February 2005
Focus on Saudi Arabia
Update August 2005: The death of King Fahd bin Abdel Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia recently is likely to unleash an internal struggle for power within the royal family. The inner circles and workings of the Saudi royal family remain opaque and closed to outsiders. Behind the quiet and carefully planned succession, a number of struggles loom ahead. A major contentious issue with enormous implications for U.S. strategic interests and policies in the region is the pace of political, social, and educational reforms in Saudi Arabia.
Introduction
In his State of the Union address, President Bush called on Saudi Arabia to expand the role of its people to determine their future. But the House of Saud, the informal name given to the ruling royal family, long considered a haven of political stability and a lucrative source for oil and military sales, may not survive reforms. Saudi Arabia was also a major ideological pillar in the United States’ fight against Arab nationalism and communism in the region. Has the country’s value diminished in U.S. overall strategy in the Middle East?
Preliminary research on Saudi Arabia, as a part of our series of studies on “Pivotal States of the Muslim World,” suggests that the country’s sources of instability are multiple and varied. Since September 11, 2001, a series of terrorist attacks, stirred if not directly guided by Osama bin Laden, have exposed the extremists’ large ideological influence and social implantation in Saudi society. Whether Iraq plunges into civil war or whether it emerges as a Shi’ite dominated democracy is likely to affect negatively the Sunni Saudi ruling family. Internal pressures by disenfranchised women, neglected tribes, excluded Shi’a, angry youths, and reformist elites are dividing an otherwise cohesive and loyalty driven royal family. General fear of instability associated with political reform and social modernization is intimidating the liberals and emboldening the conservatives within the royal family. Lastly, despite immense wealth, Saudi Arabia suffers from serious economic and social problems: in this country of 22 million, 75% of the population is under 21 and 20% of the active workforce is unemployed.
Should Saudi Arabia’s timid attempts at reforms advance or falter will have consequences of global importance. What is at stake is not only the constancy of oil prices and production but the stability of the Muslim world. The kingdom is the largest exporter of petroleum and has 25% of the world’s proven reserves. Yet, half of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are concentrated in eight fields that remain vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist attacks. Destruction of the complex web of these concentrated pipelines may interrupt the flow of oil by months if not years. Equally important, Saudi Arabia is the home of Islam’s most scared sanctuaries, Mecca where the Prophet Muhammad was born, and Medina where he was buried in 623 AD. Hundreds of millions of Muslims pray five times a day toward Mecca to express tangible commitment to the faith. The symbolic power of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world cannot be overstated.
2005 Municipal Elections in Saudi Arabia: Democratization or Pretense
Jean-Francois Seznec, Columbia University
(Jean-Francois Seznec is contributing a chapter on Saudi politics in an Institute Muslim World Initiative study on "Political Authority in Contemporary Muslim Societies.")
In January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz announced that Arab states should include their own population in the management of their affairs. At the time, this idea was seen as a momentous reform in Saudi society and many Saudis came to expect elections to the Majlis as-Shura, the appointed parliament. At the time, Prince Abdullah may have meant to have a real election to Parliament. However, an al-Qaeda inspired uprising led the al-Saud family to firm up the old alliance with their political allies and ideological guides since 1744, the Salafis. The Saudi Salafis have an absolutist view of religion and morality. Any political change that could question their stronghold on society, such as popular elections, could undermine their power and authority. Hence, they do not support a liberalization of which elections are part and parcel. It is not surprising that the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef, a royal champion of Salafi causes, cracked down on the liberalization efforts. Societal reforms were placed on the back burner but the Salafis-al-Saud unity was preserved. A series of elections will take place in Saudi Arabia on February 10, 2005 (the Riyadh region), March 3 (the Eastern provinces), and April 21 (the rest of the Kingdom). However, the elections will be for only half of the members of the newly established 178 municipal councils, a far cry from elections to a national, legislative institution with meaningful powers.
That Saudis have now the opportunity to chose any kind of government is an important step in Saudi Arabia. But the upcoming municipal elections came as a major disappointment to many who have demanded that the royal family allow more public participation in the political process. In 2002 and 2003, voices demanding liberalization of the political system were increasingly heard. The press became quite vocal and full of articles and editorials debating the arch conservative culture imposed by the Salafis in the kingdom. The extra judicial power of the religious police, the Mutawa’in, was increasingly questioned. The treatment of women as second class citizens was actively discussed. The Crown Prince organized dialogues between conservatives and liberals on religion in society, on the role of the youth, and on the rights of women. For the first time, the Saudi leadership admitted that Shi’a and non Wahhabi Sunnis actually existed, were citizens and fellow Muslims. The Shi’a were allowed to present petitions to the Crown Prince asking for equal treatment under Saudi law. Saudi “liberals,” those men and women who support power sharing and a more open society, also wrote numerous petitions to the Crown Prince asking among many things for more participation of the people in the political process, elections to the appointed Majlis as-Shura, an end to corruption, and an independent judiciary system. This was another way to demand an end to royal family privileges. Many princes were heard actually agreeing with these petitions. In fact, the two major press groups in the country are owned by Prince Salman bin Abdel-Aziz, the governor of Riyadh, and by the al-Faysal clan. Since these two press groups were very vocal in favor of liberalization, one can assume that these two major princely groups were supporting it. At the time, people felt free to debate openly all subjects.
The Crown Prince, with the support of major royal clans, seemed to favor reform. For example, he presented a charter for increased popular political participation in January 2003, saying that women should participate in society and presenting the opinion that Muslims can have diverging views on Islam. Countering these views, Prince Nayef, the Minister of Interior, often praised the Salafis’ contribution to society and Islam. After stinging newspaper editorials against the Salafis, accused of encouraging Jihad against the West and the royal family, Prince Nayef dismissed two editors. In March 2004, he ordered the arrest of thirteen leading liberal intellectuals and clerics. He demanded that they apologize and renounce all political activities. Three of them refused and are still in jail awaiting trial for sedition. These arrests brought an end to the atmosphere of reform.
When extremists inspired by al-Qaeda started to wage war against the Saudi state during 2003-2004, Prince Nayef, as Minister of Interior, set further limits on the liberalization efforts. Prince Abdullah’s national dialogues became very stilted affairs. In particular, the dialogue on women in society was delayed for many months. It finally took place in late 2004, but was placed under the leadership of the Salafis with limited participation by women. In a similar vein, the Mutawa’in’s budget was increased by $100 million. In other words, the Salafis were handed back the control of society which had been slipping away from them in the past few years.
It appears that in early 2004, the royal family rekindled the alliance forged between AbdelWahab and Mohamed bin Saud in 1744. On can theorize that under a renewed arrangement the Salafis would support the royal family and give up their unspoken, albeit obvious, support of the extremists. In exchange, the royal family would acquiesce to the Salafis’ efforts to impose their views of morality and religion on society. In this power grab by the Salafis through Prince Nayef, the “liberal” princes’ silence was very loud indeed. Prince Abdallah, Prince Salman, and the al-Faysals did not utter a public word against the crackdown. Therefore, one can conclude that they agreed to the arrangement to avoid a conflict with the Salafis, hoping to liberalize another day.
Elections to the appointed Majlis as-Shura have been a major demand of liberal reformers and the Crown Prince promised such elections in 2003. Hence, to preserve Prince Abdullah’s appearance of leadership, elections had to happen. However, they had to be arranged in a manner that would provide the smallest disturbance within the family and their renewed Salafi allies. Electing deputies to the Majlis as-Shura who would have a say on national and international affairs would have been too sensitive. Even elections to local offices could become a base for liberal dissent. Therefore, a compromise was made to have elections for innocuous municipal councils, and only for half of the council members. The other half of the council would be appointed by the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, Prince Mitaib bin AbdelAziz, guaranteeing pro-government majorities on all councils. The voting age was placed at twenty-one, ensuring fewer young disaffected and unemployed potential opponents would be involved.
More importantly, women were disenfranchised with no legal basis. Indeed, the electoral law makes no reference to gender. In 2002, under orders from Prince Abdullah, women were allowed to have their own identity papers, independent from any male relative, and thus became full fledged citizens who could participate in all activities open to Saudi men, including elections. However, Prince Nayef, to the Salafis’ relief, announced that the country was not ready for women to participate. Naturally, the debate on women’s participation has been raging since in Saudi owned newspapers such as the Arab News, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Riyadh, and al-Watan.
Under a barrage of complaints, Prince Mansur bin Mitaib bin AbdelAziz, who administers the elections, admitted that there was no legal basis for the disenfranchising of women, except “technical” issues which would be resolved for the next elections in 2009. This of course is not satisfactory to many Saudis. It implies that women will not vote for another four years and causes one to question whether there will be any elections to the Majlis as-Shura any time soon.
In the Riyadh region, which has over 4 million Saudi citizens, there are only 400,000 to 500,000 persons entitled to register and only 150,000 actually did so, about 3.75% of the overall population. These low numbers are in part explained by Saudi demographics. Over 75% of the Saudi population is below the age of 21, the minimum voting age. Since women are not allowed to register, this leaves only half a million enfranchised citizens. However, the fact that only 150,000 males actually registered shows that in the Riyadh region, these elections are seen as hardly representative. On the other hand, registration seems to have been substantially higher in the Eastern Province, where 220,000 people registered out of a potential of about 370,000. Since a large number of the Eastern province’s citizens are Shi’a, it may imply that the Shi’a groups in the kingdom may have seen these elections as a way to increase their voice in the political process. Any voice at this time is a major progress for them. It will be interesting to see how the registration numbers develop in the Western province later this year.
Sharing of power through an electoral process was started as a major reform by the Crown Prince and liberal members of the royal family. However, true power sharing would have cut into the societal stronghold of the Salafis. The al-Qaeda inspired rebellion gave a perfect tool to the Salafis to get the royal family to buckle under and keep them in control of society. The elections, having been announced by the Crown Prince, had to proceed but were transformed to become an exercise in futility for most Saudis.
On the other hand, the very fact that there are elections at all have promoted vocal and semi-public debates which include women, Shi’a, Sufis, and Hijazis, and which will be very difficult to suppress. Whether the Salafis like it or not, the kingdom has been transformed in depth by outside influences. The Internet, satellite television, and education, however flawed, have made people question the societal controls to which they have been subjected to by the Salafis. Since May 2004, liberalization has taken a back seat, but as the al-Qaeda rebellion comes under control, liberals seem to be raising their heads again. Newspapers have restarted discussing the rights of women, criticizing overly puritanical behaviors, and asking for more participation. Perhaps this trend will continue and revive the possibility of real elections in the near future.
Interfaith Dialogue: Saudi Delegation to the Institute
In the spring of 2003, Prof. Abdul Aziz Said of American University, and David Smock, Director of the U.S. Institute of Peace Religion and Peacemaking Initiative, proposed to the government of Saudi Arabia that the Institute organize and send an Abrahamic delegation of religious leaders to Saudi Arabia to engage in dialogue with Saudi counterparts. This past summer, the Saudi government proposed an alternative as a preliminary step toward an American delegation going to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government proposed that it would bring to the U.S. a delegation of five prominent Saudi religious scholars and asked that the Institute plan all their meetings and agendas. The Institute accepted this proposal.
From December 12 to 18, 2004, this Saudi delegation was in Washington. Its program included a day-long meeting with Christian leaders, a day-long meeting with Jewish leaders (organized by the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University), and a comparable meeting with American Muslim scholars. Also on the agenda were meetings with Karamah (an organization of Muslim women lawyers), Jim Towey (director of the Faith-Based and Community Initiative at the White House), Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, the State Department, and the Center for Global Peace at American University.
The participants in the three dialogue meetings with Jewish, Christian, and Muslim leaders are listed below:
Dr. Sulaiman M. Al-Jarallah, Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University
Dr. Hamad Al-Majed, Imam Mohammed Bin Saudi Islamic University
Dr. Abdullah M. Alhomaid, King Saud University
Dr. Ibrahim Bin Mubark Al Juwair, Imam Mohammed Bin Saudi Islamic University Dr. Ibrahim Abdullah Al-Sadan, Imam Mohammed Bin Saudi Islamic University
Rabbi Dr. Marc Gopin, George Mason University, Chair
Dr. Robert Eisen, George Washington University
Rabbi Bob Carroll, Edah
Rabbi Dr. Yakov Travis, Siegal College of Jewish Studies
Rabbi Dr. Saul Berman, Edah
Rabbi Gerry Serotta, Temple Shalom
Larry Lowenthal, American Jewish Committee
Dr. Lindsey Kaplan, Georgetown University
Rabbi Jack Bieler, Kemp Mill Synagogue
Rabbi Bruce Aft, Congegation Adat Reyim
Rev. Dr. David Smock, U.S. Institute of Peace, Chair
Bishop Vicken Aykazian, Armenian Church of America
Michael Cromartie, Ethics and Public Policy Center
Bishop Jane Holmes Dixon, Episcopal Church
Walt Grazer,U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Dr. Kent Hill, USAID
Dr. Douglas Johnston, International Center on Religion and Diplomacy
Msg. William Kerr, John Paul II Cultural Center
Dr. Peter Makari, United Church of Christ/Disciples of Christ
Rev. Dr. Susan Thistlethwaite, Chicago Theological Seminary
Rev. Dr. Miroslav Volf, Yale Divinity School
Prof. Abdul Aziz Said, American University, Chair
Prof. Aziza al-Hibri, University of Richmond
Prof. Muqtedar Khan, Adrian College
Prof. Sulayman Nyang, Howard University
Prof. Asma Afsaruddin, Notre Dame University
Dr. Zahid Bukhari, Georgetown University
Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui, U.S. Institute of Peace
Ahmed el-Hattab, Islamic Society of North America
Amb. Touquir Hussain, U.S. Institute of Peace
Because the discussions at the three meetings were off-the-record, it is not possible to summarize the discussions. But listed below are the principal questions that were raised and considered in these discussions:
How have American Muslims been treated since 9/11?
Is there a self-critique among American Muslims?
What is the nature of American secularism compared to European secularism?
Is there really a clash of civilizations in the world today?
Is Islam becoming an integral part of Western society and civilization?
Is there sufficient dialogue and understanding among Muslim sub-groups, particularly between Shia and Sunni communities?
How can Muslims from Muslim countries be more effectively exposed to the West?
How can young Muslims in the West be educated to be good and faithful Muslims?
How can diversity be reinforced and valued within Muslim societies?
How can Muslim countries institutionalize diversity in order to protect religious minorities, like Shia, Sufis, conservatives, etc.?
What has been the impact on American Muslims of Wahhabism coming from Saudi Arabia?
Is the way Islam is practiced in Saudi Arabia a liability to American Muslims?
How much religious tolerance is there in Saudi Arabia? How much openness is there to other faiths?
Is there a recognition in the West of the extent of ideological and religious diversity that exists in Saudi Arabia?
How much freedom of expression is there in Saudi Arabia and openness to dialogue?
How can the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia be improved?
Is Islam in Saudi Arabia too legalistic?
Is lack of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia a concern to the Saudi public?
What is the nature of the current national dialogue in Saudi Arabia, particularly in so far as it is addressing the status of women?
Why does Saudi Arabia feel the need to export Wahhabism?
What can be done to counter the public image of Islam portrayed by some American religious leaders, who have insulted the Prophet?
Do the extreme anti-Muslim statements of some Christian leaders accurately reflect the views of American Christians toward Muslims? If not, can the followers curtail the statements of some high profile spokespersons?
Why have images of Islam become so distorted in the U.S.?
What can we identify as shared values among the Abrahamic faiths that can draw us together?
What do Muslims want Christians to work on to improve interfaith relations?
To what extent does President Bush’s Christian faith dictate the Administration’s foreign policy and U.S. relations with Muslim countries?
Is the separation between church and state being eroded in the U.S. and does this have an impact on religious tolerance?
Is tolerance a religious value embraced by and embedded in all three Abrahamic faiths?
How can Christians and Jews help improve the image of Islam and of Muslims in the U.S.?
How much religious tolerance is evident in the history of Christianity and of the Christian church?
Do most Muslims believe Islam is the only avenue to know God?
What is the nature of Christian evangelism?
Can Christians, Jews, and Muslims engage in religiously-motivated joint action to bring the three faiths closer to each other?
Can interfaith dialogue encourage moderation among the three Abrahamic faiths or is something more than dialogue required?
Why do so many Saudi clerics level such hateful charges against Jews?
How much of the animosity between Muslims and Jews is rooted in Zionism? What exactly is the meaning of Zionism?
Is it inevitable that religious and political discourse become intertwined, particularly in discussions about Israel and Palestine?
Can agreement on a two-state solution provide and basis for tolerance between Muslims and Jews worldwide?
Do Saudis and Palestinians accept the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East, assuming Palestinians have their own state as well?
Why do Arabs have to be the ones to sacrifice to help Jews resolve their fear of annihilation?
Can Muslims criticize the policies of the Israeli government without being accused of being anti-Jewish?
How can repentance and forgiveness be avenues for peaceful co-existence among Jews, Christians, and Muslims?
How can representatives of the three communities reinforce the fundamentally peaceful character of the three faiths?
Muslim World Experts
The work of the Muslim World Initiative is being coordinated by Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui who joined the Institute in September 2004 as Associate Director of the Research and Studies Program. Beyond Dr. Maghraoui, the Institute's expertise on the Muslim World is extensive. Please click here for more information.
