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PASSING THE BATON

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES AND  
OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

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THURSDAY  
JANUARY 8, 2009

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PANEL 2: 3:15-4:15 P.M.  
BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY TO MEET 21ST CENTURY  
CHALLENGES

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Room 202 B  
Walter E. Washington Convention Center

801 Mount Vernon Place, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001

PANELISTS:

JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO

JAMES DOBBINS  
NANCY LINDBORG

MODERATED BY CHESTER CROCKER

This transcript done from audio provided by  
the United States Institute of Peace.

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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 2:22 p.m.

3 MR. CROCKER: My name is Chet  
4 Crocker, and I am chairing this panel, Building  
5 Civilian Capacity to Meet 21st Century Challenges.

6 A few introductory words and then I  
7 will say a word -- a very brief word -- about  
8 each of our panelists. I'll keep it very brief  
9 because the bios are all in your packets, and  
10 they're very well done and they're very eloquent.  
11 And they provide considerable detail about the  
12 career trajectory of everybody who's speaking  
13 here. So I'm going to keep it very brief.

14 I think many of us assume that we  
15 need to improve the civilian capacity for  
16 managing various dimensions of external  
17 intervention and external assistance in conflict  
18 environments. But there will need to be some  
19 international division of effort in this vast  
20 enterprise. No single institution or country can  
21 do everything.

22 More important, I think we need to be

1 clear, and this panel will shed some light I'm  
2 certain on this question about civilian capacity  
3 to do what. I don't think there would be much  
4 enthusiasm in many countries for ramping up  
5 greater capacity to invade, administer and occupy  
6 in foreign lands for long periods of time in  
7 order to change regimes or sort out ill-governed  
8 societies. But there will be enthusiasm for a  
9 lot of other things -- for creating a robust  
10 civilian capacity to lead the way in developing  
11 and deploying political solutions in violent  
12 conflict situations and for linking-up mediation  
13 efforts with others who are also engaged, for  
14 monitoring security and humanitarian crises at  
15 various times and devising responses, guiding the  
16 provision of emergency and development assistance  
17 and coordinating initiatives to advance security  
18 sector reform and training in the rule of law.  
19 Our panelists are well qualified to address all  
20 of those agendas.

21 The U.S. Institute of Peace -- and I  
22 wanted to emphasize this point -- is very keenly

1 interested in the output of this panel. We are  
2 building at the Institute a school for  
3 practitioners drawn from a wide range of  
4 institutions -- U.S. and foreign, civilian and  
5 military, official and nonofficial. We believe  
6 that people from these different institutions --  
7 professionals, mid-career, starting out, maybe  
8 even senior people -- will need to do joint  
9 training so that they are more able to operate  
10 effectively in conflict zones. The courses that  
11 we are now establishing will fill a major gap in  
12 the availability of training opportunities for  
13 professionals interested in best practice in  
14 these different fields.

15 And of course I'd like to recognize  
16 Pamela Aall who directs the domestic education  
17 and training program here at USIP who's sitting  
18 right in the front row, and who has been  
19 developing the pilot courses that are now  
20 becoming real courses in a whole variety of  
21 different fields. And sitting next to her is  
22 Mike Lekson who directs our training program for

1           internationals. So for those of you who have any  
2           questions about where we're going in this  
3           training enterprise of ours, come forward  
4           afterwards and have your conversations.

5                         Again, I'm not going to read the  
6           panelists' bios. I'm going to go alphabetically  
7           in terms of just saying a word and ask speakers  
8           to speak alphabetically starting with Jim  
9           Dobbins.

10                        Jim directs the RAND Corporation's  
11           International Security and Defense Policy Center,  
12           and has managed a few peace and stability  
13           operations in his time. Jim will briefly  
14           describe what the U.S. lessons learned are in  
15           this vast field. He's produced quite a series of  
16           studies in this area, and we're asking him to  
17           focus primarily on the U.S. lessons.

18                        I will then turn alphabetically to  
19           Jean-Marie Guehenno who is a veteran French  
20           career diplomat and international civil servant  
21           whose most recent posting was as Under Secretary-  
22           General for Peacekeeping as you all know. And

1 we've asked Jean-Marie to focus his remarks on  
2 the lessons learned in the U.N. system. And when  
3 I say lessons learned, I mean not only in terms  
4 of best practice but also training needs. What  
5 are the skill sets that we are trying to develop  
6 more of in the international system?

7 And thirdly, Nancy Lindborg who is  
8 President of Mercy Corps, a leading relief and  
9 development organization with operations all over  
10 the world in many regions. Nancy will address  
11 the lessons learned from the perspective of  
12 lessons in the non-governmental, non-official  
13 sector for all the different kinds of relief and  
14 development challenges that are faced from the  
15 standpoint of that community.

16 So without further word, Jim, over to  
17 you.

18 MR. DOBBINS: Thank you very much,  
19 Chet.

20 Anyone observing the American  
21 performance in Iraq over the first year of the  
22 American occupation could be forgiven for

1 thinking that this was the first time we'd ever  
2 done something like this. It was one unexpected  
3 challenge after another. It was one improvised  
4 response after another.

5 In fact, of course, it wasn't the  
6 first time. In fact, it was the seventh time in  
7 little more than a decade that the United States  
8 had liberated a society and then tried to re-  
9 build it.

10 So in the early '90s, the United  
11 States liberated Kuwait. And in the subsequent  
12 years, it went into Somalia, into Haiti, into  
13 Bosnia, into Kosovo, into Afghanistan, and  
14 finally into Iraq. And of those seven societies,  
15 six are Muslim. The only one that's not a Muslim  
16 society is Haiti.

17 So when the United States went into  
18 Iraq in 2003, there was no country in the world  
19 with more experience in nation building. And  
20 there was no country in the world with more  
21 experience in nation building within Muslim  
22 societies than the United States. And so you do

1           have to ask yourself how we can do this so often  
2           and yet do it so badly. And the answer was we  
3           simply weren't taking this mission seriously. We  
4           didn't regard it as a core national competency.

5                       Despite the increasing frequency of  
6           the missions, we were treating each of them as if  
7           it was the first one we'd ever done. And worse  
8           than that, we were treating each of them as if it  
9           was the last one we were ever going to do. And  
10          at the conclusion, we were dispersing the  
11          expertise and we weren't creating an ongoing  
12          doctrine, and we weren't creating a cadre of  
13          experts capable of executing these kinds of  
14          missions.

15                      Now the growth in American nation  
16          building over this period wasn't an isolated  
17          phenomenon. The growth in U.N. missions of  
18          similar import was even more startling.

19                      During the Cold War, the United  
20          States intervened in a new country about once  
21          every ten years. And in the aftermath of the  
22          Cold War, that went from once every ten years to

1           once every two years. During the Cold War, the  
2           U.N. mounted a new peacekeeping mission on  
3           average of once every four years. Since 1989, it  
4           mounts a new peacekeeping mission in a new  
5           country every six months.

6                        So this exponential growth is not a  
7           phenomenon of American policy particularly. It's  
8           a growth in demand for these kinds of services.

9                        I think while the Bush administration  
10          wasn't particularly keen to draw attention to its  
11          early failures, I think to its credit it did  
12          recognize them, and it has taken a number of very  
13          important corrective measures. And you've seen  
14          institutional changes in the State Department, in  
15          the Defense Department and the Administration as  
16          a whole designed to do this kind of mission  
17          better in the future.

18                       So in the Defense Department, a  
19          directive was issued by the Secretary of Defense  
20          making what it calls stability operations --  
21          which is their name for nation building -- a core  
22          mission of the U.S. military. This would have

1           been a radical measure in the 1990s. Bill  
2           Clinton would have been impeached if he'd tried  
3           to do something like this. But by the middle of  
4           this decade, it passed without significant  
5           notice.

6                        The State Department actually created  
7           for the first time in 15 years an office, the  
8           purpose of which is to improve the conduct of  
9           American stability in reconstruction operations,  
10          to do just the things we weren't during the  
11          previous decade, that is create an ongoing  
12          doctrine for the conduct of these kinds of  
13          missions and build a cadre of experts.

14                      And finally, the White House  
15          established an interagency structure to manage  
16          these kinds of operations. Clinton had done the  
17          same thing. The new Administration when it came  
18          into office had suppressed the Clinton mechanism  
19          without replacing it. But in 2005, a new  
20          structure was put in place.

21                      And I think you do see improved  
22          performance. If you look at American performance

1 in Iraq in 2007-2008, you see a much better  
2 blending of civilian and American capacity, a  
3 much more appropriate set of military and  
4 civilian responses, and a highly successful  
5 counterinsurgency strategy that has made  
6 remarkable progress in returning stability and  
7 also promoting reconstruction in that country.

8 There is however still a good deal  
9 that can be done in this regard. And there is  
10 room for considerable improvement.

11 Now, there are a number of proposals.  
12 Any number of commissions and prestigious groups  
13 have come and put forward suggestions for  
14 renewing or revamping or reorganizing the U.S.  
15 government with respect to these kinds of issues.  
16 I tend to be a minimalist in this regard. That  
17 is to say I don't particularly favor a new agency  
18 that does reconstruction. I don't particularly  
19 favor a substantially increased White House staff  
20 to oversee these kinds of operations. But I do  
21 think that we do need to improve the  
22 professionalism with which we conduct operations.

1           And we need to bolster the mechanisms that we  
2           primarily rely on for performing the nonmilitary  
3           components of these missions, which is in my  
4           judgment specifically USAID.

5                        I favor a three-tier structure for  
6           running the U.S. government, not just in this but  
7           in other spheres in which the White House sets  
8           and coordinates policy. The State Department  
9           makes sure that all programs that are conducted  
10          internationally support that policy so it  
11          coordinates the programs that are conducted by  
12          the Department of Defense, the Department of the  
13          Treasury, AID, or other programs at the national  
14          level. The Ambassador does that at the local  
15          level that is. And internationally, that's a  
16          State Department function.

17                       But actually conducting those  
18          programs is not something that the State  
19          Department is particularly good at. And I would  
20          strip the State Department of many of the  
21          programmatic elements that it has gradually  
22          accrued at the expense of other agencies, in

1 particular the USAID.

2 There's a general view that we need  
3 to bolster AID. There's also a recognition we  
4 don't have a lot of money, and there's not much  
5 interest in putting more money into foreign aid,  
6 and therefore it's going to be very difficult to  
7 do.

8 I think it can be done very simply by  
9 simply putting back into AID all of the things  
10 that have been stripped out of it in the last 30  
11 years, which would create a large substantial  
12 bureaucracy with a basis of expertise across a  
13 spectrum of activities. This would include all  
14 of the refugee work done in the State Department.  
15 It would include all the police training done in  
16 the State Department. It would include the  
17 millennium development program which has been  
18 taken out of AID. It would include assistance to  
19 AIDS and other endemic diseases which have been  
20 taken out of AID. And I think if those were all  
21 put back in AID, you'd have a robust agency which  
22 would have a core of expertise which could be

1 directed to national priorities as they emerge.

2 So I do think that there's scope for  
3 further improvement in this regard. And I think  
4 the State Department's current focus on building  
5 a ready reserve of citizens and officials who are  
6 prepared to take off from their day jobs for  
7 relatively brief periods to serve in places like  
8 Bosnia or Kosovo or Afghanistan or Iraq, while  
9 it's helpful on the margins isn't going to go  
10 very far, because the numbers that actually can  
11 be generated are limited. And I would propose  
12 spending a lot more money on that only once we'd  
13 had an adequate basis of full-time civil servants  
14 who could fill these positions. And there's  
15 clearly a significant shortage of those.

16 So I think that the Bush  
17 Administration's response to the early failures  
18 in Afghanistan and Iraq was a determination that  
19 we need to do better next time. And I think they  
20 deserve credit for that.

21 I'd also note however that that's not  
22 necessarily the conclusion that many American

1           Congressman and many American citizens have come  
2           to.  Indeed many Americans have probably come to  
3           the conclusion that we better not do this again  
4           next time.  And there is I think a possibility  
5           that we'll go through sort of a post-Vietnam,  
6           never again phenomenon.  After Vietnam, we forgot  
7           everything we'd learned about counterinsurgency  
8           and had to spend half a decade relearning it when  
9           we found ourselves involved in other rather  
10          similar insurgencies.  And we could go through  
11          the same kind of phenomenon in the area of nation  
12          building and stability operations as well.

13                        So I think one of the main questions  
14          I have is whether the American people based on  
15          the frustrations they've experienced in Iraq and  
16          our experience in Afghanistan, can come to two  
17          separate conclusions.  One is yes, let's not  
18          invade any more large, hostile Middle East  
19          countries on the basis of flawed intelligence  
20          with very narrow nonrepresentative coalitions.  
21          That's a good lesson.  But if Iraq was a war of  
22          choice and the choice was a poor one, Afghanistan

1 really wasn't. And both of those commitments  
2 left us with very substantial nation building  
3 burdens.

4 And so even if you extract Iraq out  
5 of the equation and look back at the experience  
6 over the last 15 years, you're going to find from  
7 Kuwait to Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo to  
8 Afghanistan an enduring requirement for  
9 developing these kinds of skills. And we still  
10 have not adequately institutionalized the basis  
11 by which we make that a national competency.

12 MR. CROCKER: Thank you very much,  
13 Jim.

14 Jean-Marie, I'll turn the floor over  
15 to you to give us the perspective from New York  
16 and elsewhere around the world.

17 MR. GUEHENNO: Thank you. Well,  
18 since 1999 when the missions in Timor and Kosovo  
19 were launched, I think there have been a lot of  
20 lessons learned. Maybe the first lesson is a  
21 lesson of humility. That is 1999 is a sense that  
22 when a country is broken, you just run it, and

1           that the U.N. can be the new sort of colonial  
2           power.

3                           And I think the more one looks at  
4           those situations, the more one sees that the U.N.  
5           flag may be a little more legitimate than a  
6           national flag. But the notion that foreigners  
7           can run a country, the notion of trusteeship as  
8           an answer to problems of fragile states, I think  
9           the more one looks at it, the more one sees that  
10          it's overambitious, the resources will not be  
11          there, and the acceptance would not be there, and  
12          the legitimacy would not be there. Because the  
13          key is the acceptance. The key -- the first  
14          lesson is really political. You will succeed if  
15          you have political support.

16                          Now moving to the technical issues, I  
17          think one lesson that we have learned is the  
18          issue of orchestration of the effort is  
19          fundamental. I happen to think that the U.N.  
20          set-up with all its limitations -- its  
21          imperfections especially in the execution -- but  
22          the notion that there is a civilian

1           representative on the ground to orchestrate both  
2           the civilian and the military effort without  
3           pretending to be a general, and that relationship  
4           between the civilian leader and the military  
5           component has to be managed in a very careful  
6           manner.

7                         But the notion that on the ground you  
8           have someone who orchestrates the whole effort I  
9           think is a good one. Because you are in a very  
10          difficult position to help a country if you do  
11          not get the political/military relationship  
12          right. And you can only get it right if you are  
13          right in the theater. You can't get it right  
14          from thousands of miles away. I think you have a  
15          problem. So I think that set-up is right.

16                        And another lesson is that the head  
17          of the civilian effort has indeed a very big job  
18          because he has to work on several fronts. He has  
19          to mobilize the international community in  
20          support of squatter strategies so to speak to  
21          prevent squatters from derailing a process. That  
22          means he also has to work on the regional

1 dimension because no conflict will be solved if  
2 the region is not managed. And we see it in  
3 Iraq. We see it in Congo. I see it in many  
4 places. So that's another lesson.

5 Then when one looks at the various  
6 functions that need to be performed. I think  
7 after ten years of successes and failures, the  
8 list of the critical issues is pretty straight  
9 forward. At the heart, there's the politics  
10 because if you don't get the politics right, if  
11 you do not have the right political advisors, if  
12 you do not have the right political team to lead  
13 the effort on the ground, all the technical  
14 support aid that you will give while it's nice,  
15 but you'll not make peace just by providing  
16 technical aid.

17 So the political cluster with the  
18 political advice at the national level, at the  
19 local level, with the constitutional and  
20 electoral advice and the electoral advice not  
21 just in terms of how do you run an election, but  
22 what kind of election will be less divisive

1           because an election is a very dangerous moment.

2           That is a critical cluster.

3                         Then the security cluster, because in  
4           a way it all flows from the basic mission  
5           statement that we are deployed in a fragile state  
6           to help re-establish the monopoly of the state  
7           with a limited use of force. And so that means  
8           you have to address all those people who have  
9           guns. And you would want to remove the guns from  
10          them. And that's the whole disarmament, de-  
11          mobilization, reintegration effort.

12                        How do you do it? It's not a  
13          technical issue. It's a highly political issue.  
14          You have to address how you create a new security  
15          force, both the military and the police. And  
16          there if you can't be quickly on the ground, if  
17          you do not have a rapid deployment capacity to  
18          shape things right from the outset, you have a  
19          problem. And as you address the police, I think  
20          one of the lessons that we have learned is that  
21          the best way is to mix including for the purely  
22          police segment of rule of law is to mix uniformed

1           personnel and civilian personnel because if you  
2           help re-establish a ministry of interior, you  
3           need to have a support structure, you need to  
4           have a vetting system, you need to have an  
5           administration. So you need to think in a  
6           comprehensive way on how you're going to  
7           establish that institution.

8                         And you need also to think of the  
9           police not in isolation. And that's why in the  
10          U.N. when we created in Peacekeeping, an Office  
11          of Rule of Law in Security Institutions to  
12          precisely combine police, judiciary, corrections  
13          and security reform in a broader sense. Because  
14          if you don't do that, it's like having a chair  
15          with one leg missing. If you have police but you  
16          don't have a judiciary focused in the early  
17          stages mostly just on the criminal law, you're  
18          not going to address everything.

19                        But if you don't have that, the  
20          police will have no framework. And if you don't  
21          have corrections, then you create a problem for  
22          yourself as you lock up people and you have no

1 national institutions to deal with the problem.  
2 So these are key institutions. There's another  
3 cluster which I think is critical. It's the  
4 financial cluster, so to speak, because unless  
5 the international community is prepared to  
6 underwrite the budget of a fragile country in an  
7 open-ended manner, you need to quickly help that  
8 country create a solid revenue base and control  
9 its spending change. If you don't have that, you  
10 have also a fundamental problem.

11 And lastly, what I would call the  
12 administrative cluster -- working at both ends.  
13 At the top end, the cabinet. We see it in  
14 Afghanistan. I've seen it in Congo. I've seen  
15 it in many places. The whole issue of how the  
16 national state structure is able to function and  
17 prioritize so that the plans of the country are  
18 not a juxtaposition of plans developed by various  
19 foreign agencies so that if you help build a  
20 national interlocutor which can set the  
21 priorities for itself. That has a lot to do with  
22 a cabinet process at the top. And at the bottom,

1           then it's the whole issue of local  
2           administration.

3                         Now what does that mean in terms of  
4           training? We send police officers, civilian  
5           experts, who for many of them have never been in  
6           a conflict zone. And it's very different to be a  
7           police officer in Paris or New York or  
8           Washington, or to be a police officer in  
9           Khandahar. It's radically different. And if  
10          you're not prepared for that -- if you're not  
11          being trained also to transfer knowledge, not  
12          just to be a good police officer, you're going to  
13          function at five percent of your capacity.

14                        And so I think one of the big gaps  
15          that we have today is that we throw people who  
16          may have the national expertise and that who  
17          would be just fine as police officers or  
18          judiciary or this or that in a national context,  
19          but they are thrown into a situation that they  
20          don't really know how to deal with. And it is,  
21          to be fair, very difficult to deal with those  
22          situations because you need a balance of empathy,

1 listening, and the same time not being a push  
2 over. That requires some training.

3 Second issue on training, I think we  
4 get too many people who are fine experts who have  
5 no sense of operations.

6 I'm finishing in a second. I have  
7 just one third point.

8 We need not just experts. We need  
9 people who know how to run things and to transfer  
10 that knowledge.

11 And thirdly -- and that's linked to  
12 the security sector reform and all these idle  
13 people that you'll find in a post-conflict  
14 situation -- we are very bad at developing  
15 capacities to generate quick economic growth with  
16 job creation. And that requires more thought.

17 And I'll stop there.

18 MR. CROCKER: Thank you, Jean-Marie.

19 And that's a perfect segue I think,  
20 Nancy, for your remarks. Over to you. MS.

21 LINDBORG: Great. Thank you.

22 Nice to be here. And I'll try to be

1 complementary in some of the things that I have  
2 to say and draw on the experience from a  
3 nongovernmental organization's perspective and  
4 our sector which I think has been increasingly  
5 involved over the past decade in many, many of  
6 these environments-- many of the seven that Jim  
7 ticked off as the big ones.

8 But there are others as well. And  
9 when we think about working in conflict and on  
10 conflict areas, it's a whole broader list of  
11 failed and fragile environments in which we have  
12 these similar challenges. And one of the things  
13 that we consider over and over again I think is  
14 are we talking about the Afghanistans and the  
15 Iraqs of the world, or do we also need to  
16 consider the Somalias, the Sudans -- all the  
17 places where there isn't currently a more active  
18 military presence. And that I think lends  
19 additional urgency to the need to enhance and  
20 increase our civilian capacity.

21 Our other two speakers haven't  
22 mentioned the need for re-balancing some of the

1 funding streams besides Jim's rather pessimistic  
2 comment that he doesn't think there will be  
3 appetite for that. But I hope that there is  
4 indeed an opportunity to think about additional  
5 funding for the international affairs budget to  
6 address some of the needs to do the kind of  
7 planning and the kind of training in the civilian  
8 sector that the military has the great luxury of  
9 doing.

10 As we look at how to be most  
11 effective in these conflict and post-conflict  
12 environments, we really still divide it into  
13 conflict relief and then the development boxes.  
14 And what we haven't done structurally nor do I  
15 think programmatically is really think in a more  
16 fluid way about these transitional environments,  
17 and what does that mean both programmatically,  
18 funding authorities and structures.

19 What we have found in so many of  
20 these environments, especially if you do have a  
21 peace treaty or some at least temporary  
22 conclusion to the conflict, is you do have this

1 moment -- this sort of golden hour, golden year  
2 in many cases. We certainly saw that in  
3 Afghanistan and Iraq. How do you consolidate  
4 those gains? And how do you bring forward the  
5 flexibility of funding that enables you to move  
6 as quickly as the contextual environment allows  
7 you to do?

8 So a couple of things that from a  
9 kind of structural policy approach that I would  
10 flag is first of all, I hope we learn different  
11 lessons than the provincial reconstruction teams  
12 which seem to be emerging from both Iraq and  
13 Afghanistan. As we look at the roles of civilian  
14 actors and the roles of the military, I would  
15 actually refer back to some of the comments that  
16 Mr. Zoellick made at lunch today. It's critical  
17 to secure the environment to create ambient  
18 security within which development and those  
19 transitional pathways to peace can occur. It  
20 does matter I think who conducts the development  
21 activities. And you'll achieve different  
22 objectives with a hearts and mind strategy than

1           you will with a development strategy. So how you  
2           construct the environment within which people can  
3           do that will make a big difference.

4                        I think there's often not enough  
5           emphasis on perimeter security on main roads or  
6           borders or the kinds of things that could create  
7           a better environment for security. And as Mr.  
8           Zoellick said, numbers matter.

9                        As we look forward at the whole of  
10          government approaches, I think all of us agree  
11          that there needs to be better coordination and  
12          there needs to be clear understanding of how all  
13          the actors contribute to an objective of peace  
14          and stability in an environment. But we also  
15          need to understand how you can undermine the  
16          capacities of certain actors by making it too  
17          tightly coordinated of a team. And very  
18          specifically with a provincial reconstruction  
19          team approach, when you have a barricaded  
20          environment within which state actors are  
21          working, the more you try to pull your  
22          nongovernmental partners into that barricaded

1 environment, or even your civilian state actors,  
2 the more you undermine their ability to do the  
3 kind of development work that can be the most  
4 effective and needs to happen as quickly as  
5 possible in any of these environments. When you  
6 are out working with communities, it matters if  
7 you're retreating at night to a barricaded  
8 environment or able to stay out and working more  
9 freely with them. And that'll lead to some a  
10 training agenda in just a moment.

11 The related principle to this is the  
12 importance of community-led approaches as a  
13 complement to some of the capacity -- government  
14 capacity -- approaches that my colleagues have  
15 mentioned. You need to have ownership at the  
16 community level as well as at the national level.  
17 And again, that goes to the kinds of civilian  
18 capacities and understandings of how development  
19 can occur as we look at the future.

20 You need the center fringe, and you  
21 need the top and the bottom -- all of these  
22 development approaches working hand in hand and

1 parallel. Too often what we see is you'll lurch  
2 from one to the other. It's all investment in  
3 development at the national level and then all of  
4 a sudden it's like whoa, we got to do the  
5 provincial and the local levels where you really  
6 need those to be proceeding from the beginning  
7 especially during that sort of golden year where  
8 often you have more latitude, more confidence of  
9 the population so that they can proceed at the  
10 same time.

11 I completely agree with Jim in terms  
12 of lodging the expeditionary, if you will,  
13 capacities within USAID, providing additional  
14 funding there. And I would look there to create  
15 mechanisms that involve flexibility so that when  
16 you're putting programs out into the field, the  
17 people who are implementing them have the ability  
18 to be flexible so that you're able to shift with  
19 the environment and not get stuck in plans that  
20 have been made back at a center somewhere and  
21 create that ability for community-led ownership.

22 What does this mean in terms of a

1 training agenda? First of all, there needs to be  
2 additional training around planning and being  
3 able to within the civilian sector do the kind of  
4 planning that the military has the extraordinary  
5 luxury to do. And I won't bore everyone with  
6 quoting that military band statistic. About the  
7 USA has fewer people than the military band.  
8 It's a sobering thing when you think about the  
9 lack of planning capacity that we have, and the  
10 training that goes along with that. So I would  
11 put that very high on anyone's training list.

12 Secondly, I would agree with the need  
13 for a negotiation training approach. When you're  
14 putting people in conflict environments, they  
15 need to be better equipped to negotiate with the  
16 many, many actors with whom they'll interact.  
17 Throughout that reconstruction period, you often  
18 need to negotiate checkpoints, clan elders,  
19 militias, all kinds of folks who are critical to  
20 the enterprise and with whom you need to deal and  
21 to deal effectively. Also to be able to transmit  
22 those negotiation techniques often to those local

1 structures to support their ability to solve  
2 problems at a local level.

3 Secondly, I would emphasize remote  
4 management, which is a variation of the  
5 management agenda. But often times when things  
6 get hot, the answer is not to go in and stall a  
7 barricaded facility from which to conduct  
8 operations but rather to train your local teams  
9 to conduct the development programs and then to  
10 have the remote management techniques to enable  
11 you to liaise with them most effectively and to  
12 manage the ongoing program.

13 Thirdly, conflict analysis so that  
14 all the civilian actors understand all of the  
15 small conflicts that occur on an ongoing basis.  
16 It's not just the big conflicts that we have to  
17 worry about. It's land use disputes. It's this  
18 clan against that clan. It's resource scarcity  
19 where people are going to battle and conflicts  
20 will erupt. And being able to understand those  
21 root causes so you can design the kind of  
22 programs that don't allow those to flame up and

1           become center stage as you try to move toward  
2           peace and stability.

3                         So I would end with the need to focus  
4           very strongly on the economic approaches early,  
5           early on, and to do so not just at the macro  
6           level but at the community level so that people  
7           have an ability to invest in their own future and  
8           to support their families with dignity as a  
9           critical ingredient of creating both constituents  
10          for stability and reform and also constituents  
11          for a governance that enables their own  
12          businesses to go forward. And that's a huge  
13          piece that needs to go hand in hand as quickly as  
14          possible after a security approach.

15                        Thanks.

16                        MR. CROCKER: I'd like to thank all  
17          three of our panelists. And I'm going to now  
18          open this up for a few minutes of Q and A. And  
19          we have mics. Don't ask your question until the  
20          mic comes to you. And please identify yourself  
21          very briefly. And no speeches.

22                        What I'm going to do is collect three

1 or four questions and then come back to the panel  
2 so we have more efficient use of the time.

3 I see a hand right here, sir. If a  
4 mic could come to this gentleman here, that would  
5 be great. If you'll stand up, a mic will come to  
6 you.

7 The next questioner in the back who  
8 is standing up now will get the mic. Yes, please  
9 go ahead.

10 MR. KIRSCH: Thank you. Don Kirsch  
11 from the Institute for Defense Analyses.

12 Throughout the day, there's been a  
13 lot of comment and I think common agreement on  
14 the need for a greater civilian capacity within  
15 the U.S. government to respond to stability or  
16 reconstruction operations. But so much of this  
17 seems to be taking place in a vacuum. We think  
18 about how we coordinate the U.S. effort.

19 I would like to take the advantage of  
20 the presence of a U.N. rep to see how our new  
21 administration might do a better job in making  
22 this a part of a broader international effort and

1 coordinating with international institutions and  
2 other donors.

3 MR. CROCKER: Thank you. So the  
4 question is international coordination and  
5 working with others.

6 Yes, in the back?

7 MR. CONSOLITORE: Thanks. My name is  
8 Dan Consolitore. I work for a small firm called  
9 McKeller Corporation. We support the Under  
10 Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness  
11 and who've asked us to look at how DOD might  
12 support interagency training especially civilians  
13 and really develop and hold government integrated  
14 training programs and take advantage of its  
15 greater resources.

16 I know that might be somewhat  
17 controversial and the suggestion might be that  
18 they should stay away from that and funding  
19 should simply go straight to the civilians. But  
20 I wonder if especially Mr. Dobbins would like to  
21 talk about how DOD might leverage its resources  
22 to provide training.

1                   MR. CROCKER: Okay. I see a question  
2 right here.

3                   MS. SCHRUBBER: Hi. My name is  
4 Claudeen Schrubber. I'm at the University of  
5 Maryland.

6                   It seems to me a lot of the  
7 discussions so far had to do with needing to have  
8 a systems perspective that is looking at varying  
9 parts of how they all fit together. And what  
10 sometimes is missing is the feedback loop. That  
11 is you have a project and you say let's look and  
12 see how it worked and in six months or a year  
13 make changes.

14                  I ask you whether you have any  
15 examples of where there was in fact a feedback  
16 loop build into whatever you were doing and that  
17 changes were made or what you were doing was then  
18 confirmed as what you intended to accomplished.

19                  MR. CROCKER: Thank you. And there's  
20 one more right here in the front. Yes, sir? And  
21 we'll take that and then we'll go back to the  
22 panel.

1                   PARTICIPANT: I'm from the Executive  
2 Intelligence Review. This question is directed  
3 towards the second speaker.

4                   Taking advantage of the fact that you  
5 mentioned the question of finance, it is  
6 important that a reconstruction policy is set  
7 forth. But especially if you see the current  
8 bail-out policy that was passed by the Congress  
9 early this year, it's pretty clear that we don't  
10 have a financial system which could do something  
11 of that sort. So what do you think that the  
12 better approach would be to first reorganize the  
13 current bankrupt bank system and set up something  
14 new?

15                   MR. CROCKER: Okay. Thank you.

16                   Who would like to start? Jim, there  
17 was a question that was headed your way. There  
18 was one that could go between Nancy and Jean-  
19 Marie. Several for Jean-Marie.

20                   MR. DOBBINS: Well, let me try to say  
21 something that apply to most of these questions.

22                   First of all, as the U.S. looks to

1 improve its own capabilities, it's important to  
2 do so in ways that make it easier rather than  
3 harder to leverage everybody else's abilities --  
4 to leverage the U.N. and other contributors. And  
5 that means establishing mechanisms within the  
6 U.S. government that are compatible with the  
7 mechanisms everybody has is very important.

8 If we decide that our military is  
9 going to train police and every other country in  
10 the world has its civilians training police,  
11 we're creating a serious barrier to collective  
12 programs to conduct that kind of activity. And  
13 that's just one example.

14 So we have to be conscious of how the  
15 U.N. does it, how other countries do it. And  
16 there are trade offs. If we decide it's more  
17 efficient for us to put it in a different agency  
18 of the U.S. government, fine. But we have to  
19 understand we're degrading our capability to  
20 leverage other countries.

21 And while in Iraq, we haven't been  
22 successful largely for other reasons and not

1       leveraging anybody else. We have to remember  
2       that in Bosnia we only provided 25 percent of the  
3       money and the troops. And in Kosovo, we only  
4       provided 16 percent. And the other 80 or 75 or  
5       80 percent were provided by other allies. And so  
6       it was important for our components to slot in  
7       with other components.

8               So establishing mechanisms of the  
9       U.S. government that are compatible with others  
10      is important for international integration.

11             On feedback loops, I think that there  
12      are built-in feedback loops that work. But they  
13      only work up to a point. During the Clinton  
14      Administration, they clearly got better over  
15      eight years. If you look at Somalia, Haiti,  
16      Bosnia and Kosovo, each operation was conducted  
17      more professionally with less screw ups. Somalia  
18      was a pretty low base to start with.

19      Nevertheless, it was a steady improvement. And  
20      then it didn't carry over to the next  
21      Administration. And it didn't carry over because  
22      it was largely lodged in the people who were

1       doing it repeatedly, and they all left. And a  
2       new Administration came in dedicated to not doing  
3       anything the last Administration had done, and  
4       therefore had to make all the mistakes over  
5       again. And there's a serious danger we'll repeat  
6       that again.

7                   So more continuity. If you're  
8       looking for a place to fix the U.S. government,  
9       it's largely at the transition point because  
10      that's where a lot of expertise is lost.

11                   Another problem is that functions  
12      keep switching between agencies. If you can fix  
13      who's going to do a particular function in a way  
14      that transitions from one Administration to the  
15      next, that agency will get better. But if a new  
16      Administration comes in and says state train the  
17      police and this, now DOD's going to train the  
18      police or any other function -- and there have  
19      been many examples -- then no one ever gets  
20      better because every two or three years, some new  
21      agency has inherited this function because people  
22      are dissatisfied with the way the old agency was

1           conducting the function. And it could be that  
2           some legislature is important in that regard.

3                         Now we've seen important improvements  
4           in the Bush Administration's performance over the  
5           last eight years. And in Iraq over the last two  
6           years, you've seen an accrued improvement largely  
7           as the result of feedback loops, which DOD is  
8           actually very good at. DOD's the only agency  
9           that actually pays people to critique its  
10          performance -- something the State Department has  
11          never even thought of -- and then actually uses  
12          that material. And so you saw a remarkable  
13          improvement in performance as a result of the  
14          feedback loop.

15                        Partially it was just the whole world  
16          that was telling them they were doing a terrible  
17          job. But partly, it was because they actually  
18          studied it, spent money to have people tell them  
19          how to do it better, and then took advantage of  
20          those lessons.

21                        MR. CROCKER: Nancy?

22                        MS. LINDBORG: A couple of responses.

1           On the systems approach, I would add  
2           to that you need the feedback loop not just on  
3           how is the system working, but how is it working  
4           for the people in those communities and in that  
5           country. And I think that's what we often  
6           underinvest in.

7           If you believe that local and  
8           national ownership is one of the critical  
9           ingredients for moving towards peace and  
10          stability, you need to have baked into that  
11          through survey mechanisms, through the kinds of  
12          programs that engage people in conversations in  
13          being a part of the accountability systems -- you  
14          need to have that baked into your programs. And  
15          so, I do think that's an important part of it.

16          On the whole of government training  
17          proposal, this is a real conundrum for us because  
18          there are currently some programs -- the 1207  
19          funding mechanisms -- that are designed exactly  
20          to do that -- to take advantage of DOD resources  
21          for the purposes of use by state and USAID for  
22          various programs.

1           The concern is that inevitably -- and  
2           it's understandable; it's not a critique of DOD;  
3           but it's your money -- you're going to want to  
4           know what happens to it. You want to have  
5           oversight of it. Pretty soon it's a DOD program.  
6           And it's an expensive work around ultimately for  
7           the taxpayers.

8           And so one would hope that if we all  
9           agree that those are needs that serve the overall  
10          agenda, that there might be a way to have co-  
11          ownership, co-design, something that takes it out  
12          of only a DOD lens, not to diminish in any way  
13          the many, many lessons and systems and the  
14          planning capacities that DOD has, but to take it  
15          out of a wholly owned enterprise and create more  
16          of a partnership.

17          The NGOs have worked a lot with the  
18          military over the last decade. I think in any  
19          real tough environment, who's out there? And  
20          you've got the military, the journalists, and the  
21          NGO workers. And so just by virtue of being  
22          there together, we've learned a great deal about

1           how to operate effectively, how to understand  
2           each other's language and systems.

3                         We've also learned there's an  
4           insatiable appetite among the military for  
5           training. We get invited all the time to  
6           participate in training, and we simply cannot  
7           keep up with the appetite.

8                         So there's also a need to develop  
9           ways of doing training that doesn't require  
10          endless individual -- what are some more  
11          efficient mechanisms -- distance learning,  
12          videos, et cetera -- that enable that imbalance  
13          of just personnel time to interact with one  
14          another effectively.

15                        MR. CROCKER: Jean-Marie, there were  
16          several questions headed your way.

17                        MR. GUEHENNO: Yes. On the how can  
18          the U.S. operate in a broader context, I would  
19          stick on what Jim said. I would say two things.

20                        One, in the way one develops  
21          training, in the way one develops identification  
22          of personnel, more engagement with the various

1 actors who do the same -- other countries,  
2 organization, World Bank, EU -- so that what is  
3 done the U.S. is compatible with what is done by  
4 other actors.

5 The other thing that I would say on  
6 that is that if it is accepted that helping  
7 fragile states recover has become a strategic  
8 issue. I don't think we should think of the  
9 personnel as a kind of afterthought. When  
10 defending the border was the strategic issue,  
11 there was a draft. There was a whole  
12 mobilization of the country. But for this very  
13 difficult exercise of getting involved in the  
14 life of another country, we sort of scramble to  
15 muster the resources.

16 I personally believe that it would be  
17 quite useful to re-think for instance the way the  
18 civil service is organized to see that for the  
19 careers for some civil servants when they have  
20 the right expertise, it would make sense and it  
21 would be an added value to their career to spend  
22 a year in some difficult place, which would fit

1 with what I said when I said we need not just  
2 experts but we need operators.

3 You have to establish a little  
4 customs office in Congo. You don't need a great  
5 expert on Congo. You don't need a great expert  
6 on customs. You need someone who knows  
7 considering the number of trucks that go through  
8 that place, how many customs officers do I need.  
9 And how am I going to organize it so that the  
10 various employees don't park at the duties. It's  
11 very practical things. And it's an interesting  
12 experience. You need those things. So one has  
13 to think how one reorganizes the domestic service  
14 for international engagement.

15 On feedback, I think the area where  
16 there has been the best use of feedback is rule  
17 of law. Certainly we don't do police today the  
18 way we would have done it ten years ago. There's  
19 still a long way to go. But there is an  
20 understanding that today there is a need to a  
21 much more comprehensive approach as I said that  
22 combines police, judiciary, corrections, civilian

1 and uniformed personnel.

2 I don't think we have had the same  
3 feedback in terms of local administration. I  
4 think there we can do much more progress.

5 On finance, on budget -- what I meant  
6 there is that if the state doesn't pay the police  
7 officer, the police officer will prey on the  
8 population. That happens everywhere. And so  
9 this is a really fundamental issue. And there  
10 you have to fix the key financial structures of a  
11 state so that there is a minimum of transparency,  
12 because not only if you don't do that, the  
13 security forces instead of being a reassurance to  
14 the people will be perceived as a threat. But  
15 also because of their lack of transparency, that  
16 will feed also to suspicions and conflicts in the  
17 country that you want to move away from  
18 conflicts.

19 So it's a major political stake to  
20 establish financial procedures that are simple,  
21 transparent and effective. And that requires  
22 some expertise. It can't be improvised.

1                   MR. CROCKER: Thank you. I'll go  
2 back to the floor now. I think there may be a  
3 few more hands raised. There were a couple in  
4 the back. Again, keep it short and indicate your  
5 name. And if you have a specific addressee,  
6 indicate that please.

7                   PARTICIPANT: Hi. My name is Jawad  
8 and I'm a policy analyst on a strategic economy.

9                   And my question is in regard to the  
10 foreign aid. How much of it is being spent on  
11 the ground and how much of it goes to the  
12 contractors and so on? There was a study done by  
13 Oxfam in Afghanistan. And they concluded that of  
14 each dollar given to Afghanistan, about 65 cents  
15 of that dollar goes to contractors and other  
16 people who work on the ground. How do you think  
17 we can come up with a system that increases  
18 efficiency and allows the money to be spent on  
19 the ground and not be taken back from the country  
20 that it's supposed to help? Thank you.

21                   MR. CROCKER: Okay. I have a  
22 question right here. If we can get a mic up

1 here, there's a couple in the front.

2 MR. COHEN: Eric Cohen, Investors  
3 Against Genocide.

4 Sudan is a particularly difficult  
5 place in many ways. But I'm interested if you  
6 could share with us your views -- maybe several  
7 of you could speak to it -- on how we've been  
8 doing and what we could be doing better to  
9 develop civilian capacity in South Sudan at least  
10 where we have access and possibly in other parts  
11 of Sudan.

12 MR. CROCKER: Okay. There's a  
13 question in the middle here. Yes, sir? MR.

14 STEELE: My name is David Steele. I just  
15 returned two weeks ago from Iraq where I've been  
16 a reconciliation facilitator for the U.S.  
17 Institute of Peace. And previously I'd worked as  
18 a program manager for Mercy Corps, also training  
19 Iraqis from the southern part of Iraq.

20 My question is I'd like for a number  
21 of you to address what is the special role of  
22 government versus nongovernment agencies in terms

1 of effectiveness. I have my own opinions on  
2 that, but I'm not going to express them. Having  
3 worked in both sectors, having been imbedded for  
4 a while with a PRT in Salah ad-Din Province in  
5 Iraq working for USIP, I can see pluses and  
6 minuses in both cases. I'd like you to address  
7 if you can what's the specific role that the  
8 nongovernmental organization can function in  
9 versus the specific role that's an advantage for  
10 government agencies.

11 MR. CROCKER: Okay. Thank you.

12 There's a question back there. Yes,  
13 sir? Stand up, please, and you'll get a mic.

14 MR. HILL: I'm Rick Hill. I'm with  
15 RTI, International.

16 And this is actually a facet of one  
17 of the questions that was just asked, and it has  
18 to do with civilian capacity. I note that this  
19 discussion has all been about international  
20 civilian capacity. And I appreciate Nancy's  
21 comments about the need to build constituencies  
22 for stability and focus on the community. And

1           also vis a vis security the fact that ultimately  
2           most of the work gets done in a place like Iraq  
3           by civilians who are not international.

4                        So I think it's worthwhile, and I'd  
5           like the panel's comments on a slight strategic  
6           shift that has to do with emphasis on building  
7           indigenous civilian capacity as quickly as  
8           possible and that sort of remote management that  
9           Nancy mentioned.

10                      MR. CROCKER: Thank you. I think  
11           I'll have to close it there because we have to  
12           end this session at around 4:15. And I have a  
13           couple of questions of my own to add to the list.

14                      One thing that I'm deriving from this  
15           discussion is that we need to be training people  
16           at many different levels for many different kinds  
17           of disciplines ranging from field people who need  
18           to understand how to negotiate and put out a  
19           local fire to people who might be called the  
20           managing intervention czars -- let's call that  
21           the Jim Dobbins' track -- to people who've set up  
22           the U.N. clustering in the field. We'll call

1           that the Jean-Marie Guehenno track. And then we  
2           have all the field people and the nonofficial  
3           people who have to work with the official people.  
4           We'll call that the Nancy Lindborg track. We're  
5           going to have a lot of tracks and quite a broad  
6           school of professional training before we're  
7           done.

8                         So that's my impression. I throw  
9           that out for comment if any of our panelists have  
10          a different view.

11                        The question also that I wanted to  
12          raise is what is the role in terms of civilian  
13          capacity building, not of the nonofficial sector  
14          -- we've talked about that -- but of the private  
15          sector. And what is rightfully outsource? And  
16          should the private sector be part of the training  
17          programs that we're talking about here in setting  
18          up this school of professional training at USIP?

19                        So with that, I think I'll turn to  
20          you first, Nancy, because a lot of those  
21          questions were aimed at you.

22                        MS. LINDBORG: Thanks. And having a

1 track would be fabulous.

2 MS. LINDBORG: Actually I think all  
3 four of the questions blend very closely together  
4 in terms of how do you get the cost of foreign  
5 aid that flows outside a country to reverse, how  
6 do you build civil society in capacity in South  
7 Sudan, and the roles of NGOs.

8 By the way, hi, David. Good to see  
9 you again.

10 And Rick Hill's question. I think it  
11 goes to what I was calling local ownership, which  
12 is also local capacity. And the faster you  
13 capacitate and support and catalyze people to  
14 organize for the change that they want to see and  
15 then catalyze those economic opportunities to  
16 sustain those changes, I think that the faster  
17 you move on a trajectory towards stability and  
18 recovery. And so a lot of it was -- a goal of  
19 NGOs versus governmental rules I think is a that,  
20 and being able to do it in a way that is outside  
21 the wire. And it absolutely matters if you can  
22 sit and have a cup of tea in a community without

1           having shooters in uniforms around. I think it  
2           provides a different kind of possibility for  
3           recovery and movement, and to negotiate in the  
4           case in Iraq with the Hakeim folks and the  
5           Sistani folks and the Sadr folks because you have  
6           to be able to move around more freely often than  
7           government actors can, and do so in a more  
8           flexible and fluid way.

9                         In Sudan, that is such a devastated  
10          place. So the people who never left to go into  
11          the refugee camps had very little opportunities  
12          for education or understanding even of what a  
13          government looks like with any kind of  
14          accountability. So there's I think a lot of just  
15          basic development work that is going on there to  
16          help people organize, to understand what that  
17          looks like, in addition to basic literacy and  
18          kind of basic civic literacy are essential  
19          ingredients, along with all the political  
20          negotiations that are going on.

21                        The issue of foreign aid and the  
22          study that Oxfam did, I do think that there is an

1 overreliance on contractors who go in as advisors  
2 making extraordinary amounts of money vis a vis  
3 their local counterparts for too long, not that  
4 there's not a role and a need for that kind of  
5 expertise in technical transfer.

6 But in Kosovo, for example, we saw  
7 that continue for years, and really squash a lot  
8 of the local capacity and not do a fast enough  
9 hand over of that. So again, it's less about the  
10 doing it and more about the training to do it.  
11 And actually Kosovo stands as one of those places  
12 where I think we did not learn that lesson fast  
13 enough and can.

14 The challenge of course is how  
15 quickly you start those aid flows directly to the  
16 government. And this is a point of debate in  
17 Afghanistan right now because as you flow the  
18 money into the government which you want to do  
19 when you want to capacitate the government at  
20 both the national and municipal levels, how do  
21 you match the resource flows with the capacity,  
22 because otherwise the money is just getting

1           bollixed up at various critical points.

2                         So it's a delicate balancing act.

3           And it goes to my earlier comment of you need to  
4           have those tracking -- the local, the national,  
5           the top, the bottom. All those tracks going from  
6           the earliest stages instead of starting with the  
7           national and assuming that it will flow out  
8           because then you're not going to move quickly  
9           enough with being able to bring those flows into  
10          the government.

11                        MR. CROCKER: Thanks.

12                        MR. DOBBINS: Well, it would be nice  
13           if aid were less tied, that is if there was less  
14           of a legal or a practical requirement for aid to  
15           flow through national contractors. But  
16           unfortunately the fact is that the contractors  
17           themselves are a major constituency for the aid.  
18           And if you denied them access to it, you'd lose  
19           the constituency and you'd probably lose a lot of  
20           the aid. So there is a certain dilemma there.

21                        Similarly, it would be better if more  
22           of the aid were delivered in the form of budget

1 support, that is the money was just transferred  
2 to the indigenous government with some degree of  
3 oversight to make sure that it was spent  
4 reasonably, but it was spent through the  
5 indigenous government. Aid agencies don't like  
6 that because they prefer to have the money  
7 themselves and conduct the programs themselves.  
8 And so you have this same problem of losing a  
9 major constituency to the extent you force that  
10 kind of diversion. Nevertheless, these are both  
11 worthwhile things to do. You just have to  
12 understand the trade offs and the sources of  
13 resistance.

14 On the role of government versus NGO,  
15 I think this is skewed and Nancy's already  
16 alluded to this in these circumstances where  
17 there isn't adequate security. All NGOs or  
18 nearly all NGOs are operating with government  
19 money as contractors or as grantees. But in a  
20 situation in which civilians have to live in  
21 military concerns, wear helmets and flack vests,  
22 travel in military convoys and behave in all

1           intents and purposes as if they're soldiers, the  
2           marginal utility of using civilians goes way  
3           down. It doesn't go down to zero, but it goes  
4           down.

5                        The ideal circumstance is where the  
6           military establishes a secure environment in  
7           which the civilians can circulate reasonably  
8           freely, in which the government representatives  
9           oversee the execution of programs and in which  
10          either NGOs or for profit contractors actually  
11          execute the programs, whatever they are. That's  
12          the ideal division of labor.

13                      As to the issue of the private  
14          sector, if you mean elements of the private  
15          sector that aren't simply operating off the  
16          public trough, that is they're not just  
17          contractors to the government but others, I think  
18          the basic answer is that until you establish  
19          security and some reasonable level of stability,  
20          you're not going to get investment. You're not  
21          going to get international investment. You're  
22          not even going to get local investment in

1 significant levels. And so for that initial  
2 period, other than bringing in private sector as  
3 contractors to aid donors, I think there's only a  
4 limited role for them.

5 MR. CROCKER: Thank you. Jean-Marie?

6 MR. GUEHENNO: Well, I would say we  
7 are often pursuing two objectives that in a way  
8 are contradictory. We want quick results, and we  
9 want national and local ownership.

10 And to have quick results, very often  
11 it's better to have some international contractor  
12 that dumps something. And there are good reasons  
13 to want that. But there are bad reasons too  
14 because the donors want to show that their money  
15 has produced something quickly. So there's a  
16 trade off there. And how much you want to really  
17 build the national and the local structure, how  
18 much you want to show quick impact. And I think  
19 we often do not accept to be maybe a little less  
20 visible, but with deeper results.

21 Private sector? Agreed with what Jim  
22 said.

1           On the local private sector, I would  
2           add that in a post-conflict environment, it's  
3           highly politicized. The people that are hired  
4           will belong to this group, that group. And so  
5           you have to know what you're doing there.

6           Otherwise you think that this market which is  
7           independent from the politics of the country,  
8           that's a complete illusion. And so you have to  
9           know where you operate.

10           Thirdly, I would mention one program  
11           which -- and just to stress, there's no silver  
12           bullet -- that has worked in my view reasonably  
13           well in Afghanistan, that didn't work at all in  
14           Timor, which is the National Solidarity Program,  
15           which is in essence the World Bank program where  
16           the World Bank would put money with the minister  
17           of rural development which would then be  
18           allocated to self-defined local communities, and  
19           it would kill several birds with one stone. It  
20           would empower a national structure at the  
21           national level. It would create grassroots  
22           democratic communities. And at the same time, it

1 would identify needs that correspond to the real  
2 needs.

3 It has worked more or less I think --  
4 rather more than less -- in Afghanistan. So  
5 there are ways to involve the people with not too  
6 much overhead and money flowing outside. But I  
7 think we have to be aware that there will always  
8 be trade offs.

9 MR. CROCKER: It would be very  
10 difficult to imagine a richer conversation about  
11 all these issues. I think we've run out of time.  
12 But I wouldn't try to summarize this very rich  
13 discussion.

14 I would say that one conclusion I  
15 reach is that there's going to have to be lots of  
16 tracks and lots of levels of training in our  
17 future training institution.

18 Another conclusion I've reached --  
19 and I think I sense this from both the questions  
20 and from the panelists -- is that this business  
21 of being involved in various ways in countries  
22 that are fragile and in transition is going to

1           continue for a while. This is not an area that's  
2           going to suddenly cease to be an area of demand  
3           and activity. It may be as Jim Dobbins has said  
4           that the way we did it in Iraq may not be  
5           repeated, but there are going to be lots of  
6           demands for this kind of involvement in parts of  
7           the world. I'm assuming that I'm speaking for  
8           the panel when I say that. So this is an area of  
9           continuing need and continuing importance for  
10          building up civilian capabilities.

11                        I'd like you all to join me in  
12          thanking our panel for their comments.

13                        (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter  
14          was concluded at 3:25 p.m.)

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