May 11, 2006
LTC Kurt Meppen, Senior Fellow
Security Strategies Toward Central Asia
Project Report Summary
This presentation provided an analysis of the national security strategies' (NSS) of the major powers affecting Central Asia (Russia, China, U.S.), the NSSs of the regional powers (India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey), and the impact of these strategies on the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan). The driving idea of Meppen's project is to establish where the regional state actors have overlapping and common national security interests and to note where potential rivalries and self-interests threaten any one state or group, while viewing the region in its entirety.
Meppen pointed out that the diverse strategic challenges of Central Asian states—radicalized Islam, the erosion of infrastructure, institutionalized corruption, ethnic friction, narcotics transit, poorly performing economies, among others.—stem both from their geographic environment as well as from post-Soviet legacies.
At the same time, the region's increased geopolitical importance—which is greater today than it has been in decades—creates new strategic opportunities for states as well as improved understanding of such opportunities by their leaders.
Of particular importance is the present and future interplay between Russia and China in Central Asia. Whereas Russia is often viewed as the most earnest suitor for Central Asia's allegiance, Russia in fact cast the Central Asian states adrift after the collapse of the USSR. While Russia has not articulated a driving coherence to its Central Asia policy, its interests in the region include: political stability, control of radical Islam, continued dominance over Central Asian hydrocarbon exports, and containment of U.S. influence in the region. Its agenda appears almost reactionary and opportunistic rather than well considered and dynamic.
China shares similar interests with Russia in Central Asia: ensuring political stability, control of radical Islam (particularly on the Chinese border), access to Central Asian hydrocarbons, strengthened economic ties with the region, and ensuring minimal U.S. influence. China is a rising power in Central Asia. Its policy is methodical and focused and has shown gradual, consistent advances.
Based on this assessment, China and Russia are going be long-term rivals for control of energy resources and business affairs of the region. As a result, the Central Asian states will eventually have to choose sides in this likely rivalry, or else maintain a precarious political balance. This raises questions regarding the future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), presently a subject of numerous commentaries and speculations. Meppen emphasized that the SCO remains an organization in search of a mission. It appears to be ready to do many things, but has not produced any tangible outcomes. The SCO does have some value as a discussion forum for the region's powers. However, it seems questionable that the SCO would be able to effectively serve both Russia's and China's interests simultaneously in the future. Rather, it already appears that Russia is using the SCO as a tool to monitor China's advances in Central Asia.
The emerging Chinese factor has a significant impact on the strategic interests of India and Pakistan in Central Asia. India does not view Pakistan as its only threat. China remains the greater threat, but also presents significant opportunities to India. Both India and Pakistan are seeking closer relations with Central Asian states, including Afghanistan, with Pakistan in particular attempting to gain strategic depth at India's expense. Whereas India is achieving some diplomatic advances in the region, Pakistan maintains a strong desire to use the Central Asian states in potential diplomatic or military alliances at India's expense. China emerges in both South and Central Asia as Pakistan's nearest ally, despite their ideological and religious differences. China and Pakistan are likely to build a closer alliance based on common strategic and economic interests.
Another regional power with significant impact on the nexus of NSSs within Central Asia is Iran. While Iran is a commercial competitor for the hydrocarbon market, it is willing to make some commercial concessions to pursue better relations with neighboring states, especially if this helps to contain U.S. influence in the region. To limit narcotics transit, Iran makes efforts to shut its borders, a situation that redirects the flow of narcotics traffic into Central Asian states with unfortunate consequences.
As foreign powers compete for influence in the region, Central Asian leaders and their national elites are still struggling to achieve consensual visions of national interests and security strategies for their own states. Given a lack of agreed upon national interests, states' policies often reflect competing domestic interests. Compounding the problem is the fact that each remains in an ideological vacuum after rejecting the legacy of Soviet ideology and identity. Thus far, Islam has not served as a comprehensive and universally accepted ideological replacement.
For example, Uzbekistan has pursued regime perpetuation by forming partnerships first with the U.S. and now with Russia. Uzbekistan will now remain loyal to Russia so long as Russia continues to serve the interests of Uzbek president Islam Karimov. Uzbekistan must ultimately come to grips with future regime change. The greatest question that remains is how violent the change will be.
Kazakhstan pursues its NSS with a more nuanced, internationally astute political strategy. Aware of its role as a vital interest of Russia, China and the U.S.—combined with strategic weaknesses such as lengthy borders with Russia and China and a shortage of hydrocarbon export facilities—Kazakhstan has sought to maintain a strategic balance among the competing powers. It is also seeking to establish itself in Central Asia as the de facto leader vis-a-vis Uzbekistan.
For Turkmenistan, strategic policies are single-handedly defined by its dictatorial leader Saparmurat Niyazov. Niyazov is weary of too close relations with Russia, but has made costly mistakes in the past by missing opportunities to build external pipelines independent of Russia's control.
Tajikistan appears to be moving out of the shadow of its disastrous civil war, and while lacking economic strength, it is nevertheless forging business opportunities for electrical export from its hydrological assets.
Finally, Kyrgyzstan stands out as a state that lacks an influential leader. Its foreign policy appears to lack an NSS. This state is willing to accommodate all the major powers even though this involves agreeing to incompatible commitments. Organized crime is ultimately the leading factor in future Kyrgyz politics, promising further discord and potential disaster.
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