In the Field: IraqUSIP experts are more than analyststhey are practitioners that can often be found far outside Washington, D.C. putting conflict resolution methods into practice and aiding in the rebuilding and stabilization of communities that have experienced conflict. This series summarizes recent examples of USIP efforts to resolve conflicts around the world. ![]() USIP's Iraq program aims to reduce interethnic and interreligious violence, speed up stabilization and democratization, and reduce the need for a U.S. presence in Iraq. As part of this program, USIP has maintained a small office in the Green Zone in Baghdad since early 2004. Rusty Barber, a former political officer in the Foreign Service, has run the office since March 2007. His regular dispatches offer a lively and sobering insider's view of the promise and peril facing U.S. efforts in that country. We'll update this section each week, making only minimal changes for security reasons. July 18, 2007
Rend al-Rahim Francke is in town, meeting with senior Iraqi and U.S. government officials in an effort to get a pulse of the situation here and acquire her own sense of how the Surge and political reconciliation are progressing...or not progressing. Aside from being struck by just how challenging it is to get from point A to point B in Baghdad and the IZ these days, Rend reports a palpable paranoia among Iraqi leaders that the U.S. is secretly working to replace them. Rend meets with Ambassador Robert Ford, senior political counselor at the embassy, this Friday. She will no doubt have much to report upon her return to Washington. ![]() Typical bullet damage to a car. Meanwhile, the IZ continues to take an occasional battering from "insurgent mail" as I have taken to calling it. A barrage last week claimed the lives of several people, including an American soldier. Services for her were held in the "bunker chapel." An incoming rocket late last night destroyed half a dozen more vehicles in the parking area, which is beginning to double as a scrap lot. Working in the office, I had the unpleasant sensation of being under siege, as the sound of gunfire emanated from several directions at once around the villa. I scrambled to extinguish all the lights and notified Julie, our program manager in Washington, that things may have taken a real turn for the worse. Eventually allowed to return to my hooch at 2AM, I was informed that ammunition in one of the vehicles had exploded. Feeling sheepish, I trundled off to bed. In the morning, I discovered the villa grounds littered with bits of rubber and small car parts. Mercifully, the USIP chariot was in the shop this time and escaped further injury. I must conclude with the sad news that one of our staff has had to temporarily leave Iraq for security reasons. We expect, however, that she will remain fully engaged with our work and we are praying for her return to our fold as soon as it is safe for her to do so. In the meantime, we ask for your continued support for K and her family during this particularly difficult time. The Baghdad Rumor Mill*
They then began inspecting the identification cards of the men they had stopped. The open source for this information told the terrorists that he did not have his jensiya (Iraqi National ID). Instead he showed them his employment related badge. They then asked him what tribe he belonged to. Based on their previous slogans, he thought they were Sunni terrorists, so he told them that he is from the well-known Sunni Al Jabouri Tribe. They then began asking him questions about the al-Jabouri tribe and he identified himself as being from a very militant sub-tribe of the Jabouris. At this point, the terrorists bound his hands and attempted to place him in the back of their vehicle. The terrorists then shot him in the leg (luckily only a flesh wound) when he resisted. At some point, while driving through the Bayaa area, the injured man was able to jump out of the car in an attempted escape. He begged for someone to help him but no one would. The insurgents found him and threw him in the back of the car again. They then moved to a "torture house" in Hay Al Amil. While being moved, the injured man learned that the terrorists were actually Mahdi Army members. He then tried to explain that he was really a Shiite and he that he had lied because he thought they were Sunni terrorists. The terrorists then began quizzing him as to what Shiite tribe he was from and about where he lives. The injured man also told the terrorists the name of the Mahdi Army Commander responsible for his area. In the torture house the man saw several more IP and IA members. He also saw the other men that had been stopped at the same time he had. He heard one of the men he knew yelling and the injured man believes that this Sunni man was shot twice in the head in the torture house. After he was able to convince the Mahdi army terrorists that he was a Shiite, they admonished him to not tell anyone about what happened. They returned his belongings and dropped him off at a hospital so that he could obtain treatment for his leg wound. They have carried out this decentralization by bringing in "imams" or "clerics" from Najaf (Kufa) to control an area which consists of two or three districts. Overtly, these clerics appear to be pious and not to be involved in Mahdi Army operations. These clerics operate out of specific Hussainiyas. Mahdi Army members are not allowed to conduct any operations in or near these Hussainiyas or the cleric will personally punish them.
Some people believe these "clerics" are members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Division. These clerics rotate in and out of Baghdad every three to six months.
The clerics live outside of the areas they control. They then covertly meet with Mahdi Army operational leaders (usually in the homes of people that have been displaced or killed) to pass instructions from Kufa for upcoming operations. The homes used for these meetings are selected for their ability to be defended for the security of the "cleric."
Atmospherics*
Iraqis report that electricity service was still very bad this week consistent with last week's reporting. Most in the group reported having either no electricity, or only one to four hours of electricity per day. One member of the group reported that the ten amp program has moved to his area (Urr) and that he was told he should begin receiving the ten amps at the beginning of August on a three on, three off schedule. However, he is currently only receiving one hour of electricity per day. The group reported that water service improved even more this week despite short intermittent shutdowns of service. The water they do receive they DO NOT drink for fear of illness or poisoning. Propane is still a problem throughout Baghdad as it is still controlled by the Mahdi Army in most areas and mafias in other areas. The group answered that the fuel crisis began to dissolve this week due to the actions finally being taken against the black marketers at the fuel stations. At the fuel stations where action has been taken there is usually only a comparatively short wait in line for fuel. One concern people do have is that as part of this crackdown, no one can fill any jugs at the fuel stations, including neighborhood generator operators. This may have a secondary effect of limiting the electricity Baghdadis receive due to the extreme lack of governmentally provided electricity. The group said one solution to this may be to have neighborhood generator operators register to receive a special card to fill a predetermined number of jugs for generator fuel. The group agreed that such an operation would eliminate around 50-60% of the Mahdi Army's medium and heavy weapons, including rockets and mortars, and this would have a very positive effect on Baghdad's security situation. The group stated that this should be a U.S.-only operation that stresses operational security to prevent any information leakage from the Iraqi government to militia leaders. The members all agreed that, as has been done in other areas of Baghdad, as U.S. forces search Sadr City, they should use barriers to cut Sadr City into four to six smaller areas. The group stated that the Sadr Movement/Mahdi Army's initial reactions to such an operation would be to initially go to the Iraqi government and demand that the U.S. be forced out of Baghdad by Prime Minister Al Maliki. They would also attempt to conduct large demonstrations to distract attention in an attempt to move weapons and high level personnel out of the city. Their last option would be to resist by combat. This would include Mahdi Army units from outside the area hitting the cordon as either a distraction or to create a breech for the exfiltration of weapons and personnel from Sadr City. * The source of the Baghdad Rumor Mill and Atmospherics is The Baghdad Mosquito. The collected views do not necessarily reflect the opinions or impressions of USIP's Baghdad staff. |
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