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Step 2 - Ensure Mediator Readiness

Step 2
Ensure Mediator Readiness

The mediator needs to know not only what needs to be done but also whether he or she is the right person to do it — whether he or she has the right skills, the right resources, and the right support to be successful. To answer these questions, mediators need to take a long, hard look at themselves and their situation. Whatever happens, a prospective mediator must not let institutional vanity or personal commitment cloud his or her judgment — the mediator, and the victims of the conflict, will pay a heavy price later for failing to acknowledge any shortcomings he or she may have to mediate a particular conflict. By the same token, however, if the mediator's self-assessment shows that he or she can make a real contribution, then the mediator should have faith in that assessment and act accordingly.

Determine What Role Is Appropriate

Determine the Right Mediation Role Given Backing and Resources

Mediators can play very diverse roles. That diversity extends far beyond the division between Track-I initiatives conducted by governments and intergovernmental organizations and Track-II endeavors launched by private organizations and individuals. Some mediators, for example, facilitate while others manipulate; some exert their political authority and flex their institutional muscle while others exploit their own weakness.

Some mediators have a high profile and the full backing of a major power or international organization. They engage official representatives of conflicting parties and may have considerable resources at their disposal. Others will have a much lower public profile but may nonetheless function with important political support and significant resources. By contrast, so-called weak mediators such as non-governmental or religious organizations have little political power of their own. That weakness, however, is a strength in that it gives them great flexibility.

Unencumbered by a perceived political interest or official protocol, weak mediators can conduct their activities with greater operational dexterity than governmental mediators enjoy and can more easily gain the confidence of opposing sides.

These contrasting roles are illustrated by the "weak mediation" of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and that of internationally supported Martti Ahtisaari in the Aceh peace negotiations.

Ensure That the Mediation Strategy Is Appropriate to the Mediator's Identity

A mediator's strategy must be appropriate to his or her identity. Weak negotiators cannot throw their weight around. Neither can a superpower slip in a side door or whisper over someone's shoulder. Each type of mediator has specific assets, and those are the ones he or she should deploy.

Enhance the Ability to Engage Effectively

What makes a good mediator? There are as many answers as there are good mediators. But all mediators need credibility, a portfolio of skills, and cross-cultural awareness.

Build Credibility

Credibility and trust are essential to conflict mediation. No mediator arrives with these entirely in place. Rather, credibility and trust are built over time in relationships with the different parties to the conflict.

Standards of conduct that can help a mediator earn and maintain trust include performing competently, consistently, and predictably; communicating accurately and openly with a balance between transparency and confidentiality; interacting appropriately and with equal levels of proximity with all parties; and exhibiting empathy toward and commitment to the possibility of a solution.

In any conflict, some level of distrust may remain and even be helpful. Besides encouraging reasonable vigilance about the possibilities of being manipulated or misled, distrust can usefully disrupt excessive group cohesion that might result in "groupthink" and a refusal to countenance new ideas. Distrust can be managed through shared recording practices, reporting back to the parties about what has been discussed or decided, and agreed-upon methods of monitoring and verifying actions that the parties have committed to take.

Develop and Strengthen a Broad Portfolio of Skills

Numerous studies, training manuals, workshops, and reference books provide advice on how to negotiate or to mediate a negotiation. Even an experienced mediator can benefit from these resources, which cover a wide range of topics, including the following:

  • Active listening, which reassures parties that their concerns have been heard and understood
  • Conducting open-ended questioning to encourage meaningful answers
  • Reframing proposals by paraphrasing and summarizing them
  • Describing a problem, including its symptoms and causes, before proposing solutions, and then gathering all proposals before beginning to evaluate them
  • Envisioning "possibility trees" — diagrams that chart the possible evolution of systems from their present condition — and identifying steps necessary to achieve imagined futures
  • Disaggregating and sequencing to promote movement: dividing issues into several parts, mandating or delegating preliminary work to study groups, layering discussions, or sequencing decisions
  • Using matched conditioned statements ("yes, if") to define elements of a settlement

As might be expected, given the abundance of literature on the subject, there is no consensus on what techniques work best in which situations — but this is just as well, for the field of mediation benefits from the variety of ideas on offer. There is, however, a growing consensus about the need to complement experience, insight, and intuition with formal skills and training, and to do so before undertaking a mediation.

Recognize Cultural Differences

  • Become familiar with local styles of communication.
  • Consider how the mediator's identity will be received.

Different cultures communicate and negotiate differently. Cultural patterns are not homogeneous across any grouping such as nation or ethnicity, and although they exhibit considerable continuity, they are subject to change and adaptation. Nonetheless, culturally distinctive styles and expectations regarding expression and interpretation are deeply relevant to a process of mediation. Mediators should not only be able to speak and read the local language (or have reliable interpreters who can) but should also be familiar with the local cultural styles of communication: for instance, forms of courtesy; uses of humor; patterns of reciprocity; and ways of conveying respect, gratitude, or disapproval and of declining an offer or expressing criticism. Cross-cultural preparation will make communication more effective and help the mediator avoid unintentional damage.

During the transition from apartheid in South Africa in 1994, Henry Kissinger and Lord Peter Carrington were unable to successfully mediate an end to the crisis between the ANC and Inkatha. But another member of the mission, Professor Washington Okumu from Kenya, in part through his greater understanding of the involved cultures, was able to bring the two sides to agreement.

Another cross-cultural aspect of mediation is the perception by the parties of the mediator's cultural identity. Some aspects of the mediator's identity (notably, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and gender) impact the mediation. A mediator should give some thought to how this might affect an intervention. The mediation team should be designed with an eye to cross-cultural perceptions, as well as with regard for the skill, experience, and acumen of prospective team members. For example, the inclusion of women among top mediators might encourage the parties to the conflict to put some women on their own negotiating teams, thereby increasing the chances that women's interests and issues will appear on the negotiating agenda.

Ensure Adequate Authority and Resources

Obtain a Clear Mandate

In order to generate appropriate strategies, mediation initiatives need clear mandates. The underlying purpose of the mandate may be to resolve a conflict, to contain it so as to maintain regional stability, or to freeze it until anticipated contextual changes occur. Sometimes, the goal of a mediation is merely to create political cover; a state may send an envoy to a conflict zone so as to be seen to be doing something, but the conflict may actually receive little attention. Strategies that exceed mandates are unlikely to find political support.

Build and Sustain Political Support

To pursue a peace process with confidence and credibility, mediators need consistent political support. Predictable rhythms such as the term of office for an organization's leadership or the election cycle of the sponsoring nation will affect support for mediation. A mediator should be attentive to other major events that will affect the sponsor's political support. Domestic lobbies or international players may bring pressure regarding the conflict. Will the government or organization be willing and able to deflect such pressure, insulating the mediation initiative? Might the mediator use such pressure to influence the outcome of the peace process?

Obtain the Necessary Resources and Staying Power

  • Obtain a clear mandate.
  • Ensure sponsor provides adequate resources and support.
  • Plan and budget for the long run.

The institutional sponsor of a mediation should provide decision-making authority, open channels of communication with the parties and other stakeholders, expertise for specific tasks, and counsel. It should also provide or pay for the full range of logistics and for adequate staff and administrative support.

Both institutional support and material resources are needed throughout the entire mediation effort. Peace processes are typically protracted, going through many phases and rotations of staff. Those that are truncated, under-resourced, or abandoned prematurely can do grave damage, exacerbating the intractability of a conflict.

The individual effort of Betty Bigombe, a former Ugandan cabinet minister, to mediate between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army was badly hampered by the lack of institutional support for her private initiative.

Feature Box 2-1: Making Use of the Mediator's Emotions

Mediators must not neglect their own material and emotional needs during the course of what is typically a demanding and strenuous process. Mediators are likely to feel frustration and even anger with the parties or the process, and in some cases may even feel that they are in physical danger. These sentiments can impact the mediator's performance and interaction with the parties. The mediator should recognize these emotions and take steps either to mitigate them or to channel them in support of the process. A controlled loss of temper by the mediator, for instance, may convince parties of the seriousness not only of the mediator's resolve but also of their own situation. Similarly, a mediator who insists on and receives adequate personal security is more likely not only to reach out to some armed groups but also to confront them with information and ideas they would prefer not to hear.

Know When Not to Mediate

Ignoring protracted conflicts (on such grounds as they are containable, too complex, a low strategic priority, someone else's problem, or the subject of previous intervention failures) risks both intractability and contagion. Nonetheless, valid reasons do exist for deciding not to launch a mediation initiation or to withdraw from an ongoing effort.

Avoid Mediation if the Sponsor Lacks Commitment, Resources, or Credibility

If the sponsoring organization or government lacks either the commitment or the resources to truly support a mediation, the effort could be counterproductive. Mediators cannot work with credibility and confidence if political change in their sponsoring institution may undercut the work, if their communications will be ignored, if required decisions will be postponed, or if necessary funding will not be forthcoming. Under such conditions, the chance that mediation will fail increases, and the risk of failure is not only that this effort is wasted but that it may deepen the intractability of the conflict by increasing suspicion and cynicism among the parties to the conflict and antipathy toward future mediators.

Another circumstance in which mediation may be inappropriate is when the prospective mediator or sponsoring organization is too closely aligned with one party or too directly involved in the conflict to be balanced and/or credible. This is not to say that a mediator must be impartial to be effective, but a mediator does need to be capable politically of pressing and influencing both sides toward a settlement.

In the 1980s, Chester Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, effectively mediated between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola despite U.S. enmity toward the Cuban government.

Assured success is not a requirement for beginning a mediation; the chance of making a constructive impact is, and the odds of doing so are much higher in a mediation that commands political and financial support and standing.

Avoid Mediation if the Conflict Is Not Ripe for Resolution

  • Avoid mediation if parties lack the intent to settle.
  • Consider alternative means of engagement.

Mediation may not be the right answer when the parties do not demonstrate serious intention to explore a political solution. In such circumstances, the mediator needs to test parties' motives and avoid pleading for the engagement. The mediator should be cautious about engaging when mediation may play into the hands of a dominant party, legitimizing actions by the parties that may cross the line of acceptable conduct.

The best response in some conflict situations, in other words, may be benign neglect, coercive diplomacy, or even threatening use of force rather than mediation. There may also be times when the would-be mediator is best advised to undertake activities aimed at ripening the conflict.

The subjects of assessing and enhancing ripeness are explored in the next chapter.

Know When to Withdraw

  • Consider withdrawal if settlement would be undesirable.
  • Consider withdrawal if it is impossible to operate equitably.
  • Evaluate reasons for withdrawal to inform future efforts.

Ongoing mediation initiatives should be regularly evaluated. In some situations, a lack of clear progress is best met with renewed commitment and the introduction of new forms of leverage or new settlement formulas; in other settings, the best option might be to focus on protecting the peace process itself until more propitious conditions emerge. In some contexts, however, withdrawal may be the most responsible action. This is the case if the process is clearly being pursued in bad faith by one or more parties (such as using a cease-fire to rebuild fighting capacity) or if it is heading to a settlement that the mediator judges to be unworkable, illegal, or unethical.

Former U.S. secretary of state James Baker terminated his efforts as mediator in the Western Sahara because of the parties' lack of willingness to compromise and the inability of the UN Security Council to unify behind the mediation effort.

A mediator might also withdraw if it becomes impossible for him or her to operate equitably or to ensure that the conduct of negotiations is meeting minimal standards of security or fairness.

Withdrawing from a peace process presents its own challenges. By staying in an unproductive process, a mediator risks providing cover for those using the talks to stall or distort the process. By departing, a mediator risks being made a scapegoat for the failure of talks. Part of managing the situation will include evaluating the mediation, identifying reasons for the failure, and assessing what parts of the mediation might be salvaged in a later iteration, perhaps conducted by a different type of mediator with a different approach or different resources.

The termination of a mediation process does not necessarily mean failure. One mediation process often builds on previous efforts. An effort that does not directly lead to peace may nevertheless contribute to the success of a subsequent process.

Although the Aceh mediation managed by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, a Swiss NGO, did not result in a sustained peace, it provided a platform upon which the next and successful mediation process of Martti Ahtisaari was built.

A mediation process that keeps the conflict from deteriorating further, even if it does not result in sustained peace, constitutes a positive contribution.

Manage Multiple Mediators

Assess Roles Played by Other Mediators

While some conflicts are ignored, others attract a plethora of mediators. A multiplicity of mediators can sometimes be helpful. New actors can enliven stalled talks or open new avenues of communication. Mediators with specific skills or expertise can handle particular facets of negotiations. Working in cooperation, multiple mediators can isolate spoilers, increase leverage, distribute burdens, divide tasks, create momentum, and provide credible guarantees.

But a crowded field also causes problems. If mediators do not have a shared understanding of the problem, they may work at cross-purposes. This generates mixed messages about which negotiation initiative the international community is backing. A multiplicity of mediators also encourages forum shopping, as parties seek to work with mediators perceived to favor their side, and allows parties to play mediators against each other.

A plethora of workshops and meetings can create meeting overload and communications gridlock, wasting finite resources and taxing the leadership involved in numerous initiatives. The process can become unfocused and unwieldy.

Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah resigned as the UN secretary-general's special representative to Burundi in 1995 because of the confusion created by the multiplicity of international negotiators, envoys, and mediators.

If mediators are seen to compete or criticize each other, this can undercut the practice of mediation. Finally, when efforts fail, a multiplicity of mediators in the field can mean that responsibility is diluted, with none taking on the task of analyzing what went wrong.

Communicate, Coordinate, and Cooperate with Other Mediators

An environment with multiple mediators calls for careful communication, coordination, and cooperation to ensure a coherent and unified mediation effort. Ideally, cooperation will involve a conscious division of labor and perhaps even sequenced interventions that build on the strengths of different actors and encourage interdependence. Even in loosely coordinated endeavors, mediators should keep one another informed and refrain from public criticism of parallel efforts. (The subject of coordination between Track-I and Track-II mediators is explored in more detail in a later chapter.)

 

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