February 2005
Focus on Saudi Arabia
Muslim Youth in Europe: Addressing Alienation and Extremism
Event held in Wilton Park, February 7-10, 2005
From Hamburg, where a terrorist cell prepared the 9/11 attacks, to Madrid, where seven commuter trains were blown up, to Amsterdam, where filmmaker Theo van Gogh was shot dead, Europe has emerged as a major battleground in the war on terror. These attacks have shattered the illusion of Muslims’ integration in Europe. They have rekindled the debate between advocates of multiculturalism and proponents of assimilation. To explore why young Muslims in Europe might join extremist groups, the Muslim World Initiative and Wilton Park co-sponsored a conference on “Muslim Youth in Europe: Addressing Alienation and Extremism,” February 7-10, 2005. This report summarizes the main themes and findings of the meeting.
Muslim community leaders, counter-terrorism experts, and independent scholars attended the conference. Three major themes dominated the presentations and discussions: 1) Cultural identity and alienation, 2) The process of transition from extremism to violence, and 3) Policies of integration or assimilation.
Cultural Identity and Alienation
At the core of the identity debate is whether Muslim youth can be both fully Muslim and fully integrated European citizens. Three main ideas emerged from this session. First, being a Muslim and a citizen are not only compatible but also mutually reinforcing. The emergence of a European identity that transcends narrow nationalist considerations may provide the best political and cultural framework to reduce the problem of alienation among Muslim youth. Rather than forced cultural assimilation, the building of a European identity would go hand in hand with the construction of a European Islamic discourse. Only through a familiar and coherent cultural order can Muslim youth forge a “confident personality,” articulate common interests, and develop a sense of civic responsibility.
Second, mutual negative perceptions are worsening and deepening the divide in Europe. In addition to problems associated with youthrebellion against authority, crisis of identity, uncertain future Muslim youth are socially disadvantaged and subjected to daily instances of Islamophia and media stereotyping. Suspicion, fear, cultural differences, and the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe constitute serious obstacles to forging a Muslim-European identity. Much of the current unease among native Europeans has to do with the fear of terrorism and the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism.
Third, to overcome these problems Muslim communities and European states will have to act in partnership. Muslim youth and leaders must engage in inter-community dialogues, foster good relations with the wider European society, take a stand against violence, accept the principle of cultural diversity, and dispel attitudes of essentialism, victimization, and social isolation. For their part, European states need to encourage political participation, penalize prejudice and discrimination, enforce equality before the law, guarantee citizenship rights, and educate Europeans about Islamic history and civilization. It is generally agreed that a sense of belonging is slowly emerging through civic activities in European societies where multicultural interactions is a fact of life.
Transition from Extremism to Violence
Scholars, Muslim community leaders, and counter-terrorism experts disagree on why and how some individuals become extremists and what pushes them to act on their beliefs.
Some point to unscrupulous terrorist leaders who exploit social and political grievances and feelings of humiliation and alienation among youth. To recruit and indoctrinate operatives, terrorist leaders resort to a variety of manipulation “techniques.” They may use international and inter-religious conflicts, promise divine rewards, exploit spiritual and material needs, and even exert physical and psychological pressure. Arguments that highlight the role of “inspirational” leaders and the vulnerability of youth view the organizational structure of terrorist groups as key to understanding transition form extremist ideas to acts of violence and martyrdom. Although terrorist organizations may vary in size and management style, they are run like any NGO with an appealing mission statement and a consideration for funding and competition.
Other scholars advise against putting too much focus on leaders and organizations because such claims are empirically questionable. They may stigmatize entire communities resulting in ineffective anti-terror policies. These scholars put forward a more complex process where recruitment, radicalization, and passage to violence follow unexpected patterns. Sociological research on Muslim youth in France suggests three types of recruitment and radicalization taking place simultaneously: i) within the Muslim community which would include mosques, official Islamic cultural centers, and community networks of social support; ii) outside the Muslim community such as the prison system, circles of friends, and various secret prayer places; iii) within “neo-communities” such as cyber cafes, chat rooms, and web sites on the internet. Three main ideas emerged from this discussion: first, the media and counter-terrorism experts use the “Muslim community” concept too loosely and sloppily. Coherent, tight Muslim communities are in fact difficult to find, and more often than not are organized along ethnic and nationalist lines rather than doctrinal affiliation. Hence, one can speak of Turkish, Moroccan, or Pakistani mosques but hardly of radical, moderate, or Hannafi mosques. Second, radicalization and recruitment within the few tightly established Muslim communities is rare to find. The major sources of recruitment have been “neo-communities” outside community networks. Finally, there has been no documented, discernible pattern on the transition from verbal radicalization to acts of violence. While verbal radicalization in public mosques may be common, the next step to violence is very rare.
Muslim community leaders and European counter-terrorism officers also highlight the estrangement between terrorist networks and established Muslim communities in Europe.
Community leaders expose the myth that masjids are primary centers of recruitment and radicalization through four arguments:
- Proven cases of recruitment within known community mosques have been very rare and exceptional.
- Ideological and doctrinal differences among Imams are so vast that it is hard to make any generalizations about their role.
- Real contact between youth and Imams outside of prayer time is actually rare and can hardly match the influence of the media or other sources of information.
- Access to the terrorists’ favored battlegrounds – such as Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir, or Chechnya – is easy and does not require shadowy intermediaries. Altogether, these arguments raise doubts about the connection between terrorism and community networks such as mosques, charities, and social support groups. Focus on Muslim communities in Europe as breeding grounds for global jihad can be very misleading.
European counter-terrorism officers go further to suggest that the war on terror is being lost because of a serious problem of misperceptions. As one officer put it, because of stereotyping, media exposure, cultural differences, and mutual suspicion, “what we think we see is not necessarily the reality.” The police may focus on a group because of their physical appearances, fundamentalist views, or radical criticism of foreign policy. Yet, they may overlook the real threat that remains unseen and undefined. Addressing the misperceptions problem and building trust with Muslim community leaders are essential to win the war against terror.
Integration/Assimilation Policies
The central challenge facing community leaders, civic associations, and public authorities in Europe is how to provide Muslim youth with a sense of social cohesion and increase their awareness of society’s fundamental values. Three major areas of state intervention, in coordination with Muslim communities, were identified:
- Social empowerment. Alleviate everyday social problems associated with poverty, unemployment, bad schools and housing, drugs and petty crimes, and street violence. Many considered social empowerment a necessary condition for building youth self-confidence, self-respect, and integration within society at large. But sharing European societies’ social benefits and opportunities must go in hand with self-responsibility.
- Political empowerment. Increasing information about the possibilities and benefits of political participation though civic education, political mobilization, Muslim role models, and direct contacts with different levels of government. Muslim youth must also accept the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-ideological make up of European democratic societies and polities.
- Cultural empowerment. Public recognition and respect of the Muslim community’s cultural values and ethical appeal provides Muslim youth with a cultural frame of reference to build a meaningful life beyond material pursuit and political ambition. But the recognition of specific cultural traditions does not mean living under a different set of rules and laws. Quite the opposite; special effort should be made to educate young Muslim girls, enhance the role of women, and make sure that the family does not become an impediment to emancipation and integration.

Muslim World Experts
The work of the Muslim World Initiative is being coordinated by Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui who joined the Institute in September 2004 as Associate Director of the Research and Studies Program. Beyond Dr. Maghraoui, the Institute's expertise on the Muslim World is extensive. Please click here for more information.