June 15, 2006
Stephen Farry
Inside Out: An Integrative Critique of the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Project Report Summary
Introduction
Eight years on from the creation of the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland remains in the grip of political uncertainty. While there is no real prospect of a return to large-scale terrorism and Northern Ireland will be able to continue to function as a society with an air of normality, there is a considerable danger of long-lasting political intractability.
The British and Irish governments have determined that 2006 will be a decisive year for the peace process. By 24 November, either power-sharing devolved government (which has been suspended since October 2002) will have resumed, or the Assembly (Northern Ireland's parliament and the principle institution arising out of the Agreement) will have been dissolved. If the talks fail, the governments will move to a so-far ill-defined Plan 'B' and seek to implement the other non-institutional aspects of the Good Friday Agreement. The British government will continue to exercise Direct Rule over Northern Ireland, but with an enhanced consultative role for the Irish government.
However, a simple restoration of the status quo ante is not a viable option. The bar has risen considerably for Republicans end to all paramilitary activity as well as involvement in organized crime, and to demonstrate respect for the rule of law. More importantly, there has been a major change in the balance of power within the putative Assembly since 2002. In the 2003 Assembly Elections, which proceeded even though the body was in suspension, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein--the parties on the relative extremes of the Northern Ireland political spectrum--overtook their respective unionist and nationalist rivals, the UUP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). There are major question marks over whether the DUP and Sinn Fein, as the new larger parties on either side of the communal divide, are capable of reaching sufficient agreement to allow for the restoration of a power-sharing Executive, let alone being able to sustain one on a stable basis.
The Agreement and the Effects of Its Implementation
The Agreement and the manner in which it was implemented have contributed to a deepening of the divisions within Northern Ireland and to increased political polarization. The unintended side effects, in turn, have contributed to the current political deadlock.
The Good Friday Agreement has some in-built design flaws. It is consociational in design, and reflects a belief that tensions between two divided communities can be managed through a form of "benign apartheid." Sectarianism was institutionalized within the Agreement, most notably within the Assembly voting system. Furthermore, no real incentives for cooperation or accommodation were created within the putative power-sharing Executive. Most importantly, the Agreement was purposely ambiguous on the nature of the Northern Ireland state itself. Nationalists saw it as one step in the direction of unification with Ireland, while unionists believed that it reinforced the union with Great Britain. This prevents the emergence of any shared sense of identity. While both sides generally regarded the Agreement in 1998 as a benefit for the entire community, it is now widely viewed that the nationalists have "won" and unionists have "lost."
Implementation has been much more difficult than anticipated. Most focus has fallen on four broad issues: decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, security normalization, policing reform, and the stability of the institutions. A high price in terms of the perceived concessions awarded to Republicans in order to achieve decommissioning created a backlash within public opinion. Furthermore, the failure of the authorities, until fairly recently, to deal effectively with residual paramilitary activity and involvement in organized crime created the perception of a 'moral vacuum' within the peace process. Other problems related to the non-inclusive nature of the negotiations over implementation of the Agreement, the disengagement of civil society from the process, and the failure of the ethnic moderates to take full advantage of the opportunities presented to them to make the institutions work effectively.
Notably, there has been a failure to address transitional justice issues in a holistic manner, thereby leaving in place a barrier to reconciliation. Similarly, community relations issues were not prioritized until the recent Shared Future agenda came about.
Yet with all of this difficulty, the Good Friday Agreement has had many successes, including the end of terrorist violence, security normalization, policing reform, improved North-South relations, and improved attitudes and norms of behavior in some areas.
Moderates versus Extremes
Arguments have been made that the Good Friday Agreement should be seen as a precursor to the "real deal" to be made by extremist parties. The supposed advantage of this outcome is that it binds those with the ability to undermine progress, either through the ballot box or the force of violence. However, this scenario runs contrary to thirty years of peacemaking efforts by the British and Irish governments. Their strategies tended to focus on building up the moderates, seeking to find a deal across the broad center, and to marginalize the extremes.
The prospects of a system of government in which the DUP and Sinn Fein are the two main parties are poor. International history suggests it is extremely difficult to sustain a political process on such a basis. Both the DUP and Sinn Fein have mutually exclusive goals. Both parties have built electoral success on representing segregated constituencies, and have interests in preserving their power bases. There are fears that they could only work together to increase separation - a Balkanization of Northern Ireland into spheres of control.
Conclusions
Peace in Northern Ireland has ultimately come at the price of reconciliation. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement entrenched divisions between unionists and nationalists.
With the new efforts to build a political accommodation around the DUP and Sinn Fein, the Northern Ireland peace process is in uncharted waters. The different approaches related to the shifting balance of power within Northern Ireland raise major questions for international mediators regarding whether it is better to focus efforts upon perceived moderates which, if properly bolstered, could marginalize the extreme elements, or whether to build a process around those extremes despite all the associated problems. These questions are much broader than their Northern Ireland context, and the ongoing process in Northern Ireland may provide tentative answers for those who are dealing with similar problems in Iraq and elsewhere.
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