Introduction

1. See Appendix E, Acronyms and Glossary of Selected Key Terms.

2. Ibid.

3. United States President, “United States Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex ContingencyOperations,” 1997.

4. United States President, “United States National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of InteragencyEfforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 2005.

5. This includes, but is not limited to, the U.S. Departments of State, Labor, Treasury, Justice, HomelandSecurity, Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Developmentand Transportation; and agencies including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the CentralIntelligence Agency, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

6. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,PeacekeepingOperations Principles and Guidelines,2008. Hereafter: UNDPKO,Principles and Guidelines,2008.

7. International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations,A Comparative Study on Doctrine and Principlesfor Multinational Peace Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability,2007.

8. Dennis C. Blair, “Annual 3reat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009).

9. See Appendix A, Resource List.

10. See Appendix B, Participants in Review Process.

11. United States Department of State, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,”www.state.gov/s/crs/.

12. The international leadership could be the United Nations, a lead nation, a coalition of nations, a regionalorganization, or some hybrid of these institutions.

13. See Appendix C, Summary of Strategic Frameworks Surveyed.

14. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, 2005.

15. See Appendix D, Snapshot of Components From Overarching Resources.

16. United States Army,Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations(Washington, D.C.: Department of the U.S.Army, 2008). Hereafter: U.S. Army,FM 3-07,2008.

17. Daniel P. Serwer and Patricia Thomson, “A Framework for Success: International Intervention in SocietiesEmerging from Conflict,” inLeashing the Dogs of War(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).

Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

18. The development of this framework occurred over a two-step process. The U.S. Institute of Peacedeveloped the “Framework for Success for Societies Emerging From Conflict” in 2006. In developingthis manual, the objectives and sub-objectives were translated into conditions necessary to reach the coreend states. This new construct is based on a review of hundreds of core strategic documents and a nine-monthvetting process.

19. See Appendix D, Snapshot of Components From Overarching Resources.

20. See Appendix E.

Cross-Cutting Principles

21. United States Agency for International Development, “Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction,”2005. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_nineprinciples.html, accessed July 2009.

22. U.S. Army,FM 3-07, 2008.

23. United States Department of State and United States Joint Forces Command,United States GovernmentDraft Planning Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction and Conflict Transformation,2005.

24. USAID, “Nine Principles,” 2005.

25. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation,2008.Hereafter: S/CRS,Principles, 2008.

26. United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit,!e United Kingdom Approach to Stabilisation—A Stabilisation GuidanceNote,2008. Hereafter: UK Stabilisation Unit,UK Approach to Stabilisation,2008.

27. S/CRS,Principles, 2008.

28. USAID,Nine Principles,2005.

29. UK Stabilisation Unit,UK Approach to Stabilisation,2008.

30. United Nations Development Group and World Bank, “DRAFT Joint Guidance Note on IntegratedRecovery Planning Using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks,” 2007.Hereafter: UNDG/WB, “DRAFT Joint Guidance Note,” 2007. United Nations Security Council, “UnitedNations Security Council Resolution 1325,” www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/res1325.pdf (accessed June 17,2009).

31. Camille Pampell Conaway,Role Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Institute of Peace, 2006).

32. John Darby,The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001).United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit,Quick Guide to Stabilisation Planning,2007.

33. U.S. Army,FM 3-07,2008.

34. United Nations Development Programme and United States Agency for International Development,First Steps in Post-Conflict State-Building: a UNDP-USAID Study,2007. Hereafter: UNDP/USAID, “FirstSteps,” 2007.

35. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart,Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008). Hereafter: Ghani/Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 2008.

36. Ibid.

37. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

38. UNDPKO,Principles and Guidelines,2008.

39. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse,!e Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007). Hereafter: Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse,Beginner’s Guide,2007.

40. Jack Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds.,!e Quest for Viable Peace: InternationalIntervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2005).Hereafter: Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley,Quest for a Viable Peace,2005.

41. International Forum for theChallenges of Peace Operations, Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperationand Coordination, Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report,2003–2005, 2006.

42. UNDG/WB, “DRAFT Joint Guidance Note,” 2007.

43. U.S. Army,FM 3-07,2008.

44. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,2008. Hereafter: S/CRS,Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,2008.

45. See Section 5, Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Approach.

46. Interaction, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Institute of Peace, “Guidelines for Relations Between U.S.Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,”2006.

47. UNDPKO,Principles and Guidelines,2008.

48. Japan International Cooperation Agency,Handbook for Transition Assistance,2006. Hereafter: JICA, Handbookfor Transition Assistance,2006.

49. See Appendix E, Acronyms and Glossary of Selected Key Terms.

50. UNDG/WB, “DRAFT Joint Guidance Note,” 2007.

51. Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, eds.Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). Hereafter: Guttieri/Piombo,Interim Governments,2007.

52. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

53. United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense, and United States Agency forInternational Development,Security Sector Reform,2008.

54. Sean McFate,Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries(Washington,D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).

55. Rights are cross-cutting and are enshrined in law, including the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” the “International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights,” the “Convention of the Rights of the Child,” the “Convention Against Tortureand Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” and the “Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.”

56. UNDPKO,Principles and Guidelines,2008.

57. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,Frequently Asked Questions on aHuman Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation,2006.

58. S/CRS,Principles, 2008. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley,Quest for a Viable Peace,2005.

59. S/CRS, “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,” 2008. UNDG/WB, “DRAFT Joint GuidanceNote,” 2007.

60. Marvin G. Weinbaum,Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood(Washington, D.C.:U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

61. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall,Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in aDivided World(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

62. Iraq Study Group,The Iraq Study Group Report: !e Way Forward—A New Approach(New York: Vintage

Books, 2006). Hereafter: Iraq Study Group Report, 2006.

63. Ibid.

64. Ghani/Lockhart,Fixing Failed States,2008.

65. Southern African Development Community, “SADC Profile,” www.sadc.int/ (accessed June 18, 2009).Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization," www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.html (accessed June 18, 2009); Economic Community of West African States, “ECOWASin brief,” www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en (accessed June 18, 2009).

66.Iraq Study Group Report,2006.

High-Level Trade-offs, Gaps and Challenges

67. United States Agency for International Development,Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries,2009.

68. UN Development Group, UN Development Programme, World Bank,Practical Guide to Multilateral NeedsAssessments,2004. United Kingdom Department for International Development,Review of the United KingdomGovernment Approach to Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from United Kingdom GovernmentFunded Peacebuilding Projects, 1997–2001,2003. Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding,Towards a StrategicFramework for Peacebuilding: Getting !eir Act Together,2004. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach toStabilisation,” 2008.

Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Approach

69. Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, “Lt. Gen. Zinni’s Twenty Lessons Learned for Humanitarian Assistance andPeace Operations,” presented at the Center for Naval Analysis Annual Conference Proceedings: MilitarySupport to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995.

70. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Whole of Government Approaches to FragileSocieties,2006.

71. Cooperation is also addressed in Section 3.6 Unity of Effort in Cross-Cutting Principles.

72. UNDG/WB, “DRAFT Joint Guidance Note,” 2007.

73. Robert Perito, ed.Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations(Washington, D.C.: U.S.Institute of Peace, 2007).

74. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner’s Guide, 2007.

75. S/CRS, “Principles,” 2008.

76. UNDP/USAID, “First Steps,” 2007. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

77. United Nations Development Programme, “Millennium Development Goals,” 2000, www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml (accessed June 18, 2009).

78. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Development,2004.

79. Japan International Cooperation Agency,Handbook for Transition Assistance,2006. S/CRS,Principles, 2008.United States Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, 2005.

80. Ghani/Lockhart,Fixing Failed States,2008.

81. Burundi and the United Nations,Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi,2007.

82. Charles Call,Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Concepts and Issues for DPA(New York: United Nations, 2005).

83. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse,Beginner’s Guide,2007.

84. S/CRS,Principles,2008.

85. Guttieri/Piombo,Interim Governments,2007.

86. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

87. Craig Cohen,Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute ofPeace, 2006).

88. Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia, eds.,Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments(MPICE)—A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization,Defense TechnicalInformation Catalog, 2008.

Safe and Secure Environment

89. In this section, the term "security" is used within the context of S&R missions in a society that is just emerging from conflict. It refers primarily to physical safety, although broader definitions of security exist within the development community for "human security." See Appendix E.

90. UK Stabilisation Unit, UK Approach to Stabilisation, 2008.

91. United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008. Hereafter: UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008.92. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. UK Stabilisation Unit, UK Approach to Stabilisation, 2008.

94. Jack Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005). Hereafter: Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for Viable Peace, 2005.

95. Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia, eds. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)—A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, Defense Technical Information Catalog, 2008. Hereafter: Dziedzic/Sotirin/Agoglia, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments, 2008.

96. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

97. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

98. JICA, Handbook for Transition Assistance, 2006.

99. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfighting Publication 3-50: !e Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, 2006. Hereafter: UK MOD, JWP 3-50, 2006. 

100. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. Hereafter: UNDPKO, Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2003. UNDPKO, Principles and Guidelines, 2008.

101. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

102. UK Stabilisation Unit, UK Approach to Stabilisation, 2008.

103. UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008.

104. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

105. Ibid.

106. JICA, Handbook for Transition Assistance, 2006.

107. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

108. Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997). Hereafter: Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 1997.

109. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1: Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 2007. Hereafter: NATO, AJP 3.4.1, 2007.

110. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

111. JICA, Handbook for Transition Assistance, 2006.

112. UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008; Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 1997; NATO, “AJP 3.4.1,” 2007.

113. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

114. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

115. UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008.

116. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

117. UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover,” 2008; Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).

118. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner’s Guide, 2007. 

119. UK MOD, JWP 3-50, 2006.

120. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner’s Guide, 2007.

121. Col. Hugh Boscawen, Col. Mike Redmond, and Bertram Welsing, “Intelligence to Evidence Operations,” presented at the UNDPKO Command Development Seminar, Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), 2006.

122. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Shaping a Security Governance Agenda in Post-

Conflict Peacebuilding, 2005.

123. UNDP/USAID, “First Steps,” 2007.

124. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GTZ), DDR: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide, 2004. Hereafter: GTZ, Practical Guide, 2004. European Union, EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2006. Hereafter: EU, Concept for DDR, 2006.

125. Camille Pampell Conaway, !e Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006). Hereafter: Conaway, !e Role of Women, 2006.

126. United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Lessons-Learned: Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2006.

127. EU, Concept for DDR, 2006.

128. United Nations DDR Resource Centre, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standard, 2006. Hereafter: UN DDR, Integrated DDR, 2006. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

129. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner’s Guide, 2007.

130. GTZ, Practical Guide, 2004; UN, Integrated DDR, 2006.

131. UN, Integrated DDR, 2006.

132. Ibid.

133. EU, Concept for DDR, 2006. GTZ, Practical Guide, 2004. UN, Integrated DDR, 2006.

134. GTZ, Practical Guide, 2004. UN, Integrated DDR, 2006.

135. JICA, “Handbook for Transition Assistance,” 2006.

136. United Nations Secretary-General, “Note to the General Assembly,” A/C.5/59/31, 2005.

137. UN, “Integrated DDR,” 2006.

138. UNDP/USAID, “First Steps,” 2007.

139. Conaway, “3e Role of Women,” 2006.

140. UN, “Integrated DDR,” 2006.

141. EU, “Concept for DDR,” 2006.

142. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Economic Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Transitions: Lessons for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003.

143. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, Security Sector Reform, 2008.

144. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, !e Post-Conflict Security Sector, 2006.

145. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Economic Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Transitions: Lessons for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003.

146. Conaway, “The Role of Women,” 2006.

147. OECD DAC, SSR Handbook, 2007. UNDP/USAID, “First Steps,” 2007. Oakley/Dziedzic/Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder, 2002.

148. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Border Control Services and Security Sector Reform, 2002; JICA, “Handbook for Transition Assistance,” 2006; and U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

149. UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Peace Support Operations: Information and Guidance for UK Police Personnel, 2007. Hereafter: UK FCO, Police Personnel, 2007.

150. David H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (Oxford: University Press Oxford, 2006). Hereafter: Bayley, Changing the Guard, 2006.

151. Conaway, “The Role of Women,” 2006.

152. Bayley, Changing the Guard, 2006.

153. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

154. Sean McFate, Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).

155. Dobbins/Jones/Crane/Cole DeGrasse, Beginner’s Guide, 2007.

156. UK Stabilisation Unit, “UK Approach to Stabilisation,” 2008.

157. Ibid. UNDPKO “Principles and Guidelines,” 2008. Covey/Dziedzic/Hawley, Quest for a Viable Peace, 2005.

158. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

159. Interaction, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Institute of Peace, Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, 2007. In some instances, international forces may be tasked to provide security for designated NGOs delivering humanitarian assistance. International military forces must never disguise themselves as NGO personnel nor their equipment as NGO equipment.

160. International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross,” 1979, available at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/EA08067453343B76C1256D2600383BC4?OpenDocument&Style=Custo_Final.3&View=defaultBody3 (accessed June 18, 2009). Hereafter: ICRC, “Fundamental Principles,” 1979.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect, 2001. The “responsibility to protect” is “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”

165. UNDPKO, “Principles and Guidelines,” 2008.

166. UNDPKO, “Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 2003.

167. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

168. UNDPKO, “Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 2003.

169. Ibid.

170. UNDPKO, “Principles and Guidelines,” 2008.

171. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

172. U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Sectoral Practices and Experiences in Coordination (SPEC) on Cultural Resources,” 2007.

173. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

174. Colette Rausch, ed., Combating Serious Crimes in Post-Conflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006).

175. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

176. UK MOD, “JWP 3-50,” 2006.

177. Dziedzic/Sotirin/Agoglia, “Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments,” 2008; U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008; and UK MOD, “JWP 3-50,” 2006.

178. United States Army, Escalation of Force Handbook, 2007.

179. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

180. Katherine Andrews, Brandon Hunt, and William Durch, Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: 3e Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). Hereafter: Andrews/Hunt/Durch, Post-Conflict Borders, 2007.

181. Andrews/Hunt/Durch, “Post-Conflict Borders,” 2007.

182. Ibid.

183. United Nations Security Council, “UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” 2001. United Nations Security Council, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

184. U.S. Army, FM 3-07, 2008.

185. Andrews/Hunt/Durch, “Post-Conflict Borders,” 2007.

186. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World Disorder (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002.) Hereafter: Oakley/Dziedzic/Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder, 2002.

187. Ibid.

188. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: “Improvisation and Confusion” from the Field, 2006.