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Fellow Project Report Summary

July 24, 2006

Albaqir Mukhtar
The Cultural Roots of Human Rights Violations in Sudan: Identity and the Civil War

Project Report Summary

Introduction

The Darfur crisis hinges on the marginalized identities of the 1.8 million people of the Darfur region whose lives “hang in the balance.” In his discussion, Dr. Albaqir Mukhtar outlined several weaknesses in the Darfur peace process and agreement, explaining why fighting and the perpetration of human rights abuses against civilians has continued unabated.

Key Shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Process and Agreement

The international community and the African Union (AU) pressured some of the many rebel groups to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Accordingly, since the DPA did not represent the interests of Darfurians, it understandably failed to gain popular support. In fact, many of the so-called “representatives” from Darfur were actually individuals affiliated with the Sudanese government. This resulted in a DPA that was so biased towards the Government of Sudan that the International Crisis Group characterizes it as “tantamount to unilateral surrender.”

Secondly, the DPA is flawed because it relegates the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to the limited roles of monitoring and verifying processes of redeployment, assembly and disarmament, while increasing the authority of the parties to the conflict. No modalities for implementation were included in the agreement, and representatives from key parties, particularly the Arab tribes, were excluded from the agreement. Add to this the fact that AMIS troops are not well-funded, equipped, supported, or trained, Mukhtar argued, and it is not hard to conclude that the DPA represents a wholesale “sell-out” of the Darfur region.

Dr. Mukhtar pointed out that the agenda of the Government of Sudan is clear – to prosecute a counter-insurgency strategy that relies on regional proxies in the form of ethnic militias, to exacerbate existing cleavages among the rebels in order to facilitate factionalization, to “impede negotiations,” buying time for the Janjaweed and other militias to create “new realities” in terms of land grabs on the ground, and finally, to lead a diplomatic offensive designed to fend off international intervention and possible pursuit of war crimes prosecutions by the International Criminal Court. He surmises that if the ICC indicted just one member of the Government of Sudan, they would surely identify an expedited strategy to resolve the situation in the region.

The respective agendas of the various rebel movements, according to Mukhtar, share some overriding concerns: decreasing the marginalization of the region as a whole and gaining increased access to the country’s political power and economic resources. Yet these groups have, regrettably, become increasingly factionalized and involved in their own internecine struggles.

Overlooking the Roots of the Problem: Identity as Spoiler of Already Fragile Peace Process

Mukhtar proposed that the failure of the DPA could largely be traced to the failure to recognize a non-essentialized Sudanese identity, and by extension, a distinct Darfurian identity. Currently, the Sudanese-Arab identity constructed by Northerners places Darfurians on the fringes. Northerners themselves do not “fit” the prototype for Arab identity, and Darfurians do not fit the Northerners’ illusion constructed for them. Equally importantly, as a result of the current crisis, Darfurians feel they have been prohibited from assuming their identity of preference. Therefore, “the stage” for reconstructing identity is set – shifting away from that of being Arab and transitioning toward one of being Zurga, essentially African and non-Arab. The failure to recognize and integrate this critical issue of non-recognition of the Darfur identity into the DPA is somewhat predictably spoiling an already fragile peace process and contributing to an ongoing state of violence.

Recommendations

Noting the futility of the Government of Sudan’s continued reliance on a centralized form of governance that standardizes its treatment of each region, Mukhtar recommended that the cause of preventing further conflict in Sudan would be better served by a government that was democratic, decentralized and federalized. Moreover, he argued that the Sudanese government must recognize the multi-dimensional nature of identity throughout the country by granting marginalized regions the power to legislate, develop and manage education, cultural and other public affairs.

Specifically, he suggested that the parties to the peace agreement along with the international community overhaul the DPA in order to account for the following omissions that relate directly to recognition of identity:

  • Creation of a federalized system of government which would devolve power from the central government in Khartoum and in particular, the National Congress Party (NCP) to the states in the Darfur region modeled after the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) last year. Similar to the GPA, the DPA could set up a framework for regional autonomy. The GPA, for example, calls for graduated regional autonomy culminating in a referendum on the issue of independence in six years. Other key tenets of the GPA that are potentially germane to Darfur include the division of wealth resulting from natural resources and a more equitable allocation of the proportion of government jobs divided between the central administration and the government in the region.
  • Reform of an educational curriculum that invalidates the Darfurian identity and promotes cultural intolerance to one that reinforces the Darfurian identity and in general more broadly reflects the multi-dimensional nature of the region and the country at large.
  • Ensuring that Government of Sudan will respect the unique nature of the Darfur region and its cultural identity as policies and programs are developed in consultation with the region’s leaders.

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