July 17, 2006
Dana Eyre
Re-Inventing Iraq: Understanding Iraqi Society and Coalition Democratization Efforts
Project Report Summary
Introduction
With the relatively quick downfall of the Ba’athist regime in 2003 came a comprehensive sea change within Iraqi society. Not only had the regime of Saddam Hussein been removed, but so had the fundamental organizing principles of much of Iraqi life. In sociological terms, the nomic instrumentalities of Iraqi life had withered away. Nomic instrumentalities are the central, socially constructed realities that people use to order their social and personal lives. Examples of these include the taken-for-granted institutions of social life, such as money, the state, and ethnic identity. They act as the fundamental “social terrain” around which communal life is understood and organized. The end of Saddam Hussein’s rule, therefore, brought not just the end of the rule of a tyrannical dictator, but also the disappearance of foundational ordering principles in Iraqi social, political, and economic life.
Coalition operational efforts in democratization did not sufficiently address this critical absence. A gap in our theoretical understanding of the situation led to critical deficiencies at the operational level in the pursuit of democratization. This situation was the cumulative result of a series of decisions, individually appropriate to the specific situation, but collectively having a negative result. The process was similar to that of drug interactions, whereby two drugs, each individually beneficial, can have a cumulative negative effect on a patient if taken together. The net result was that the Coalition missed the opportunity to engage the Iraqi people in a structured, transparent and understood transition process, and to shape the emerging political dynamics positively. The coalition lost the initial race to mobilize Iraqis. As a result, uncertainty, fear and opportunistic behavior increased, and an environment in which anti-democratic forces could mobilize in resistance developed.
The degree of political organization in Iraq when the US arrived in 2003 indeed indicates that Iraqi society was not polarized. While the Kurdish regions are unique, the majority of Iraqis in Iraq did not have a strong political organization or identification. Clearly, some elements of the population were linked to the Ba’ath Party, others to Shia elements such as SCIRI or Da’wa. However, for the majority of the population, politics was something to stay away from, not to participate in. Iraqi identification with political parties was very low prior to the fall of the regime, and only 20% of the population identified with any party even as late as the middle of 2004.
Iraq in 2003 therefore contained both the possibility of democratization and of violent conflict. If common identities were reinforced, and linked to new democratic forms, the potential for progress might be realized. If ethno-sectarian identities were exploited and reinforced in a period of political anomie by the entrepreneurs of violence, conflict was possible. For all Iraqis prior to the invasion, Iraqi life was ordered by the state. With the departure of Saddam Hussein and the collapse of the state, this majority of the population became disconnected from central ordering principles, and potentially able to be mobilized—either enabled for participation as citizens in a democracy, or herded like sheep into sectarian and ethnic enclaves. The challenge wasn’t to win the “hearts and minds” of all 24 or 25 million Iraqis, but to win "enough" active Iraqis to the side of peace and democratic development.
The difficulties facing the US-led Coalition’s democratization efforts in Iraq thus do not stem from tactical failures in reconstruction or from the inherent impossibility of the task at hand. A fundamental gap continues to exist in our applied understanding of the core processes of democratization. In particular, democratization efforts must attend to the dynamics and interrelations of political mobilization and social change processes, and how these processes not only affected but were also shaped by the violent pursuit of political aims by competing political entrepreneurs. By approaching the democratization process through a framework built upon sociological and political theory, a more comprehensive policy analysis can be formulated.
By understanding democratization as a social process, a more robust operational approach to democratization can be drawn. The essence of the effort is creating a positive interaction between three key components: a clear and definitive structure of democratization, meaningful and systematic opportunities for participation, and sustained reinforcement of the democratization process through information and political-economic processes. This framework, grounded in an understanding of the political and sociological processes of democratization, recognizes that successful nation-building can only be achieved if the nation is fully involved.
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Related Resources
- Re-Inventing Iraq: Understanding Iraqi Society and Coalition Democratization Efforts
Dana Eyre's Senior Fellow Project Report, July 17, 2006
- Iraq Programs
- Ground Truth from Iraq: Politicians, Police, and Pacification
Event, June 29, 2006 (Audio Available)
- Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence
USIPeace Briefing, June 2006
- Rule of Law: Project on Constitution Making, Peacebuilding, and National Reconciliation
- Who Are Iraq's New Leaders? What Do They Want?
Special Report, March 2006
