Part III: Investigation of the Assassination

105. In order to establish the facts regarding the assassination of President Ndadaye, as mandated by Resolution 1012, the Commission had of necessity to investigate the fact regarding the attempted coup d’Etat, in the course of which the assassination took place. But the coup d’Etat as such, while in itself a crime, was not an object of the Commission’s investigation.

106. While the Commission investigated the acts concerning the act of execution itself, which was carried out by soldiers in a military camp in Bujumbura, the main focus of its inquiry was to determine who had ordered the assassination, as well as whether it had been planned in advance as a part of the planning of the coup d’Etat and if so, who had participated in drawing up and carrying out the plan.

107. The Commission carried out its investigation by seeking and hearing testimony and seeking written or other evidence that could be pertinent to the inquiry. It sought to hear, among the military witnesses, both the officers, who had publicly alleged that the coup and assassination were carried out by mutinous soldiers and non-commissioned officers which they could not control, and as many of those soldiers and non-commissioned officers as possible.

108. The facts that were to be determined by the Commission had previously been related in the "Fédération internationale des Ligues des droits de l’homme" (FIDH) and the Aké/Huslid reports. The Commission obtained tapes of the pertinent testimony recorded by both Commissions, and heard the member of the FIDH Commission who had investigated the coup and assassination. These tapes, as well as documents supplied by FIDH were used as sources, but were not treated as evidence to support the Commission’s conclusions.

109. The Commission encountered unsurmountable difficulties in its efforts to obtain pertinent evidence. Since the assassination of President Ndadaye took place in the midst of a military coup, evidence had to be sought in military files and records and in the testimony of officers and enlisted men. The Commission, however, could neither inspect such files and records nor summon such witnesses directly, but had to proceed through the Burundian Ministry of Defense. A request for a transcript of records proved fruitless. So was the request for the names of the non-commissioned officers and men of the "1er Bataillon Parachutiste" and the "11e Bataillon Blindé", the units alleged to have revolted, and of the "2e Bataillon Commando", the unit responsible for the President’s protection.

110. With respect to military witnesses, the Commission sought since November 1995, an interview with the Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Firmin Sinzoyiheba. It was only on 23 January that, after repeated requests, the Commission was received by the Minister. The Minister promised to appoint a liaison officer, but only did so in February after a written reminder from the Commission. The Commission requested the appearance of 51 witnesses through the liaison officer, of which only 40 appeared. It could not request the appearance of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the above mentioned units, as the request for their names went unanswered and the officers who testified denied knowing their names. The appearance of military prisoners was obtained through the "Procureur général de la République" (Attorney General), Jean-Bosco Butasi. The Commission requested and obtained a list of those in prison for acts committed during the events of October 1993, although it had no means to verify its accuracy. Full cooperation was received in bringing these prisoners before the Commission.

111. An equally serious difficulty was the security situation in Burundi. Although nominally under the command of the civilian President, it is generally admitted that the Army is a power unto itself, and is publicly accused of being responsible not only for the coup and assassination, as well as the deadly repression that followed, but of being at present engaged, with total impunity, in the large scale killing of civilians. The Army, moreover, has undergone no change in its composition or command since the assassination of President Ndadaye.

112. Under these conditions, and having no means to offer protection or immunity to witnesses, the Commission could hardly expect testimony that could incriminate the Army. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that the Commission had no means to detect electronic surveillance of its offices a fact that could have been known or suspected by some of the witnesses themselves, and that at the door to the building which housed those offices, there was a guard of uniformed Gendarmes.

113. From 29 October to 20 December, all the members of the Commission worked jointly in the investigation both of the assassination and the massacres and other related serious acts of violence that followed it. On 9 January, the investigation of the assassination was assigned to Commissioners Herrera and Maurice, together with the investigation in the Province of Gitega. On 7 February, it was assigned to the President and Commissioner Güney. On 23 April, Commissioner Güney absented himself from Burundi, and work on the investigation was assigned to Commissioner Maurice. Upon Commissioner Güney’s return, on 9 May, he resumed work on the investigation and Commissioner Maurice went back to work on Gitega. When Commissioner Güney resigned from the Commission on 16 May, Commissioner Maurice was once more assigned to the investigation, on which he worked until its conclusion.

114. In the course of the investigation, members of the Commission heard witnesses in Uganda, France and Côte d’Ivoire. The Commission heard in all 61 military and 25 civilian witnesses.

A. 3 July 1993

115. On 3 July 1993, a coup was attempted by soldiers of the "2e Bataillon Commando" (2e Commando, Second Commando Battalion), shortly before President Melchior Ndadaye was to be sworn in. The coup failed, and several officers and men were ordered arrested, among them, Lt. Col. Sylvestre Ningaba, who had been "Chef de Cabinet" of President Buyoya, Major Bernard Buzokosa, Major Jean Rumbete, Capt. René Bucumi, Capt. François-Xavier Nintunze and Commander Hilaire Ntakiyica.

B. 10 July 1993

116. President Ndadaye was sworn in on 10 July 1993, and took up residence in the former presidential palace. The palace is situated in the middle of extensive grounds, surrounded by a high wall, on the northwest corner of the intersection of two wide avenues in the center of the city. To the north of the palace stands the former Meridien Hotel, now source du Nil. A golf course extends beyond the western and part of the northern outer wall.

C. 11 October 1993

117. At around 11 a.m., Lt. Gratien Rukindikiza, Chief of the President’s bodyguards, according to his own testimony, was ordered by Lt. Col. Jean Bikomagu, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, to leave for Mauritius on the afternoon of the same day, in order to prepare the President’s attendance at a meeting of francophone heads of State that was to take place from 16 to 18 October. Bikomagu also ordered him not to return before 21 October, without giving any reasons. Before leaving Bujumbura, Rukindikiza told Lt. Col. Pascal Simbanduku, President of the "Cour militaire" (Military Court) that he suspected a coup was being prepared, mentioning the names of certain officers, including Lucien Rufyiri and Somisi.

D. Monday, 18 October 1993

118. President Ndadaye returned from the summit in Mauritius on 18 October.

119. On that day, the Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Charles Ntakije, was informed by the Chef d’Etatmajor (Chief of the General Staff) of the Gendarmerie, Lt. Col. Epitace Bayaganakandi, that there were reliable reports that a coup was in preparation. Persistent rumors about this coup had begun to circulate the same day.

E. Tuesday, 19 October 1993

120. President Ndadaye held a meeting of the Council of Ministers on Tuesday 19 October, which lasted all day, and went on the following day until evening.

F. Wednesday, 20 October 1993

121. On Wednesday, 20 October, Major Dieudonné Nzehimana, Head of military intelligence, told his superiors that there was tension among some soldiers in the capital.

122. At around 1 p.m., the Commander of the "2e Bataillon Commando", Major Isaïe Nibizi, whose unit provided the men for the presidential guard, inquired whether the President's wife was still at the palace and was told that she was.

123. At around 4 p.m., Major Isaïe Nibizi, the Commander of the "2e Bataillon Commando" requested an urgent meeting with the President's Chef de Cabinet, Frédéric Ndayegamiye, and told him that elements of the "1er Bataillon Parachutiste" (1er Para, First Airborne Battalion) and the "1le Bataillon Blindé" (11e Blindé, Eleventh Armored Battalion), which shared the same quarters in Camp Para, were preparing to stage a coup, that they were very excited, that they intended to arrest some political figures and worried that they might have fled. Major Nibizi said he had informed the "Etat-major général" of the Army that a coup was imminent. He asked Ndayegamiye to provide him with an unmarked car in order to make a tour of inspection of the units concerned.

124. Ndayegamiye then contacted Bikomagu and asked him to verify the rumors. Bikomagu told him that he had visited the "1er Para" himself and had found everything normal. He gave assurances that nothing would happen.

125. In the afternoon several persons, including unit commanders, reported to Bikomagu that an imminent coup was rumored. The imminence of a coup was discussed at the "mess des officiers" (officers' mess).

126. The President's political and diplomatic adviser, Antoine Ntamobwa, was told at 5 p.m. by the Chef d'Etat-major of the Gendarmerie, Lt. Col. Bayaganakandi, that a coup by the "1er Para" and "11e Blindé" would take place at 2 a.m. next day. He tried without success to contact the Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Ntakije, who was at the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

127. At around 6 p.m., Lt. Joseph Rugigana of the "2e Commando" was told by Capt. Idelphonse Mushwabure, of the same unit, that something was afoot and that he should remain on the alert.

128. Major Nibizi ordered some of his men to be on the lookout and to warn all positions. At around 8 p.m., he ordered Capt. Mushwabure to go and assume command of the presidential guard at the palace. Mushwabure contacted his subordinate officer, Lt. Gabriel Bigabari, who was at the palace at the head of the detachment of the presidential guard there, and ordered him to put all his men on alert, prepare all weapons and take all necessary security measures pending his arrival.

129. The Council of Ministers ended at 9 p.m. At that time, Ntakije was informed by presidential adviser Ntamobwa of his earlier conversation with Bayaganakandi. He was told that the coup would be launched at 2 a.m. in the night of 21 October, by elements of the "1er Para" and the "11e Blindé".

130. President Ndadaye was informed of the imminence of a coup by his Minister of Communication, Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, and had this information confirmed by the Minister of Defense, in the presence of the political and diplomatic attaché. The President requested that Ningaba, who was in prison for the 3 July coup, be transferred to another prison but the Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Ntakije, reassured him, saying that the prison guard would be reinforced by the Gendarmerie.

131. The President arrived at the palace around 9.30 p.m. and told Mrs. Ndadaye that, according to the Minister of Communication, there would be a coup during the night. He appeared worried and left his cellular phone on when he retired for the night.

132. When the Secretary of State in charge of security at the Ministry of Defense, Lt. Col. Lazare Gakoryo got home, he was told that Bikomagu had phoned him. He tried without success to reach him on the telephone.

133. At around 9.30 p.m., Minister Ntakije stopped by at the officers' mess, on his way to a meeting, to look for the commanders of the "1er Para" and "11e Blindé". He only found the commander of the "1er Para", Major Juvénal Juvénal Niyoyunguruza, who assured him that he had heard nothing out of the ordinary and who minimized the danger. The Minister told him to watch the situation closely together with the Commander of the "11e Blindé". He recommended both spend the night in camp with their respective units.

134. At about 10 p.m., Ntakije held a meeting with Bikomagu, Bayaganakandi, Nibizi, Major Ascension Twagiramungu, Head of the operations section, Major Nzehimana and another officer in charge of information in the general staff of the Gendarmerie. It was decided that measures would be taken to contain any action by the troops and that Twamiramungu would keep Ntakije informed. These measures included sending units from the "2e Commando" which had several armored cars, to guard the bridges on the River Muha and thus prevent any armored car from reaching the presidential palace. No measures were taken to stop the foot soldiers, who could easily cross the river at any point. There is conflicting testimony regarding whether Ntakije informed the President of the result of this meeting.

135. Around 11 p.m., Major Niyoyunguruza telephoned Major Sophonie Kibati, officer on guard at the Etat-major of the Army, to report unusual activity in Camp Para, and was told to hide the keys to the armory.

136. At 11 p.m., Capt. Mushwabure arrived at the presidential palace after stopping on his way at the home of Capt. Térence Cishahayo, an officer of the "2e Commando", to tell him to return to his unit. Mushwabure took over command from Lt. Bigabari, put the detachment on alert, and informed the President that the imminence of a coup had been confirmed.

137. At about 11.30 p.m., Lt. Léonidas Sindarusiba, of the "2e Commando", arrived at Camp Muha, where his unit was quartered; he met Major Nibizi and Lt. Rugigana in the canteen. Major Nibizi asked them to stand ready since a coup was in preparation.

138. At about the same time, Lt. Col. Gakoryo spoke on the phone with Lt. Col. Bikomagu, and was told by him there had been considerable tension that afternoon among soldiers of the "1er Para" and "11e Blindé" and that they had even threatened their officers. Gakoryo asked whether arrangements had been made to ensure that the soldiers did not cross the bridges on the River Muha, which separates the military camps from the city center. Bikomagu replied that the "2e Commando" would defend the bridges. Gakoryo then telephoned Lt. Col. Bayaganakandi, who confirmed this information.

139. Shortly before midnight, Major Daniel Ningeri, Commander of Camp Base (the armed forces base camp), who was at home, heard shots. Testimony is contradictory as to whether he at that time received a telephone call from Capt. Nicolas Ndihokubwayo, officer on guard in Camp Base, informing him that soldiers had forced their way into Camp Base and compelled drivers to take out the trucks.

140. Towards midnight, Major Nibizi gave orders to prepare the armored vehicles in order to defend the bridges on the River Muha. Before they had left, armored cars from the "11e Blindé" passed the Camp on their way to the center of the city. The armored cars of the "2e Commando" left the Camp under the command of Lt. Rugigana, with units of the "11e Blindé" ahead and behind them. Shots were heard from all directions.

G. Thursday, 21 October 1993 - Midnight to 2 a.m.:

a) At Camp Para

141. Camp Para, shared by the "1er Para" and "11e Blindé", is in the southern part of Bujumbura, at a distance of about four kilometers from the presidential palace. Camp Muha is some hundreds of meters away. The River Muha, which cuts across the city, is about one kilometer away, and is crossed by two bridges.

142. Most testimonies state that troop movements in Camp Para started before 1 a.m., although there are considerable contradictions as to time. The Commander of the "1er Para", Major Niyoyunguruza testified that soldiers, led by Corporal Juvénal Gahungu, broke into his office as early as 11 p.m., when he had just finished reporting on the situation to Major Kibati, the officer on guard at the Etat-major (Kibati, on his part stated that he received that he received the call around 2 a.m.). Niyoyunguruza states that he was then forced to remain in a garage.

143. Troops of the "1er Para", together with the armored cars of the "11e Blindé" left the Camp and proceeded directly without any opposition to the palace. Again, there are considerable contradictions as to the time, which is stated by most witnesses to be around 1.30 a.m.

144. Starting at about the same time, at least five detachments of soldiers and non-commissioned officers went out from Camp Para to set up military checkpoints throughout the city, to take the Etat-major of the Army, the air-force base, the radio station and the telephone company, to bring François Ngeze, a UPRONA Hutu parliamentarian who had been Minister of the Interior in Buyoya's Government, to bring Lts. Jean-Paul Kamana and Jean Ngomirikiza of the "11e Blindé", to capture several important FRODEBU Government officials, and to try to rally to their cause the soldiers at Camps Base, Ngagara, Kamenge and Muzinda. One of these detachments, according to all testimony but his own, was led by Corporal Gahungu who, on his part, testified he had never left the Camp that day. Witnesses state that Corporal Nzeyimana was with him.

b) At Camp Muha

145. Camp Muha, where the "2e Commando" is stationed, is located near the river from which it takes its name.

146. Major Nibizi ordered the four armored cars under his command to get ready to defend the bridges on the River Muha. Most testimonies state that this order was given around 1 a.m. The commander of the armored squadron, Lt. Rugigana, however, states that it was only at 1 a.m. that someone sent by Nibizi came to wake him up at home, where he was sleeping, to take him to the Camp.

147. Around 1.30 a.m., as the armored cars were about to leave Camp Muha under the command of Rugigana, some armored cars from the "11e Blindé" passed by the door on their way to the palace. Rugigana and his armored cars left Camp Muha and proceeded to the palace, with some units of the "11e Blindé" preceding them and others behind them.

c) At the palace

148. The guard at the palace, under the command of Capt. Mushwabure, consisted of around 40 men. Numbers given by witnesses vary from 35 to 60. They had two armored cars. The guard had not been reinforced.

149. Around 1 a.m., Capt. Mushwabure received a call from Major Nibizi to inform him that the coup had started at Camp Para.

150. Around 1.30 a.m., President Ndadaye received a telephone call from Minister Ntakije telling him that the coup had started. He got dressed in civilian clothes and went out of the house and was put into one of the armored cars of the guard. Considerable contradictions exist regarding this act. A witness states that Mushwabure put him into the armored car. Mushwabure himself says that, against his advice, the President insisted on going into the car, saying that Minister Ntakije had advised him to do so. Ntakije states that he advised the President to leave the palace at once in a armored car. Mrs. Ndadaye states that Ntakije only told the President about the beginning of the coup and hung up without comment.

151. The President stayed in the armored car and did not talk to the crew. Although he had his cellular telephone with him, telephone records show that he made no calls and that he received only two calls, one lasting 27 seconds, from his Chef de Cabinet, who advised him to leave at once, and another, lasting 40 seconds, from an unidentified source. Mrs. Ndadaye tried to telephone him, but only heard the taped signal saying that the telephone was out of reach.

152. Meanwhile, Mrs. Ndadaye telephoned the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, the "Chef de la Documentation nationale" (Secret Service), Richard Ndikumwami; the Minister of Agriculture; the "Chef de Protocole", Jean-Marie Nduwabike and some other friends. She called the President of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, who told her that he had already been informed of the coup.

153. Shortly after 1.30 a.m., armored cars from the "11e Blindé" and two from the "2e Commando", one commanded by Lt. Rugigana and the other by Lt. Augustin Managure, arrived together at the palace. The other two armored cars from the "2e Commando" had turned back on the way. Capt. Mushwabure, however, contradicts himself about the hour of their arrival.

154. Lt. Rugigana went into the palace grounds with his armored car by breaking the gate leading to the Hotel Meridien. Some soldiers from the "1er Para" who tried to follow him in were turned back without shooting. Instants later, shooting from submachine guns started from the troops that had surrounded the palace.

d) At the Etat-major

155. The offices of the Etat-major are located near the center of the city, on the north side of the River Muha.

156. Probably around 1 a.m., Major Kibati, the officer on duty, received a call from the Commander of the "1er Para" telling him that his troops were in revolt. After consulting with Major Twagiramungu, Head of the operations section, he called Bikomagu and informed him.

157. Kibati also called Major Deo Bugegene, Commander of the Air Force Base and told him to proceed to his base.

158. Minister Ntakije testified that before 2 a.m., he telephoned Bikomagu, who was at the Etat-major and who advised him to go into hiding. This version is contradicted by Bikomagu's and other witnesses' testimony, who state that Bikomagu first arrived at the Etat-major around 2.30 a.m.

e) Elsewhere

159. According to his testimony, Minister Ntakije was awakened at his home at 1 a.m., by a call from Twagiramungu, informing him that preparations were going on in Camp Para. Ntakije asked him to report whether the measures he had recommended had been carried out.

160. Ntakije states that he then called President Ndadaye to inform him. Ntakije then went to the Ministry of Defense. Before entering, he telephoned Bikomagu who, according to Ntakije, was at the Etat-major, and was advised by him to go into hiding. He then passed by his home and went on to hide in a friend's office, where he arrived as firing started to be heard in the city. He kept in touch with Mrs. Ndadaye, who was at the palace, and Bikomagu. He received a call from the Minister of Defense of Rwanda, who offered him aid. He states that he contacted practically all Ministers and advised them to go into hiding and to pass on the advice to FRODEBU leaders.

161. Between 1.30 and 2 a.m., the following officers who were in prison in Bujumbura accused of having participated in the 3 July coup, were liberated by soldiers: Major Busokoza, Capt. Bucumi, Capt. Nintunze and Major Rumbete.

H. Thursday, 21 October 1993 - 2 a.m. to 6 a.m.:

a) At the palace

162. Around 2 a.m., about 15 armored cars from the "11e Blindé" that had concentrated in front of the Meridien gate fired their cannon, but drew back when the palace guard fired some anti-tank rockets, and took positions around the outer wall of the palace. Firing went on for about fifteen minutes. No one was wounded and neither the armored cars nor the palace sustained any damage.

163. The President remained inside the armored car, speaking only with Mushwabure. Mrs. Ndadaye and her children remained inside the palace.

164. Around 5 a.m., Lt. Managure, commander of the second armored car from the "2e Commando" that had remained outside the surrounding wall of the palace, entered on foot, and told Lt. Bigabari that Lt. Kamana, Commander of the infantry squad of the "11e Blindé", who led the troops surrounding the palace, threatened to bombard the palace unless everyone came out. He stated that Lt. Kamana forced him to deliver the message. Lt. Kamana, on his part, testified that, far from being in command, he was held hostage by the mutinous troops.

165. Around 5.30 a.m. the armored cars around the outer wall started firing their cannon again, and hit the second floor of the palace. A daughter of the President was slightly hurt by debris.

166. The President, at Mushwabure's urging, changed into military uniform and was transferred to Rugigana's armored car. Mrs. Ndadaye, her children and two servants were taken into another armored car. When it failed to start, they were transferred to the third armored car, which took them to the side of Rugigana's armored car. They were then all transferred to this car, where they joined the President. Apart from telling the President about her conversation with the President of Rwanda, she had no conversation with the President.

167. The President was then called out by Mushwabure and both, together with Firmin Barengayabo, a palace servant, attempted to go out over the northern wall, but found that there were soldiers on the other side. Barengayabo, who had gone over the wall first, was captured. The President went back to Rugigana's armored car.

b) At Camp Para

168. Around 3 a.m., a detachment arrived with Ngeze, dressed in a jogging suit and wind-jacket and driving his own car. According to his testimony, he was put into an empty office and kept isolated.

169. Shortly after, Bikomagu arrived at the Camp and talked to the soldiers and to Ngeze. He left after about an hour. In his testimony, Bikomagu states that he was forcibly brought to the Camp by soldiers who had taken him at the Etat-major, and had to convince them to let him leave the Camp.

170. At 5 a.m., according to his testimony, the Commander of the "1er Para", Niyoyunguruza, was taken in a truck to the officers' mess.

c) At Camp Muha

171. Around 2 a.m., two of the armored cars that had gone out with Rugigana's but turned back, entered the Camp. One, commanded by Lt. Joseph Bodiguma stayed on guard, while the other, commanded by Lt. Sindarusiba, according to his testimony, was sent by Nibizi to bring the President of the National Assembly, Pontien Karibwami, for his protection. Sindarusiba came back some time later to report that, when he arrived at Karibwami's home he was told that he had been taken away by a group of soldiers shortly before. He was then sent by Nibizi to bring the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya.

d) At the Etat-major of the Army

172. Upon his arrival, at around 2.30 a.m., Bikomagu, according to his testimony, telephoned the Commander of "ler Para". Niyoyunguruza, on his part, testified that at that time he was held in a garage with no telephone within reach.

173. Around 3 a.m., according to his testimony, Bikomagu was forced by a detachment of soldiers to accompany them to Camp Para.

e) Elsewhere

174. Between 2 and 3 a.m., a detachment captured in their homes Richard Ndikumwami who headed the civilian intelligence service and Juvénal Ndayikeza, "Ministre de l'Administration territoriale et du développement communal", and took them away in a truck. Capt. Térence Cishahayo, of the "2e Commando", testified that he had just arrived at Ndayikeza's home with his military car, under orders from Nibizi to take him for his protection, when a detachment under Corporal Gahungu also arrived, captured him as well and the Minister and forced both to get in a military truck, where they met Ndikumwami, who had already been captured.

175. The President and Vice-President of the "Assemblée Nationale", Pontien Karibwami and Jules Bimazubute, were also taken from their homes about this time. The rebels also sought in their homes the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, but could not find him. His wife, who was roughly treated by the soldiers at the time, was later killed at another house where she had taken refuge.

176. Around 2 a.m., the rebels arrived at the telephone company with Busokosa, whom they had freed from the prison, and who had been director of the company. They took over the telecommunication center but did not succeed in interrupting the service. Busokosa testified that this was due to his lack of cooperation.

177. Around 3 a.m., the radio station was taken over by the rebels.

178. According to the autopsy, Karibwami, Bimazbute, Ndikumwami and Ndayikeza were executed around 5 a.m.

I. Thursday, 21 October 1993 - 6 a.m. to noon:

a) At the palace

179. At about 7 a.m., the armored car commanded by Rugigana left the palace with the President and his family through the south gate, without opposition from the surrounding troops and armored cars. It then proceeded, at the President's request, to Camp Muha by an indirect route. On the way, they were allowed to go through several barricades after the crew talked to the rebellious troops that guarded them.

180. After the President had been driven away from the palace ground, Mushwabure, according to his testimony, went over the surrounding wall and went into hiding.

b) At Camp Muha

181. Bikomagu arrived in Camp Muha around 4 a.m., from Camp Para. Gakoryo, according to all testimony but his own, was at the Camp before President Ndadaye was brought in. He states, however, that when he arrived he found the President already there.

182. President Ndadaye and his family arrived at Camp Muha in Rugigana's armored car shortly after 7 a.m. The President was taken to an office where he met Bikomagu, Secretary of State Gakoryo and Nibizi. Neither of these three officers gave details in their testimony as to the conversation that took place. After about twenty minutes, the President was led back to the armored car, where he rejoined his family shortly before 8 a.m.

183. According to the testimony of the officers, rebellious troops arrived outside Camp Muha in a menacing attitude between fifteen minutes and half an hour after the President, and demanded to be let in. No shots were fired.

184. Around 8 a.m., after, according to Nibizi's testimony, his soldiers refused to obey his orders to defend the Camp, the gates of Camp Muha were opened and a group of soldiers came in and surrounded the armored car and Bikomagu, Gakoryo and Nibizi, who stood next to it. The President and his family were forced out. The President told the soldiers, in Kirundi: "Tell me what you want, we can negotiate, but above all do not spill blood, think of your country, think of your families". Bikomagu then told the soldiers that he would take Mrs. Ndadaye and the children. According to Mrs. Ndadaye's testimony, Bikomagu added, referring to the President: "There is the man you want. Do whatever you want with him". In his testimony, Bikomagu denied having said those words. Mrs. Ndadaye and her children left the Camp in Bikomagu's jeep, driven by his chauffeur, and proceeded to the French Embassy. The President was put in a jeep by the soldiers and taken to Camp Para. Bikomagu, Gakoryo and Nibizi went with them.

c) At Camp Para

185. Around 8.30 a.m., the soldiers arrived at Camp Para with the President, who was immediately surrounded by a crowd of soldiers. According to their testimony, Lt. Kamana told Nibizi to leave with Bikomagu and Gakoryo because their life was in danger. They proceeded to do so. According to a witness, however, upon arriving in Camp Para, Bikomagu again told the troops: "Here is your man".

186. Major Rumbete, who had been released from prison and brought to the Camp shortly before, was present when the President was brought in.

187. The President was put in a room, under guard.

188. Shortly after, Kamana who, according to all testimony but his own, was in command, addressed a meeting of the troops. He then made a list with the names of some officers and sent Adjutant-Chef Mbonayo to the officers's mess to get them.

189. The exact time of the execution of President Ndadaye could not be determined by testimony. It apparently took place within thirty minutes of his arrival. Three soldiers from the "1 le Blindé", Corporal Philbert Nduwukumana, alias Kiwi, Corporal Ndayizeye, alias Runyutu and another, went into the room. Apparently while being held by two with a cord around his neck, the third stabbed him. Nduwukumana, now in prison, refused to testify before the Commission. Ndayizeye could not be found and the third could not be identified. A witness stated that, after these three men entered the room, someone padlocked the door, locking them in until Kamana, shortly after, asked for the key and released them. This is refuted by Kamana's testimony.

190. Around 10 a.m., the officers from Kamana's list who had been summoned at the officers' mess arrived. Among them were Lt. Col. Simbanduku, Major Nibizi, Major Alfred Nkurunziza, Director of a department at the Ministry of Defense, Major Juvénal Nzosaba, Commander of the Engineer Battalion at Muzinda, Major Deo Bugegene, Commander of the Bujumbura Air Base, Major Hypax Ncacasaba, Lt. Ngomirakiza, Major Rumbete, Major Busokoza and Major Celestin Ndayisaba, Second Commander of the military schools.

191. Bikomagu, who was not on the list, arrived with them. He had the soldiers release the Chef de Protocole and two other civilians who had been captured and brought to the Camp.

192. The officers were met by Lt. Kamana, who led them to a meeting room. Although testimony differs on many points as to what took place in the room, most concur in stating that Kamana brought Ngeze, still in a jogging suit, and said the soldiers demanded him as President. According to a witness, he told them at that point that the President and Vice-President of the "Assemblée Nationale", Pontien Karibwami and Jules Bimazubute, as well as some Ministers, had been killed. Asked about the President, he answered that he was in the Camp, alive. It was then agreed that Ngeze should accept to take over, in order to "manage the crisis". Kamana then left the room and shortly afterwards returned and announced that President Ndadaye had been killed. Simbanduku and another officer left for the officers' mess to inform the officers gathered there.

193. Around 11 a.m., Ngeze, accompanied by the remaining officers, addressed the troops on the football grounds. Ngeze announced his acceptance and was cheered. It was agreed that the soldiers would return to obedience of their officers and that Bikomagu would resume command. Ngeze and the officers then left the Camp to go to the officers' mess.

d) At the Etat-major

194. Around 8 a.m., Twagiramumgu left and went to the Etat-major. Kibati remained as the sole officer on guard.

e) At the officers' mess

195. Around 7 a.m., officers started to congregate at the officers' mess, which is situated near Camp Muha. By 9 a.m., most of the officers stationed at Bujumbura had arrived. Some were brought in military trucks. Many officers claim that they were prevented by the troops to leave the mess. Bikomagu, however, circulated freely and Simbanduku stated that he went home for a while.

196. Around 9 a.m., Bikomagu, Gakoryo and Nibizi arrived and announced that the President was in the hands of the soldiers in Camp Para. While at the officers' mess Bikomagu received a telephone call, after which he said he feared President Ndadaye was dead.

197. According to an officer present, rumors started circulating at that time that the soldiers of Camp Para were about to summon some officers. Shortly after, a group of some six soldiers, led by Adjudant-Chef Mbonayo, arrived and read the list prepared by Kamana. Accounts of the number and composition of the list vary. Bikomagu stated in his testimony that the list consisted of thirteen officers. The name of Lt. Col. Sylvestre Ningaba, who was not present, was on it.

198. Mbonayo asked the officers whose names were on the list to go with him to Camp Para. Some of these officers stated that they were forced to go, without being told the purpose of the summons. They left in a minibus.

199. Bikomagu left for Camp Para, in his car, at the same time. The other officers remained at the mess.

200. Before 11 a.m., Simbanduku and Nsozaba returned to the officers' mess from Camp Para, and related the events that had taken place there, including the President's death. Simbanduku states that he then stayed at the mess, but a witness states that he went back to Camp Para.

201. Around 11 a.m., the group of officers returned from Camp Para, with Ngeze, still dressed in jogging clothes, and Bikomagu. According to all testimony but his own, Simbanduku presented Ngeze as the new President. Ngeze addressed the officers, telling them that the soldiers demanded that he take charge in order to "manage the crisis" and asking for their support. Ngeze, Bikomagu and the officers that had arrived with them then left for the Etat-major, while the other officers left to go to their units.

J. Thursday, 21 October 1993 - After Noon:

a) At the Etat-major

202. Ngeze and the group of officers arrived at the Etat-major from the officers' mess around noon. There, they found Lt. Col. Sylvestre Ningaba, who had been freed from prison at Rumenge, 122 kilometers from Bujumbura, where he had been held under the accusation of having led the 3 July attempted coup, and Com. Hilaire Ntakiyica, also released from prison.

203. Bikomagu organized a "general staff for the crisis" made up of some of the officers named in Kamana's list and some officers from the Etat-major. Simbanduku, Ndayizaba Nzosaba and Nkurunziza were included.

b) Elsewhere

204. Jean-Bosco Daradangwe, Director General of Communication at the Ministry of Defense, stated that at 7 a.m., he received a message from Minister Ntakije telling that FRODEBU had already "mobilized its troops" and that there was going to be a bloodbath. He then went to Ntakije's hiding place and, without entering, sent someone to deliver a cellular phone to him.

205. The above account of the events as represented by testimony can by no means be taken as reliable evidence. It is completely one sided. Apart from some soldiers and non-commissioned officers who were in prison, the Commission had access only to officers. All the officers, including Kamana, maintained that the coup and assassinations were the deed of rebellious soldiers, who not only disobeyed their officers, but threatened to kill them if they did not cooperate. The Commission, however, was not given access to these alleged rebels so that it could hear their testimony. Understandably, prisoners for the most part declined to testify or claimed they had done and seen nothing. It is evident that officers had ample time in over two years to compare notes and practice their accounts so as to conform them to the official version of the Burundian Army. To convince several hundred enlisted men to take the blame and to rehearse them so that they would not incur in blatant contradictions would have been an impossible undertaking. Even so, the officers' testimony is full of contradictions and of alleged lapses of memory, especially when the witnesses answered questions.

206. In considering the officers' version, it must be borne in mind that Burundi is a country entirely dependent on foreign aid. No Burundian Government could hope to survive without the contribution of the industrialized countries and international organizations, which amount to about a third of the gross national product. Income from coffee exports would not suffice even to maintain the Army, let alone the Government and the standard of living to which high government officials had become accustomed to. With the end of the Cold War, the option of playing East against West no longer existed. The industrialized countries had already adopted at the time the unanimous policy of encouraging democracy in Africa. They could be expected to react with irresistible pressure against any de facto government resulting from a military coup, led or controlled by the authors of the coup. The memory of French, Belgian and Zairian troops intervening in Rwanda to defend Habyarimana's Government was fresh in all minds. It would have been essential, for any officers planning a coup at that time, to ensure that when they took effective power, it would be with apparent reluctance, as men intent on helping their country out of a crisis for which they had not been responsible. Precedent was at hand. The coup that had overthrown Bagaza five years earlier had, in fact, been initiated by discontented troops. Precedents, such as that of Haiti, also showed that it was also essential to secure that no person who could claim legitimate democratic authority would manage to get away. This meant President Ndadaye and the person who would automatically succeed him according to the Constitution: the President of the "Assemblée Nationale" (Art. 85 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, Annex 2).

207. The version of events at the presidential palace cannot be given credence. Fully aware of the impending danger, the military commanders in fact did nothing to reinforce the palace guard, to prevent the "rebellious soldiers" from reaching the palace, or to take the President to a safe place. An armed confrontation is reported to have taken place between "attackers" and "defenders" for about six hours, with fire from cannon, rockets and small arms, yet no one was killed, no armored car damaged. During all this time, except for the alleged attempt of escape over the outer wall, the President remained inside an armored car, cut off from the world, allegedly for his protection, while his wife and children were left inside the palace. When his wife and children joined the President in the armored car, he hardly spoke a word, except to "request" to be taken to Camp Muha. The armored car then left the palace and went away without any challenge from the "attackers", who commanded not less that fifteen armored cars, and was given free passage through several checkpoints manned by "rebel" soldiers. The established facts suggest, rather, that the President was in fact a prisoner in the armored car, and that his silence in the presence of his wife, as well as his "request" to proceed to Camp Muha, were the result of his wish to preserve her life and that of his children.

208. The version of events at Camp Muha when the President was brought there in the armored car is equally lacking in credibility. To begin with, no effort had been made by the "rebels" to secure the camp, as was done at other camps, although Nibizi, its commander, stated that his soldiers had refused his orders to act against the "rebels". The direct commander of the Army, Bikomagu, was at the camp, and stayed with the President in an office for no less than half an hour, together with Nibizi and Gakoryo. Yet no account of any discussions is given, no telephone calls were made by the President, although it is established that Bikomagu had a cellular telephone. No attempt was made to hide the President or to take him to safety, although it had been demonstrated that the armored car could circulate freely and, if all else was hopeless, the border with Zaire was only twenty kilometers away. The President was taken back to the armored car only to be delivered to the "rebel troops". The "pressure of the rebel troops" against the Camp during this time is alleged to have proved irresistible. Yet when the armored car with the President arrived at the Camp, the "rebel" armored cars at the palace had not followed it, and during the whole episode no shot was fired. Bikomagu who, according to his testimony, had been taken forcibly from his office and been held prisoner in Camp Para some hours previously, secured without effort from the same "rebels" the President's wife and children. The facts as reported suggest, rather, that the President was a prisoner, and that he was delivered to his executioners when he refused to cooperate.

209. As these events were taking place, the majority of the officers of the garrison of Bujumbura were at the officers' mess. Some stated they had gone there to obtain information, others that they had been forcibly taken there by the "rebels". All those who testified, except Bikomagu and Simbanduku, who admitted they could leave freely, stated that they were held there against their will. They submitted passively, without attempting any action. Such conduct in a numerous group of officers can only be interpreted as complicity or extreme negligence and cowardice.

210. It is established that the rebels, within a short time, "attacked" the palace, took the radio station and telephone company, neutralized the Airforce Base near the Airport, captured high officials, freed imprisoned officers from different prisons throughout the country, summoned officers to the mess and established checkpoints throughout the city. Yet all this is alleged by the officers to have resulted from the initiative of non-commissioned officers in Camp Para, with no officers present save the Commander, who claims to have been held in a garage by force. While the previous day all officers in Camp Muha were told to spend the night in their camp with the troops, in view of the unrest among the troops in neighboring Camp Para, no such orders had been given to the officers of Camp Para, who were allegedly sleeping peacefully in their beds until much later summoned to Camp Muha by Bikomagu.

211. The events that followed immediately after the death of President Ndadaye contribute to the lack of credibility of the officers' version. No sooner had the President been murdered, than the officers regained command of their troops, and Bikomagu retook supreme command of the Army, adding the Gendarmerie to his command. Bikomagu was, according to all reports, in effective control of the "Committee for the management of the crisis" of which he was a member, with Ngeze as an obvious and willing figurehead. Among the first actions of this committee was ordering the provincial military commanders to take over from the Governors. Although this committee was allegedly merely trying to bring the situation back to normal, far from attempting to return power to the civilian Government, it tried to set up, without success, a "Council of National Salvation" that could provide some appearance of respectability. It was only three days later, when most of the interior of the country was engulfed in an apparently unstoppable ethnic bloodbath and all hope of acceptance by the donor countries was lost, that power was returned to the civilian government, without any objection from the allegedly uncontrollable troops.

212. Special consideration must be given to Bikomagu's activities, since as "Chef d'Etat-major général de l'armée", according to the structure of the Burundian armed forces, he had direct command of the Army, under the Minister of Defense. The following is a summary of his actions as reported by himself or by other witnesses:

On 11 October, he orders the head of the President's bodyguards to leave to Mauritius immediately, and not to return before 21 October, without giving reasons.

- On 20 October, at around 4 p.m., he is asked by the President's Chef de Cabinet to verify reports that the "ler Para" and "1 le Blindé" were preparing to stage a coup, and answers that he has personally inspected these units and that all is normal.

- At about 11.30 p.m. on the same day, he tells Gakoryo on the telephone that there had been considerable unrest that afternoon among the soldiers of those same units, and that they had even menaced their officers, and was asked whether measures had been taken to ensure that the soldiers could not cross the bridges on the River Muha.

- He claims to have been asleep at 1 a.m., when an officer from the Etat-major telephoned him to tell him that the rebellion had started. He claims to have stayed home until around 2.30 a.m., when, hearing cannon shots, he went to the Etat-major.

- Around 3 a.m., he leaves for Camp Para, according to him under the constraint of rebellious soldiers, and there talked with Ngeze.

- At around 4 a.m., he leaves Camp Para and goes to Camp Muha. There he claims to have asked Nibizi to send someone to get the officers of the "ler Para" and "1 le Blindé" at their homes. He claims he told these officers to go regain the control of their troops

- He is at Camp Muha when the President was brought in around 7 a.m., and, together with Gakoryo and Nibizi, talks with the President for some time in an office. When the President is captured by enraged troops out of control, he has no difficulty in taking charge of the President's wife and children and sending them away in his jeep.

- He follows the troops that had taken the President to Camp Para. Once there, he leaves allegedly in mortal danger, and goes to the officers' mess, where all the officers were allegedly held against their will.

- He returns to Camp Para around the time the President is killed and the list of officers to be summoned is sent to the mess.

- He arrives back at the mess just as the group of officers is leaving for Camp Para, and leaves with them, in his own car.

- In Camp Para, he has the troops free three civilians that they had captured. He allegedly takes them personally to the other side of the city.

- He arrives back at the mess at the same time as Ngeze and the group of officers from Camp Para. At the mess, he "regains" command of the Army.

- He then goes with Ngeze and the officers to his offices at the Etat-major, and becomes the dominant figure of a "committee" of three. He then adds to his command the command of the Gendarmerie and orders provincial military commanders to take over from the Governors. The committee summons diplomats and political leaders to seek their support, and tries unsuccessfully to constitute a "Council for Public Safety" to exercise power. It broadcasts a communique, read by an officer, in the name of the fictitious Council, in which it is stated without qualification that all the units of the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie had risen against the Government.

- The committee is in control for three days and only reinstates civilian Government when it has failed to control the bloodbath throughout the country in spite of the bloody repression by the Army under Bikomagu's command, and has lost all hope of overcoming the adamant opposition of the international community.

- After the reinstatement of civilian power, Bikomagu remains in command of the Army and Gendarmerie, a position which he retains to this day. The official version of the coup is that only the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers of the two "rebellious" battalions are responsible. The only officers involved in the planning and execution of the coup are those who had been freed from different prisons and two lieutenants, all of whom had by then conveniently fled the country.

213. Although the Commission did not obtain, nor could be expected to obtain under the circumstances, direct proof in the form of testimony or written evidence, it considers that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the assassination of President Ndadaye, as well as that of the person constitutionally entitled to succeed him, was planned beforehand as an integral part of the coup that overthrew him, and that the planning and execution of the coup was carried out by officers highly placed in the line of command of the Burundian Army. The Commission considers, however, that with the evidence at hand, it is not in a position to identify the persons that should be brought to justice for this crime.