



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
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9/11 a Year On: America's Challenges in a Changed World

United States Institute of Peace Conference

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Welcoming Remarks by Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace

As we begin a very full day, I want to express thanks—on behalf of the Institute's Board of Directors and staff—to our corporate and foundation sponsors for enabling us to make this event hospitable:

- **The American International Group**
- **The Boeing Corporation**
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In putting together today's events, just about all Institute staff gave a good deal of their time in the doldrums of August to make the arrangements for the conference come together so smoothly. I can't mention them all by name, but I do want to give special thanks to Dr. Paul Stares, our Director of Research and Studies, for his lead role in conceptualizing and organizing this conference.

A year ago our country suffered its third direct attack in three centuries. The 21st Century thus began with a profound shock to our sense of security. Any of you who saw the CNN replay earlier this week of the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers can only feel renewed anguish at the sight of the people in those burning buildings faced with the terrifying dilemma of whether to burn or jump. Those of us professionally concerned with matters of national security and foreign policy feel a special obligation to do what we can to see that Americans—indeed, people of any nation—are not again faced with such a rending, lethal choice.

Like the attack of December 7, 1941, September 11, 2001 has provoked us to think about fundamental changes in the way we deal with our defenses and the rest of the world. The process of recasting America's national security and foreign policies that began with our entry into World War II and carried us through the Cold War years took more than a decade to fully play out. Conceptualizing new policies and institutions, and building domestic support and international coalitions takes time, vigorous national debate, and considerable effort at institution building.

Today, we are very early in the process of making the needed adjustments for dealing with a world in which narrowly-based sectarian extremism in the Muslim world has expressed itself in terrorist violence; a world of proliferating weapons of mass destruction; a world in which the dislocations of globalization are creating security challenges as well as opportunities for social and economic development.

Our purpose here today—consistent with the Institute's charter from Congress—is to spark policy dialogue, debate, and brainstorming that will contribute to the development of policies and

institutions appropriate to our post-9/11 national agenda. Our objective is to go beyond the specific issues of the day and look at the fundamental, long-term issues raised by the challenge of global terrorism. To that end, we are fortunate to have on the program today a number of our country's most senior and experienced national security and foreign policy officials and former officials. We have encouraged them to explore the "big picture" issues that are fundamental to shaping effective national policies in the wake of last year's attacks.

The Institute's special commitment is to encourage the evolution of foreign and security policies that will deal with international conflict by political means. Military action is appropriately needed to deal with the terrorist violence imposed on us—and which still threatens us. But as Institute Board Chairman Chester Crocker and I suggest in an op-ed to be published tomorrow in the *Christian Science Monitor*, military action can only be the initial, short-term response to the challenges of 9/11. Our successful military operations in Afghanistan have disrupted, but not eliminated, the threat of al Qaeda's terrorism. They have bought us time to develop a comprehensive national strategy for the long struggle we now face, time to develop the international support that is essential to dealing effectively with the new security agenda.

Today's conference presentations and panel discussions will only touch on the most immediate of our current challenges. Issues explored today will be sustained in other Institute programs. You have in your conference packets information on many of the Institute's activities developed over the past year. But I should mention in particular:

- Our Special Initiative on the Muslim World, led by former Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich, which is exploring the full range of issues that will shape our dealings with Islamic states ranging from North Africa through Southeast Asia.
- Our Rule of Law Program, led by Neil Kritz, which is promoting the development of legal systems in the Israeli-Palestinian context, and human rights accountability and reconciliation in states torn apart by violence.
- David Smock's Religion and Peacemaking Initiative, which is sponsoring interfaith dialogues designed to promote tolerance and understanding between Christians, Muslims and Jews.
- And our Training Program, under George Ward's leadership, which is working with AID and various NGOs to make our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan more effective.

With this perspective on our purposes today, it is a special honor to begin the program by introducing one of our country's most distinguished national security leaders, retired General Brent Scowcroft. Full biographical information on all our presenters is in your conference folder, but I should mention that many of us at the Institute have had the honor of working with General Scowcroft over the years, and the Institute has benefited in numerous ways from his counsel and support. Brent, we welcome you as our lead keynoter.

"New Directions for American Foreign Policy"

Remarks by Brent Scowcroft, Forum for International Security

Thank you very much, Dick. I want to congratulate you and Chet in steering this wonderful institute into the more vital issues of the day. I'm proud to be associated with you in any respect.

It's a great pleasure to kick off this conference on America's challenges in a changed world after 9/11. It's a huge topic and as keynoter I will not attempt to cover everything.

In fact, it reminds me of the story of the couple who had taken a vacation in Scotland and they landed and rented a car, drove out into

the countryside and promptly got lost. After driving around for some time they saw this little old man sitting at an intersection whittling on a piece of wood. So they said, "Excuse me, sir. Could you tell us the shortest way to Aberdeen?" He whittled a minute, looked up, and said, "Folks, if you want the shortest way to Aberdeen you wouldn't start from here."

Anyway, I propose this morning to be something of a scene-setter for the great program that you have in front of you today. To set the scene of a changed world we must ask at least two questions. The first is change from what? The second is how much is the change in the world and how much of the change is in us?

In the first decade after the Cold War, relieved from the awesome pressure of nuclear holocaust, we tended to treat foreign policy sort of like a charity—something we could engage in or not as the whim struck us. We were no longer threatened, even remotely, and we essentially drifted without any deep inquisition into what might be going on in the world. Indeed Frank Fukiyama published a book during this period, "The End of History", in which he forecast the triumph of liberal democracy, market economies, and the absence of conflict.

What was going on in this period before 9/11? In particular, I want to mention two phenomenon developing contrarily but in some respects interactively. The first was globalization, primarily the facts rather than the policy of globalization but both are involved.

Borders are becoming porous. The old notion of the Treaty of Westphalia in which national borders are an absolute barrier to the outside world from what goes on inside, that notion is crumbling under the pressure of international capital flows, communication—not only press, but television and all those kinds of things, environment, and conscious developments such as Kyoto, International Criminal Court and things like that, are changing our world dramatically.

In the United States and Western Europe and other developed countries, globalization was broadly seen as a good, enabling progress and prosperity in an integrating world. But the world was very different from the earlier world say in 1945 when the United Nations was founded. It had 51 members. It now has 190. The bulk of these new members are poor and weak, and for them globalization is the onslaught of a bewilderingly *mélange* of forces disrupting their lives, their culture, their values, and the ability of their poor governments to provide for them in the way that Westphalia assumed.

For many of the people for whom globalism is seen as a threat, the term globalism is synonymous with the United States because we're the ones who are carrying the flag. The McDonalds, the movies, the television. It is the onslaught of American culture which is taken to be globalism.

The contrary and yet associated phenomenon which is going on is the political tendency in some societies to break up into ever-smaller, more homogenous, more intolerant political entities. Perhaps the connection here is groups seeking purity against the onslaught of alien forces. In any case, this

has been going on during this period and these, I believe, are a breeding ground, especially globalization, for terrorism.

We didn't see it, partly because we tended to see terrorism as regional or a response to specific grievances, not existential.

During this period, however, we did see the dynamism of Asia during the 1990s and its vulnerability to globalization in the form of the extreme of capital flows in the crisis of '97-'98. What we have not really noticed, however, is a growing ability of China as it modernized to turn out quality industrial products, coupled with the lowest wage rate almost anywhere in the world. This is a phenomenon which would dramatically change Asia and threaten the economies even of the Asia Tigers. On the other hand, of course, with WTO the Chinese market may finally come to be highly attractive. This is a dramatic change.

Our gradual estrangement with Europe continued during the '90s as the Europeans became more intent on integration, turned their gaze primarily inward, and the United States reacted by tending to favor unilateral approaches.

During the '90s we began increasingly to ignore Russia unless we wanted something from them.

Then there were the holdover issues. The two Koreas, Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Middle East conflict, which threatened during this period as they have before and since.

Into this world first came the Bush Administration and then 9/11. The great change of 9/11 I believe was in the U.S. rather than in the world.

For us, it was a huge discontinuity, partly because we didn't see it coming and partly because it was a huge departure. It was the first time in generations that Americans have felt vulnerable. It was new for us. Even in World War II, while Pearl Harbor was a horror, Hawaii was a long ways away, it wasn't a state yet, and for most Americans there was not the personal sense of vulnerability. That vulnerability is new to us, almost uniquely in the world.

In addition, the perpetrators were non-state actors for whom the traditional notions of deterrence and retaliation either didn't apply or took very different forms.

Finally, there was the suicidal component which, in addition to the horror of it, is very difficult to combat.

The change in the United States was immediate. First the last vestiges of what we call the Vietnam Syndrome disappeared. There was virtually no objection to our sending forces into Afghanistan. We see American flags everywhere now, and none of them are burning. That is a dramatic change over the previous 30 years.

Our hero now is no longer the Wall Street hotshot who makes his first million long before he's 30 years old but the policemen, the firemen who go back into the burning buildings one more time.

After 9/11 there was a great coming together in the world. In Europe the French, of all people, said "now we are all Americans." NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time. The Russians, Chinese, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan—indications of cooperation came from around the world. This spirit helped us

to get through phase one of the war on terrorism, which I think was a great military success. It is probably the only military phase in this war on terrorism—which is part of the problem that we face. Because we've also been engaging in military transformation, and the Afghan war showed the awesomeness of that transformation. But it is unlikely to be applicable to subsequent phases because they are unlikely to be military in the sense Afghanistan was. There are not going to be many more volunteers to be the next Taliban. The war is going to be primarily a war of intelligence and we're not nearly as high tech in the area of human intelligence as we are in our military.

This is a war, now in the intelligence phase, which we cannot win by ourselves. We cannot do it. We have to have the cooperation of friends and allies, in capital flows, in terrorist flows. We need the help of every service because our enemy is shadowy, elusive, not playing by any of the rules that we know how to utilize so well.

The nature of our intelligence task in this part of the war is conceptually simple but high tech in a new way. Whenever terrorists talk, whenever they move, whenever they spend money, whenever they get money they leave traces, and theoretically we ought to be able to pick up those traces.

There are several problems. How do you pick them up? Then how do you separate those from the millions of other traces from people going about their daily lives? And how do you do all of that while respecting the privacy of the other millions? That is a problem, partly of technology, and we need to focus on it very deeply.

I'm not going to talk about homeland security, but it is interesting that for the first time in 200 years we now are setting up a Department of Homeland Security. We've never had one before. Why? Because early on we were protected by two great oceans, and lately by our power projection capabilities and we have assumed we could keep conflict away from the United States.

Several problems are beginning to arise in the war on terrorism. Cooperation is waning. The Europeans charge that in essence we stiffed them in Afghanistan, did not accept or utilize the forces they offered until much of the conflict had been completed. We said thanks, we could do it by ourselves. Likewise with other issues, whether it's the conflict in the Middle East, a second Intafada; whether it is Iraq. These frictions are interfering with the concentration on the war on al Qaeda.

Phase one is virtually over, although mopping up in Afghanistan will take a long time and nationbuilding, an essential part of it, will take even longer. The Administration has not explained the strategy for phase two the way it did for the Afghan phase. Last week there was a cartoon in the Financial Times which showed a billboard saying "America's Most Wanted". On the billboard was Osama bin Laden, which a workman was pasting over with a picture of Saddam Hussein.

The Administration is no longer talking about terrorism with a global reach. That's important in several respects. There are all kinds of terrorists. They're all repugnant and we need to deal with them all. But we cannot deal with them all at once. By dropping the phrase that the President began with, terrorism with a global reach, we make all terrorism equal, and dissipate our ability to concentrate. It makes the problem, if we take it seriously, almost unmanageable.

Finally, except on the East Coast, 9/11 is fading as a galvanizing concept.

Can we win the war on terrorism? Yes, I think we can, in the sense that we can win the war on organized crime. There is going to be no peace treaty on the battleship Missouri in the war on

terrorism, but we can break its back so that it is only a horrible nuisance and not a paralyzing influence on our societies.

But to win it, will require close cooperation in a worldwide campaign and it will require perseverance, patience, and focus. In the mean time, of course, the world goes on. All of the other problems which preceded 9/11 have not gone away, threatening to divert our attention to what is clearly the predominant problem we face. We must learn to walk and chew gum at the same time.

The longstanding conflicts—the two Koreas, Taiwan, Israel-Palestine—they all are as threatening as they have ever been to disrupt this world of ours. India-Pakistan came very close to hostilities recently and the notion that all terrorists are equal, together with the focus on preemption could play into the hands of the Indians.

Incidentally, just as an aside, it is interesting to compare Kashmir and the West Bank. In many respects the conflicts have a great deal in common. The Indians and the Israelis are status quo powers on the territory in question. They want the violence to stop and, if it does, they're quite happy with the situation the way it is. It is the Palestinians and the Pakistanis who resent the status quo and want to overturn it. That makes for a very, very difficult conflict.

There's a new element in the Middle East and that's Al Jazeera television. The Arab world has complained for over a decade about its "street," and now they must be careful about how it reacts to events. It very well may be real now because Al Jazeera plays night after night, day after day, pictures of Israeli tanks smashing Palestinian homes and so on. So there may really be building a "street" reaction in the region which is to be feared.

In Europe, after the surge of 9/11, relations have resumed their decline. There's a book which will be out this fall which discusses what it argues is a return to great power politics of the late 19th and 20th Century and that one of the fundamental conflicts is likely to be between the U.S. and Europe. I think that's probably extreme, but not impossible. What to me this world demands is U.S.-European cooperation, close cooperation. Simply assuming it is not nearly enough.

After a very bad first year with the Bush Administration China is beginning to be viewed with more balance. The transition of leadership seems to be going okay and the Olympics should be a very positive influence over the next several years. There will always be rocks in the road but that relationship looks better than it did a year ago.

Russia is a bright spot and I think it shows the value of personal politics. The improvement in Russian relations is largely a result of a personal rapport between President Bush and President Putin, and in fact it has not fully penetrated the bureaucracy on either side. It's not clear to me exactly who Putin is but it appears we have an opportunity to attract Russia toward the West.

There are a great many issues that I have not discussed, such as Japan, NATO, Latin America. Latin America in the early '90s seemed to be the model for Fukiyama's book about the triumph of democracy and market economies. The outlook, of late, does not look nearly so bright.

One last word on terrorism. We can only win the war on terrorism on the offensive. Homeland security can reduce the impact of terrorism, but winning requires us to take the war to the terrorists.

We need also to work on the predisposing factors that I alluded to behind the terrorist organizations themselves. We need to help those countries and peoples still struggling to find their way in what for many of them is an alien world. Just more economic aid will not suffice.

We have to try to find new ways to reach out a hand to help these peoples and small countries into the 21st Century so that the promise of technology and an integrated world can become a blessing for all rather than a curse for most.

Thank you very much.

"Prospects for Peace in South Asia"

**Remarks by Christina Rocca
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs**

Conflict in South Asia

I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the prospects for peace in South Asia. This subject is central to the goals of the United States, and to the interests of the international community in the region. I know that a principal concern of this gathering today is the continuing crisis between India and Pakistan, and I will review current administration thinking on this issue.

But it is also important to keep in mind that there are other, quite serious, conflicts in South Asia. I think that these also need to be included in any discussion of stability and the prospects for peace in the region. I know that the situation in Afghanistan was taken up at a separate session this morning, so I do not intend to address it except to the extent it influences other developments in South Asia. But I would like to talk about Sri Lanka, where there are some indication that an almost 20-year conflict may be on the way to resolution, and about Nepal, where a rural insurgency has grown over the past five years to threaten the future of a country struggling to establish prosperity and democracy.

India-Pakistan

Throughout South Asia, the search for prosperity and democracy is too often overshadowed by the specter of war. The most prominent case in the region, of course, is the continuing crisis between India and Pakistan. Twice so far this year, the possibility of war between India and Pakistan became very real. Hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops were mobilized along their border and the Line of Control in Kashmir. These crises were generated by extremely provocative terrorist attacks, first against the Indian parliament in New Delhi last December, and then against families of Indian soldiers in Jammu in May. The forces of extremism once again sought to exploit the deep and long-standing differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

They did not succeed, and tensions have been reduced since then thanks to decisions made in Islamabad and New Delhi, with the encouragement of the international community. But we, and the rest of the international community, remain deeply concerned. The military mobilization continues.

The rhetoric, though muted, could bubble up again. Another major terrorist attack or a significant surge in violence could still spark a military confrontation, with long-lasting and devastating consequences for the entire region. The enemies of moderation in the region are aware of this fact and have already tried to exploit it through high-profile terrorist attacks. They could very well try again.

We need to recognize that an important factor in the current crisis is the willingness of extremists and terrorists to go to any length to reach their goals. Our efforts to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan are made even more urgent by the global war on terrorism. President Musharraf, recognizing the danger that extremism poses to his country, has denounced the senseless ideology of violence. Pakistani authorities have moved against extremist groups. The extremists, showing how threatened they feel by President Musharraf's actions, have struck back. The government has not been intimidated; instead it has continued its campaign against terrorists and their supporters. We are standing by Pakistan as it faces this brutal challenge.

Secretary Powell has said that war is just not an option in resolving the differences between India and Pakistan—it will only make the situation worse, probably much worse. The only realistic way forward is the path of dialogue and confidence building. The secretary has also publicly recognized that Kashmir is now on the international agenda. Given the potential cost of a conflict, the international community has focused on the need to reduce tension and demobilize. No one from the outside can impose a settlement, but we must work to help the two sides further de-escalate current tensions and begin to tackle the more fundamental differences between them.

Both sides have reaffirmed their desire for a peaceful political solution to their differences. President Musharraf has pledged that his government will provide no support for infiltration across the Line of Control, and that he will not permit Pakistan to be used as a base for terrorist attacks in any other country. Pakistan needs to sustain that pledge in order to begin a process of resolution of the immediate crisis and of its more fundamental differences with India. We also look to India to take further de-escalatory actions, as Pakistan carries through with its commitments. As tensions begin to subside, New Delhi should agree to resume talks with Islamabad on all issues, including Kashmir. During his recent meetings with Indian leaders in New Delhi, Secretary Powell saw that there was a solid commitment to dialogue. He said that India understands that their dialogue had to include all the issues between the two nations but especially it had to include Kashmir.

Kashmir

The problems of Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only through a healthy political process and dialogue between the parties. We look forward to India holding free and fair state elections beginning later this month. We also encourage a continuation and expansion of the nascent efforts to engage Kashmiri separatist leaders. Kashmiris, Pakistanis and Indians must do their part to ensure that the upcoming elections can be held in safety and without interference from those who would like to spoil them. Recent attacks on officials and political party activists in Kashmir cannot be allowed to derail the election.

State elections can be an important step in a political process, but they alone cannot resolve the problems between India and Pakistan, nor can they erase the scars of so many years of strife. Only a productive and sustained bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir, will prevent future

crisis and finally bring peace to the region. We are committed to staying engaged, in the months and years ahead, helping both parties resolve their differences so that everyone in the region can live in dignity, prosperity and security.

Sri Lanka

As I said earlier, there are other serious conflicts in South Asia, in which thousands have died, and thousands more can die if they are not resolved. I'll touch briefly on the situations in Sri Lanka and Nepal. I hope that our discussion after the opening remarks will include some attention to these situations.

Recent developments in Sri Lanka have been encouraging and give us cause for cautious optimism. After almost two decades of war, costing well over 60,000 lives, a serious peace process is now under way. A ceasefire has been in place since late last year. Norway, which has been acting as a facilitator, recently announced that the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have agreed to begin the first round of formal talks on September 16 in Thailand. The government's announcement yesterday that it was lifting its ban on the Tamil Tigers as part of the peace process is another welcome development.

The United States has supported Norway's efforts and we are continuing to watch developments very closely. We hope that the talks will eventually bring to an end this bitter conflict. The Norwegian government has played a key role in bringing the two sides together in what appears to be a major step forward. We wish them, and the Sri Lankan parties, continued success in their efforts toward peace. A negotiated political settlement to this conflict would be the best demonstration that negotiation—not violence—provides the most effective means for dealing with contentious issues that divide and separate peoples throughout the world.

We believe that such a settlement is possible if both parties continue to demonstrate the constructive and serious approach that has brought the process to this point. The people of Sri Lanka deserve nothing less. Everyone should understand, however, that the path to peace will not be smooth and that this is just the first step on that journey. The United States strongly supports the Sri Lankan peace process, as President Bush affirmed in July when he met with the Sri Lankan prime minister in Washington. Deputy secretary of state Armitage recently concluded a successful visit to Sri Lanka, which included meetings with the government, the opposition, and Tamil leaders. Mr. Armitage emphasized the U.S. commitment to peace in Sri Lanka and our desire to help that country realize its great potential. We will continue to urge a negotiated settlement, which has as its goal a nation that is whole, at peace, and respects the rights of all of its citizens.

Nepal

I wish we could have as much optimism over an early end to the conflict in Nepal. That country continues to confront a violent Maoist insurgency, now in its sixth year, which has left over 4,000 dead. The Maoists have employed ruthless tactics in the field and conducted terrorist attacks against both government targets and innocent civilians. We acknowledge the Nepal government's right and duty to protect its citizens, within the framework of its constitution. Unfortunately, the leaders of

Nepal's ruling political party are locked in a power struggle that inhibits the government's effectiveness in dealing with the insurgents and undertaking development initiatives to start restoring its authority in the countryside. The United States is finalizing plans for assistance as part of an international response to end this brutal conflict and help bring peace to Nepal. Our programs are intended to facilitate the government's efforts both to restore security and to focus on development and poverty reduction.

To truly end this conflict, the government and people of Nepal must build a better future for their country. Nepalis must hold their officials accountable for good governance and ending corruption. All must work to find the common ground on which to begin rebuilding what the Maoists have destroyed. We can assist in that reconstruction by continuing to aid Nepal's economic development. Peace can provide the space in which Nepal can diversify its economy, attract foreign investment, and seek sustainable and environmentally sound ways to tap the potential of its natural resources. While much remains to be done, many in the international community stand ready to assist.

Continued U.S. Engagement

These then are three of the four major conflicts in South Asia. All need to be resolved to truly have peace in the region. It is our intention that the United States does what it can to move toward resolution of each one. As Secretary Powell said in his visit to the region in July, what the United States is trying to do is to play the role of a friend, a good friend to all the nations of South Asia. He observed that our relations with all of the nations of the region are perhaps better than at any time in the last quarter century, and noted that if we are seen as a good partner then we can be in a position to perhaps assist nations in resolving their differences. Not as a meddler nor as a mediator, but somebody whose good offices can help bring people to the table to deal with their differences. We hope that we will be able to play this role in the region.

"One Year Later: America's Agenda"

Remarks by Samuel R. Berger, Chairman, Stonebridge International

Thank you, Max, for that introduction, and for your years of service to our country. Thank you, also, to Dick Solomon and Chet Crocker for your leadership. For almost two decades, the U.S. Institute of Peace has been a strong voice in managing and preventing conflict. The Institute never pretends there are easy answers—but you always ask the right questions. I'm delighted to be here today, among such distinguished company.

September 11, One Year Later: Vulnerability and Interdependence

We meet at a time of sober reflection, nearly a year since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We will never forget what we lost that day—some 3,000 lives cut short... families shattered... voids created forever. The images of those events are indelibly seared on our minds. September 11 changed our perspective and priorities as a nation... perhaps even as individuals.

September 11 shook another feature of the American landscape, one that, in no small measure, helped shape the 20th century: the American sense of invulnerability. We have been a bountiful continental nation—what Teddy Roosevelt described, a century ago, as "[t]he young giant of the West, stand[ing] on a continent and clasp[ing] the crest of an ocean in either hand." There was, of course, an existential threat to the United States during the Cold War. We built bomb shelters and imagined "Nuclear Winter." But with few exceptions—the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, for example—the threat was abstract. It did not beset us with questions about how we lived our everyday lives— "Should I fly today? Is my office building safe? Do I know where my loved ones are?"

September 11 did. The events that day breached the wall of the unimaginable. Suddenly, planes became terrifying missiles and anthrax was being delivered in our mail. We could conjure any nightmare.

We are more conscious of our vulnerability today, but the past year also should make us more confident of our resilience. These are uncertain times economically, but September 11 did not unravel our economy. And in the fight against this enemy, the United States has accomplished a good deal in the past 12 months. We collapsed the Taliban regime that gave sanctuary to bin Laden and his camps. We've substantially disrupted—although by no means destroyed—al Qaeda. And by responding in a fierce but focused way—directed at the perpetrators and their allies—we frustrated what I believe was the fundamental purpose of bin Laden's attack: to provoke an indiscriminate response that would further polarize the United States and Islamic world and help bring down regimes from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, creating a region of Islamic radicalism.

But this threat is hardly behind us, even if you define it in the clearest and sharpest of terms—defeating a strain of anti-American jihadist fanatics who seek to do us grievous harm. The fight against these terrorists must remain a top American priority for a very long time.

In some cases, that will mean targeted military action, alone or with others. In other cases, it depends on intense intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. It also requires that we win the peace in Afghanistan—helping establish a secure environment in which the international community can assist Afghanistan achieve stability and a functioning economy. The events of today [the Kabul bombing and assassination attempt] only underscore the importance of this. In this war, our staying power will be as important as our firepower.

And there is another critical front to this war: the home front, where we must undergo nothing less than a paradigm shift in our approach to domestic security. In the past, we've pursued an essentially "threat-based" approach to defending the U.S., relying heavily on prior warning—whether that was the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) or intelligence—which could give us time to respond. Our intelligence capabilities on the terrorist threat, domestic and international, will grow stronger over time. But with this enemy, it can never be failsafe. Now, we need—and are gradually embracing—a "vulnerability-based" approach. We have to ask, "Where can they hurt us the most? And how can we act now to lower the risks?"

But if the first fundamental lesson of September 11 was to expose America's vulnerability, there is a second lesson, no less important. The events a year ago also demonstrated—more starkly than anything before—our interdependence. On September 11, the rest of the world came crashing in our door. We know now that even Manhattan is not an island: what happens beyond our borders can

immediately and directly affect our lives and well-being. We can't walk away from the world, not least because the world will not walk away from us.

And that raises what I believe is a central challenge: advancing America's interests, one year later, in a world where a clear and present danger from terrorism still exists—but where the safety and well-being of Americans demand that we do much more than defeat terrorism...where our future will be shaped not only by what we destroy, but also by what we build.

We must be intensely focused in our determination to defeat this enemy, on its turf and ours. But just as focus is important, so is peripheral vision. Our victory in the war on terror cannot come at the expense of our other priorities, for if it does, we may find ourselves no safer than before. The war on terrorism must be imbedded in the larger constellation of U.S. interests.

We need to begin by defining terrorism distinctly. All terrorism is evil—but not all evil is terrorism. Defeating the violent jihadists who want to spill American blood is, by itself, a daunting challenge. If we paint with too broad a brush, if we define the war on terror to embrace an axis of evil, we can lose our focus and credibility—on both fronts.

Does Saddam Hussein pose a threat to the United States? Yes—especially if he develops nuclear weapons that could embolden him to try again for the regional hegemony he seeks, misguided by the notion that, this time, we would hesitate. But, based on what we know today, linkages with terrorists directed against the U.S., past and potential, are unclear at best. And even if we displace him, there are numerous other countries that could supply terrorists with such deadly weaponry.

That is not to say that we can ignore the threat Saddam Hussein poses. And new linkages may appear. But we undermine our authority if we are seen as shoehorning a complicated issue into a simple rationale.

If we conclude that regime change is the right end—as I believe—then there's a right way and a wrong way. The right way leaves the region and the world more secure. It proceeds on a timetable dictated by the trajectory of the threat. It permits us neither to be dulled into perpetual inaction nor rushed into precipitous action. It faces up to a heavy price, a long stay, and the dangers of acting alone.

The wrong way could leave friends like Jordan destabilized, Israel imperiled, even a radical regime in Islamabad with a ready-made nuclear arsenal. And it could lose us essential international support against the terrorist enemy all of us acknowledge.

That is why we need to do more than simply plan a military invasion: we also need the building blocks that can make long-term success possible; and that includes making the case to others of the legitimacy of our actions. Today, even many of our closest allies do not share our sense of the threat.

Some in the United States say, "So what? Our allies are weak militarily and soft strategically." As for those in the region, others say in effect, "If we do it, they will come." To some degree, I agree that the exercise of power is self-reinforcing. Strength is respected and weakness is exploited. But in such a challenging undertaking as Iraq, our strategy cannot rest on such an assumption. We have suffered in an earlier war from the arrogance of power. Let us not build a war plan for Iraq based on the power of arrogance.

As we use the hard edge of American power to protect ourselves—from terrorists and aggressors who imperil our interests—our national interests also require that we lead with equal energy across a broader agenda, one that isolates the extremists, not ourselves. In this interconnected world, we must use—and be seen as using—our power to build a less bitter and divided world...not simply because it is important to our security, but because it defies those who foment anger at an America they perceive as self-absorbed. We will win the fight against terror only if we also tackle other threats to our shared well-being...if our leadership is defined not only by what we are against but by what America is for.

I want to explore those two points further: first, the purpose of American power; and second, a broad agenda for American leadership—one year later.

The Purpose of Power

With all of our challenges, this is a time of unparalleled opportunity for America in the world. By almost any definition, we stand at the apex of our power. Our economy is twice as large as that of our closest rival, Japan. The posters on the dorm walls at Beijing University are of Michael Jordan, not Mao Tse-Tung. Our political system, while hardly perfect, remains a beacon to millions of people around the world. We spend more on defense today than the next 25 countries combined.

Our power is a blessing, built on sweat and sacrifice. It helps to define us in the world, for better and for worse. If we use our power only for self-protection, and in a manner that is self-righteous, we fuel the fires of resentment. If we also use our power, with others, to advance our shared well-being, we earn influence, respect and moral authority that raw power can never purchase. Power gains legitimacy by the purpose to which it is applied and the manner in which it is exercised.

This isn't simply a question of unilateralism vs. multilateralism. We acted essentially unilaterally in Afghanistan, and the world accepted our military actions as a legitimate response to the provocation. There will always be causes and values worth fighting for... and there are times when we will be compelled to act alone.

But if we fail to build support for whatever we do in Iraq...if we accept transatlantic drift as inevitable or even inconsequential rather than build the U.S.-European alliance as the anchor of our security...if we turn our backs on international arrangements—from Kyoto to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—rather than stay and improve them...if, when long-time allies like Argentina face life-and-death crisis, we not only throw up our hands but appear to throw down the gauntlet...if we do these things, we isolate ourselves, not those who seek to do us harm.

Freedom of action is not always preferable to collective action. And while America will always do what it must to protect our people, we lead best by building coalitions around us.

The Broader Agenda

In short, the fight against terrorism, one year later, must remain very much at the heart of our agenda, but it cannot be the whole agenda. Even as we chart our course on Iraq, we must address the

broader agenda for America in the world, the range of challenges and opportunities that lie before us. Let me suggest five.

First, how—beyond Iraq—do we deal with the spread of the most dangerous weapons into the most volatile regions and the most irresponsible hands? In recent months, some have talked of a new doctrine of preemption—hitting them before they hit us. Certainly, every country reserves the right to act preemptively in unique circumstances of danger. But it would be a mistake to elevate this from an option reserved for unique circumstances to a doctrine we espouse in a broad context. Doing so risks lowering the threshold of use—as each actor in a crisis is tempted to act first, to use or lose. And the broader the application we give to such a policy, the greater justification we give other nations, in dangerous regions like the Middle East or South Asia, to use it as a pretext for attacking enemies.

There is no silver bullet that eliminates the ominous spread of weapons of mass destruction. But the United States must lead a wide-ranging global effort to reduce these threats.

We should seek to strengthen international regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention—and lend our weight, not walk away, from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Biological Weapons enforcement protocol. It has become fashionable to suggest that such treaties do more harm than good. But when the NPT came into force in 1970, it was widely believed there would be 20-30 nuclear weapons states within 20 years. Instead, there are eight—and governments including Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Argentina, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan and Taiwan have given up nuclear weapons programs. The international norm has mattered. International treaties with viable inspection regimes won't eliminate cheating, but they give us greater transparency, establish the baseline of appropriate international behavior and enable us to rally international support when that norm is not observed.

We also must secure the most dangerous nuclear material at its source. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left behind more than 20,000 strategic nuclear warheads, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and the materials to make up to 60,000 more nuclear devices—much of it inadequately stored and safeguarded. I commend the President for leading the G-8 in committing up to \$20 billion over the next 10 years toward securing weapons and materials around the world, particularly in Russia. Now we must make that happen.

In addition, particularly against a shadowy, stateless terrorist enemy, we must strengthen our defenses against a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is a delicate balance here at home, anticipating the unspeakable without speaking like an alarmist. But denial is not an option. The better prepared we are to detect and respond to insidious attacks, the less likely we are to confront them.

Second, America must use its influence to be a peacemaker—seeking to defuse if not resolve enduring conflicts that often fuel the forces of terrorism. We must finish the job in the Balkans...test whether engagement and deterrence can work in Korea...and continue to pursue our unique opportunity to help the parties in South Asia toward dialogue.

The overriding challenge, however, remains the Middle East. There is no stable status quo. A strategy of terror is suicide for the Palestinians. Israel will do what it believes it must to control violence. But there is no durable security for Israel through military action alone.

Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that the United States has an essential and active role to play to control this conflict. After nearly two years of growing bloodshed, bitterness and distrust, there will be no bolt from the blue. But only the United States, on the ground with its sleeves rolled up, can stitch opportunity out of exhaustion, orchestrating reciprocal steps that reverse the deadly momentum. And only with U.S. leadership can the physics of the situation be changed, so that those Palestinians who seek a necessary change of leadership and direction are propelled forward by a concrete picture we portray of what is on the other side of the mountain if they give up on violence and genuinely respect the existence of a Jewish state.

This conflict is not self-correcting. If we stand aside, we increase the chance it will breed a bitter new generation that sees America not as part of the solution but as part of the problem.

Third, we need to offer leadership on the crisis in emerging countries, starting with our own hemisphere. From Argentina to Venezuela, South America is heading toward turmoil. This is not a simple matter. The orthodoxy of the '80s and '90s—open markets and investment, external support and discipline in times of crisis—has had mixed results at best. From 1980 to 2000, per capita incomes in Latin America grew hardly at all, and declined in Africa. Even in Mexico, a hemispheric success story, per capita income today is only slightly higher than it was in 1980.

Last month, the Treasury secretary, in response to a question in Argentina on why Latin Americans were rejecting privatization, open markets and foreign investment, said, "I have no idea." His candor is refreshing, but I would feel better if it were accompanied by a restless energy to lead the effort to find the right role for the international community in a weak but inexorably globalizing world economy...to search for the right balance of social investment and economic liberalization.

We have learned over recent years that elections do not automatically produce responsive governments...that globalization without a safety net can be a windfall for the few and a freefall for the many. Open trade and investment are indispensable, but they are not sufficient. A billion people on earth today live on the knife's edge of survival. Sixty-five million will perish from AIDS by 2020—more than six every minute. We may look back on this moment of history as much for what we did or did not do on AIDS as on terrorism.

America cannot be safe in a world where the gap between rich and poor is growing wider. Trade promotion authority is an important step—but trade by itself will not pull struggling nations out of poverty. We must close the gap between what is spent and what is needed to prevent a world that is bitterly and violently divided a generation from now.

A fourth challenge is to continue to integrate our former adversaries Russia and China into the international community. These are truly historic opportunities, after a half century of costly and dangerous standoff. But the future is not pre-ordained.

China is engaged in the boldest economic experiment in human history—to take a poor, largely rural, collective society of 1.2 billion people and transform it into a largely middle class, increasingly urban society driven by the economics of the market. But can it also develop the rule of law and growing pluralism that are essential to cushion and distribute the costs and benefits of dislocation and change in a peaceful and stable fashion?

Russia has a leader who understands its weakness and is compelled by modernization. But will the need for order come at the cost of dissent? Will Russia's economic expansion come at the expense of its neighbors?

In the first instance, of course, these issues will be resolved by the Chinese and the Russians. But our posture matters—either respectful and principled or dismissive and one-sided.

Finally, we must bring a greater sense of urgency, today, to the environment we are leaving to the future. We know that global temperatures are rising. Nine of the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 1990. Climate change will alter the way we live, as sea levels rise and weather grows more extreme. Denial is a risky strategy. If Kyoto is flawed, we should use our influence to fix it. A rising tide will sink all the boats.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, meeting these and other challenges depends in no small measure on whether and how America leads in the world. We must prevail in our campaign against terrorism. But we can neither define all threats as terrorism, nor our only threat as terrorism.

There is no reason to apologize for America's power. To an extraordinary degree, it has been harnessed over time to good, not ill; to freedom, not repression. But power does not guarantee success. That depends upon how we use it to shape the forces transforming the world. Our purpose always must be to advance America's interests and values. But more and more, our challenges are global and their solutions must be cooperative. We are more likely to earn other's support for our priorities when we show respect for theirs. We are more likely to shape the outcome of events when we are in the game rather than on the sidelines. And when it comes to addressing the problems that challenge our common humanity, the more America pulls its weight, the greater will be our reward—not only in a better, more peaceful world, but the authority we command within it.

If you visit the U.S. Capitol, you will see inscribed on the wall the words, "We defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but for all mankind." They were spoken by President Franklin Roosevelt in May of 1940. That American generation's courage and foresight not only brought victory in World War II, but secured the peace that followed—and an era of unparalleled progress.

If we summon that strength and vision today...if we are unrelenting but not overreaching...if we preserve our confidence, our decency and our values...Americans will stay together, the world will stay together, and we will emerge even stronger.