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IV. CASES AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE (cont.)
B. VIOLENCE AGAINST OPPONENTS BY AGENTS OF THE
STATE
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
(c) THE AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
On 2 December 1980, members of the National Guard of El Salvador arrested four churchwomen after they left the international airport. Churchwomen Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan were taken to an isolated spot and subsequently executed by being shot at close range.
In 1984, Deputy Sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Alemán and National Guard members Daniel Canales Ramírez, Carlos Joaquín Contreras Palacios, Francisco Orlando Contreras Recinos and José Roberto Moreno Canjura were sentenced to 30 years in prison for murder.
The Commission on the Truth finds that:
1. The arrest and execution of the churchwomen was planned prior to their arrival at the airport. Deputy Sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Alemán carried out orders of a superior to execute them.
2. Then Colonel Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Director-General of the National Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, Commander of the Zacatecoluca military detachment, Colonel Roberto Monterrosa, Major Lizandro Zepeda Velasco and Sergeant Dagoberto Martínez, among other military personnel, knew that members of the National Guard had committed the murders pursuant to orders of a superior. The subsequent cover-up of the facts adversely affected the judicial investigation process.
3. The Minister of Defence at the time, General José Guillermo García, made no serious effort to conduct a thorough investigation of responsibility for the murders.
4. Local commissioner José Dolores Meléndez also knew of the executions carried out by members of the security forces and covered them up.
5. The State of El Salvador failed in its responsibility to investigate the facts thoroughly, to find the culprits and to punish them in accordance with the law and the requirements of international human rights law.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 149
The murders
Shortly after 7 p.m. on 2 December 1980, members of the National Guard of El Salvador arrested four churchwomen as they were leaving Comalapa International Airport. Churchwomen Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan were taken to an isolated spot where they were shot dead at close range.
Two of the four murdered churchwomen, Ita Ford and Maura Clarke, worked in Chalatenango and were returning from Nicaragua. The other two had come from La Libertad to pick them up at the airport.
The arrests were planned in advance. Approximately two hours before the churchwomen's arrival, National Guard Deputy Sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Alemán informed five of his subordinates that they were to arrest some people who were coming from Nicaragua.
Colindres then went to the San Luis Talpa command post to warn the commander that, if he heard some disturbing noises, he should ignore them, because they would be the result of an action which Colindres and his men would be carrying out.
Once the members of the security forces had brought the churchwomen to an isolated spot, Colindres returned to his post near the airport. On returning to the place where they had taken the churchwomen, he told his men that he had been given orders to kill the churchwomen.
The investigation
1. The burial
The next morning, 3 December, the bodies were found on the road. When the justice of the peace arrived, he immediately agreed that they should be buried, as local commissioner José Dolores Meléndez had indicated. Accordingly, local residents buried the churchwomen's bodies in the vicinity.
The United States Ambassador, Robert White, found out on 4 December where the churchwomen's bodies were. As a result of his intervention and once authorization had been obtained from the justice of the peace, the corpses were exhumed and taken to San Salvador. There, a group of forensic doctors refused to perform autopsies on the grounds that they had no surgical masks.
2. The Rogers-Bowdler mission
Between 6 and 9 December 1980, a special mission arrived in San Salvador, headed by Mr. William D. Rogers, a former official in the Administration of President Gerald Ford, and Mr. William G. Bowdler, a State Department official.
They found no direct evidence of the crime, nor any evidence implicating the Salvadorian authorities. They concluded that the operation had involved a cover-up of the murders. 150 They also urged the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to play an active role in the investigation. 151
3. The Monterrosa commission and the Zepeda investigation
The Government Junta put Colonel Roberto Monterrosa in charge of an official commission of investigation. Colonel Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Director-General of the National Guard, put Major Lizandro Zepeda 152 in charge of another investigation. Neither official took the case seriously or sought to resolve it. Subsequently, Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr., appointed by the United States Secretary of State, carried out a third investigation. It found that the purpose of the two previous investigations had been to establish a written precedent clearing the Salvadorian security forces of blame for the killings. 153
(a) The Monterrosa commission
Colonel Monterrosa admitted that his commission had ruled out the possibility that security forces had been involved in the crime; to have acknowledged it would have created serious difficulties for the armed forces.
In fact, Monterrosa kept back the evidence implicating Colindres. In February 1981, he sent the United States Embassy the fingerprints of three out of four National Guard members from whom the commission had taken statements. However, none of them appeared to have been involved in the murders. Colonel Monterrosa failed to provide the fingerprints of the fourth man, Colindres, from whom testimony had also apparently been taken. Judge Tyler therefore concluded that Colonel Monterrosa had not forwarded Colindres' fingerprints because he knew from Major Zepeda that Colindres was responsible for the executions. 154
(b) The Zepeda investigation
Major Zepeda reported that there was no evidence that members of the National Guard had executed the churchwomen. 155 According to testimony, Major Zepeda personally took charge of covering up for the murderers by ordering them to replace their rifles so as not to be detected, and to remain loyal to the National Guard by suppressing the facts.
There is also sufficient evidence that Major Zepeda informed his superior, Vides Casanova, of his activities. 156
4. Resolution of the case
In April 1981, 157 the United States Embassy provided the Salvadorian authorities with evidence incriminating Colindres and his men. Despite the existence of evidence against Colindres, such as the presence of his fingerprints on the churchwomen's minibus, neither he nor his subordinates were charged with any crime. 158
In December 1981, Colonel Vides Casanova appointed Major José Adolfo Medrano to carry out a new investigation. In February 1982, one of the persons involved confessed his guilt and implicated the others, including Colindres. All of them were charged with the deaths of the churchwomen.
On 10 February, President Duarte, in a televised message, reported that the case had been resolved. He also gave to understand that Colindres and his men had acted independently and not on orders of a superior. In conclusion, he said that the Government was convinced that the accused were guilty. 159
The judicial process
1. The judicial investigation
The judicial investigation did not represent any substantial progress over what the Medrano working group had done. Nevertheless, under questioning by the FBI, Sergeant Dagoberto Martínez, then Colindres' immediate superior, admitted to having been told by Colindres himself about the churchwomen's murders and about his direct role in them. On that occasion, Martínez had warned Colindres not to say anything unless his superiors asked him about it. Martínez also said that he had not been aware that orders had been given by a superior. 160
2. The trial
On 23 and 24 May 1984, members of the National Guard were found guilty of the executions of the churchwomen and were sentenced to 30 years in prison. 161
It was the first time in Salvadorian history that a member of the armed forces had been convicted of murder by a judge. 162 Despite ambiguous statements by some of its official representatives, 163 the United States Government had made its economic and military aid contingent on a resolution of the case. 164
The involvement of senior officers
Although the Tyler Report concluded in 1983, "... based on existing evidence", 165 that senior officers had not been involved, the Commission believes that there is sufficient evidence to show that Colindres acted on orders of a superior.
There is also substantial evidence that Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, Commander of the Zacatecoluca detachment, was in charge of the National Guard at the national airport at the time when the murders of the churchwomen occurred.
General Vides Casanova and Colonel Casanova Vejar have denied any personal involvement in the arrest and execution or in the subsequent cover up of the crime. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that both General Vides Casanova and Colonel Casanova Vejar knew that members of the National Guard had murdered the churchwomen, and that their efforts to impede the gathering of evidence adversely affected the judicial investigation.
Cooperation with the Commission on the Truth
On several occasions from October 1992 onwards, the judge of the First Criminal Court of Zacatecoluca, Mr. Pleitus Lemus, refused to cooperate with the Commission on the Truth and to provide the evidence and the full court dossiers of the case. He transmitted only a condensed version which does not include testimony and other critical evidence on the possible involvement of senior officers 166 in the case.
It was only after much insisting that, on 8 January 1993, the Commission finally obtained all the dossiers of the case from the Supreme Court, barely a week before its mandate expired.
FINDINGS
The Commission on the Truth finds that:
1. There is sufficient evidence that:
(a) The arrest of the churchwomen at the airport was planned prior to their arrival.
(b) In arresting and executing the four churchwomen, Deputy Sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres Alemán was acting on orders of a superior.
2. There is substantial evidence that:
(a) Then Colonel Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Director-General of the National Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, Commander of the Zacatecoluca military detachment, Colonel Roberto Monterrosa, Major Lizandro Zepeda Velasco and Sergeant Dagoberto Martínez, among other officers, knew that members of the National Guard had committed the murders and, through their actions, facilitated the cover up of the facts which obstructed the corresponding judicial investigation.
(b) The Minister of Defence at the time, General José Guillermo García, made no serious effort to conduct a thorough investigation of responsibility for the murders of the churchwomen.
(c) Local commissioner José Dolores Meléndez also knew of the murders and covered up for the members of the security forces who committed them.
3. The State of El Salvador failed in its obligation under international human rights law to investigate the case, to bring to trial those responsible for ordering and carrying out the executions and, lastly, to compensate the victims' relatives.
(d) EL JUNQUILLO
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
On 3 March 1981, a military operation took place in the north of the Department of Morazán. Units under Captain Carlos Napoleón Medina Garay arrived at El Junquillo and stayed there for 8 to 12 days. On leaving, Captain Medina Garay ordered the execution of the civilian population in El Junquillo canton.
On 12 March 1981, soldiers and members of the Cacaopera civil defence unit attacked the population, consisting solely of women, young children and old people. They killed the inhabitants and raped a number of women and little girls under the age of 12. They set fire to houses, cornfields and barns.
The Commission finds that:
1. On 12 March 1981, units of the Military Detachment at Sonsonate and members of the civil defence unit at Cacaopera indiscriminately attacked and summarily executed men, women and children of El Junquillo canton in the district of Cacaopera, Department of Morazán.
2. Captain Carlos Napoleón Medina Garay ordered the execution of the inhabitants of El Junquillo canton.
3. Colonel Alejandro Cisneros, the military commander in charge of the operation carried out in March 1981 in northern Morazán, involving units from Military Detachment No. 6 at Sonsonate under the command of Captain Medina Garay, failed in his duty to investigate whether troops under his command had executed members of the civilian population of El Junquillo canton.
4. The Government and the judiciary of El Salvador failed to conduct investigations into the incident. The State thus failed in its duty under international human rights law to investigate, bring to trial and punish those responsible and to compensate the victims or their families.
5. The Minister of Defence and Public Security, General René Emilio Ponce, is responsible for failing to provide this Commission with information on the military operation carried out in the area of El Junquillo canton, thereby failing to honour the obligation to cooperate with the Commission on the Truth entered into by the Government when it signed the peace agreements, and thus for preventing the identification of other soldiers who took part in the massacre.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 167
The massacre
On 3 March 1981, a military operation was launched in northern Morazán, with Colonel Alejandro Cisneros in charge. In the course of the operation, soldiers from the Military Detachment at Sonsonate, under the command of Captain Carlos Napoleón Medina Garay, went to El Junquillo.
The unit set up camp in the El Junquillo area, where it remained for 8 to 12 days. According to the testimony received, as the unit was preparing to withdraw to a different location, Captain Medina Garay ordered another officer to do the job they had agreed on before leaving the hamlet.
On the night of 11 March 1981, soldiers occupied the hills near El Junquillo canton. The next day, they shelled the canton for 15 minutes. After the shelling, soldiers entered the canton in large numbers and closed in on the houses.
According to the testimony, soldiers and civil defence members proceeded to kill the following persons: Francisca Díaz, her daughters Juana and Santana Díaz, and nine children all under the age of 10; Guillerma Díaz, her 13-year-old daughter María Santos Díaz, and five children under the age of 12; Doroteo Chicas Díaz, his wife and his one-day-old son, and seven children under the age of 10; Eulalio Chicas, his wife and his three sons; Rosa Ottilia Díaz, her daughter-in-law María Argentina Chicas Chicas, and the children who were present; Santos Majín Chicas, his wife and his daughters Lencha aged 12 and Gertrudis aged 9; Tránsito Chicas, aged 58, and Filomena Chicas, aged 68; Luciano Argueta, his wife Ufemia Sánchez, and two sons, under the age of seven; Leopoldo Chicas, an 80-year-old man, and Esteban and Vicente Argueta, both aged over 70; and Petronila and two of her sons, under the age of 11. Some of the victims were shot in the back of the head; some of the children's bodies had knife wounds in the chest and bullet holes in the back of the head. In some cases, the bodies had been burned. According to testimony, some of the women and little girls had been raped.
The soldiers and civil defence members set fire to the houses in the hamlet and to cornfields and barns. They stole some of the corn which the farmers had stored and killed a number of animals.
The survivors fled. The next day, a peasant returned to see what had happened. In the house of Doroteo Chicas, he saw the dead bodies of the Chicas children. The soldiers noticed he was there and shot at him several times. He fled to the hills to hide. One survivor of the massacre returned to the canton to try to bury the victims. As the soldiers were still occupying the canton, he went back into hiding.
The survivors stayed in hiding in the hills for several days. One of them found the remains of a number of people. The survivors dug several mass graves where they buried the remains.
One survivor went to a guerrilla camp at La Guacamaya, where he recounted the episode to a priest, who took care of him.
Total absence of official investigations
When it heard about the survivors' reports, FMLN condemned the massacre on Radio Venceremos and in various statements and press releases.
Despite these public complaints, the Government, the armed forces and the judiciary of El Salvador made no attempt to investigate the incident.
FINDINGS
The Commission finds that:
1. There is substantial evidence that on 12 March 1981, units of the Military Detachment at Sonsonate and members of the civil defence unit at Cacaopera indiscriminately attacked and summarily executed men, women and children of El Junquillo canton in the district of Cacaopera, Department of Morazán.
2. There is sufficient evidence to show that Captain Carlos Napoleón Medina Garay ordered the execution of the inhabitants of El Junquillo canton.
3. There is sufficient evidence to show that Colonel Alejandro Cisneros, the military commander in charge of the operation carried out in March 1981 in northern Morazán, involving units from Military Detachment No. 6 at Sonsonate under the command of Captain Medina Garay, failed in his duty to investigate whether troops under his command had executed members of the civilian population of El Junquillo canton.
4. There is full evidence that the Government, the armed forces and the judiciary of El Salvador failed to conduct investigations into the incident. The State thus failed in its duty under international human rights law to investigate, bring to trial and punish those responsible and to compensate the victims or their families.
5. The Minister of Defence and Public Security, General René Emilio Ponce, is responsible for failing to provide this Commission with information on the military operation carried out in the area of El Junquillo canton, thereby failing to honour the obligation to cooperate with the Commission on the Truth entered into by the Government when it signed the peace agreements, and thus far preventing the identification of other soldiers who took part in the massacre.
(e) THE DUTCH JOURNALISTS
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
On the afternoon of 17 March 1982, four Dutch journalists accompanied by five or six members of FMLN, some of them armed, were ambushed by a patrol of the Atonal Battalion of the Salvadorian armed forces while on their way to territory under FMLN control. The incident occurred not far from the San Salvador-Chalatenango road, near the turn off to Santa Rita. The four journalists were killed in the ambush and only one member of FMLN survived. Having analysed the evidence available, the Commission on the Truth has reached the conclusion that the ambush was set up deliberately to surprise and kill the journalists and their escort; that the decision to ambush them was taken by Colonel Mario A. Reyes Mena, Commander of the Fourth Infantry Brigade, with the knowledge of other officers; that no major skirmish preceded or coincided with the shoot-out in which the journalists were killed; and, lastly, that the officer named above and other soldiers concealed the truth and obstructed the judicial investigation.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS
The days before the ambush
A large number of foreign journalists were in El Salvador to cover the 1982 elections to the Constituent Assembly. The political situation in the country had aroused the interest of world public opinion. 168
At that time, violence in the country was widespread. A number of journalists had received threats, presumably from death squads, and there had been accusations that their reporting favoured the guerrillas.
In March 1982, Koos Jacobus Andries Koster, a Dutch journalist, was in El Salvador making a report on the political and military situation in the country for the Dutch television company IKON. 169 Producer and editor Jan Cornelius Kuiper Joop, sound technician Hans Lodewijk ter Laag and cameraman Johannes Jan Willemsen, all of them Dutch nationals, had come from Holland especially to make the report.
The team was headed by Koster, who was familiar with the political situation in the country, spoke Spanish and had the necessary contacts, since he had been working in Latin America for years. 170
In 1980, Koster had produced a report on the civil defence units and the death squads which had had a great impact abroad. The Government had considered the report to be favourable to FMLN.
This latest report was to cover the situation in San Salvador and in a number of areas under FMLN control. According to diplomatic sources, it was "public knowledge" that the Dutch journalists were producing a report favourable to the guerrillas, similar to that of 1980.
On 7 March, as part of their work, the journalists visited Mariona prison in San Salvador to interview and film prisoners accused of belonging to the guerrilla forces. During a cultural event at the prison, one of the leaders thanked the journalists for their support for political prisoners in El Salvador. The videos filmed by the journalists included shots of prisoners' scars, which the prisoners said were the result of torture. 171
In order to make preliminary contact with FMLN, Koster met with an FMLN member. Koster gave the man a piece of paper with his name, nationality and where he could be reached. After the meeting, the guerrilla member was followed by several men. While attempting to escape over a fence, he apparently dropped his papers, where he had put the piece of paper for safe keeping.
According to a statement made by Francisco Antonio Morán, Director General of the Treasury Police, around that time Morán received a report from the Commander of the Military Detachment at Usulután 172 that a piece of paper had been found in the clothing of a dead subversive 173 which read: "Contact with Koos Koster at Hotel Alameda, room 418, tel. 239999, Dutch". As a result, Colonel Morán gave orders that Koster be brought to Treasury Police headquarters for questioning. 174
At around 6 a.m. on 11 March 1982, members of the Treasury Police in civilian clothing brought Koster and the three other journalists to Colonel Morán's office. 175 Colonel Morán asked Koster about the piece of paper. Koster denied knowing any terrorists in the country and explained that the information about him might have been provided by another journalist. 176 Before releasing the journalists, 177 Colonel Morán warned Koster to be careful because subversive elements knew that he was in the country. 178
The next day, 12 March, photographs of Koster and the three other journalists appeared in the newspaper, together with a press release from the Armed Forces Press Committee (COPREFA) containing a transcript of the interrogation. The article was headlined "Foreign journalist a contact for subversives" and the caption to Koster's photograph said that he had been summoned to make a statement to the Treasury Police because some of his personal papers had been found on terrorist Jorge Luis Méndez, along with a piece of paper identifying him as a "contact". 179
That same day, Dutch journalist Jan Pierre Lucien Schmeitz, who also worked for the company IKON, arrived in the country to cover the elections. Journalists of other nationalities told him that Koster had been arrested and taken to Treasury Police headquarters, accompanied by the three other Dutch journalists.
On the night of 12 March, the four journalists met with Schmeitz. Remembering what El Salvador had been like in 1977, Schmeitz advised them to be very careful of the possible consequences of the interrogation by Colonel Morán. In spite of everything, they decided to go on with their work. 180 Koster's FMLN contacts also urged him to leave the country for a while, but he consistently refused to postpone the journey he wanted to make for his report.
On Monday, 15 March, 181 Schmeitz lent them his minibus but did not offer to drive it. On Tuesday, 16 March, Armin Friedrich Wertz, an independent journalist of German nationality, agreed to act as driver for a fee of $100. That same day, Koster held a further meeting with members of FMLN, at which it was agreed that they would leave the next day, 17 March. Also present at the meeting, in addition to Koster's previous contacts, was "Commander Oscar", a member of the FDR/FMLN command in Chalatenango, who was to travel with them and could act as interpreter because he knew English.
On the night of 16 March, the journalists discovered that their rooms had been searched.
The journey to Chalatenango
On the morning of Wednesday, 17 March, they picked up Schmeitz's minibus, which had the words "PRENSA-TV" painted in large letters on the sides, as was customary in El Salvador. In the afternoon, the four journalists met up with Wertz and went to a restaurant car park, where they met "Commander Oscar" of FPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación) Forces. A boy named "Rubén", aged between 12 and 15, also arrived; he was the guide and the only one who knew where the meeting was to take place.
At around 3 p.m., they set out from San Salvador for Chalatenango, passing through the town of Aguilares. 182
A few kilometres before the El Paraíso barracks, Wertz noticed in the rear-view mirror that a dark brown Cherokee Chief jeep with tinted windows appeared to be following them. He slowed down, but the vehicle did not overtake; he then speeded up, but the vehicle stayed in sight. They continued on the Chalatenango road to about kilometre 65, where they took the turn-off to Santa Rita. About 1 kilometre before the turn-off, the Cherokee Chief disappeared from sight. 183
They had driven nearly 1 kilometre on the side road when they saw a group of people. Immediately "Rubén" got out of the minibus and signalled to them. 184 It was the contacts, who were waiting for them.
According to Wertz, the four members of the escort party were waiting on a piece of ground below the level of the dirt road and behind a barbed wire fence. One of them was carrying an automatic rifle, probably an FAL, the second a pistol, and the third a rifle of some kind. The fourth man was unarmed. According to a statement given by "Martín", 185 the man in charge of the escort who was armed with an M-1 rifle, he went to meet the journalists with two other men, "Carlos", who had an M-16, and "Tello", who was carrying a 9-mm pistol.
When they approached the vehicle, Wertz apparently agreed with "Martín" that he would return to pick up the group at 8 a.m. on Sunday, 21 March. 186 The journalists unloaded their equipment and, at around 5.10 p.m., took a path leading into a hollow opposite a hill.
Wertz says he then returned to San Salvador with the radio on high volume and neither saw soldiers nor heard shots during the journey. 187
The ambush
According to "Martín" he was given the order to go and meet the group on 14 March 1982. He knew "Commander Oscar" and "Rubén". He also knew that the others were foreign journalists. He took seven men and left base camp at 4 p.m. the next day, 15 March. 188
At around 5 a.m. on 17 March, the escort party reached a refuge 2 kilometres from the meeting place. Two men went out to reconnoitre the area over a radius of 1 kilometre, but found nothing unusual.
In their statements, "Martín" said that he had never had any problems on that route in the past, 189 but Colonel Mario A. Reyes Mena said that the army had information that the route was being used to supply nearby guerrilla camps. During the trial, "Commander Miguel Castellanos", a former member of FMLN, said that the route was known to the army. 190
When the escort arrived at the agreed place, the journalists put on their rucksacks, took the rest of their equipment and set off overland.
According to "Martín", the group was walking in a single file, at a distance of 4 metres apart. "Commander Oscar" led the way, followed by "Rubén", Martín was among the journalists, and "Carlos" brought up the rear with his M-16. 191 They had gone about 250 metres when they came under heavy fire from M-16 rifles and M-60 machine-guns, coming from two hills about 100 metres away. Martín saw two of the journalists fall to the ground. They were hit by the first shots and never moved again. 192 He headed towards the road, dodging the soldiers' fire, climbed over the barbed wire fence and escaped. 193
Most of "Martín"'s account was confirmed by the statement made by Sergeant Mario Canizales Espinoza, who was in command of the military patrol that staged the ambush. 194 The sergeant also said that he noticed that some members of the group were carrying equipment and were taller than the average Salvadorian; at the time, however, it did not occur to him that they might be foreigners and he assumed that they were armed. He added that, towards the end of the shoot-out, he noticed that two of the tall men were attempting to escape towards the river-bed. He came down the hill in pursuit of them and shot and killed them with his M-16 from a distance of about 25 metres. In his statements, he said he did not know for certain whether the men had been armed. 195
The statements by the sergeant and the soldiers differ in some respects from those made by "Martín", as well as among themselves. They claim that the first shots were fired from a hill by FMLN guerrillas and that the shoot-out with the group of journalists and their escorts was part of a larger skirmish involving a second group of FMLN combatants. As indicated below, these statements do not appear to be true.
Origin of the patrol
According to the statements by Sergeant Mario Canizales Espinoza, the patrol he was commanding consisted of 25 soldiers and had been sent to inspect the area because information had been received that it was being used as a supply route for the guerrillas. According to the sergeant, his men had set the ambush because, just before the encounter, they had seen a small group of armed guerrillas heading towards the Santa Rita road and had decided to surprise them on their return. He denies having any prior knowledge that a particular group would be using that route or that it would include foreign journalists. 196
This version of events is essentially the same as the one which subsequently appeared in the press release issued by the Armed Forces Press Committee (COPREFA).
However, according to statements made to the Commission on the Truth by officers stationed at the El Paraíso barracks at the time, a meeting was held in which officers of the General Staff of the Fourth Brigade, including its Commander, Colonel Mario A. Reyes Mena, and officers of the Atonal Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalion (BIRI) took part. According to those interviewed, the ambush was planned at that meeting, on the basis of precise intelligence data indicating that the journalists would try to enter the zone controlled by FMLN via that route the next day. 197 The mission was entrusted to a patrol from the Atonal Battalion, which left the El Paraíso barracks at 5 a.m. on 17 March in order to avoid detection and remained in the hills all day awaiting the group's arrival.
Subsequent events
Sergeant Canizales says that, when the ambush was over, he informed barracks by radio of the outcome. 198 Colonel Reyes Mena 199 then dispatched a vehicle patrol which, when it arrived at the scene, found the eight bodies. 200 The lieutenant in command sent some of his men for the Santa Rita justice of the peace, who arrived half an hour later.
According to one officer of the detachment, the lieutenant's decision to notify the justice of the peace and take the bodies to the El Paraíso barracks surprised and greatly annoyed Colonel Reyes Mena. In the end, however, Colonel Reyes Mena decided to inform the General Staff.
The next morning, 18 March, the judicial inquiry continued at the El Paraíso barracks. 201 Because of his physical features, "Commander Oscar" was taken for a foreigner and his body was sent with those of the Dutch journalists to San Salvador.
According to Schmeitz, at around 9 a.m. he received a telephone call from Howard Lane, press attaché at the United States Embassy in El Salvador, confirming that his four colleagues were dead. 202 He later went to COPREFA, where an official handed out a statement explaining briefly that the journalists had been killed in cross-fire during a clash between guerrillas and the army. 203
When Schmeitz was back in his hotel room, he received a threatening phone call telling him to "stop his inquiries and leave the country, because there was a fifth coffin ready for him". He received three more such calls in the course of that night. On 20 March, Schmeitz left El Salvador.
In the days that followed, the Dutch Ambassador met with a member of the Revolutionary Government Junta to transmit his country's request to the Salvadorian authorities that it be allowed to conduct a full investigation into the incident. One key element would be to interview the sergeant and soldiers who staged the ambush, but the Salvadorian Government would not give authorization for this. In its second report, the Dutch Commission of inquiry noted that "at the request of the Government of the Netherlands, the United States Government endorsed this request to the Salvadorian authorities". 204
"Martín", the guerrilla who survived the ambush, was taken to Holland, where he testified on 4 and 5 May 1982. Subsequently, on 19 May, the Dutch commission interviewed the sergeant at length in private. 205
The judicial proceedings on the case came to a halt in 1988, when the judge, Dora del Carmen Gómez de Claros, sought and obtained asylum abroad. In a letter, she said that she had received anonymous threats.
The Commission requested a copy of the dossier from Margarita de los Angeles Fuente Sanabria, the current judge of the Court of First Instance at El Dulce Nombre de María, Chalatenango. Although initially prepared to hand over the dossier, she later said that she had received instructions that the Commission should apply to the President of the Supreme Court of Justice for a copy. The Commission repeatedly telephoned and wrote to Mr. Mauricio Gutiérrez Castro, President of the Supreme Court of El Salvador, requesting a copy, but received no answer. It was the Chief State Counsel of the Republic who transmitted a copy of his dossier to the Commission.
FINDINGS
1. The Commission on the Truth considers that there is full evidence that Dutch journalists Koos Jacobus Andries Koster, Jan Cornelius Kuiper Joop, Hans Lodewijk ter Laag and Johannes Jan Willemsen were killed on 17 March 1982 in an ambush which was planned in advance by the Commander of the Fourth Infantry Brigade, Colonel Mario A. Reyes Mena, with the knowledge of other officers at the El Paraíso barracks, on the basis of intelligence data alerting them to the journalists' presence, and was carried out by a patrol of soldiers from the Atonal BIRI, under the command of Sergeant Mario Canizales Espinoza.
2. These same officers, the sergeant and others subsequently covered up the truth and obstructed the investigations carried out by the judiciary and other competent authorities.
3. These murders violated international human rights law and international humanitarian law, which stipulates that civilians shall not be the object of attack.
4. The State failed in its obligation to investigate, bring to trial and punish the guilty parties, as required under international law.
5. The President of the Supreme Court, Mr. Mauricio Gutiérrez Castro, failed to cooperate with the Commission on the Truth.
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Posted by USIP Library on: January 26, 2001
Source: UN Security Council, Annex, From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 62-75.
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