Notes

¹ Published by the United Nations under the title El Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace (DPI/1208, May 1992).

² El Salvador Agreements, supra, p. 30.

³ El Salvador Peace Agreement (signed at Chapultepec), supra, p. 55.

⁴ It is important to mention that, in the San José Agreement on Human Rights, it was the understanding of the Parties to the peace agreements that "human rights" shall mean "those rights recognized by the Salvadorian legal system, including treaties to which El Salvador is a party, and by the declarations and principles on human rights and humanitarian law adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of American States".

⁵ See, for example, FMLN, La situación de los derechos humanos a la Luz de los Convenios de Ginebra, p. 5 (1983).

⁶ Article 3 (common to the four Conventions): conflicts not of an international character

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

⁷ See, for example, article 4 of Protocol II.

⁸ United Nations, Mexico Agreements, 27 April 1991, Commission on the Truth, "Functions" section, para. 2 (a). Document A/46/553-S/23130, p. 16.

⁹ The Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños (ANDES) reported that in the period January-June 1981, 136 schoolteachers were executed. United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1981.

¹⁰ The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, quoting the United States Embassy, reported that the average number of political murders in El Salvador was approximately 300 a month in 1982. According to the Catholic Legal Aid Office, the figure was 500 a month. OAS-IACHR, Annual Report, 1981-1982, p. 121.

The Archbishop Oscar Romero Christian Legal Aid Office reported the following numbers of civilian victims:

Source: Central American Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA), Los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador durante 1985, vol. II, José Simeón Cañas Central American University, San Salvador, 12 April 1986, p. 39.

¹¹ In September 1980, the house containing the office of the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador was blown up. Damage was considerable and the bodies of three young people, showing signs of having been brutally tortured, were found at the front door of the office. OAS-IACHR, Annual Report, p. 124.

Attacks against the non-governmental Human Rights Commission were systematic during this period:

On 3 October 1980, Maria Magdalena Henríquez, press secretary of the Commission, was abducted by uniformed police. Her body was found later. On 25 October, Ramón Valladares, the Commission's administrator, was murdered. On 4 December 1981, security forces abducted the Commission's director, Carlos Eduardo Vides, who then disappeared. In August 1982, the Treasury Police abducted América Perdomo, Director of Public Relations, who also disappeared. On 16 March 1983, Marianela García Villas, the Commission's President, was killed when a military patrol ambushed a group of displaced persons.

Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of Terror. Human Rights since the Assassination of Archbishop Romero, Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 44-45, 144-148.

¹² According to Christian Legal Aid, 16,266 people, 7,916 of them peasants, were killed between January and December 1981.

Source: Archbishop Oscar Romero Christian Legal Aid Office. See Central American Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA), Los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador durante 1985, San Salvador, April 1986, p. 41.

¹³ On 11 November 1981, the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador reported that in recent months the bodies of over 400 people had been dumped at the place known as El Playón.

¹⁴ The General Secretary of MNR, Guillermo Manuel Ungo, the Rector of the Central American University, Román Mayorga Quiroz, and businessman Mario Antonio Andino became part of the Junta. Colonels José Guillermo García and Nicolás Carranza were appointed Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence respectively. Other members of the cabinet included Salvador Samayoa (Education), Enrique Alvarez Córdoba (Agriculture), Colonel René Francisco Guerra y Guerra (Under-Secretary of the Interior), Héctor Dada Hirezi and Héctor Oquelí Colindres (Foreign Affairs).

¹⁵ The Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN) was a civil defence body set up by General Medrano in the 1960s to keep an eye on the peasant population. It became one of the precursors of the death squads.

¹⁶ The Agencia Nacional de Servicios Especiales de El Salvador (ANSESAL) was the State intelligence agency set up by General Medrano. Its last director was Colonel Santibañez. National Security Archives, El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, 1977-1984, Chadwick-Healey, Inc., Alexandria, VA, p. 73.

¹⁷ The Bloque Popular Revolucionario was the largest coalition of organizations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was established in 1975 and the sectors represented in it included peasants (the Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños (FECCAS) and the Unión de Trabajadores del Campo (UTC)); teachers (the Asociación Nacional de Educadores de El Salvador (ANDES); shanty-town residents (the Unión de Pobladores de Tugurios (UPT); and students (the Movimiento Estudiantil Revolucionario de Secundaria (MERS)).

The Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (LP-28) was a smaller, urban-based organization controlled by students. It took its name from the date - 28 February 1977 - when dozens of demonstrators were killed in protests denouncing electoral fraud in the elections in which General Carlos Humberto Romero became President.

The Frente Popular de Acción Unificada (FAPU), founded in 1974, was an organization composed of trade unions, student organizations, peasants and schoolteachers.

The Unión Democratíca Nacionalista (UDN), founded in 1969, was the legal mouthpiece of the banned Salvadorian Communist Party.

¹⁸ By agreement between the Revolutionary Government Junta and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the members who resigned were replaced on 10 January by PDC members Héctor Dada Hizeri and José Antonio Morales Elrich and independent José Ramón Avalos Navarrete.

¹⁹ The Agrarian Reform Act decreed the expropriation of landholdings in excess of 1,250 acres. This affected some 372 landowners and a total of 625,000 acres of land. Approximately 85 per cent of the rural population were to benefit. To forestall a reaction by the landowners concerned, the Junta issued Decree No. 155 imposing a state of siege for 30 days.

National Security Archives, El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, 1977-1984, Janet Di Vicenzo, project editor, Chadwick-Healey, Inc., Alexandria, VA, 1984, p. 33.

²⁰ United States Embassy in El Salvador, cable 00837, 6 February 1980.

²¹ In his last Sunday sermon, on 23 March, Monsignor Romero had said: "In the name of God, in the name of this suffering people whose cries rise up to Heaven more urgently with each day that passes, I beseech you, I beg you, I order you to stop the repression."

²² United States Embassy in San Salvador, cable 02296, 31 March 1980. The Washington Post, 31 March 1980. Op. cit., National Security Archives, El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, 1977-1984, p. 34.

²³ National Guard Major and Director of ANSESAL until the 15 October coup, when he was forced to resign.

²⁴ On 12 May, Majano lost his influence when Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, of the conservative wing, was appointed President of the Revolutionary Government Junta by the armed forces and, as such, became their Commander-in-Chief.

That same day, a communiqué from a group calling itself "death squad" was read out over the telephone to the press, demanding the release of Major D'Aubuisson and the others arrested at Santa Tecla and threatening to blow up any newspapers that did not publish the message. La Prensa Gráfica, 12 May 1980, p. 25.

²⁵ D'Aubuisson and the other detainees were never brought before the courts, despite the seriousness of the accusations about the death squads and the murder of Monsignor Romero.

²⁶ On 22 May, the Junta issued Decrees Nos. 264 and 265 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first of these expanded the definition of terrorist activities and prohibited the occupation of public buildings, workplaces and religious establishments. The second decree prohibited bail for persons accused of or sentenced for political offences.

On 24 June, Decree No. 296 prohibited officials and employees of State bodies from taking part in strikes, and ordered immediate dismissal for anyone who promoted or organized work stoppages.

On 22 August, Decree No. 366 gave the executive branch the power to withdraw legal recognition from any State union for taking part in strikes or causing the interruption of essential public services.

On 3 December, the Junta issued Decree No. 507 giving military courts jurisdiction over political offences against the State.

²⁷ On 26 June 1980, after a national strike, the army and the National Guard attacked the National University, killing between 22 and 40 students and destroying facilities. The Rector of the University, Félix Antonio Ulloa, was assassinated on 29 October.

²⁸ Op. cit., National Security Archives, The Making of US Policy, 1977-1984, p. 35.

²⁹ After a brief period in detention, Majano went into exile in March 1981.

³⁰ The direct complaints received by the Commission on the Truth and referred to in this chronology concerned both parties to the conflict. Most complaints concerned violations committed by members of the armed forces or paramilitary organizations. Only those complaints which, in the Commission's view, were sufficiently substantiated were processed (see annex 5).

³¹ The victims were José Rodolfo Viera, President of ISTA, and two AIFLD agricultural advisers, Mark David Pearlman and Michael Hammer.

³² On 27 December, during one of the first large-scale attacks launched by FMLN on military garrisons, Commander Fermán Cienfuegos of FARN announced that a final offensive would be launched before Reagan's inauguration on 20 January 1981. Op. cit., National Security Archives, El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, p. 38.

³³ On 28 August 1981, a communiqué issued by the Governments of Mexico and France referred to FDR-FMLN as a representative political force for seeking a political solution to the conflict.

³⁴ On 14 January, in one of his last foreign policy measures, President Carter announced the sending of US$ 5 million in military aid to El Salvador. Among the reasons cited was evidence of Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadorian rebels. Op. cit., National Security Archives, El Salvador: The Making of US Policy, p. 34.

Not long after the Government of Ronald Reagan took office, the State Department sent a cable to the Embassy in San Salvador instructing it to inform the Duarte Government that the United States was planning to launch a diplomatic offensive the following week in Europe and Latin America to demonstrate Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement with the insurgents in El Salvador. Department of State (draft), 2/4/1981.

³⁵ Op. cit., Americas Watch, pp. 48-49 and 146.

³⁶ The Miami Herald, 23 August 1981. Op. cit, National Security Archives, p. 42.

³⁷ Christian Legal Aid, San Salvador, 1984 report.

³⁸ The breakdown of the Assembly by party was as follows:

³⁹ Decree No. 3 of the Constituent Assembly. The Decree also repealed Decree No. 114, containing the basic legal provisions governing the agrarian reform.

⁴⁰ Phase III of the agrarian reform was launched by Decree No. 207 of the Revolutionary Government Junta and enabled peasants who were leasing small plots of land to buy them and gain title to them with financial assistance from the Government. Op. cit, National Security Archives, p. 79.

⁴¹ The New York Times, 7 February 1982.

Newly elected President Reagan, citing the attack on the Ilopango Base, also signed an Executive Order on 1 February authorizing $55 million in emergency military aid for El Salvador (see The Washington Post, 2 February 1982).

⁴² According to statistics, acts of sabotage focused on means of transport (46 per cent), the electricity distribution and supply system (23.7 per cent) and roads and railways (5.7 per cent). During the first quarter of 1982, the following bridges were destroyed or damaged: 4 in Santa Ana, 1 in San Salvador, 3 in Usulután, 2 in San Miguel and 1 in Morazán. Centro Universitario de Documentación e Información, Proceso, Año 3, No. 98, February-April 1982.

⁴³ Op cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1982, p. 33. Armed Forces of El Salvador, National Police, Datos estadísticos sobre atentados dinamiteros, incendiarios y sabotajes diversos realizados por las diversas agrupaciones terroristas con el fin de destruir la economía nacional, San Salvador, 22 September 1982.

⁴⁴ United States Embassy in San Salvador (cable 02165), 3 March 1983.

⁴⁵ United States Embassy in San Salvador (cable 00437), 3 December 1982. The information also indicates that the armed forces troop strength was 31,757.

⁴⁶ Op cit., Americas Watch, 1991, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁷ The Washington Post, 28 December 1982.

⁴⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Information, Central America, June 1982, No. 5.

⁴⁹ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, p. 20.

⁵⁰ Central American Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA), Los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador durante 1985, vol. II, José Simeón Cañas Central American University, San Salvador, 12 April 1986, p. 41.

⁵¹ "Death squads" is a generic term referring to the modus operandi of such groups. They were used as instruments of terror and introduced the systematic practice of massive human rights violations.

⁵² Op. cit., OAS-IACHR, Annual Report, 1981-1982, pp. 115-116.

⁵³ United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 22 November 1982, p. 24.

⁵⁴ Archbishop Oscar Romero Christian Legal Aid Víctimas de la Población Civil desde 1977 hasta 1985, February 1986 (mimeo).

⁵⁵ Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 108.

⁵⁶ Decree 210 of the Constituent Assembly referred to the Amnesty and Citizen Rehabilitation Act presented by the President of the Republic; 533 political prisoners were freed by 24 June. The Act also granted amnesty to any rebel who abandoned the armed struggle before 4 July.

⁵⁷ The Constitution contained 247 articles and provided for greater control over presidential power. It also reduced the impact of the land reform on landowners. According to a report issued in December by United States labour advisers, only 57,000 of the 117,000 who were eligible to benefit from the reform had exercised their right to purchase up to 17.5 acres of land which they were leasing; more than 10 per cent of those who did exercise that right were either displaced or murdered. The New York Times, 28 December 1983.

⁵⁸ The Government was represented by the Salvadorian Peace Commission set up by the Apaneca Pact. Possible participation of the rebels in presidential elections was one of the main issues discussed. The talks failed because FDR-FMLN rejected the conditions of the Peace Commission.

⁵⁹ The other bodies were identified as those of Santiago Hernández Jiménez, Secretary-General of FUSS, who disappeared on 25 September, José Antonio García Vázquez and Dr. Dora Muñoz Castillo. La Prensa Gráfica, "El conflicto en El Salvador", second edition, 1983.

⁶⁰ Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 148.

⁶¹ Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 148. The Miami Herald, 1 October 1983.

⁶² According to newspaper reports, a group of 20 women and children were surrounded in a dwelling and executed. Another 30 people drowned in Lake Suchitlán while being shot at by soldiers. Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 148. The Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 1983.

⁶³ Congress had set the ceiling on the number of advisers at 55. Starting in June 1983, a contingent of 130 Green Berets stationed in Honduras began training a first group of 2,400 Salvadorian soldiers in anti-guerrilla tactics.

⁶⁴ Department of State press briefing, 29 November 1983.

⁶⁵ United States Embassy, San Salvador (06349), 18 July 1983.

⁶⁶ The New York Times, 5 and 19 November 1983, quoted in op. cit., National Security Archives, pp. 64-65.

⁶⁷ United States Embassy, San Salvador (11503), 12 December 1983, The New York Times, 15 December 1983.

⁶⁸ On 14 December, the High Command ordered all security forces to look into the existence of the death squads. On 19 December, Captain Eduardo Ernesto Alfonso Avila was arrested on orders of the High Command on suspicion of having participated in the murder of the United States advisers in the Sheraton case. On 21 December, Colonel Nicolás Carranza, Director of the Treasury Police, announced that his forces had captured one member of a squad, though no name was given. La Prensa Gráfica, "El Conflicto en El Salvador", second edition, 1983, pp. 61-62.

⁶⁹ The Los Angeles Times, 27 December 1983.

⁷⁰ Op. cit., the National Security Archives, p. 63.

⁷¹ Report of the Special Representative, 22 November 1983 (A/38/503).

⁷² The following day the House of Representatives approved $67.75 million in emergency aid to El Salvador. Op. cit., the National Security Archives, p. 72.

⁷³ President Duarte offered to grant amnesty to FMLN and to recognize it so that it could participate as a political party in the elections, if it agreed to lay down its arms. FMLN responded with a counterproposal that would have involved its participating in a provisional Government that would call elections and would reorganize the armed forces. Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 12.

⁷⁴ On 1 January, the rebels blew up Cuscatlán bridge, the longest in the country, connecting the eastern and western regions. On several occasions, the northern and eastern areas of the country were left without electricity as a result of continuing acts of sabotage. On 21 June, FMLN attacked and occupied the Cerrón Grande hydroelectric power station, leaving 120 people dead. On 30 July, following a number of attacks involving dynamite, train service in the country was suspended. Towards the end of the year, it was reported that FMLN attacks on the economic infrastructure had cost the country 238 million colones. Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, "El Conflicto en El Salvador", 1984.

⁷⁵ Between 17 and 22 July, 68 civilians were executed by army troops during a military operation in Los Llanitos, Cabañas. Between 28 and 30 August a further military operation by the Atlacatl Battalion in Las Vueltas, Chalatenango, resulted in the massacre of some 50 civilians on the banks of the Guaslinga river. Op. cit., Americas Watch, 1991, p. 148.

⁷⁶ According to a cable from the United States Embassy, no murder had been attributed to any known death squad since the end of 1983. United States Embassy, San Salvador (02547), 8 March 1984.

⁷⁷ Op. cit., the National Security Archives, p. 70.

⁷⁸ Report on the situation of human rights in El Salvador (A/39/636), 9 November 1984.

⁷⁹ On 7 March, Lt. Col. Ricardo Arístides Cienfuegos, Head of COPREFA, was executed. On 23 March, General José Alberto Medrano, former Director of the National Guard and founder of ORDEN and ANSESAL, was murdered. On 17 May, Mr. José Rodolfo Araujo Baños, military judge of the Court of First Instance, was killed in an attack. Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, "El Conflicto en El Salvador", p. 81.

⁸⁰ Inés Guadalupe Duarte Durán was abducted, together with her friend, Ana Cecilia Villeda. On the 16th, an organization calling itself Frente Pablo Castillo claimed responsibility for the abduction. Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, "El Conflicto en El Salvador", p. 81.

⁸¹ Op. cit., Central American Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA), Los derechos humanos en El Salvador durante el año 1985, fascicle II, pp. 79-81.

⁸² In a letter dated October 1985 to Monsignor Rivera y Damas, the population of Suchitoto reported that the following damage had occurred between May and October 1985: 39 bombings, 4 landings, 32 machine-gunnings, 28 raids, 252 captures, 26 dead, 9 wounded, 28 houses destroyed, 41 manzanas (approximately 25 hectares) of farmland and considerable quantities of corn destroyed. Op. cit., IDHUCA, Los derechos humanos en El Salvador durante el año 1985, fascicle II, p. 43.

⁸³ Op. cit, IDHUCA, Los derechos humanos en El Salvador durante el año 1985, fascicle II, p. 39.

⁸⁴ This list refers only to cases for which testimony from survivors has been received. Op. cit., IDHUCA, Los derechos humanos en El Salvador ..., p. 67.

⁸⁵ Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica "El Conflicto en El Salvador", p. 76.

⁸⁶ The figures given by the various sources are as follows: Legal Protection: 3,306; Legal Aid: 1,714; Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (non-governmental): 1,995; Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (governmental): 1,810; and United States Embassy: 1,855. Op. cit., IDHUCA, Los derechos humanos en El Salvador ..., p. 36.

⁸⁷ Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, "El Conflicto en El Salvador", p. 86.

⁸⁸ Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, p. 85.

⁸⁹ The document entitled "Procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America", known as the "Esquipulas II Agreement", was signed by the Central American Presidents on 7 August 1987 in Guatemala City. Among the main points of the Agreement are the objective of concluding a cease-fire within 90 days, the establishment of national reconciliation commissions, a general amnesty, formation of an International Verification Commission and the termination of logistical assistance and arms supplies to all armed groups in the region.

⁹⁰ "The humanization of the conflict" refers to the objectives of halting such practices as abductions, bombings, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, summary executions and the indiscriminate planting of mines, etc.

⁹¹ In a paper issued on 22 July 1987, Amnesty International expressed concern about what appeared to be a campaign of repression against the cooperative movement. Over 80 cooperative workers and leaders had disappeared, been summarily executed, arbitrarily detained or beaten.

United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1988, p 3.

⁹² The Act conferred unconditional amnesty on anyone who had been involved in political offences or politically motivated ordinary offences committed prior to 22 October 1987 in which fewer than 20 persons had participated. This option was also applicable to the rebels if they came forward, renounced the use of violence and manifested their desire to be amnestied within 15 days following the promulgation of the Act.

The Act would not apply to persons who: (a) participated in the murder of Monsignor Romero; (b) engaged in kidnappings for profit; (c) were involved in drug trafficking; or (d) participated in the murder of Herbert Anaya.

Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1988, p. 19. OAS-ICHR: Report on the situation of human rights in El Salvador, 1978, p. 299. Amnesty International: Annual Report, 1988, p. 137.

⁹³ The United Nations Special Representative said that the broad scope of the Act that had been promulgated might make it even more difficult to overcome the climate of impunity that existed in El Salvador.

⁹⁴ "... the Esquipulas II Agreement is not being served by an act that pardons the murderers of non-combatants and whose authors are connected with FMLN, the armed forces or the death squads".

⁹⁵ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1988, p. 19.

⁹⁶ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative, 1988, p. 5.

⁹⁷ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1988, p. 12.

⁹⁸ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1987, p. 18.

⁹⁹ Op. cit., OAS-ICHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1987-1988, p. 294. This report estimates the loss of life caused by the civil war at 60,000 persons.

¹⁰⁰ On grounds of an error in procedure, the Supreme Court revoked the request for the extradition of Captain Alvaro Saravia, who was implicated in the murder of Monsignor Romero.

With regard to the implementation of the Amnesty Act, military judge Jorgé Alberto Serrano Panameño, just before handing down his decision on the case of abductions for purposes of extortion, stated that he opposed granting amnesty to the officers implicated in those cases. The following day, 11 May, he was shot dead by persons unknown in the doorway of his home.

¹⁰¹ Op. cit., Proceso, "Annual Summary", San Salvador, December 1988, p. 27.

¹⁰² Source: IDHUCA. See in Proceso, "Annual Summary", December 1988, p. 30.

¹⁰³ Americas Watch pointed out that "... both the Government and FMLN appear to have violated the rules of war during the first week of the offensive. Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative ..." 1990, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, 1989, p. 111.

¹⁰⁵ Op. cit., OAS-ICHR, Annual Report, 1989-1990, p. 140.

¹⁰⁶ Alfredo Cristiani received 53.83 per cent of the 939,078 valid votes counted, higher than the 36.03 per cent received by the Christian Democratic candidate, Fidel Chávez Mena.

¹⁰⁷ On 28 August, army units opened fire on 15 university students, killing one and wounding six others. On 16 December, Imelda González, a lecturer at the National University in Santa Ana, was killed.

¹⁰⁸ Op. cit., OAS-ICHR, Report on the human rights situation in El Salvador, 1989-1990, p. 145.

¹⁰⁹ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1989, p. 14.

¹¹⁰ Edgard Antonio Chacón was President of the Institute of International Relations and a columnist known to have extreme anti-communist opinions. On 30 June, while driving with his wife, he was attacked and died of gunshot wounds.

Both COPREFA and the widow of the deceased blamed FMLN urban commandos for the killing, but the charge was denied by FMLN.

Gabriel Eugenio Payes Interiano was a computer engineer affiliated with ARENA. He was shot in the street on 19 July and died on 21 August after a stay in hospital.

¹¹¹ The fourth Summit, Esquipulas IV, was held at Tela, Honduras, from 5 to 7 August 1989 with the five Central American Presidents in attendance. In chapter III of the annex, the Governments of the Central American countries urged FMLN to hold a constructive dialogue with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace. At the same time, the Central American Governments urged the Government of El Salvador to arrange, with full guarantees, the integration of the members of FMLN in peaceful life.

Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative to the Commission on Human Rights, 1990, p. 4.

¹¹² On 31 October 1989, the bombing of FENASTRAS headquarters left 10 trade unionists dead and about 30 injured. Among the dead was the leader of Febe Velázquez. That same day, a bomb injured four people at the headquarters of the Comité de Madres de Presos Políticos, Desaparecidos y Asesinados de El Salvador (COMADRES).

Op. cit., Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of Terror, p. 156.

¹¹³ Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, San Salvador, p. 109.

¹¹⁴ The Special Representative, in theory, conceded that the perpetrators might have ties to members of the armed forces and security forces or be tolerated and protected by them.

United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1990, p. 10.

¹¹⁵ Noteworthy among those acts was the murder of the Chief of the Legal Department of the Armed Forces Joint Staff, Major Carlos Figueroa Morales, for which the FMLN "Modesto Ramírez" commando unit claimed responsibility.

Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1990, p. 13.

¹¹⁶ OAS-ICHR, Report on the situation of human rights in El Salvador, 1990-1991, p. 472.

¹¹⁷ Op. cit., United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1990, p. 11.

¹¹⁸ According to the timetable, the process would comprise two phases. The first phase would be aimed at reaching a set of political agreements leading to a cease-fire and would cover the topics of the armed forces, human rights, the judicial and electoral systems, constitutional reforms, economic and issues and United Nations verifications reached of the agreements. The second phase would be devoted to establishing the necessary conditions and guarantees for reintegration of the members of FMLN into the institutional, civil and political life of the country.

Op. cit. United Nations, Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, 1991, p. 4.

¹¹⁹ On 19 November, the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, called on FMLN not to jeopardize the negotiating process. Mexico, Canada and the Central American Governments also appealed to FMLN to suspend its new offensive. Finally, on 17 December, the Presidents of the region, at a summit meeting held at Puntarenas, Costa Rica, demanded that FMLN declare a cease-fire.

¹²⁰ In his Sunday sermon on 3 February, Monsignor Rivera y Damas accused members of the First Infantry Brigade of this mass murder. Op. cit., La Prensa Gráfica, p. 115. Op. cit., Americas Watch, El Salvador's Decade of Terror, p. 160.

¹²¹ The new Legislative Assembly, enlarged from 60 to 84 representatives in 1991, comprised 39 deputies from ARENA, 26 from the Christian Democratic Party, 9 from the Partido de Reconciliación Nacional, 8 from Convergencia Democratica and 1 each from the Unión Democrática Nacionalista and the Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano.

¹²² On 9 February, the offices and typewriters of Diario Latino were destroyed by arson. Five days of truce at the beginning of March were followed by an escalation of clashes, attacks on military installations and army personnel, etc. resulting in more than 100 people killed in action.

¹²³ Among its most important provisions are the creation of a National Civil Police under the direction of civilian authorities independent of the armed forces, the establishment of the Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, an allocation to the judiciary from the State budget amounting to no less than 6 per cent of current income, the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the redefinition of military jurisdiction as an exceptional procedure limited to dealing with purely military offences and misdemeanours. In this Mexico round it was also agreed to establish a Commission on the Truth to investigate serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society demanded that the public should know the truth.

¹²⁴ El Salvador Peace Agreement, Chapultepec, 16 January 1992, 5, End to Impunity: "The parties recognize the need to clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces, particularly in cases where respect for human rights is jeopardized. To that end, the Parties refer this issue to the Commission on the Truth for consideration and resolution".

¹²⁵ In investigating and resolving the cases referred to below, Commission members examined documents in El Salvador and other countries; interviewed numerous participants, witnesses, victims and relatives; requested information from Government bodies; consulted court dossiers; visited places where incidents had occurred; and requested copies of instructions and orders given.

Requests for precise information on various cases were transmitted to Ministers and heads of Government departments, and to what is now the former FMLN Command.

In the case of requests for reports from the Ministry of Defence, the Commission received replies to some of its inquiries. However, many of the replies were incomplete.

With regard to requests for reports that were not met and that in some cases referred to events prior to 1984, the Ministry of Defence informed the Commission that "no records exist since the General Staff was completely restructured in that year" (letter No. 10692, 27 November 1992). The Armed Forces Press Committee (COPREFA) told the Commission that it did not have any information for the period from January 1980 onwards and currently had available only the archive of press releases from January 1988 onwards (letter of 29 October 1992).

The replies to requests made to FMLN were also, in some cases, incomplete. the former Command attributed the inability to provide precise information to the Commission to the irregular nature of the war and the consequent lack of records.

¹²⁶ A detailed analysis of complaints and lists of victims are to be found in the annexes. More than 18,000 complaints from indirect sources were also registered, of which over 13,000 were analysed. The figures for direct and indirect sources have not been added together. It is estimated that as many as 3,000 complaints were duplicated in the two sources. In any event the Commission believes that the total number of complaints registered is at least 22,000.

¹²⁷ The Commission also received thousands of other complaints from institutions which, once registered, could not be analysed either because they did not meet the corresponding minimum requirements, even though institutions had been informed of these in good time, or because the incidents reported had occurred outside the period covered by the mandate.

¹²⁸ For the investigation of this case, the Commission interviewed many witnesses, reviewed the court dossier and other documents and reports on the case, and visited the scene of the murders.

¹²⁹ The Commission received testimony from survivors and eyewitnesses. The accounts agree and are consistent with one another in describing the circumstances and indicating who was responsible. The relevant documentation was also reviewed. The court records and the forensic examination confirm that the incident occurred.

Belén Güijat canton was under the military jurisdiction of the Second Military Brigade which, in 1980, was under the command of Colonel Servio Tulio Figueroa. The Commission issued a summons to that officer through the Ministry of Defence. The only response it received - belated at that - was that he had retired. Information was also requested from the Minister of Defence concerning military operations carried out at the time in the district where the incident occurred; that request went unanswered. Despite repeated requests to the Minister of Defence for the names of those in charge of the security forces in Santa Ana and for information on military operations in Metapán in May 1980, no answer was received.

Another request to the present Commander of the Second Infantry Brigade went unheeded. A visit to Brigade headquarters to consult the records proved fruitless. Generally speaking, the competent military authorities did not cooperate in the investigation of this case.

¹³⁰ According to witnesses, he died a few years after the incident.

¹³¹ The report on the medical examination of the bodies states specifically that a number of the bodies had what are known as powder burns. The forensic interpretation of this type of wound refers to the carbon ring that impregnates the skin when a person is shot at close range (under 30 centimetres). This carbon ring is caused by the deflagration of the powder when a shot is fired, leaving an indelible mark on the deceased's skin; in other words, the shot "burns the skin".

¹³² When a person is shot, it is usually quite simple to determine where the bullet entered the body and where it exited, since the dimensions and characteristics of the two holes are quite different. Accordingly, the only logical interpretation of the statement that the forensic doctor was unable to make this determination is that the deceased were shot at such close range and with weapons of such large calibre that the bodies were literally destroyed.

¹³³ Enrique Alvarez Córdoba, former Minister of Agriculture and Livestock and President of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR). There were two bullet holes in his body. El Diario de Hoy, 29 November 1980.

¹³⁴ Juan Chácon, age 28, General Secretary of the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR). There were three bullet holes in his body, one in the ear, another in the forehead and one in the thorax, and signs of strangulation. F. 7, court dossier No. 600, Fourth Criminal Court of San Salvador.

¹³⁵ Enrique Escobar Barrera, age 35, a member of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR). There were two bullet holes in his temple and signs of strangulation. F. 5, court dossier, quotation 2.

¹³⁶ Manuel de Jesús Franco Ramírez, age 35, a graduate in international relations and a member of the Partido Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN). There were four bullet wounds in his thorax and signs of strangulation. F. 6, court dossier, quotation 2.

¹³⁷ Humberto Mendoza, age 30, a member of the Movimiento de Liberación Popular (MLP). There were two bullet wounds in his body, one in the temple and the other in the thorax, and signs of strangulation. F. 4 court dossier, quotation 2.

¹³⁸ Doroteo Hernández, journalist and trade union leader of the Unión de Pobladores de Tugurios (UPT). At the time, he was not identified as a leader of FDR; however, the UCA Human Rights Institute/Christian Legal Aid document sent to the Commission on the Truth states that he was a leader of that organization.

¹³⁹ The Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) came into being on 18 April 1980 as a result of a political agreement between the Frente Democrático (FD) and the Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (CRM). It was formally established on 18 April 1980 by various political, popular and mass organizations. A number of its leaders had held prominent government posts in the first Revolutionary Junta which had overthrown General Romero on 15 October 1979. At the time, the leadership of FDR consisted of the five victims, Leoncio Pichinte and Juan José Martel.

¹⁴⁰ The National University of El Salvador was militarized on 26 June 1980, along with the Western University Centre and the Eastern University Centre, Revista ECA, No. 389, March 1981, p. 240. Other human rights organizations were also persecuted.

¹⁴¹ "G3" rifles were the regulation weapon of the security forces at the time and were used by the armed forces of El Salvador in the war against Honduras in 1969.

¹⁴² The JRG communiqué speaks of 13, a UPI cable mentions 200, Prensa Gráfica, 28 November 1980.

¹⁴³ The dossier notes that the justice of the peace made a visual inspection, that the bodies were identified and that two death certificates were issued. There was no police report of any kind, and nothing at all was done by the judicial authorities; the case was finally closed because no proceedings had been carried out during a given period of time. This case clearly demonstrates the failure of the judiciary to function.

¹⁴⁴ Major Roberto D'Aubuisson stated publicly in a communiqué "Right now, based on the information available to us, we attribute responsibility to DRU, acting on direct orders from Colonel Majano ...".

¹⁴⁵ Communiqués of the Brigada Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, the Revolutionary Government Junta, the armed forces, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, FDR, FMLN, Revista ECA No. 386, December 1980.

¹⁴⁶ Another significant point is that neither President Duarte nor other important Christian Democratic leaders were in the country, nor was Colonel Majano.

¹⁴⁷ Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Commission on the Truth to the Chief of the National Police.

¹⁴⁸ The funeral itself turned into another act of violence when an explosive device blew up.

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Posted by USIP Library on: January 26, 2001
Source: UN Security Council, Annex, From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 201-217.