

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE  
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PASSING THE BATON

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES AND  
OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

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THURSDAY  
JANUARY 8, 2009

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PANEL 1: 3:15-4:15 P.M.  
SECURITY AND POLITICAL REFORM IN THE GREATER  
MIDDLE EAST

+ + + + +

Room 204 AB  
Walter E. Washington Convention Center

801 Mount Vernon Place, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001

PANELISTS:

MONA YACOUBIAN

SAMER SHEHATA  
SHUJA NAWAZ

MODERATED BY DANIEL BRUMBERG

This transcript done from audio provided  
by the United States Institute of Peace.

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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 3:15 p.m.

3 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Welcome.

4 Today's panel examines a topic that the Obama  
5 administration will surely struggle with in  
6 the coming year and beyond: the complex  
7 relationship between political reform and  
8 security in the Middle East and wider Muslim  
9 world.

10 As we well know, in the wake of 9-  
11 11 democracy promotion became a matter of high  
12 foreign policy making. The guiding assumption  
13 behind this shift was that the absence of  
14 democracy-- or more precisely, the presence of  
15 autocracy-- is a root cause of Islamic  
16 extremism movements and ideologies.

17 Repudiating at least in word, decades of  
18 support for Arab autocrats, Washington  
19 declared that it would henceforth back a  
20 process of political reform that would not  
21 only help repair the torn fabric of Arab and  
22 Muslim political systems, but also provide--

1           in the long run at least it was hoped-- a more  
2           durable basis for domestic political stability  
3           and regional peacemaking and security.

4                       This vision was hardly applied in  
5           a consistent fashion, particularly in states  
6           of strategic importance to the United States,  
7           such as Egypt or Pakistan. Moreover, it was  
8           largely untested, and truth be told, it was  
9           not very well thought out. Yet it did create  
10          this vision in both the Middle East and the  
11          United States-- expectations that given the  
12          nature and complexities of the challenge  
13          itself, expectations that were bound in some  
14          sense to be dashed or at least frustrated.  
15          Thus perhaps the inevitable crash went in the  
16          wake of electoral successes by Islamist groups  
17          in Egypt and Palestine and in the face of  
18          mounting sectarian conflict in Iraq, critics  
19          of the freedom agenda within and outside the  
20          US Government, quietly or not quietly, began  
21          to sound warnings of a "democratic backlash."

22                       That term, "democratic backlash,"

1 of course has a double meaning. Analytically  
2 it pointed to the supposed boomerang effect of  
3 political reform in the Middle East. Reform,  
4 it was assumed, empowering Islamist forces and  
5 creating instability. And prescriptively, the  
6 term "democratic backlash" made the case in  
7 effect for backing away from democracy  
8 promotion in favor of a foreign policy guided  
9 first and foremost by realpolitik  
10 considerations.

11 Viewing these developments in  
12 winter 2008, USIP organized a study group on  
13 reform and security in the Muslim world shared  
14 by Larry Diamond and Frank Fukuyama, directed  
15 by myself, and made up of leading scholars,  
16 policy makers and practitioners. The study  
17 group has met regularly to consider and debate  
18 the track record of reform since 2003 on the  
19 one hand, and the impact of political reforms  
20 on the domestic political stability of key  
21 Muslim states on the other. We've also  
22 reversed the formula, looking at the

1 relationship or effort to promote security and  
2 its effect on reform.

3           Ultimately the mission of the  
4 study group is to provide concrete policy-  
5 relevant recommendations for designing  
6 democratic reform strategies that can enhance  
7 domestic political stability and regional  
8 stability, and thus reduce the potential  
9 tensions or trade-offs between the quest for  
10 democracy and the exigencies of domestic and  
11 regional security.

12           While the study group will  
13 continue its work into 2009-- and is  
14 continuing its work-- we thought it would be  
15 useful to share with you today some of the  
16 broad, as well as case-specific findings. For  
17 this purpose, we are joined by three members  
18 of the study group. Immediately to my left,  
19 Mona Yacoubian; to her left, Samer Shehata;  
20 and to my right, Shuja Nawaz. Now before each  
21 of these speakers-- and we'll start with Samer  
22 this afternoon-- discusses the particular

1 cases; Samer will discuss Egypt, Mona will  
2 discuss Lebanon and Shuja will dive into the  
3 easy case of Pakistan, I wanted to share three  
4 broad findings from our deliberations, and I  
5 want to make clear that these are sort of  
6 broad findings because we are far from  
7 completing our work and we are still  
8 deliberating and debating, and will continue  
9 to do so into the spring, particularly as the  
10 study group begins to focus more on the cases  
11 of South Asia more intensively.

12 First of all, all the study group  
13 members believe that an uncritical jump from  
14 the neolist soniism of the past years to an  
15 equally uncritical revamped realism will  
16 ultimately undermine US security interests.  
17 While democratic reforms by their very nature  
18 introduce a level of uncertainty and sometimes  
19 instability that troubles regimes and the key  
20 constituencies that they protect, the  
21 ideological and political gulf between states  
22 and societies will only expand, absent a

1 process of gradual political reforms that  
2 allow for accountability, participation and  
3 effective governance. To put it succinctly,  
4 we do not believe that it would be in the  
5 interest of the United States simply to  
6 abandon this agenda, and we are concerned  
7 about how it can be revived in a more  
8 effective way to garner both domestic  
9 political support-- or support in the Beltway  
10 in particular-- and of course regional support  
11 where the reform agenda is unfolding.

12 Second, we believe that Washington  
13 was give greater attention to the overall  
14 architecture of security and peacemaking in  
15 the Middle East. The cases of Jordan and even  
16 Palestine demonstrate that where there is a  
17 real prospect for a just and sustainable two-  
18 state solution to the Palestine and Israeli  
19 conflict, radical Islamic voices will  
20 mobilize, but they will not necessarily  
21 prevail. Indeed, Hamas' so-called electoral  
22 victory was not the result of an inevitable

1           Islamist wave spreading throughout the region.  
2           Had the peace process borne fruits much  
3           earlier-- and had Fatah not fragmented in  
4           tandem with the collapse of the peace process--  
5           - it is doubtful that Hamas would have  
6           squeezed through in 2005.

7                         Third, we believe that a  
8           resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will  
9           reinforce modern Arab voices and in so doing  
10          allow for a more sustained focus on the  
11          domestic challenges of political reform.  
12          There is a linkage there, particularly the  
13          closer you get to the center of this conflict.  
14          But we do not think that Washington should  
15          throw out the proverbial baby with the bath  
16          water by pursuing a peace process at the  
17          expense of democratization. Arab leaders will  
18          happily invoke the challenge of Arab-Israeli  
19          peacemaking, or of course the struggle against  
20          radical Islam to deflect pressures for reform.  
21          But as the case of Pakistan suggests; that's  
22          not the only case, Washington should not

1           indulge such posturing-- that's instrumental  
2           posturing-- in a manner that magnifies the  
3           political leverage of increasingly unpopular  
4           autocrats. None of our friends in the Middle  
5           East or South Asia will abandon their  
6           strategic relationship with a US Government  
7           that makes clear its long-term commitment in  
8           both word and deed to a process of effective  
9           political reforms. So we do believe that the  
10          United States needs to be recommitted to this  
11          agenda, but committed in a way that will  
12          produce an effective and gradual process of  
13          democratization.

14                         Now, having said all that, these  
15          are three broad outlines. The cases are very  
16          different in many respects. There sure are  
17          some similarities. We couldn't possibly in  
18          the context of this meeting today in the short  
19          hour that we have, provide you a summary of  
20          all our deliberations or go into all the  
21          cases, obviously. But we thought we would at  
22          least share with you some of the particular

1 case studies. A key group within the core  
2 group of our study group were tasked with the  
3 challenge of looking at the relationship  
4 between domestic political stability and  
5 domestic security, and regional security since  
6 2003 or 2004, looking empirically at the  
7 record, looking at the potential trade-offs  
8 and tensions between security and reform, and  
9 also looking in particular at the way regimes  
10 instrumentalized the question of security in  
11 ways that are designed to fend off the  
12 challenge of reform.

13 So, our members were tasked to  
14 produce papers. What you're going to hear  
15 today is not a recapitulation of those papers,  
16 but in some sense an expansion of some of the  
17 ideas in those papers and some of the  
18 conclusions that they suggest. And we're  
19 going to start with Samer and each of our  
20 members will speak from 12, no more than 15  
21 minutes. I promise to be ruthless. They've  
22 been pre-warned several times. It's not easy

1 to do that with your colleagues and friends.  
2 But we will try to leave enough time for  
3 questions at the end of the three  
4 presentations.

5 So, Samer, please.

6 DR. SHEHATA: Sure. Thank you,  
7 Dan.

8 Just to add something to Dan's  
9 comments, I think I speak for the group if I  
10 were to add that we share the belief that  
11 issues of reform should be pursued and  
12 continue to be pursued peacefully, non-  
13 militarily, of course, in a consistent manner  
14 throughout the region.

15 I'd like to thank Dan Brumberg and  
16 the US Institute of Peace for inviting me to  
17 participate in this event and address this  
18 audience.

19 It is of course impossible to do  
20 justice to our long papers in 12 minutes. And  
21 as a result, much will be omitted in my  
22 presentation. Some things will be simplified

1 and other points will be presented  
2 telegraphically. Because of time constraints,  
3 I will concentrate on the conclusion, lessons  
4 and policy recommendations, and if there is  
5 time in the Q&A, I can discuss other sections  
6 of the report.

7 Okay. Moving to the major lessons  
8 and policy recommendations with regard to the  
9 case of Egypt, which I work on every day of my  
10 life. I have eight.

11 The first is, credible and  
12 consistent rhetoric coupled with action are  
13 effective and inexpensive with regard to  
14 promoting reform. US pressure on the Egyptian  
15 government between 2003 and 2005 played an  
16 important role in facilitating Cairo's  
17 political opening in 2005. Consistent  
18 rhetoric from the president and the secretary  
19 of state, followed up with diplomatic action,  
20 provided disincentive for the Egyptian  
21 government to crack down on peaceful political  
22 activity, protest and other forms of political

1 dissent.

2           Although US pressure did not  
3 achieve democracy-- nor could it-- or even  
4 substantive political reform in this case, it  
5 helped expand the space in which domestic  
6 actors could operate. American focus on  
7 reform and high-level statements provided  
8 cover and restrained regime repression.  
9 Domestic actors, including new movements,  
10 reform-minded judges and established political  
11 groups, took advantage of the increased space  
12 to engage in peaceful politics.

13           When US pressure was reduced at  
14 the end of 2005 during Egypt's parliamentary  
15 elections as Muslim Brotherhood candidates won  
16 and unprecedented 88 out of 444 elected seats  
17 in parliament, the Cairo spring rapidly turned  
18 to winter. The Egyptian government quickly  
19 moved toward political de-liberalization. And  
20 of course two other historical events should  
21 be quickly added to understand this, and that  
22 is the following months: that is January 26,

1           2006, the victory of Hamas in legislative  
2           elections in Palestine, followed by the summer  
3           2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, which  
4           transformed Hassan Nasralla into the hero of  
5           the Arab world, and of course made President  
6           Mubarak and that regime look significantly  
7           better from the perspective of Washington,  
8           among some.

9                         The second conclusion concerns  
10          security-- or understood in a different way,  
11          the stability of the Egyptian government with  
12          regard to these efforts. At no time as a  
13          result of US pressure for reform on the  
14          Egyptian government was the stability of the  
15          Mubarak regime seriously threatened. Legal  
16          political parties in Egypt are feeble, other  
17          organized political forces are weak, and the  
18          Muslim Brotherhood-- and this is very  
19          important-- the leading opposition movement in  
20          the country does not have the organizational  
21          capacity, the ideological inclination or the  
22          political interest in coming to power through

1 force. Although the Brotherhood retains some  
2 troubling ideological elements in tension with  
3 democratic principals-- and I'd be happy to  
4 speak about that, if you like-- it has  
5 consistently demonstrated a commitment to  
6 peaceful political participation for at least  
7 three decades and in the face of significant  
8 regime repression. Therefore, and in  
9 conjunction with the following points I'm  
10 going to make, the incoming administration  
11 should not refrain from encouraging Cairo to  
12 move forward on political reform issues.

13 Third lesson relates to the cost  
14 of pursuing reform for the United States. The  
15 cost of US pressure for reform with regard to  
16 Egyptian cooperation on key US interests has  
17 been limited and mostly rhetorical. Although  
18 this is in need of some further investigation,  
19 the evidence suggests that even during the  
20 period when US pressure for reform was  
21 greatest, there was continued Egyptian  
22 assistance on key issues deemed critical to US

1 policy in the region, namely Israeli-  
2 Palestinian negotiations in the peace process,  
3 support for the new Iraq government, including  
4 establishing diplomatic relations between  
5 Cairo and Baghdad and Egyptian training for  
6 the Iraqi police force, and support for  
7 curbing Iran's influence in the region.

8           Moreover, during this period the  
9 US continued to routinely enjoy over flight  
10 rights above Egyptian territory and hundreds  
11 of US military vessels, including nuclear  
12 vessels, continued to be granted expedited  
13 passage through the Suez Canal. Egypt also  
14 maintained its cooperation with the US in what  
15 the Bush administration has dubbed "the global  
16 war on terrorism." Feathers were ruffled and  
17 Egyptian officials, including President  
18 Mubarak and many other Arab leaders,  
19 criticized US reform efforts as "foreign ideas  
20 imposed from the outside." But this does not  
21 appear to have manifested itself in  
22 consequential action on the part of Cairo.

1                   In order to understand this, it  
2                   should be quickly noted that Egypt has a self-  
3                   interest in Palestinian-Israeli peace,  
4                   independent of US policy concerns in the  
5                   region. In fact, this morning David Makovsky  
6                   said that it is not about "doing anyone a  
7                   favor" that Egypt pursues peaceful relations  
8                   in the region and particularly with regard to  
9                   the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The  
10                  Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a sensitive  
11                  domestic political issue as well as a  
12                  legitimate national security concern for  
13                  Cairo.

14                  Moreover, as a regional power,  
15                  Egypt has an interest in curbing Iranian  
16                  influence in the Middle East. Such policies on  
17                  the part of the Egyptian government would  
18                  likely be pursued in one form or another  
19                  whether the US exerted pressure or encouraged  
20                  reform on the Egyptian government or not.

21                  The fourth point has to do with  
22                  pursuing both peace and reform simultaneously,

1 and Dan mentioned this in the initial  
2 comments. There is no reason with regard to  
3 my examination of the Egyptian case, why US  
4 policy cannot pursue Palestinian-Israeli peace  
5 and support reform and democratization in  
6 Egypt and the wider region simultaneously. I  
7 am certainly not underemphasizing the  
8 importance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict  
9 for Middle Eastern politics, but there is no  
10 evidence or inherent logic that points to the  
11 necessity of pursuing one of these objectives  
12 at the expense of the other. Nor is there  
13 evidence to suggest that one policy concern,  
14 a focus on the peace process, for example,  
15 must necessarily proceed the other. Of course  
16 it would be extremely difficult to effectively  
17 pursue almost any US objective in the region  
18 under the conditions of the last two weeks.  
19 But both peace and reform can and should be  
20 pursued simultaneously, consistently and even-  
21 handedly. In fact, being actively engaged,  
22 let alone making progress on the Palestinian-

1 Israeli issue, as well as Iraq and a number of  
2 other issues, will limit Arab regimes from  
3 using these issues to create anti-US sentiment  
4 and excuses to reject political reform.

5 The fifth point regards America's  
6 standing in the region. It is no secret that  
7 US policies over the last eight years have  
8 significantly damaged America's standing in  
9 the Middle East. Expectations on the incoming  
10 administration are extremely high, and this is  
11 especially true in the region. Securing a  
12 just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace in  
13 addition to a stable and independent Iraq, and  
14 closing the Guantanamo Bay prison camp, as  
15 well as other things, would certainly improve  
16 public opinion toward the US.

17 There are also expectations among  
18 many in the region that the new US  
19 administration will more effectively,  
20 consistently, and credibly pursue laudable US  
21 principles of human rights, rule of law and  
22 democracy. America's standing in the Middle

1 East will be impacted by whether these  
2 principles are reflected by US foreign policy.  
3 President Elect Obama understands this, and  
4 has criticized what he has called an effective  
5 "20th century mind-set of supporting dictators  
6 as long as they are our dictators."

7 The sixth point: back principles  
8 and don't back people. The US must support  
9 principles and not individuals in its push for  
10 reform. While the US should not stop applying  
11 pressure on Egypt and other countries in cases  
12 such as Ayman Nour's or Saad Eddin Ibrahim's  
13 for example, for US commitments to rule of  
14 law, fairness and democracy to be taken  
15 seriously and be more effective, the US must  
16 support the principles of rule of law, due  
17 process and free speech regardless of who the  
18 victims of political oppression are, and not  
19 just when the victims happen to support  
20 Washington.

21 The seventh point regards  
22 supporting reforms that already enjoy broad

1 public domestic support in the region and in  
2 the particular countries. Rather than  
3 pursuing a Washington-centric reform agenda,  
4 the US should support proposals that already  
5 enjoy widespread domestic appeal. For  
6 example, broad segments overwhelmingly in  
7 Egypt support lifting restrictions on forming  
8 political parties, for example, abolishing  
9 military trials for civilians, establishing  
10 presidential term limits, lifting the  
11 emergency law, providing civil society groups  
12 greater freedom, supporting judicial reform  
13 proposed by Egypt's pro-democracy judges in  
14 addition to things like ending torture. These  
15 are basic democratic principles that deserve  
16 our support.

17 Finally, don't pick winners during  
18 Egypt's succession. Egypt will of course  
19 undergo a presidential transition in the  
20 coming period. The US should not be seen as  
21 supporting particular individuals for the  
22 Egyptian presidency. Many in Egypt already

1 believe that the US supports a father-to-son  
2 succession, and they have good reason to think  
3 so. Doing so, however, would be both  
4 dangerous for the United States and  
5 inappropriate. The transition will present  
6 its own challenges and opportunities; and I'm  
7 speaking about the transition in Cairo for the  
8 moment, and the US should be prepared to use  
9 this moment to encourage structural political  
10 reforms such as those mentioned above.

11 There are many more issues to  
12 discuss than the 12 minutes have allowed, or  
13 11 minutes I think I might have taken, and I  
14 would be happy to address some of them in the  
15 question and answer period.

16 Let me end, however, by saying  
17 that Egyptians are increasingly frustrated  
18 with political stagnation, corruption, poor  
19 governance, rising prices-- and for many,  
20 deteriorating economic conditions. US policies  
21 that support comprehensive peace in the  
22 region, democratization and economic

1 prosperity are in our interests as well as the  
2 people in the region. Thank you very much.

3 MS. YACOUBIAN: Good afternoon.

4 First, thank you, Dan, for including me on the  
5 panel. Like Samer, I'm going to begin with a  
6 caveat, which is, it's very difficult, I  
7 think, to talk about Lebanon's complexities.

8 And I hope I can do as succinct a  
9 job as you did, Samer, in the 12 minutes or so  
10 that we have.

11 I was asked or I think all of us  
12 were asked to address two questions, so I'm  
13 going to divide my talk into those two. The  
14 first is kind of an analytic question, which  
15 is, what if any are the major trade-offs  
16 between political reform and domestic  
17 security, in my case in the Lebanese case?  
18 And then I will conclude with my sort of  
19 policy recommendations.

20 Let me give my bottom line up  
21 front. While it may appear that domestic  
22 security and reform are mutually-exclusive

1 goals, I would argue that these are in fact  
2 complementary and mutually reinforcing. You  
3 cannot achieve one without the other. Let me  
4 unpack this a little bit in the Lebanese case.

5 I think at first glance the trade-  
6 offs between political reform and domestic  
7 security in Lebanon appear significant.  
8 Certainly, in the short term, clear tensions  
9 exist. I don't want to reduce my answer to a  
10 commentary on Hezbollah. I think Lebanon's  
11 complexities deserve far more than that, and  
12 yet Hezbollah is the elephant in the room. So  
13 let me dive right in and address it up front.

14 Lebanon is slated to hold  
15 parliamentary elections on June the 7th, and  
16 the militant Shi'ite organization is expected  
17 to fare quite well. As part of a broader  
18 coalition they are likely to win a mandate to  
19 form a unity government. The inherent  
20 contradiction of an armed militia winning free  
21 and transparent elections is obvious and in  
22 some cases one may see or hear echoes of the

1           Palestinian elections in 2006, in which Hamas  
2           did quite well.

3                         Moreover, Hezbollah's democratic  
4           tendencies and its commitment to political  
5           reform are certainly suspect. Hezbollah has  
6           also benefitted tremendously from Lebanon's  
7           weak central government and it does not appear  
8           to have any genuine interest in strengthening  
9           state institutions. Meanwhile, many Lebanese  
10          take great issue with Hezbollah's reckless  
11          decision making, taking Lebanon into war with  
12          Israel in the summer of 2006, and then turning  
13          its arms on its fellow Lebanese this past May.  
14          And of course, Hezbollah maintains its arms in  
15          violation of UN Resolutions 1559 and 1701,  
16          obviously a key point of the contention.

17                        And yet, Hezbollah, with its  
18          deeply-entrenched grassroots support, is  
19          widely recognized as the most credible and  
20          legitimate representative of Lebanon's Shi'ite  
21          community, a community that many believe  
22          constitutes a plurality in Lebanon's volatile

1           confessional mix. Here I think it is  
2           important to consider Hezbollah's dual nature  
3           as both an armed militia qua resistance  
4           movement and a social and political movement  
5           that is deeply rooted in the Shi'ite  
6           community. Hezbollah is viewed as both clean;  
7           that is to say devoid of corruption, and  
8           competent, providing important social services  
9           in the face of an often ineffective Lebanese  
10          state. It is in effect, the most powerful  
11          representative of Lebanon's largest community.  
12          As such, Hezbollah cannot simply be ignored,  
13          ostracized or replaced.

14                        Let me take a step back for a  
15          moment and provide a little bit of historic  
16          background which is unique to Lebanon.

17                        Lebanon is a country that has been  
18          governed by a system of proportional  
19          representation based on the confessional  
20          breakdown of its 18 recognized sets. Power is  
21          currently distributed using a parity ratio  
22          essentially divided equally between Muslims

1 and Christians. Unfortunately, Lebanon's  
2 power sharing agreements, first in the 1943  
3 National Pact and later with the 1989 Taif  
4 Accord, have not always reflected dynamic  
5 shifts in the population. So far attempts to  
6 recalculate Lebanon's power sharing formula  
7 have largely been achieved through violence,  
8 most notably with the 1975 to 1990 civil war.

9           Since Taif, the Shi'ite community  
10 in Lebanon appears to be on the ascendance,  
11 certainly since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000  
12 and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. Indeed, it  
13 suggests the tectonic plates in Lebanon are  
14 shifting, reflecting a new demographic and  
15 political reality. As with other eras in  
16 Lebanese history, there are two ways to  
17 address this shift, through negotiation or  
18 through violence. The current national  
19 dialogue and the upcoming elections hold a  
20 potential for beginning to address these  
21 issues peacefully, and if accompanied by  
22 appropriate reforms, could put Lebanon on the

1 path to peace and stability.

2 As such, the key question is how  
3 to integrate Hezbollah politically and turn it  
4 away from its resistance mode toward being a  
5 fully vested political player-- how to  
6 integrate its armed faction into the Lebanese  
7 national security apparatus. Certainly, this  
8 is not a transformation that can occur  
9 overnight, and yet the answer to this complex  
10 question underscores the long-term reality  
11 that political reform and domestic security in  
12 Lebanon are not contradictory forces. Rather,  
13 they are complementary goals that can  
14 reinforce one another. It is only through  
15 sustained political reform and institution  
16 building that necessarily addresses and de-  
17 conflicts the aspirations and grievances of  
18 all of Lebanon's communities that long-term  
19 domestic security and stability can be  
20 established. Policies bent on  
21 disenfranchising or quashing any one  
22 community-- be it Christian, Sunni, Shia or

1 Druze-- will ensure the continuation of  
2 violence and instability.

3 So let me move very quickly to my  
4 policy recommendations. And here again, let  
5 me underscore that we are talking about an  
6 endeavor that is long term in nature.

7 Essentially, I would call for  
8 nothing short of a paradigm shift vis- -vis US  
9 policy in Lebanon. Following the euphoria of  
10 Lebanon's 2005 Cedar Revolution, US policy  
11 fell far short of helping the Lebanese to  
12 build on that momentous achievement. The US  
13 pursued a policy that essentially sought to  
14 promote one faction over another rather than  
15 helping to lay the ground work for a peaceful  
16 and democratic Lebanon. After months of  
17 political paralysis and violence, Lebanon came  
18 to the precipitous of civil war last May. The  
19 US needs to move away from policies based on  
20 promoting particular factions within Lebanon's  
21 fractious political arena and instead seek to  
22 build a consensus for reform and

1 reconciliation among all Lebanese parties.

2 I would advocate five specific  
3 recommendations.

4 First, I believe we need to  
5 develop a more nuanced understanding of  
6 Hezbollah. Well-crafted policy originates  
7 from nuanced and accurate analysis. I would  
8 make a plea for attempting to seek to  
9 understand better Hezbollah as a movement.  
10 More work needs to be done in order to arrive  
11 at a judgment on the nature of Hezbollah, its  
12 intentions and its long-term objectives.  
13 Under what conditions might Hezbollah evolve  
14 into a fully political actor and integrate its  
15 arms? How would the environment need to  
16 change? To what extent can US policies and  
17 actions in Lebanon encourage this shift?

18 Second, to play a constructive  
19 role in Lebanon, the US must recognize  
20 Lebanon's political and demographic realities.  
21 We should resist the temptation to play  
22 regional proxy wars out on Lebanese soil.

1           Certainly, no one can deny that Iran's  
2           influence, and Syria's, on Hezbollah is  
3           important. But Hezbollah cannot be reduced to  
4           an Iranian proxy. Hezbollah is also a  
5           Lebanese player that represents a key  
6           community. The US must address Lebanon's  
7           evolving confessional makeup.

8                         Third, US policy in Lebanon should  
9           be above the fray. The US policy, as I  
10          mentioned, of supporting one side over another  
11          has not yielded the intended results.

12          Instead, Lebanon has witnessed great  
13          instability and violence since 2005. More  
14          broadly, whenever US policy in Lebanon is  
15          geared toward supporting one faction or  
16          another, the US has not been successful in  
17          achieving its goals. Rather, it ends up  
18          getting sucked into the morass of Lebanese  
19          politics.

20                        Fourth, US efforts should be  
21          focused on institution building, strengthening  
22          the state and political reconciliation through

1 dialogue. The US should specifically seek to  
2 strengthen state institutions such as the  
3 parliament, armed forces, the judiciary. Last  
4 year as part of the Doha Accord a new  
5 electoral law was passed. It achieved some  
6 important reforms, but more significant reform  
7 is necessary to help move Lebanon from a  
8 system of feudal politics to a modern  
9 democracy. Ultimately, Lebanon will need to  
10 move away from its confessional system. The  
11 road map for this shift is laid out in the  
12 Taif Accord, and the US should seek to promote  
13 reforms that place Lebanon squarely on this  
14 path.

15 Finally, I would advocate that we  
16 engage with Syria. The US needs to adopt a  
17 policy of engagement with Syria for several  
18 reasons, among them the promotion of stability  
19 in Lebanon. Ultimately, Syria's long-standing  
20 interests in Lebanon have to be acknowledged.  
21 But let me very clear. This recognition does  
22 not translate into a ceding of Lebanese

1 sovereignty. Specifically, the US should  
2 encourage the continuation of the  
3 normalization of ties between Syria and  
4 Lebanon. The Syrians opened their embassy in  
5 Beirut this past week. The next more  
6 important, perhaps more difficult step will be  
7 the demarcation of borders and addressing the  
8 numerous bilateral treaties governing  
9 relations that were signed during the period  
10 of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.

11 Taken together, I would advocate  
12 that these five steps may help to reconcile  
13 the apparent contradictions between security  
14 and reform, and place Lebanon on the path  
15 toward peace and stability.

16 MR. NAWAZ: Thank you, Dan. It's  
17 a pleasure being here and seeing so many  
18 familiar faces. I hope I don't end up  
19 repeating things that you've already heard me  
20 say, including yesterday.

21 But I was brought into this study  
22 once it had been launched because Larry

1 Diamond and Frank Fukuyama decided that the  
2 Islamic world really needed to encompass  
3 Pakistan as well, and so a new definition  
4 emerged. And I was pleased because as I  
5 participated in the group I discovered what  
6 I'm discovering even now listening to my two  
7 colleagues here, that many of the lessons that  
8 can be drawn from the region, particularly for  
9 US policy, are quite common and similar.

10 And so my attempt as part of this  
11 study was to address the question, is history  
12 going to repeat itself? And this was couched  
13 in terms of the US-Pakistan relationship.

14 But when we look at security and  
15 reform, as Dan also emphasized, the issue is  
16 not simply external relationships. The real  
17 keys to long-term security are internal issues  
18 and what countries are willing to do  
19 themselves and what the United States is  
20 willing to help countries achieve over the  
21 long run. So if I were to cite my bottom line  
22 up front, there needs to be a shift of the

1 United States from a transactional  
2 relationship to a strategic long-term  
3 relationship.

4 And just to give you a very quick  
5 history of the US-Pakistan relationship--  
6 because obviously these details are far too  
7 long to compress in such a short period-- but  
8 it's akin to a roller coaster with its ups and  
9 downs, and there are periods of intense  
10 friendship or ostensible friendship, which are  
11 primarily guided by the United States' own  
12 strategic interests and not taking into  
13 account what Pakistan's strategic interests  
14 are. And these began in the early 1950s, in  
15 1954 with a Defense Pact, which is basically  
16 designed to help the United States protect the  
17 oil fields of Iran and Iraq against any Soviet  
18 advances towards the south.

19 Well that didn't last very long,  
20 because Pakistan's interest was not so much as  
21 fighting the communists as it was to fight  
22 India. And so the Pakistanis took advantage

1 of US aid and largesse and basically doubled  
2 and tripled their army over time. And most of  
3 the new containments or military reservations  
4 that they built were facing the Indian border,  
5 but the US went along with that. So this was  
6 a relationship between willing adults and it  
7 was also described by one US diplomat as an  
8 elaborate hoax.

9 Then you had the 1958 coup, under  
10 which a civilian president told the US  
11 ambassador four days before that he was going  
12 to impose martial law. And the Secretary of  
13 State, John Foster Dulles, crafted a very  
14 carefully-worded cable which went back to say  
15 "yes, please tell him that we support  
16 democracy, et cetera, but we are willing to  
17 live with deviation for a short period of time  
18 if it's necessary." So this became the kind  
19 of mantra and the kind of guiding force.

20 Then comes the 1965 period when  
21 Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir,  
22 and suddenly Pakistan, which was totally

1 dependent on US aid, found that all its aid  
2 was cut off. And so Pakistan had assumed that  
3 it would get United States help when it got  
4 into a battle with India, but the US read that  
5 agreement very differently.

6 In 1971, things had changed a  
7 little bit because the Pakistanis had put  
8 pressure on the US to actually issue a letter  
9 saying that if Pakistan was attacked by any  
10 country, not just the communists, that the US  
11 would come to its aid. And so we have this  
12 very interesting scene with Henry Kissinger in  
13 the White House briefing President Nixon and  
14 saying that "the people at State tell me that  
15 there's a piece of a paper, but they're still  
16 looking for it."

17 So the point that I want to make  
18 is that unless you have a long-term historical  
19 view of the relationship, new administrations  
20 will come into Washington and continue making  
21 the same old mistakes. I illustrated this for  
22 our group at USIP with just a very brief

1 reference to how we look at time in Pakistan.  
2 We have the word "kul" which means yesterday,  
3 and it means tomorrow, but it's not bound by  
4 24 hours. Tomorrow could be day after  
5 tomorrow, next month, next year or maybe never  
6 in shala bukra. The same when you say "kul"  
7 meaning the past, it could be a decade or it  
8 could be a century. So when you talk to  
9 Pakistan, particularly on the street, they  
10 remember the events of 1950s and the '60s and  
11 '70s as if they actually happened yesterday.  
12 They have very fresh memories, and therefore  
13 they're extremely unwilling to support any  
14 government that is willing to tie itself to  
15 the United States.

16 So this brings us to the period  
17 that we were reviewing, 2003 and beyond.  
18 Actually 2001 when President Musharraf, who  
19 was all and all in Pakistan, without  
20 consulting anyone, on the basis of a  
21 completely concocted story that the United  
22 States was going to bomb Pakistan back into

1 the Stone Age-- never happened-- he made a  
2 decision and then told his co-commanders that  
3 this is what he had heard that the US was  
4 going to do. And there was no proof that the  
5 United States had actually made that threat.

6 Now the relationship with  
7 Musharraf exemplifies the kind of support that  
8 the United States gives rulers in the Islamic  
9 world. Dan had already mentioned the idea of  
10 autocrats. In Musharraf, the United States  
11 found a liberal autocrat. This was a man who  
12 talked of enlightened moderation, who talked  
13 about Western-oriented, talked about being  
14 against the Islamist resurgents and militants,  
15 a partner in the war on terror and so on, but  
16 a man who also was willing to make deals with  
17 the Islamic parties in order to get past the  
18 17th amendment of Pakistan's constitution,  
19 which allowed him to assume super powers,  
20 transform and basically hijack a parliamentary  
21 democracy into a presidential autocratic  
22 system. And the United States was silent.

1                   The people of Pakistan went along  
2                   with that, but then when Musharraf had his  
3                   self-inflicted wounds in 2007 when he removed  
4                   the supreme court chief justice and civil  
5                   society coalesced around that movement, the  
6                   United States again remained silent. There  
7                   was no talk about restoring the rule of law or  
8                   restoring the constitution. It just remained  
9                   mum. And the people of Pakistan recall that,  
10                  and still remember that vividly. As a result,  
11                  when elections were held and the army, which  
12                  is a very powerful player in Pakistan's  
13                  political scene, decided that it would sit it  
14                  out, that it would only ensure the security of  
15                  elections, you found a remarkable turnaround.  
16                  The Islamists got defeated, none of the  
17                  Islamic parties really had any decent showing,  
18                  and you had a return of the two most popular  
19                  parties, both of whose leaders had been sent  
20                  into exile, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and  
21                  Nawaz Sharif. Of course Prime Minister Bhutto  
22                  had been given a very warm US embrace before

1 she went back. And so she arrived in the  
2 country as the "American candidate," and it  
3 was a death foretold. And it was a tragic  
4 event for Pakistan because it produced  
5 turmoil, and that turmoil still persists.

6 So against this background and  
7 this history, let me just quickly share with  
8 you my suggestions.

9 First of all, both the United  
10 States and Pakistan have to learn from this  
11 experience, from this history. Within  
12 Pakistan-- and this is the critical part, the  
13 internal reform process, the political reform  
14 process must continue. And this means ceding  
15 the powers of the center to the provinces so  
16 that you don't have the kind of centrifugal  
17 forces that are created by the centralization  
18 of power in Islamabad. You need to bring  
19 Balochistan, the northwest frontier province,  
20 and Sindh along with the Punjab so that  
21 they're all in agreement on what kind of  
22 Pakistan they want it to be.

1                   The army has to withdraw to the  
2                   barracks, and some of the new signs from the  
3                   new army chief, General Kayani, indicate that  
4                   he wants to take the army back to the barracks  
5                   and to convert it into a professional force  
6                   again. But we've heard this particular tune  
7                   before. And things change. And as chaos  
8                   ensues, and particularly when you have  
9                   pressure on Pakistan from the eastern border,  
10                  as well as the militancy and insurgency which  
11                  is staining, not just the federally-  
12                  administered tribal area, but also parts of  
13                  the settled area, you're likely to find people  
14                  turning back to the army to give it some  
15                  stability. That would be a step backward.

16                  An important thing to recognize,  
17                  and this is relevant to some of the discussion  
18                  of the rest of the Muslim world, is that  
19                  Pakistan somehow managed to temper the rise of  
20                  Islamic militancy by allowing Islamic parties  
21                  to actually participate in its political  
22                  system. And I think this has created a rather

1 interesting tension between the militants and  
2 the relatively moderate Islamic parties by  
3 making them part and parcel of the political  
4 process and giving them ownership.

5 So the final lesson for the United  
6 States really is to recognize that whoever is  
7 elected in a democratic manner will get the  
8 United States's support, that it's the people  
9 of Pakistan that the United States will have  
10 the relationship with and not any individual,  
11 nor any party. And certainly not to favor the  
12 military over the civil, because protracted  
13 military rule has stunted civilian  
14 institutions and the political system within  
15 Pakistan.

16 So that's the bottom line, and I'm  
17 sure we'll have questions. I'd be glad to  
18 answer them. Thank you.

19 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Remarkably,  
20 we have a good 20 minutes for discussions. I  
21 can only thank the group for adhering so  
22 scrupulously. I feel almost a little guilty.

1 Perhaps I was too rough on you.

2 MR. NAWAZ: You're the liberal  
3 autocrat.

4 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: I'm the  
5 liberal autocrat.

6 I want to say that listening to  
7 the presentation one of the things that  
8 becomes clear is the extent of the absence of  
9 long-term strategic thinking about the  
10 democracy promotion agenda itself and the  
11 way this agenda was somehow invented on the  
12 cuff. It is not an easy challenge for any  
13 administration to think long term about this  
14 agenda, but it's absolutely critical that  
15 there be long term thinking, strategizing, and  
16 a kind of consistency which all three panel  
17 members have reminded us has been absent in  
18 our approach to this question of democracy and  
19 democracy and security.

20 I might also add very quickly that  
21 another project that we've had at USIP in  
22 tandem with the study group is a project

1 looking at our political opposition and  
2 particularly the relationship between  
3 Islamists and secularists, in the Middle East  
4 in particular. Arab autocracy, and to some  
5 extent we've seen aspects of this in Pakistan,  
6 are kind of protection rackets which offer  
7 certain groups protection, particularly from  
8 Islamists, and the Islamist threat is  
9 exaggerated domestically as well as regionally  
10 and internationally and make the case for  
11 sustaining autocracy.

12 One way of undermining this  
13 process is to promote real dialogue between  
14 Islamists and secularists by which they can  
15 discover perhaps, hopefully, common interests  
16 and a common agenda. We have promoted that  
17 kind of a dialogue through meetings in Morocco  
18 and in Egypt as well.

19 Anyway, I think we'll open it up  
20 to discussions here. You may want to have a  
21 question that is focused on one particular  
22 case, or you may have a broader question. But

1 please make your questions as succinct as  
2 possible. We'll start here and work our way  
3 back; one the ambassador, two Tony, three.

4 Yes.

5 PARTICIPANT: My question is for  
6 Dr. Shehata. It seems to me --

7 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Microphone.  
8 Yes, wait, we do have --

9 PARTICIPANT: Sorry. My question  
10 is for Dr. Shehata. In your presentation you  
11 focused on the central role of the Arab-  
12 Israeli conflict and opening space for the  
13 opposition in Egyptian politics. I was  
14 wondering if you could talk about the point of  
15 view of the Egyptian opposition toward the  
16 conflict, particularly the Brotherhood, and  
17 maybe contrast that point of view with that of  
18 the regime, the position on the conflict.  
19 Thank you.

20 DR. SHEHATA: Okay. Well, one of  
21 the interesting things-- and the way I'll  
22 answer the question, which Cory could have

1           asked me at any time at Georgetown-- but  
2           that's okay, I'll answer it here briefly.

3                         One of the interesting things  
4           about the recent situation actually is I've  
5           been following the Egyptian opposition and  
6           particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's  
7           reactions to the Gaza conflict. And it's  
8           quite fascinating to look at the statements  
9           and the radicalization of the position taken  
10          by the Muslim Brotherhood from the very  
11          beginning of the Gaza conflict towards the end  
12          of December, as opposed to the position that  
13          not only the Muslim Brotherhood but wide  
14          segments of the Egyptian public are taking  
15          now, two weeks into the conflict.

16                        At the beginning of the conflict,  
17          the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other  
18          groups, called for -- there was quite a great  
19          deal of criticism not only towards Israel and  
20          the United States, but also towards the  
21          Egyptian regime, of course, of not allowing  
22          humanitarian and medical supplies into Gaza

1 and restricting the passage into Rafah and  
2 also because of President Mubarak's statement  
3 that the border crossing would not be opened  
4 until Fatah controlled either the border or  
5 the West Bank.

6 So initially, the calls or the  
7 statements were for the immediate efforts of  
8 Egypt, as well as the Arab leaders, to bring  
9 an end to the violence, an immediate cessation  
10 of the violence. There was criticism of  
11 Israel and the United States, and there was a  
12 call to open the border crossing for  
13 humanitarian and medical supplies.

14 That contrasts quite significantly  
15 from the statement that I received yesterday  
16 directly from the Muslim Brotherhood, as well  
17 as many other opposition groups in Egypt,  
18 including secular intellectuals which called  
19 on the freezing of the Camp David Accords. In  
20 other words, the positions vary depending on  
21 what's going on on the ground. The  
22 Brotherhood's official position with regard to

1 Israel has always been not to tear up the Camp  
2 David Accord, but to open it to a referendum  
3 that the Egyptian people should then decide.  
4 So their position is much more reasonable than  
5 it has been characterized by many observers,  
6 I think. And maybe I'll stop there for the  
7 moment.

8 PARTICIPANT: First, despite my  
9 disagreement with many things you have said,  
10 Mona, I fully agree with all your conclusions.  
11 At least you have offered a sophisticated,  
12 nuanced analysis of the situation in one  
13 particular Arab country.

14 The big question is the following:  
15 I'm not sure if this should be addressed to  
16 Mona or to Samer.

17 Mr. Brumberg, contrary to what you  
18 said, every internationally-conducted opinion  
19 survey in the Arab world has indicated  
20 consistently in the past 10 years that the  
21 overwhelming majority of the Arab people would  
22 support the policies of so-called rogue

1 regimes and extremists-- I mean, by the US  
2 administration.

3 Only six months ago, the  
4 University of Maryland conducted public  
5 opinion survey in six so-called moderate Arab  
6 countries; this is so important, Morocco,  
7 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, United Arab  
8 Emirates and Jordan, in which 92 percent of  
9 the people supported the Iranian position on  
10 nuclear technology. When they were asked who  
11 were the most respected Arab leader, number  
12 one came Hasan Nasrallah, number two came the  
13 president of the rogue state of Syria, number  
14 three came the Prince of Dubai, which is an  
15 indicator that first and foremost they thought  
16 of the nationalistic causes and then they  
17 thought of the good governments. But those  
18 were the three leaders that were elected as  
19 the most respected by the Egyptians, the  
20 Saudis, the Jordanians, the Moroccans and the  
21 Lebanese. This is so important.

22 The question is the following:

1           Mona has just said that she expects in the  
2           forthcoming elections in Lebanon to have,  
3           probably; it's a hypothesis, a government led  
4           by a coalition in which Hezbollah is the  
5           largest partner. If the United States will  
6           follow exactly the example given by President  
7           Bush and impose sanctions on Lebanon  
8           immediately, the very same day they elect such  
9           a government, just as happened with Hamas,  
10          then what do we expect if the same happens in  
11          Egypt, in Algeria, in Morocco, in Syria? Will  
12          we end up with a whole variety of Arab regimes  
13          under severe extreme sanctions by the United  
14          States of America? Or do you think this will  
15          be very different because we will have a  
16          different administration?

17                   MS. YACOUBIAN: Well again, I  
18           think partially what happens at the Lebanese  
19           elections is certainly speculation, but I do  
20           think, as I said, there's a good chance that  
21           there will be Hezbollah participation in the  
22           government. And it's hard to know, and I'm

1 not sure I can speculate on how an Obama  
2 administration would respond to that, but it's  
3 my sense that isolation, as I said, does not  
4 necessarily produce the intended results. Nor  
5 do I think one can actually compare Lebanon.  
6 Remember this is, as you know, very well, Mr.  
7 Ambassador, multi-confessional --

8 (Off-mic comment.)

9 MS. YACOUBIAN: Oh, well.

10 DR. SHEHATA: Well, I mean, you  
11 know, to answer your question directly, I  
12 don't think many of us on the USIP Reform and  
13 Security Team applaud it or endorsed American  
14 policy towards the Middle East with regard to  
15 this particular question. I certainly believe  
16 that democracy, by its very nature, produces  
17 unknown outcomes. And if you are a democrat,  
18 you have to accept the unknown outcomes as  
19 long as the basic institutions are in place  
20 that require and maintain the principles of  
21 democracy. And therefore, I certainly thought  
22 that the US was incredibly misguided in terms

1 of cutting off or isolating the Palestinians  
2 after the January 26th elections, which were  
3 by all international standards, free and fair.

4 I would also say that it was a  
5 tremendous mistake, again, to reduce pressure  
6 on Egypt or to stop encouraging Egyptian  
7 reform, to be polite, after the Muslim  
8 Brotherhood performed well in Egyptian  
9 elections in November and December 2005. I  
10 don't know if the disagreement is as maybe  
11 severe as it's made out to be.

12 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Yes, and I  
13 would, if I may, just very quickly add to  
14 this. I'm not worried or surprised when I  
15 hear that the polls would show that Nasrallah  
16 is a hero. It just reminds us-- and we've  
17 seen this in dealing with our Arab Opposition  
18 Project-- to the extent to which the enduring  
19 nature of conflicts in the region, whether  
20 it's been Israel and Palestine or more broadly  
21 speaking before populous forces in the United  
22 States, sucks the oxygen out of the air and

1 allows for more radical forces basically to  
2 set the agenda. So this is one reason why  
3 it's important to address the security agenda  
4 and the peace agenda in tandem with the reform  
5 agenda, the two together.

6           Anyway, we only have about six  
7 minutes left, so I've got Tony and then the  
8 gentleman here, and I believe Andrew and then  
9 Trudy?

10           Yes, Trudy, did you have your hand  
11 up there?

12           Okay. We may have to call it quits at  
13 that point. We'll see how things go.

14           Tony?

15           TONY: Yes, very briefly, and this  
16 already --

17           Yes. My wife says my voice is  
18 loud enough to talk without a microphone, but  
19 I'll use it here.

20           I have a hypothesis-- and all of  
21 the panelists have really sort of touched on  
22 it or dealt with it, without making it totally

1 explicit-- and then I have a brief question.

2 The hypothesis is anywhere that an  
3 honest, truly honest, truly democratic  
4 election is held today in the Arab world, and  
5 Shuja, Pakistan may be -- not the Arab world,  
6 but maybe an exception to this. But anywhere  
7 in the Arab world, almost certainly Islamists  
8 of some form or another or going to either win  
9 or at least do very well.

10 I'd like to have the panel's  
11 reaction to that, but perhaps more importantly  
12 my follow-on question is if that is the case,  
13 should there not be in Washington some very  
14 careful reconsideration of what we're doing or  
15 not doing in engaging directly with Islamist  
16 movements that come in various hues and have  
17 disagreements within themselves; in other  
18 words, a fundamental perhaps rethinking of our  
19 sort of long-standing now boycott of talks  
20 with such movements?

21 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Well, I will  
22 only say that in many respects the boycott of

1 Islamism movements is more the exception than  
2 the rule. We look at a lot of Arab states and  
3 we look beyond the Arab world. We are  
4 engaging Islamists all the time, and Islamists  
5 are key players in a lot of our democracy  
6 promotion strategies. And often when we look  
7 at this problem, it focuses on Egypt and there  
8 we have a boycott, but it's not necessarily  
9 the case.

10 But anyway, why don't I turn it to  
11 my colleagues and then I'm going to let the  
12 three other remaining questioners put their  
13 questions and then we'll just take them and  
14 wrap up, because we are under pressure to  
15 conclude. So please jump in.

16 MS. YACoubIAN: Just a very brief  
17 response. I mean, first, I think it's unclear  
18 in cases where Islamists are not permitted to  
19 participate exactly how well they'll do. I  
20 mean, on some level because they're not  
21 permitted to participate, there may actually  
22 even be an exaggerated sense of how well

1           they'll do. So let's put that out there  
2           first.

3                           But that being said, no doubt for  
4           reasons that perhaps you're familiar,  
5           Islamists do fairly well in open elections.  
6           And in paper that I've written, I would argue  
7           that yes, we need to very much rethink a  
8           policy of responding in a knee-jerk fashion to  
9           all Islamist parties. You know, my word here  
10          is "nuance." It's essential to inject nuance  
11          and to understand that these parties are also  
12          capable of evolving. And I would submit to  
13          that political participation breeds some  
14          amount of evolution and moderation, and  
15          therefore its in our long-term interests for  
16          them be included in the political process.  
17          Understanding that we're talking by and large  
18          about moderate Islamist parties that eschew  
19          violence. The Lebanese and Palestinian cases  
20          are I think a bit different for many reasons.  
21          And I'll stop at that.

22                           MODERATOR BRUMBERG: I have been

1 given the two-minute warning and I'm afraid  
2 that we're going to have to take these  
3 questions and then wrap up. So very quickly.  
4 Obviously, I'm going to ignore the two-minute  
5 warning and go on for four minutes. Please.

6 PARTICIPANT: I have a question  
7 for Shuja. In the Afghan, we're fighting  
8 against Soviet troops and they were the  
9 enemies' occupying forces, but they were --  
10 but the Mujahideen, they were Afghan but  
11 Mujahideen. Know the Afghans are fighting is  
12 NATO troops and now they are called  
13 terrorists, but they are the same Afghans.  
14 Can you draw some parallel what are the  
15 difference here?

16 And also from my friend from  
17 Egypt, I will say that how far is the  
18 parliament relevant in Egypt? And if the  
19 recommendations he's making, if he takes these  
20 recommendations to Hosni Mubarak, how he would  
21 respond to his recommendations?

22 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Andrew and

1 Trudy?

2 TRUDY: And my question is -- oh,  
3 sorry.

4 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: That's okay,  
5 Trudy. Go ahead and then Andrew.

6 TRUDY: My question is to Shuja.  
7 The United States is an 800-pound gorilla in  
8 Pakistan by virtue of enormous amounts of  
9 military aid and now proposed by still-Senator  
10 Biden much more non-economic aid. Do you  
11 think that those two parts of aid should or  
12 could be used to try to ensure that democratic  
13 government remains?

14 ANDREW: Hi, my question is for  
15 Samer.

16 The US is pursuing peace between  
17 Israel and Syria at the moment to promote  
18 security in the region, and at the same time  
19 has a policy of promoting, for lack of a  
20 better word, democratization or political  
21 liberalization, or whatever. Samer, based on  
22 what happened in Egypt how would a treaty

1           likely affect political reform based on what  
2           we learned from Egypt-- I mean, if you were to  
3           hypothesize? And what lessons can be learned  
4           so that we could possibly help achieve both?

5                     DR. SHEHATA: How would a treat  
6           between Syria and Israel?

7                     ANDREW: And Israel effect  
8           political reform in --

9                     MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Let's imagine  
10          this is a presidential debate. Each of you  
11          has 30 seconds to answer and then we'll have  
12          to wrap up, obviously.

13                    DR. SHEHATA: Sure, I will take 30  
14          seconds or less.

15                    I think it wouldn't be unfair to  
16          characterize the Egyptian parliament like many  
17          parliaments under authoritarian regimes as  
18          being to largely rubber stamp institutions.  
19          In Egypt we have an imperial presidency, and  
20          a president who's been in power for 27-plus  
21          years. That being said, however, it has been  
22          remarkable to see certain political

1 institutions which have a venerable and quite  
2 long history in Egypt, like the supreme  
3 constitutional court, make decisions that are  
4 democratic in nature and uphold the rule of  
5 law.

6 Also, interestingly enough, those  
7 political movements in Egypt that are seeking  
8 in the most energetic terms to make the  
9 parliament as an -- the democratic institution  
10 relevant has been the Muslim Brotherhood.

11 With regard to the question about  
12 what would Mubarak say, President Mubarak say  
13 to the recommendations, I think, you know, one  
14 of the first lessons of political science is  
15 that autocratic regimes do not give up power  
16 easily or willingly. They do not put  
17 themselves out of business, you know,  
18 themselves. And so there would be no question  
19 that I think many of the measures that I have  
20 put forward would be rejected. I don't think  
21 that's the point. The point is the vast  
22 majority of Egyptians have called for these

1 positions which are basic and fundamental, I  
2 think, to the principles of good governance,  
3 transparency, accountability and political  
4 participation.

5 MS. YACoubIAN: I'm going to cede  
6 my 30 seconds to Shuja.

7 MR. NAWAZ: Thank you. In  
8 response to Dr. Chowdry (phonetic), this is a  
9 reflection of the transactional relationship  
10 that the United States has had, this change in  
11 the stance vis- -vis the same people that once  
12 fought alongside the US against the Soviets.  
13 But I would go to what Mona was suggesting,  
14 that there needs to be a nuanced approach in  
15 dealing with even the militant Islamists. You  
16 can isolate the extreme militants by talking  
17 to the less-extreme ones and bring them on  
18 board.

19 And in fact, just yesterday when  
20 we were talking at the release of our Fatah  
21 report at CIS, we talked about the Madrassa  
22 Reform Project. That's one way of engaging

1 the breeding grounds for this kind of  
2 potential militancy, to make people aware that  
3 you can have a much broader education and it  
4 will help you rather than simply confining  
5 yourself to a very narrow band.

6 In response to Trudy, yes, I think  
7 the shift away from building military aid and  
8 aid primarily for support of the Afghan  
9 initiative is going to be very helpful,  
10 because Biden-Luger is not solely confined to  
11 the border region. The most important part of  
12 that is that it will allow people in the rest  
13 of Pakistan over a long period of time. So  
14 this is 10 years. So this the Pakistani  
15 "kul," you know, the future at work. And when  
16 they see this long-term engagement and  
17 economic development taking place over the  
18 long run with US help, that's likely to have  
19 much more effective results than what's been  
20 happening in the past.

21 MODERATOR BRUMBERG: Thank you  
22 very much. I have been asked to just quickly

1            mention that there is a meeting about to take  
2            place on Afghanistan to which you're all  
3            invited right next door in the ballroom.

4                        Thanks very much for a very rich  
5            discussion in a very short amount of time.

6                        It's upstairs.

7                        Thank you very much.

8                        (Whereupon, the panel was  
9            concluded at 4:17 p.m.)

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