

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

Interview # 77 – Executive Summary

Initial Interview Date: April 17, 2007

Interviewed by W. Haven North

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The interviewee has had extensive involvement in Sudan extending over eleven years in a humanitarian capacity. He has worked with groups in the North (Khartoum), Northeast (National Democratic Alliance, NDA), South (Southern Peoples Liberation Army and Movement -SPLA/SPLM), and in Darfur. While not having participated directly on the negotiations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and other peace agreements, he worked with the governments on organizing humanitarian assistance and with commanders on the ground.

The conflicts in Sudan originate with the British separating the North and South with two distinct population groups. Sudan in fact has a diverse ethnicity–122 languages with 117 distinct tribal groups. The marginalization policies of the North affecting these groups throughout the country, the Islamization and Arabization of the South, the attempt to institute Sharia Law in the South are the roots of current conflicts. Sudan became an exporter of fundamentalist Islamic principles with support from Osama Bin Laden. Also courts set up by Nimeiri and continued by Bashir singled out and treated unjustly the dissenters (local chiefs) who did not want to go along with their policies. The fractions and factions have been so long lasting and deep going back to pre-independence days that dissenters thoroughly distrust each other. This is the case not just from North to South, but within the south, Darfur and the northeast. Then there are the complexities resulting from the influences and interests of bordering states: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Egypt.

What brought the North and the South together was that the South was able to receive support from Ethiopia and Uganda and became among the best guerilla fighters in the world, who united to fight against the North. The North, in the meantime, was having financial problems with its isolation from America and others, problems with the uprisings in the Northeast and in Darfur, massive rioting in Khartoum. The South had the friendship of the U.S. and European Union. The tide of popular world opinion had turned against Khartoum.

The CPA made it possible for the South to have commissioners from the south appointed to positions of power. The commissioners in the South now have the chance to provide services to the people.

The CPA is being implemented to the extent the governments are capable. The South has to overcome a massive brain drain. The North has never had good governance; it is run through favors, political paybacks, nepotism and massive lack of trust.

The prospects for a census, elections and the referendum are favorable. In the South there is a move to bring back the millions of refugees in Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt. There is a public relations war being waged through various radio stations; much of the information on the CPA has to be communicated by word of mouth; no civil infrastructure. There is no doubt that the South is going to vote for secession; they will have their hands full just in building a unified South. The great question is whether the South will be able to establish a government with good governance, free from economic and political corruption.

The international community has played a pivotal role, especially the United States. A flood of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and voluntary organizations work in Sudan now. There is a great opportunity for the international community to step up and push for solid governance principles.

The Northern government is fully incompetent; it reaches out for support from its Arab neighbors for savvy in negotiations and governance. Egypt is going to play a critical role. It is not clear what Bashir will do: he is dishonest, not trustworthy, and duplicitous.

Problems continue with the Lords Resistance Movement in Uganda, the spillover effects into Chad, and the continued instability between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Wars will break out among Sudan's neighbors within the next three years. It is time for Africa to come to grips with African problems. The instability in the Horn of Africa relates adversely to the peace in Sudan. Political and economic pressure must be exerted, through financial assistance, to set up governance in the South.

The Darfur crisis will be played out on an international arena as the various outcries against the Khartoum regime allow aid and allow peace to come into the area. In the northeast the Beja and Rashida are so duplicitous in relations with the South (the SPLA is the major military force in the northeast region) that they will squander the wealth among the elite.

The major lesson is: when dealing with an ideological group that is bent on imposing a religious domination on a people, negotiations without the use of force are impossible. Fundamentalist Islamic governments do not respect a superior demonstration of force; they only respect the actual use of superior force.

Building a coalition government after guerilla warfare, that is fair and equitable with trust among the factions, is going to be a big challenge for the South.

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Q: To start off and put this interview into a context, describe what your association has been with Sudan and with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

A: I have worked in the Sudan in a humanitarian capacity for the last eleven years. I have been working, from visiting Khartoum all the way to, of course, working closely with the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army), SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) throughout the Southern region. I have also worked extensively for about five years with the National Democratic Alliance of northeastern Sudan. I recently returned from Darfur, southern area, going in under the auspices of the SPLA-SPLM pass, going into the southern area of Darfur, which is actually administered by the SPLM, looking at the refugee crisis and the situation that is going on there.

Q: What about association with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Were you connected with that at all?

A: I did not participate in the negotiations themselves. I have worked with the government in the organization of humanitarian assistance and working closely with the commanders on the ground.

Q: You have been doing this for how many years, eleven years you say.

A: Eleven years, yes.

Q: What is your understanding of the roots of the conflict between the North and South, and now in Darfur and now we have the conflict in the east. Looking at Sudan as a whole, what would you see as the main roots of the conflicts?

A: The main roots of the conflicts go back to the way that the region was governed initially under the British Empire. Obviously with the separation of the north and south you had the two going together with the distinct population, people groups, from ethnicity to language. Then, you combine that with the policies of the British government at the time with the separation of the areas. That is where you ended up with the big divide that you still continue to see today.

Of course, there are other factors that come into play. Not only did you have the diverse ethnicity, you had 122 languages in Sudan with 117 different distinct tribal groups — whether it was the Bantu Tribe, the Arabs, or the Nila, the Nile dwellers. Of course, the marginalization that had taken place with policies then of the north with the Islamization and the Arabization of the southerners continued to be one of the main focuses of contention. Under the Nimeiri, the regime, of course, practiced the popular Islamizations of the South. They instituted Sharia Law, and, of course, throughout the various times, but since 1955 up to 1972, these policies that were put in place caused massive and widespread bloodshed, especially of the southerners as they sought to resist.

Since Sudan became its own autonomous governing authority, it has had basically nine years of peace from 1973 to 1983 with the Addis Ababa Accords. Even at that time it was a really touchy peace with the emergence of the DUP Party (Democratic Unionist Party) under Sadiq Al Mahdi. He actually sought to be a uniter as best he could, and actually bring an end to the policies that they were being forced on the south and the southern people. He was overthrown by General Al Bashir in 1989. Since that time, linked up with his ideologue, Hassan El Turabi, Sudan emerged as an exporter of political Islam from Africa.

Shortly after that, Osama Bin Laden came into the region as well. We have actually worked extensively in Northeastern Sudan where he was actually based, going in and providing medical care, and food assistance and educational assistance in that region where he was. In fact, in his madrassa, his Islamic training school, we actually ended up providing medical care assistance and those types of things because they were completely marginalized or they were simply caught in fundamentalist Islamic principles. Sudan actually at one time in the Hammas Kurat Region had about 19 African nations coming to learn political Islam from Sudan. Of course, they were exporters of it. When Bin Laden came in, he brought resources as well, and they were able to pump up their efforts and their prestige in the Islamic community as an exporter of political Islam throughout the region and the world. This is something that they highly prized. These bitter roots continue.

From my recent assessment there, it is one thing to win a war; it is another thing to win the peace. Along with the Arabization and Islamization and the Sharia Law Institutes, the Southerners were unequally treated. Of course, they were forced even as animists and Christians to follow the same laws, but they were unjustly accused. There were malicious courts, and these courts that were set up first by Nimeiri and then continued by Bashir, continued to single out political dissenters, the chiefs in the regions of the south that did not want to go along with the policies of the government of the North. They were singled out. Many of them were executed. Along with that they targeted leaders like Mashar, who now has a prominent role in the southern government has been incredibly duplicitous through the years, breaking away, of course, from the SPLA, setting up to overthrow John Garang's SPLA-SPLM government with the South Sudan Independence movement.

He was able to bring one of their foreign ministers, Lam Kol, into the fold and actually employ him as well against the Sudan People's Liberation Army, as well as a few others.

But what you see is that the fractions and factions have been so deep and long lasting, going back to even pre-independence days of Sudan based upon British rule, that you have very huge dissenters groups that do not trust each other. There is a massive distrust. This is not just from North to South. This is among the southerners. Back in 1991, you had the massive massacre of the Dinka up in the Bor Region, the Bor Massacre. In fact, one of my very good personal friends actually uncovered that massacre, and, of course, reported it to the world. This was Nuer, who are southerners, a southern tribe in the southeastern part of Sudan —the northeastern part of southern Sudan. The Nuer came in along with some of the Shilluk and slaughtered and massacred the Dinka.

What you have going on in Darfur once again is very much the same process where the government is arming the Arab militia, the Chang elite and the locals from the region. What this boils down to is a policy to exploit these Nilat dwellers, the England of Sudan because they have resources, oil now. They have water resources, which are very important to Egypt, which is why they played such a prominent role in the destabilization of Sudan. Then you have the breadbasket of Africa along with cattle markets. So these factions—even among southerners that have been instigated so heavily by the Bashir government—are the issues that I see posing continuous problems even if the referendum goes through and they vote to have an autonomous region in the south.

Q: You talk about the great big divide. Are you talking about the Arab African difference?

A: Yes, that is correct. That initially was started by the policies of the British government. The policies of the British government were very up front — complete separation of the North and South. They figured the best way to handle or deal with these situations between the North and the South as far as the predominant Muslim population and the predominant tribal, animistic, Christian population in the south was to have them separated; there was no trade or very limited trade between the regions. There were very little political effects taking place. In other words, very little political cooperation.

So what you had is two countries in essence emerging that were one, supposedly geographically politically on a map, but were not culturally, ethnically with the diversity of languages. The official language in the South was English. The educated elites with their English language degrees were going out to various parts of the world. Then you had the educated elites out of Khartoum who were schooled in a completely different school, different philosophy, with the Arabic language. So you had a natural cultural, political divide continually taking place, which the policies of the British instigated.

The one thing you would hear continually (this is people from the Darfur Region; this is from people from the northeast part of Sudan, all the way up from Port Sudan down to Sawakin, all the way into Hamas Kreb and finally down to Kassala) is that that are two main tribes. One is the Beja, which are the Hadendoua tribes, and the Handendoua Benua tribes. There are seven sub-tribes under the Beja. Then you have the Rashida, which were a group from Yemen who moved over about 180 years ago into this region of Eritrea and Sudan. They have been used as pawns continually for border control between Eritrea and

Sudan. As politics works in Africa, border politics really control a lot of the events. The tribal powers in these tribal areas are manipulated by who supplies them with arms and who supplies them with money and food. They have basically no governing skills at all. They have their ethics and values; honesty is poor. They work on the chief and tribal structure.

So the distribution of wealth and resources, even for the tribal areas when they have them, is scant at best. It is a power play. What you have is that the bulk of the people in the region suffer. The government of Sudan says this is because of the rebel factions in the area. The government of Eritrea says look, if you just help us, we will give you more supplies and work on equitable distribution. It is the same thing that Ethiopia did. When Mengistu took power in Ethiopia and pushed his communist ideals, he was willing to support South Sudan because of disagreements with the North, which he had. At that time you had many of the senior officers, including John Garang, shipped off to China and Cuba. Many of the officers who are in power right now have been schooled in communism—a massive amount, in fact; it is interesting. One can meet with these officers and many of them will actually converse with you in Spanish after having been in Cuba and learning Castro-style communism.

So the complexities of Sudan... Sudan is the largest country in Africa, eight percent of the landmass of Africa, and it has the flows of the Nile. Lake Tana is the start for the Blue Nile coming out of Ethiopia, and then the various lakes out of Uganda. And you have the Sued, the drainage. So there is the White Nile, the Blue Nile with massive amounts of water running through the South. Combine that with the fact that there are still laws on the books to this day that they have adhered to that were set up under the Anglo-Egyptian empire times. They cannot put in more than a four-inch diameter irrigation water pipe from the Nile River to irrigate their huge cotton farms as well as the huge okra and ground nuts farms that they are trying to develop. I could talk about the complexity of the issue for hours and hours.

If you want to drill down by your questioning into areas that you want to, I can do that for you.

Q: Yes. But this background has been very helpful. Given that situation why did the North and the South come together to negotiate a peace agreement?

A: The only reason the North and the South came together to negotiate a peace agreement was because in 1993 the SPLA/SPLM were almost finished. They had about a 17 kilometer strip of Sudan in the very southern sector, south of Juba along what is called the Nimule Corridor. At this point, they were finished. Along came Yoweri Museveni, leader of Uganda, who decided that he did not want to be facing a neighbor that was part of the Arab North. He decided his best bet was to jump on board financially, politically, militarily, with John Garang De Mavior. One has to realize that in 1983, John Garang, a colonel in the Khartoum military and also with a good education—I believe he had a degree in Agricultural Engineering from Iowa State University—as well. You have to realize he was sent down onto this region; John Garang de Mavior, the white bull, is a

Dinka Bor. He is Dinka Bor. He was sent into this region, because they believe he was their best bet to quell the peace in the initial uprising that had taken place. He flew down there, and lo and behold, he joined the resistance.

Yoweri Museveni sees that his best attempt to deal with what he has to... At that time, he had Juno Oris with the West Nile Bank Front. Later on they were split into West Nile Bank Front I and II, but along with that Yoweri Museveni was dealing with one 1.2 million displaced Ugandans, a massive amount, probably up to 200,000 deaths. He had to bring stability to his own region. The only way he saw of doing that was—once again border politics—to use the SPLA/SPLM as a buffer to what was going on. During this time—the Khartoum regime—Bashir was meeting with Joseph Koumi and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). They were actually supporting them, helping them financially as they waged war on Uganda, because Khartoum believed they could play border politics. The obligatory response for Joseph Koumi and his group was to do systematic hits, interruption of aid convoys, attacking humanitarian relief operations in the south to further destabilize the efforts of the SPLA. So you had a proxy war being waged by Uganda against Khartoum and vice versa.

That says nothing about what was going on with Eritrea and Ethiopia, or the subversive politics that was taking place from Egypt who thrives on the destabilization of Sudan. Sudan is 87% agrarian. If you add the agrarian and pastoral areas, they constitute is 92% of the country, a subsistence farming, pastoral and agrarian society. Egypt, which looks at the Nile as their lifeblood, sees the development of Sudan as a potential threat as it gains power in the region because of the resources of the Nile. Massive problems.

Q: Right. Let us go back. Why would they—the North and South— come together given all these factors that you have just described? What brought them together to negotiate?

A: The only thing that brought them together was: after the South was able to receive sufficient support by Ethiopia and Uganda jumping in to help, the North knew right from the start—since 1983— that there had to be a resolution. They had tried several times especially under Sadiq Al Mahdi. It looked promising. There were various declarations, and finally the South came up with the DUP's (Democratic Unionist Party) Declaration of Principles. They (the North) knew that there was only going to be one solution, and that was protracted guerilla warfare. They had tried several times to go against the South— mechanized. That was impossible. So they had to bait and draw.

The SPLA became one of the best guerilla fighting forces in the world. They pushed it to a military decision. In 1997, the South overthrew Gai. Commander Thomas Serillo rode in there very victoriously. The South took one of the major population centers. When this happened in 1997, there was a massive resurgence of pride in the South. For once, the people of the South thought they could put aside their differences, unite together and actually fight a successful war against the North. In the meantime, the North, with its isolation from governments like America and others, was having financial problems. The war was costing them roughly a million dollars a day to fight. Also in the meantime, you had the Northeast under the National Democratic Alliance. Because of their

marginalization by the government as well, they decided to go to arms. One of the seven members of the Democratic Alliance was the SPLA. Then the Darfur crisis started to raise its head as well. There were also issues of Northern areas that do not get reported on much. But the North realized that they had the possibility of an all out war from various sectors against Khartoum. This is one of the reasons they were very happy to push towards some type of settlement with the South.

Osama Turabi was marginalized by Bashir, because he no longer met his political objectives. They would fly into Nairobi and have these IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) talks and file motions for peace. They would sign agreements and various declarations of principal dealing with the joint initiatives on Sudan.

But, by the time he landed in Khartoum, the press was already reporting that Bashir's negotiations were considered null and void. Two main things happened. One, Carol Dean and Kunyon Bol, who was Dinka, were very influential with SSIM, South Sudan Independence Movement, was with Bashir, and finally through some subversive movements moved over to the SPLA under John Garang. After attempting a failed execution of Garang in Nairobi, he fled back to Barbizel and started a massive rampage of bloodshed throughout that region. He was eventually captured, hung from a tree, had his genitalia ripped from his body, and was killed, along with Riak Machar, who had been a very famous powerful warrior, military leader who decided to cast his lot with John Garang. They had incredible success in the Bantu oilfields, which where the resources are.

Q: What I wanted to focus on is what brought the two parties to decide to negotiate.

A: It was a military solution. The south realized that the momentum had for once swung in their favor. The North was dealing with a failed economic policy, failed Islamization; massive rioting going on in Khartoum. Do not forget there are 4,000 South Sudanese in Khartoum living in absolute squalor.

You combine the citywide pressure in Khartoum with policies after 1997 and 1998 where the government were taking students from the North, grabbing them out of school, putting them on buses, giving them two weeks of training with wood rifles, and sending them to war in the South, especially Juba. I was actually in the trenches with Lieutenant Colonel Motown Kolm Kichner back in 1999 and 2000 where you had the war being confined to the overthrow of Juba, which is the capital of the South.

The only thing that brought these two groups together... Stalin said that sincere diplomacy is no more possible than wooden iron. The only way they could have sincere diplomacy was to have a military force that could push the battle. Back then in 1998 and 1999 the factions of the SPLA had actually moved up into the northeast around Damasin. They were near the Rosiere Damasin Dam on a river coming out of Ethiopia. There were talks that they were going to blow up this dam. If this were to happen, not only would Khartoum end up under a couple of feet of water, but it would potentially threaten the Aswan Dam which in turn threatened 56 million people in Egypt.

This is what made the international powers have to do some sincere negotiations. Senator Danforth went over in September 2001. He began to push a U.S. role for diplomacy in the region. There were some unilateral grants taking place to the Ugandan Government where they were getting money and they were supplying tires, fuel, and what was considered non-combatant support. They were actually supplying military uniforms for the soldiers.

The Southerners showed that they were able to pull it together where it counted and actually carry out a protracted global warfare that the North could not endure. This is why the talks in 2005 came to, in the end, separation or independence for the South. This is the only reason it happened and the only reason it will continue. It is probably the most precarious time ever for the South.

The North continues to sit back and watch to see what will happen. During this 1983 to 2005 civil war, which was the deadliest, with two million people dead as a result, you had a massive brain drain from the South. One of the main problems that the South has going right now is that, not only have they had intellectual brain drain, but when the educated southerners who fled, who lived in the United States, who lived in Canada, Australia, Great Britain or Europe, when they have come back now to take a role and have the ability to do so, there is still a lot of resentment from some of the intellectuals who stayed, slugged it out in the trenches if you will, in the fight for independence.

So along with that the North knows there is massive contention even among the old fighters of the South. The Africans mistrust Vice President Bashir. He is very duplicitous. Like the Braveheart of old, he was given land grants and titles as bribes, flipping back and forth from North to South. Even in the government right now, you have Lam Kol as the foreign minister, a Shilluk man, who is responsible himself for what many people have charged him with genocide. And so all this brokering, even in the Southern Government is difficult at best.

Q: Do you have any sense of how the negotiations went or how they were orchestrated so they reached some type of an agreement?

A: Negotiations reached an agreement simply because they were able to bring military force to the table. For once the South was seen as a credible military operation. It was favored by the U.S. Sudan has entered into its most critical area as far as being a rogue regime with its support of the Iraq war and Saddam Hussein. They also had one of the most wanted people in the world, as a fugitive being harbored there in Sudan, Osama Bin Laden. So the North lost its credibility. The South was now winning the friendship of the United States and other European Union nations. So the bargaining power was in their court. Also, keep in mind, there was a massive outcry among the nations of the world to the continued genocide that was going on among the Southerners through starvation and the marginalization program. The tide of popular world opinion had turned against Khartoum; the South had the upper hand. This is why the negotiations were successful.

They worked out oil revenue sharing. The final peace treaty was January 9th of 2005 out of Nairobi.

The South got autonomy for six years. They have the ability to have a referendum on secession, which they are going to take. A merging of the armed forces was a key initiative. I was then focusing, in fact I was working closely with Roger Winter, focusing closely on northeastern Sudan where you had a massive arms buildup of the SPLA in the northern regions being supported by the Airtrans task force. It was being implemented by the general that was in charge of border surveillance for Eritrea. The Eritrean government moved up tanks along the border to stand as secondary support for the SPLA up there.

So the force, the momentum was with them such as sharing 50/50 of the oil fields. One of the main things, the process of marginalization that Nimeiri carried out as a policy of the government, Islamization, Sharia Law and the policies of the British before that. One of the main contentions of the Southerners was we cannot get jobs. We cannot get any type of political standing. We cannot get any type of post of importance in the government. That changed.

In the negotiations, there were varying ratios, but for central administration they set up quotas that Southerners must have these positions. This was a strategic part of the negotiations to actually place commissioners.

When Nimeiri attacked the South, one of the things he did was to throw out all of the judges from the South who were Christian. They completely threw them out. So you had Muslims leading the courts; you had Islamic Law. Another thing is Islamic Law can remain in the North, but Sharia Law was disbanded in the South as voted on by the assembly. So many favorable things, but the most favorable thing of all was the fact that they had the right to have autonomy for six years and the ability to have a referendum on secession. This was the major point that Garang wanted. Whatever the conspiracy theories are on his death. Salva Kiir, I was with Salva Kiir. He held my hand. When they overthrew Waw in the northeastern part of Sudan, I actually walked in with him holding his hand. We walked into Waw for the first time with the military occupation of the South. It was a major psychological blow to the North as well as the fact that they had surrounded Juba. Salva Kiir a professed Christian being in power has done a lot, not to simply shore up his relationships with the elite, but Salva Kiir is also a very popular man among the common people of South Sudan. They see Salva Kiir as one of them. He stuck it out. He was an intellectual, but he stayed there. He fought in the trenches, but he built up an incredible rapport with the average man. He enjoyed a lot of support in the South.

Q: Let me come back to that. But in the negotiations, there were two approaches: one was limited it to the North and the South talking together. The other was that it should be inclusive of more of the different parties. What was your understanding of that?

A: You have to realize that those types of squabbles will continue because of the failed policies of Khartoum with its marginalization. A lot of people very naïvely look at Sudan

and say oh the war between the North and the South is absolutely false. In the meantime, you had trade unionists, you had Marghami, Sadiq Al Mahdi, Abdul Idris and various other groups vying for power in the North. They were disbanded; their political party shut down; and they were imprisoned. Some of them were killed, exiled. So what you have now is that the Government of the North has lost a lot of its footing; you have many of the various factions coming and saying hey, we want a piece of this puzzle.

For instance, for a long time the Nuba mountain region was off the table. If they were going to negotiate about autonomy for the South, Nuba was not going to be included. Coming in along with that then you had the Democratic Alliance in the northeastern, they had seven factions vying for power and vying for resources because of the marginalization along with that. You had the Rashida with the Free Alliance Defense Force. These groups now are trying to get as much political attention and media attention as they can to push their own claims for the region, to push what they feel are resources that should come to them. So this thing is far from over, even if it pertains to...

Q: Does that also apply to the Darfur problem?

A: Absolutely. What you are seeing in Darfur is a part and parcel copy of what has taken place in the south, and what has taken place in northeastern Sudan. A major danger to the Khartoum regime was the fact that the Beha forces along with the Reshida with Eritrean military support threatened to walk in toward Sudan. Whether it be bombings on the pipeline going out there or whether it be destabilization of the port, Port Sudan. These were major things that had to be taken into account as well. So Darfur is nothing but a continuation of that process. The Darfur people were part of the marginalization. The same thing you have right now in Northern Kurdufan as well. Because the population density is not there, the crisis has not reached the proportions we have seen in Darfur. The interesting thing about Darfur, it—once again border politics like in Nigeria, Chad—saw this as an opportunity to provide stability for their own problems.

Q: Let us go back to the CPA. What was accomplished by the CPA? It is a very complex agreement. It has a lot of protocols, wealth sharing and power sharing, and then the commissions were set up for Abyei, and commissions for monitoring, etc. What was accomplished by the CPA?

A: What the CPA accomplished was that you were able to get commissioners in positions, posts of power. The commissioners of the region, which are from the region, which are South Sudanese. So for the first time ever, they are sitting in posts that relate most closely to the welfare of the people.

Q: They are in the National Unity Government.

A: That is correct. What is happening is that this is where the rubber meets the road. It is called the endearment campaign. This is what I work with the United States civil and military affairs people with all the time. Instead of kicking in doors and taking names and shooting terrorists, what they need to do is focus on an endearment campaign which is

through the civil affairs operation of the foreign area officers: just win the hearts and minds of the local populace. This is done through joint work with the NGOs (Non Governmental Organizations) that are on the ground, the international organizations and PVOs working in conjunction with them to provide basic services for the people. Now the commissioners in the south were able to get these desks finally. Now they have a chance to produce. To provide the necessary services, educational, health, these types of services to their populace.

The deal is this. If you are successful at the job, you win the hearts and minds of the people. You will have a powerful South. If they squander it now... I was just seeing in one of the Juba posts where Salva Kiir called for an anti-corruption panel recently about two or three weeks ago. So what are you experiencing? In the South you have undisciplined military that they were not paid. They were not given any type of stipend. They had to make their own way. In the South, there were a lot of crimes committed and inhumanity. They would go in and rob and terrorize villages. They would take what they want. The SPLA told the people, look, we are fighting for your freedom. It is your responsibility to feed the soldiers. It was forced quartering, back to revolutionary times of America. Now you had a chance just to prove to the people that they are going to look out for their best interests.

Q: These are the commissioners of the Southern Government?

A: That is correct.

Q: Not of the Unity Government.

A: The Unity Government as it relates to Salva Kiir as a branch of the South, ok. Because they are in these power broker positions that put in these intermediary level leaders such as commissioners. Now, for instance, in North Obeel where you have massive amounts, some 100,000 Darfuri refugees...when you cross the Bar al 'Arab river and go into Kiniko which is the first major town in Darfur, as you come up from the south, massive numbers of internally displaced people fled to this region. Once again the commissioner and the SPLM had the ability to prove that they will care for the welfare of the people, provide solutions for them. If they are able to do that —the human endearment campaign, there is the possibility that the referendum for independence will be all that more sure.

Q: Is the CPA being implemented?

A: It is being implemented to the degree they are capable of implementing it. The various groups that are going in there help them with good governance. USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and other State Department groups are buying these guys suits, flying them to Switzerland and giving them courses on governance.

Q: That is in the South, but the CPA called on the north to implement a lot of decisions.

A: That is correct, and once again you do not have... you never had good governance in the North. There has never been good governance. You have to realize it has run amok with favors, political pay backs and religious attributions as well because they promote from family, from chieftain structures, from tribal structures from within. There is a massive lack of trust, among the groups in the north and amongst each other. Because what they have seen if you are not on the winning side, you end up in prison, killed or exiled. So what good faith they are operating on time will tell.

In the South, they face similar problems in the fact that one, in the South you had a massive brain drain. You had various ideological attempts such as communism and various other influences. One of the things that will be very important is: will they allow private property ownership? Will they allow a free market?

Q: When you say they, who is they?

A: Meaning the Southern leaders. It is clear that the North is not going to do anything that would destabilize the power of Omar Bashir. This is a guy who has many enemies and he sees his only future in hanging on to power as best he can. I would say that probably in five to ten years he will flee to Saudi Arabia and spend the rest of his life there with \$25 million.

Q: Are these protocols of wealth sharing and power sharing and commissions functioning now; is anything happening?

A: They are functioning to the degree that they are able to get past the corruption taking place between the governing authorities both in the North and in the South. You might say here again that the good governance principles have to come into play. It is a trickle down effect. The intellectual elite who have been part of the guerilla force in the South have this mind set about them that says: look, we stuck it out here in the trenches. We risked our lives and we fought. Now it is time we enjoy some of the benefits. Awhile ago, when I was in Yei, I was speaking with some of the local businessmen. One of the things that they brought up as possibly different is that: at one time you had one dictator 1500 miles away; now you have 1500 dictators a mile away.

The governance at the mid level structure is going to be very important as it relates to the people of South Sudan. For instance, they have not put in a credible education system in the south. You have many businessmen that are very keen on taking advantage of the opportunities now that are at their disposal in the South. However, they are reluctant to or remiss in doing that. I am talking about African businessmen. I am not talking about foreign investors. I am talking about African investment. They are reluctant to invest, because why? Their kids and their families have to live in Entebbe or Nairobi or other places so they can get an education.

So part of the angst, among the possible strength of the economy, is that these businessmen are reluctant to throw all their chips in because they want a place where they say, "Look, we are willing to pay if we have a good school in a place. We can bring our

kids home. They can grow up in their homeland, which they have never seen and begin to assume an identity as Southerners. But we have to be able to provide them with top education; these kids went to school abroad. Now if they bring them back, are they going to be in a little bush hut learning school? I do not think so.

Q: Part of the provisions of the CPA relate to having a census that would be followed by elections and later on the referendum. Are any of those being prepared for?

A: Yes, they are. In fact, gerrymandering is taking place.

Q: Are you talking about the South or the whole country?

A: ...actually, predominantly through the South. The reason being is because in the large population base in the South, you have the diaspora moving abroad. But you also have mass displacement: for example, Sudanese in Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and of course in the north. Right now I am in Cairo, Egypt, where they figure they have two million Sudanese refugees. The call has gone out. They are sending their recruiters out trying to lure these people back home into the South promising them the land of opportunity. Not many people are buying it yet. They are in a wait and see attitude. A lot of these Sudanese people, for instance here in Cairo, live as second or third class citizens with little opportunities. One of the things we are doing here is providing education and medical screening for them. They are not willing to get on a plane and fly back to the South that they supposedly belong to but do not know.

Q: Is there a census being taken anywhere?

A: I do not know if a census is actually going forward right now, but I do know this: the commissioners on the border areas are feverishly trying to get people back into their region so that when the census does happen, they will have the highest numbers possible.

Q: Is there any work being done preparing for elections countrywide?

A: Here again that all relates to governance. There are various groups working to see that the elections can actually take place, firmly and smoothly. I am not as educated as to what is taking place in the preparations for an electoral process, as much as I am about the socio-political impacts from the North and the South.

Q: How much understanding do you think the people, both in the South and in the North have about the CPA and what it means for them, and the related processes?

A: Once again that is one of the big... it is the public relations war now that is being waged. There are various radio stations that they are trying to prop up in the South to get their message out through short wave radio. That is going to be the main thing. They have tried to focus on the main population centers, Juba, Yei, Torit, New Sudan areas, and educate the people. Then, you are dealing with the uneducated as far as book smarts curricula is concerned, uneducated individuals in the first place through the

marginalization process that took place. Now they have a huge mountain ahead of them. Much of this message about the CPA and what provisions are being made and how that is coming along has to be passed out through word of mouth rather than in print. That is a daunting task.

We have a massive area to cover, and very little infrastructure. There is little infrastructure in South Sudan. In the South right now they are putting in a big road coming into Juba that extends from Yei; the Yei-Juba road heading up north as well. But what do we see, the minute they pave the road there is massive bloodshed, because these people have never learned how to drive in the first place. They are used to driving through bush roads. Now they have these roads where they can drive 120 kilometers per hour and they are hitting each other and killing each other. Simple things like that are huge problems when you have had such marginalization. There is no civil infrastructure. In order for them to send messages to Juba, they hop on trains and fly to remote regions, have cars based there that have been moved in during the dry season, because we have the ability to navigate and move around.

Q: Do you think the elections will come off?

A: Yes, I do. Absolutely.

Q: In both the North and the South?

A: Yes, I do. In fact, it will be interesting to see who actually runs the more free and fair elections.

Q: Are preparations being made; are people being prepared to organize the elections?

A: We have seen some things taking place in Yei where people are being taught about the election process. I am sure they are feverishly moving ahead. A friend of mine is in there working on this very thing in Juba with good governance skills and helping to prepare them for the referendum on secession or not. So this is going to

Q: Is that happening in the North too?

A: I honestly cannot speak to what is taking place out of Khartoum. I have to profess ignorance. I have been there. I have seen the shady policies and back street markets and various things. Khartoum has a massive amount of its own problems. Time will tell what Bashir and his government are actually going to do as far as honest brokerage as it pertains to governing.

Q: Do you have a sense of what the elections might bring about in the South?

A: My feeling, once again I want to say this is my feeling or my opinion... I believe there is no doubt right now that the South is going to vote for secession and basically try and establish...

Q: That relates to the referendum.

A: Correct. I believe they still have a long path to trod as it relates just to tribal negotiations long wounds from various attacks and genocides that have been carried out by the various tribes. So they have their hands full just in building a unified South.

Q: Let us turn to what has been the role of the international community and what should be their role.

A: The international community has played a pivotal role. I would say that especially as it pertains to the United States which you saw was a very grass roots effort. This is interesting, you know as the political observer through Washington that being away from the Beltway is such a good thing because what you are able to see is from far right groups to far left groups actually coming together over these issues in Sudan, as they relate to the suffering of the people, the genocide. You have Hollywood involved with the Darfur situation. You have Christian organizations like ours. You have human rights organizations and various groups that have come together with a unified voice to say stop the madness. Now the first time... There were some developments in 1973 to 1983 under the Addis Ababa Accords. You have to realize that since 2005 this is the first time that sustainable development has actually been able to take place in South Sudan.

So we need to look at the IOs, NGOs, PVOs that are actually working in Sudan now. There has been a flood of them going into the region now that there is some degree of security. Northern Uganda remains an issue. With some degree of security, although you have land mines and various other things that have to be taken into account as far as travel security is concerned. But now there is a great opportunity for the international community to step up and push for solid governance principles, a referendum that would give the South autonomy. It is clear that they are not going to be able to work together as long as you have an Islamic North and a Christian South that absolutely will not even for one second budge from Sharia Law. It is not going to happen.

Q: So what is the North going to be doing? They do not want this referendum to lead to separation, so what role...

A: Once again, the North is incapable; it is an incredibly incompetent government; but as best as they are able what you are going to see is they are going to be reaching out to their Arab neighbors all the more, looking for support, looking for political support, looking for some savvy in negotiations and governance. Egypt is going to play a critical role as it relates to the Government of Sudan in the North, because they have very much of a vested interest. It will be interesting to see Eritrea dealing with its own problems with Isaias Asef working in his failed government. Then, there are the contentions that they still have with Ethiopia.

An interesting thing we need to keep in mind here is what happens with Eritrea. It could have some interesting impact on the border regions of both the North and the South.

What the government of Khartoum will do... I am not sure what Bashir's next move will be. Clearly what we have seen from history is he is duplicitous, has never carried out agreements. We see it right now with Darfur. Look at the way this man negotiates with the international community. He is dishonest. He is not trustworthy. Is that going to change overnight so that he can have some type of coalition government that might keep a unified south? I highly doubt it.

Q: Does anybody have a vision of a unified Sudan with appropriate representation from different parties? John Garang I gather had that view, but does anybody else?

A: John Garang had that view, but under very strong stipulations. I sat in meetings with **Dr. Justin Yakerup**. [Sahin Yakup?] One of the things they were not going to budge on was the fact that there had to be wealth resource sharing. There had to be job sharing at the top political levels. And there was not going to be Sharia Law in the South. These were things that he said, "Look, we will stay in the bush and die for." How is that going to take place when you have a North that is decidedly moving to be even more pro-Islamic, seeking out more of those same neighbors? That does not look positive at all to me.

Q: Any other points we have not touched on or that you feel that you ought to emphasize?

A: There are still some major roles to be played as we look at what is going to happen. There have been some recent talks held in Juba with Joseph Kuni and the LRA. You have the vice president of South Sudan who is seen meeting with Joseph Kuni handing over money. How does this relate to the ostracizing of **Yaro Yusemini** [Yoweri Museveni?] and the Ugandan Government? What does this mean as we are look at spillover effects into Chad. There have been incursions by the Janjaweed Militia well into Chad. Then, you have the continued instability between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The story of Sudan is not going to be completely written between the North and the South. Just as its wars were fought with neighbors helping or detraction, you are going to see that come into play again within the next three years.

Q: Is there any role for the international community in the political dimensions?

A: With the African Union, as they were working through IGAD, we saw some pretty positive things. It is time for Africa to come to grips with African problems. That means the regional leaders are going to have to come together. I noticed there are some joint coalitions with South Africa and various other power brokers to come in to help them fix the Sudan problems, understanding Africa. This is going to be interesting to see how that all comes about.

Q: What about the role of the U.S. and the European Community.

A: Absolutely. What is important is we need to continue to push with our various opportunities through State Department; we need to continue to push for a resolution of this crisis in Sudan, but then also, it is important to maintain a grip and understand and be

aware of these governments that are rogue regimes like Isaiiah Sefi working in Eritrea; and how that relates to the situation with Daniel **Mellis [Meles? Mellis?]** in Ethiopia. The instability in the Horn of Africa is not good as it relates to the peace of Sudan. Every bit of political and economic pressure that we can exert as well as providing financial assistance through various State Department and USAID programs to set up governance in the South would be essential.

Q: Is there any specific thing the international community should be pressing for?

A: I am going to hold off on my opinions right now on that, because that is still being developed as I recently have been in the South again.

Q: What do you see as the outcome in the near future and the longer range?

A: What do I see as the immediate outcome? You are going to see an autonomous region in the South. You are going to see the referendum going through. The South is going to have its independence.

Q: Is that likely to lead to new warfare?

A: I do not believe it is likely to lead to new warfare as long as the North continues to see that the military option was a loser for them. They have so many internal problems among themselves; this is a solution that had to come. In my opinion, it is the South's to lose now. It is not theirs to win; it is theirs to lose.

Q: Do you think the South is going to bring its factional groups together?

A: That is a great question. That is the \$20,000 question as it relates to the South. Are they going to be able to set up a government with good governance that is free from economic and political corruption? That remains to be seen. We have to see how strongly Salva Kiir is going to press these issues. Many in the South when they saw these headlines, they just laughed about it.

Q: What headlines are you talking about?

A: When Salva Kiir set up his anti corruption panel. A lot of people just laughed. Now is their chance to show that they can transition from a damn good guerilla-fighting unit into a coalition government that will look out for the welfare and benefit of the people.

Q: How will the Darfur situation affect this? Is there any prospect of that being sorted out?

A: That seems to be playing out at a decidedly international level. I do believe that recently the UN won approval to bring in some attack helicopters for the security of its humanitarian relief operations. Here again humanitarian relief and short term intervention is going to do nothing but keep the populace alive. There is going to have to be

something more. Nigeria and others can have a role to play here in helping in this dispute. The Chad, Nigeria can play an important role here, as Nigeria has in other areas in West Africa. They can play an important role here, and even with the African Union Organization coming together and actually saying: “look, we need peace keepers.” Once you put stability in the area and then you can have the brokered negotiations. That is going to be an interesting thing to see how that works out. What Darfur does not have going for it is resources. The South as well, do not get me wrong, but even less resources, even less of rebel forces to counteract the government control. This one will be played out on an international arena as the various outcries against the Khartoum regime allow aid and allow peace to come into the area.

Q: What about the eastern rebel groups?

A: The National Democratic Alliances: they have been power brokered into the fold by the fact that the SPLA is the major military force in the northeastern region. With Khartoum and Asmara making overtures of peace and unity together, the border zone area becomes very cramped. Beja and Rashida are poor militarily at best. They lack discipline; they lack finances. They lack a strong strategy. They really would not stand a chance without the SPLA, so now all they can hope to do is come in on the tail of this and push while the momentum has kind of swung to the South; they can ride the coat tails, and push for equitable distribution of wealth. The problem is what I see among the Beja and Rashida is that they are so duplicitous in relations with the South that they will squander the wealth among the elite. In the end, there is very little hope any of the wealth will go to Northeastern Sudan.

Q: Are there any important aspects that you would like to emphasize that we have not touched on?

A: That pretty much gives a macro overview, delving a bit in the micro pieces possibly in the South.

Q: For the last question that USIP is interested in: what lessons are we learning from this experience, both of what works and what does not work? What would you pick out as three or four or five major lessons in brief?

A: One lesson that we can learn in the world at large is the fact that we can see that, when you are dealing with an ideological group that is bent on imposing a religious domination on a people, negotiations without the use of force are impossible. One lesson learned is this: we see among fundamentalist Islamic governments that they do not respect a superior *show* of force. They actually greet it contemptuously. They only respect the superior *use* of force.

That is a major lesson learned that we see. You have to realize the Islamic agenda is Cape to Cairo; Sudan sits in the middle. The South saw themselves freedom fighters for all of Africa.

Q: What other lessons come to mind?

A: What you are going to see as a learned lesson is for the South: while running a long protracted guerilla war has its own intricacies, they are going to see that building a coalition government in the south among the tribes that is seen as fair and equitable among them all is going to be their biggest challenge. This relates to how will things work in Iraq. There are some lessons we might be able to learn and apply there as well. So building the unity of the people in the South... there is a strong national identity of south Sudanese, Southerners In the meantime, building trust among them, for instance Nuer and Shilluk and Dinka and Dinka Bor, Dinka Batanazel, resource sharing now that they have part of the pie; how they share their resources among themselves will really be a telling factor.

Q: This has been very worthwhile. I do not want to cut off anything you feel is important to add to this. You covered a lot.

A: Like I said, my history in Sudan has been quite extensive because I have been there with boots on the ground, and actually seen these things unfolding and not just read them from briefs or newspapers.

Q: What about your personal role? Things that you are trying to do. You have not touched on that very much.

A: As an organization, we are a Christian organization. I am presently living here in the Middle East to be close to the regions that we work in so heavily, but also I am studying Arabic. I am working on my Arabic skills so I can actually travel throughout the region better and understand the culture better. I am working on those. I have learned a lot about determination being with the Southerners. I have learned so much personally about what it means to endure hardship, to suffer loss. These are your classic stoic...these are the stoic philosophers of the South. We will see this affecting the psyche for 50 years to come, because all along these people were taught to say, "Look it is god's will." If they happen to get an air drop, if they happen to get resources, they say, "Thank God he has had favor on us." When they suffer they say, "God is refining us." So this stoic philosophy has permeated the South and will be a part of its psyche for a long time to come. That is going to be interesting. Realize this. You have had three generations in Sudan that when they are hungry they look to the sky for their sorghum. Three generations.

Q: What is your strategy for what you are trying to do?

A: Recently right now we are working in Darfur putting in wells, putting in boreholes. We have identified areas the evacuation routes for the internally displaced for their walking three days in 120 to 130 degree temperatures with no water. What we are doing is we are popping in bore holes so they will have places to get water as they are relocating, and then in areas where they can have water when they settle. I was just up there where there were 9,500 refugees fleeing; they were literally on trucks, on donkeys,

on foot stopping at villages saying do you have water here? Looking for areas where they could actually settle down. So we are working on continued water resources as well as we are working on some regional primary health care units up in the region, actually putting up some building. We bring in teams of foreign doctors to do advanced medical health and then nurses midwives to provide the continued ongoing basic medical services to the people.

Q: Do you have any contact with the political processes?

A: Just as it relates to knowing these people having worked with them on the ground, been in the trenches with them. It is interesting; my work with the political process is a personal role being friends with these individuals and being with them, standing with them at critical moments in life. So it is an insider look if you will, at the grand scale of things. I am not sitting in at Nairobi courts or sitting up in Khartoum at the Nile Hilton while they discuss these things. But when they come back home I have sat around and drank a Kenya beer or whatever with them and we sit around the campfires up in the bush and actually discuss what will we do in the future. That is kind of my insight.

Q: Is your work being blocked by any groups?

A: It is interesting you should ask that. While we were working through Eritrea, registered in Eritrea as a non-governmental organization, we had, and then used Eritrea as access into Northeastern Sudan and did quite a bit of work in Eritrea itself. We were thrown out of the country as a Christian organization. We stood up and spoke out against the imprisonment of the population in Eritrea. Isaiah Seti threw us out. We actually ran into problems as well with the various fundamentalist Moslem groups who put out a fatwa or a contract on our head. All of our country workers have been arrested, and still are presently in prison in Eritrea.

Q: But in the Sudan are you being blocked by anyone?

A: No. One of the things that is still quite nice about working in the South is that because they are not quite as organized yet as they will be, they are not as encumbered with processes as well. Now I did see that a bit more this time with the SPLM as far as passes and things like that. But the good thing is yet they are not as encumbered. It is not like trying to operate through the North. So that is a good thing.

Q: What about the Northern Government?

A: Yes, of course they kind of have this... You know it is interesting. I have tried to figure out what is their operational style? It seems to me their operational style would almost be a 1950s Communist approach: the regime-style approach to governance even as it relates to people coming into their country, security monitoring.

Q: What do you mean by that?

A: Very unfriendly, very staunch, stern faced. They do not offer assistance. They are very defunct. They are very non-mechanized as far as their government is concerned. Information is still passed on by personal informants and spies, usually word of mouth, very little electronic media. Their immigration structure and various things are a farce at best, the way they carry out government policing and those types of things.

Q: But you were able to get access or permission?

A: Yes. We were able to actually get visas and get into the North, although I personally cannot stand working there. I have been in probably over 110 countries working, and I can tell you right now that probably the city that I hated working in the most of any place was Khartoum. I was in Iraq, in Afghanistan. I crossed the border into Afghanistan the day the Taliban fell, through Pakistan. The place I hated the most is Khartoum. They are also very much anti-Western. There are some markets where they sell all their weapons. You can go in and buy AK-47s for about 50-60 dollars. These areas were very much seething with anti-Western hatred as well as the political Islamic agenda. So they are not very friendly.

Q: Well anything else? It has been fascinating, and I appreciate it.

A: I have enjoyed it as well. I just hope that it has been worth your time, and that it has been beneficial; this project is that interesting. When you get a perspective that comes more from the ground level versus from the philosophical theoretical or governmental level, it can add a bit of balance to it.