PART THREE
Chapter One (A.2)

September through December 1973 (continued)

1. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OR PERSONS WORKING FOR THEM (continued)
   
   
   2. CASES
      
      We have organized the grave human rights violations committed by government agents or people working for them during this period according to the various regions in which they occurred. The fact that each region presents different features makes it convenient to group the material by regions. Each section begins with a brief account intended to provide an overview of what happened there. In order to be faithful to the order of the events themselves, we begin this section with the Metropolitan Region.
      
      
      1. Metropolitan Region
         
         
         1. Overview
            
            The Metropolitan Region is made up of what are currently the provinces of Santiago, Chacabuco, Cordillera, Maipo, Melipilla and Talagante. The political capital of the country, the seat of executive, legislative, and judicial power in 1973, is located in this region. Many of the events that took place starting on September 11, 1973 are related to that fact. It was there that events such as those around La Moneda Palace on the day of the military intervention and the arrests of the top leaders of the former government took place.
            
            This section deals with 493 cases of human rights violations that led to death or disappearance and were committed by government agents or persons working for them in the Metropolitan Region starting on September 11. The account includes some cases from 1974 in view of their similar features.
            
            On September 11, 1973, President Allende and his closest aides and the officials who worked in the government palace arrived earlier than usual. Very early in the morning they had received information of troop movements in Valparaiso. At dawn La Moneda Palace was surrounded by police forces, and witnesses say that the atmosphere inside was calm but expectant.
            
            At approximately 10:00 a.m. tanks of Armored Regiment No. 2 surrounded La Moneda Palace, and air force and army helicopters were flying over Santiago. After meeting with the president, who allowed them to make their own decision, the palace guard, the military aides, and bodyguards left La Moneda. Officials of the investigative police and members of the president's personal security guard decided to remain, as did the president's closest aides. Radio stations broadcast the first decrees of the military junta. One of them announced that La Moneda Palace had to be evacuated before 11:00 a.m. or it would be attacked by the Chilean Air Force.
            
            Over Radio Magallanes President Allende addressed the nation: "This will be my last opportunity to speak to you... Given these developments I can only say to the workers: I am not going to resign. Set upon a historic path, I will pay for my loyalty to the people with my life... These are my final words, and I am certain that my sacrifice will not be in vain..." A few hours later, the president of the republic kept that promise by taking his life inside La Moneda Palace.
            
            In view of the announcement that the Palace would be bombed at 11:00 a.m., the president ordered the women and administrative staff to leave. Approximately fifty people remained inside the building. The bombing of the government palace began at 11:52, setting it on fire. Thus began the events to be dealt with in this section on the Metropolitan Region, which is the political center of the country.
            
            On the whole we can say that the new military authorities did not encounter significant armed resistance in the region. There were only a few isolated events, primarily those that took place around the government palace on September 11 itself and in a few other places such as the La Legua shantytown. The armed forces' own internal reports, some of which the Commission examined, prove that this was the case. Thus the new military government's own internal assessment stated that "our actions in Lo Hermida were successful, and were supported by the people. There was no resistance to the search operations and no weapons were found." (Status Report on the Country No. 7, September 15, 1973, Ministry of National Defense, Military Junta, C.O.FF.AA. [Armed Forces Operational Command])
            
            One indication of the lack of resistance and armed clashes in the region is the fact that the army and police suffered about twenty-five casualties between September 11 and December 1973 and that approximately fifteen of them took place on the day of the coup itself.
            
            By September 13, the armed forces and the police had complete control over the region, and activities in business, industry, finance, education, and government administration slowly returned to normal. By the end of the month, these activities were completely normal. The military authorities themselves admitted as much when only three days after the military intervention they said that "businesses are slowly starting to function again" and that "public services are also returning to normal" (Status Report on the Country No. 4, September 14, 1973, Ministry of Defense, C.O.FF.AA).
            
            Certainly what has been said does not mean that there were not a few isolated and tiny points of armed resistance. As was noted before, these basically consisted of snipers in buildings near La Moneda Palace on September 11, and some other incidents that in no way affected military control over the region.
            
            The new authorities in the region were army officers, and it was their branch of the armed forces that took over political, military, and administrative control. Thus they had positions such as head of the zone under state of siege, the governorship, and other administrative positions.
            
            In its examination of events, the Commission found that members of the army and police were involved in activities of repression and controlling public order. Members of the air force were less involved in the intervention, and their activity was primarily focused in the area near the El Bosque air base. The Commission likewise noted in this region that the investigative police and more generally the intelligence services of the various branches of the armed forces were little involved in the events it studied. However, it was at this point that the first activities of the air force and army intelligence services were observed.
            
            Army troops from units outside this region were also involved in these incidents, for example, members of the Yungay Regiment of San Felipe and Guardia Vieja unit from Los Andes, which moved to Santiago during this first period. Territorially, the city of Santiago was divided into several zones, each of which was under the control of a particular group of military troops, generally those located in each sector.
            
            What can be observed of the police is that they generally acted in coordination with, jointly with, or subordinated to the army. In Paine and sporadically elsewhere in the region, civilians were significantly involved, either in turning in people, or directly in arresting them. That was the case in Paine where military personnel, police, and residents were involved in mass arrests of local peasants.
            
            During the first few days repressive action was aimed primarily at leaders of the left political parties, high ranking officials of the former government, members of President Allende's personal security guard, and government ministers. This situation began to change rapidly as repression then extended to include leftist union or neighborhood leaders, members of social organizations connected to the previous government, or simply neighbors whom other civilians denounced to the new military authorities.
            
            Our description of the victims would be incomplete unless we noted that a significant percentage of the cases during this period that the Commission considered were those of people who were not active in, or sympathetic with, any political organization and who lost their lives as the result of military operations that can be regarded as carried out with indiscriminate and abusive use of force against the civilian population. We should note in particular the case of foreigners who were targeted by the government. Many of them ultimately died or disappeared in custody. Nor can we omit the fact that some members of the armed forces were the victims of repression by the state, primarily due to their opposition to the new regime that arose on September 11, 1973.
            
            Most of those killed in this region during this period were younger than 30 and many were under 20. In a few extreme cases 14 or 15 year old children were killed in acts that violated their essential rights. The deaths of many victims were officially registered, even though in many instances their bodies were never turned over to their families.
            
            The series of government agents' actions that violated human rights began to occur on September 11 itself with the detention and subsequent disappearance or death of some of the people who were in La Moneda Palace, or in university or industrial sites, such as the State Technical University or in factories in what were known as the "industrial belts," where troops carried out raids and arrested people.
            
            During the next few days, raids were conducted in the various neighborhoods of the region, leading to massive arrests of people, some of whom were later killed or disappeared. Similar raids were carried out in various workplaces. Simply by way of example, we may mention arrests at the San Juan de Dios Hospital and in the Sumar, Aerolite, Elecmetal, and Mademsa factories, and in shantytowns such as La Bandera, La Legua, Roosevelt, Pablo Neruda and José María Caro, all of which are treated below.
            
            Newspaper accounts, the many eyewitness reports the Commission heard, and the reports of the armed forces themselves all indicate just how massive these operations were. Thus, for example, the status reports of the armed forces operational command on September 15 refer to an "air and land operation in Polpaico [in which] around two hundred persons were captured (sic)" and note that "raids on Lan Chile [airlines] and Palacio de Bellas Artes [theater and center of state supported cultural activities] yielded no results. The results of the raid on high rise building number 18 of the San Borja complex have not come in yet."
            
            After these operations the prisoners were transferred to the detention sites we are going to list. Some people were taken from there and executed, and their dead bodies were left on major streets throughout the city of Santiago and its environs. There were particularly large numbers of bodies left in places like the General San Martin Highway heading toward Los Andes, the road to Valparaiso near the Lo Prado Tunnel, and the intersection of Americo Vespucio and Avenida Grecia, the Metropolitan Cemetery and elsewhere.
            
            Of such sites the Mapocho River should be singled out. Bodies were left along its banks in areas near the Pedro de Valdivia, Pio Nono and Presidente Bulnes bridges and the area of what is today the Cerro Navia neighborhood. Out of humanitarian concern, local residents buried some of these bodies.
            
            At night staff members of the Medical Legal Institute and the General Cemetery of Santiago picked up the dead bodies of these people and took them to the institute for an autopsy. There the bodies remained for a varying length of time to allow the families to identify their loved ones. In some instances, military or police patrols took the bodies directly to the Medical Legal Institute.
            
            Unfortunately, the staff was not able to identify through fingerprints all the bodies they received and so many bodies were buried without being identified. It is difficult to arrive at an exact estimate of how many people died as a result of bullet wounds and were taken to the Santiago morgue.
            
            After remaining for a number of days at the Medical Legal Institute unclaimed bodies were taken to the General Cemetery of Santiago where they were buried anonymously in Lot 29 of the burial ground. The Commission gathered evidence that at least twice in subsequent years large numbers of the bodies buried in Lot 29 were removed. On one occasion they were taken to the common grave in the cemetery and on the other occasion to the crematorium, despite a 1978 judicial order forbidding such a removal.
            
            There were however, instances in which the killers did not leave the bodies in public sites, but hid them, as happened for example, in Lonquén in October, and often in Paine during 1973.
            
            Another procedure used was firing squad killings of those arrested together in a particular place, as happened, for example, on the Barriga upgrade near the Lo Prado Tunnel, at the Bulnes Bridge over the Mapocho River with one group of people arrested at Puente Alto, several times on the grounds of the base of the San Bernardo Infantry Regiment, in Peldehue with the people arrested at La Moneda, and in Lonquén and Paine.
            
            Deaths due to an unreasonable use of force during curfew or in carrying out repression in the streets were also characteristic of this period. Many people who were quite uninvolved in any political, labor union, or neighborhood activity suffered the consequences.
            
            This Commission encountered some cases of people who were abducted from medical facilities. Military or police personnel frequently visited such sites to check to see whether there were people with bullet wounds. Some of them later disappeared or died in the custody of their captors.
            
            In only one instance in this region was there official notification of the application of a death sentence ordered by a war tribunal. Likewise, in very few cases is there an official notification to the effect that prisoners had tried to flee or attacked military personnel. Often there is no official version at all.
            
            Torture of prisoners was common practice during this period, primarily during the interrogation sessions to which they were subjected in almost all detention sites in the Region. Beatings, abuse, and other inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners were also common procedure.
            
            Finally it should be pointed out that these practices occurred mainly around September and October 1973. In November they began to diminish markedly and then began to increase again with different characteristics around March 1974.
            
            Immediately after the events of September 11, the armed forces did not have enough sites properly set up to serve as detention centers. Hence during the first few hours they used transitory sites like the Ministry of Defense, the Military Academy, and the Tacna Regiment base. The Ministry of Defense served particularly as a temporary place for holding some of the people arrested on September 11. Witnesses testified to the Commission that torture was used at Defense Ministry sites. The Military Academy was also used temporarily. Some of the people being held at the Ministry of Defense were sent there, and were later transferred to Dawson Island in the Twelfth Region. Some foreigners were also held here and later sent to the Tacna Regiment base. That base served as a prison for all the troops of the investigative police who were in La Moneda when army troops entered on September 11, along with members of President Allende's security guard, who were held in the stables there. Later they were taken out to be executed, presumably in Peldehue on September 13.
            
            The National Stadium was prepared on September 12 and 13, and it then became by far the largest detention site in this region with more than seven thousand detainees by September 22 according to the International Red Cross. Between two and three hundred of these were foreigners from a variety of nations. This site fell under the command of an army officer. People from all over Santiago, who had been arrested in many different circumstances, were transferred there.
            
            Those held in the National Stadium slept in the dressing rooms and the tower room. These places had no beds, although the places set up for women had mattresses. Some international humanitarian organizations later donated blankets but they were still insufficient for the large number of people imprisoned there. The prisoners were held completely incommunicado, and were permitted no visits from relatives, lawyers, or anyone from outside. Family members were only allowed to bring them clothing and food.
            
            People spent most of the day sitting in the stands of the stadium. A hooded individual went around pointing out left activists, who were then set apart from the other prisoners. Years later it was determined that this hooded person was a former Socialist party activist who worked with the security services of the military regime. In 1977 he quit and went to a human rights agency to testify. On October 24, 1977 his dead body with many knife wounds was found in an empty lot in the La Florida neighborhood.
            
            There is information on the practice of torture and abuse of prisoners in the National Stadium. For example, the room for medical treatment was sometimes used for this purpose. Firing squads were simulated and other cruel techniques were employed. As a rule the prisoners were subjected to constant and intense interrogation.
            
            In its report on a number of visits to the National Stadium between September and October 1973, the International Red Cross notes that "several prisoners complained of mistreatment and torture, at the time of their arrest and during interrogation. The representatives and medical representatives of the IRCC (International Red Cross Committee) have found that many prisoners show signs of having undergone psychological and physical torture." The document goes on to cite some of these cases.
            
            This Commission also concluded that a number of executions took place inside the National Stadium, and that in a number of instances persons imprisoned there were taken out and killed. Such was the case of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, both United States citizens.
            
            On the morning of September 12, the Chile Stadium, located near the central train station in Santiago, also began to serve as a detention site. An army officer was likewise in charge. The first prisoners to arrive were approximately six hundred people arrested on the grounds of the State Technical University. They were later joined by prisoners from the so-called "industrial belts." Credible witnesses testified to the Commission that torture was constantly used on those held in the Chile Stadium. On September 14, 1973, prisoners were transferred en masse from the Chile Stadium to the National Stadium, which because of its size could accommodate more people.
            
            As was the case in the National Stadium, the prisoners in the Chile Stadium were not permitted any contact with people outside the stadium and were subjected to a harsh and severe disciplinary control. Prisoners were divided in accordance with their importance in the estimation of military officials. Evidence available indicates that much of the interrogation was done by personnel of the army's intelligence service. People who were held in this stadium have all said that the lights were left on permanently and that meals were deliberately served at irregular hours, in order to make the prisoners lose their sense of time. Some prisoners in the Chile Stadium were later taken out, executed, and their corpses were left in public places. Such was the case, for example, of the former Director of Prisons, Littré Quiroga Carvajal.
            
            Other detention sites were the Cultural Center in Barrancas (now Pudahuel) and the Barros Arana National Institute in the Quinta Normal neighborhood, where a contingent of the Yungay Regiment from San Felipe was quartered. The army was in charge at the cultural center. Several prisoners taken out from there were later executed. The military unit stationed there was part of the School for Subofficers and they were joined by some troops from the Yungay Regiment from San Felipe. The people taken to Quinta Normal were basically from the west-central area of Santiago. That was the case, for example, of all the employees at San Juan de Dios Hospital, who were subsequently executed and left under the Bulnes Bridge over the Mapocho River.
            
            Although the military authorities never acknowledged it, the San Bernardo Infantry Regiment base also served as a detention site. Inside was Chena Hill, where many prisoners from the area of San Bernardo and Paine were executed. Some of the bodies were sent to the Medical Legal Institute; their autopsy documents registered the fact that their corpses came from that base. Many kinds of torture were practiced there.
            
            The air force used sites within the Air War Academy to hold prisoners, and sometimes temporarily used the El Bosque air base. All the people processed in war tribunal record 1-73 of the air force were imprisoned there. The prisoners were generally questioned by members of the air force intelligence service, and it has been established that torturing the prisoners was common practice.
            
            One of the detention sites used in the Metropolitan Region in 1973 was the building at Calle Londres No. 38, which before September 11 belonged to the Socialist party. The DINA would later use it as a clandestine prison.
            
            Evidence indicates that in October 1973 a group of people who had been arrested at the San Borja neighborhood in Santiago were taken to the site on Calle Londres for a few hours and were subsequently taken to the cultural center in Barrancas. Likewise, it has been established that in December some Communist party activists were taken to that address. Newspapers at the time connected them to what was supposedly a subversive plan code-named "Leopard." They were subsequently executed.
            
            The area known as Cerrillos Park, where the International Trade Fair of Santiago is held every year, was also used as a temporary detention site. Some prisoners are known to have disappeared from there. This fairgrounds had been conditioned to enable the army to camp there.
            
            We should also mention that many police stations and other military installations throughout the region were used to hold people. There were so many of these that it would be difficult to list them.
            
            Finally, it is known that in some cases prisoners were transferred to the prison camp in Tejas Verdes, which was part of the Military Engineering School there, or to the Artillery School in Linares, both of which are outside the Metropolitan Region.
            
            

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Posted by USIP Library on: October 4 2002
Source: Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), vol. I/II, Part Three, Chapter One (A.2.a.1), 146-153.
Note: Digitized and posted by permission of the University of Notre Dame Press, February 22, 2000.