These three grantees will present their findings at a USIP event on April 12, 2005.

Elsewhere in the Muslim world, a number of grants in Iraq have supported the upcoming elections and greater engagement of civil society groups in Iraq’s political process. Most notably, grants have funded dialogues in Sulaymaniya, Baghdad and Irbil on the elections and the concept of federalism. Grants have also supported training workshops for civil society leaders and election candidates to promote political participation and negotiation/mediation skills.  Another grant has provided funding for university-based student debates and e-Bulletins, while a grant to a group of Iraqi jurists has fostered dialogue on reconciliation among Iraq’s diverse ethnic groups.

Finally, a USIP grant to Eric Bjornlund resulted in the recently-published book, Beyond Free and Fair:  Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washington, DC, Baltimore and London:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).  Based on research in a broad range of Muslim and non-Muslim countries, including Indonesia and the Philippines, the volume explores the history and evolution of international and domestic election monitoring and offers insights into how the international community can more successfully advance democracy around the world.

Recent U.S. Institute of Peace Events relating to Muslim World Elections

• Elections in Iraq: What Will January Bring?
  December 2004
• Is Afghanistan Ready for Elections?
  February 2004

Muslim World Experts

The work of the Muslim World Initiative is being coordinated by Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui who joined the Institute in September 2004 as Associate Director of the Research and Studies Program.  Beyond Dr. Maghraoui, the Institute's expertise on the Muslim World is extensive.  Please click here for more information.