

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Suite 200
1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-3011

+ + + + +

PASSING THE BATON

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

+ + + + +

THURSDAY
JANUARY 8, 2009

+ + + + +

PANEL 4: 11:15-12:15 A.M.
CONFRONTING OR ENGAGING IRAN?

+ + + + +

Room 204 AB
Walter E. Washington Convention Center
801 Mount Vernon Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

PANELISTS:

DANIEL BRUMBERG
QAMAR-UL HUDA

SUZANNE MALONEY
AVNER COHEN
WILLIAM LUERS

MODERATED BY FRANK WISNER

This transcript done from audio provided
by the United States Institute of Peace.

T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

Opening Remarks

Frank Wisner 3

Iranian Clergy

Qamar-ul Huda. 4

Relationship between Domestic Scene to the
Framework for Engagement

Suzanne Maloney. 13

The Nuclear Issue Regarding Iran

Avner Cohen. 26

A Solution for the US-Iran Nuclear Standoff

(Article preview)

William Luers. 34

Remarks, Questions and Answers. 48

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 11:15 a.m.

3 MODERATOR WISNER: Good morning.

4 My name is Frank Wisner and I've been asked,
5 a great honor indeed, to organize the panel
6 for a discussion this morning. Rather than
7 take any more time and then lose the valuable
8 time available to us, I suggest we settle down
9 and begin our discussion.

10 We have four speakers this
11 morning. They will speak in the order set out
12 in your program on page two. Qamar-ul Huda
13 will lead, Suzanne Maloney will follow both to
14 discuss the internal dynamics in Iran and how
15 those dynamics affect the policy
16 considerations that we as Americans, that the
17 new administration will have to take on board
18 as we proceed to design our relationship with
19 Iran. Avner Cohen will be with us, apparently
20 several minutes late. And Bill Luers will
21 wrap up the presentation. I hope that we will
22 have a good 15 to 20 minutes so that I can

1 take your questions on board and perhaps if
2 they're organizing themes, sum those up at the
3 end of the morning's events.

4 But let me welcome all of you on
5 what is a terrific occasion, a subject that
6 will be of enormous importance to all of us,
7 Iran, how to deal with this troubled complex
8 relationship.

9 And with that as an opening
10 introduction, Qamar-ul Huda, would you take
11 over? You can either speak from the podium or
12 you can speak sitting down.

13 MR. HUDA: Thank you very much.
14 Good morning. My talk will specifically deal
15 with the Iranian clergy and my encounters with
16 the Grand Ayatollahs and particularly certain
17 clergy who I think are important names,

18 reformers, conservatives, pro-Western, and
19 also names that we should know.

20 I traveled to Iran last year; I
21 will be traveling there shortly. And one of
22 the things I noticed immediately is how we as

1 Americans have a clear disadvantage of
2 understanding Iran, Iran's clergy class and
3 its influence in understanding most basic
4 things, not just realpolitik, regional
5 politics, ethics, war, but almost on every
6 level we don't understand or think about the
7 influence of the clergy and their own
8 assessment and mapping of world affairs.

9 Just traveling to Iran one notices
10 on the airplane the number of Europeans and
11 Asians traveling to Iran on a daily basis.
12 That's just a footnote. But I do want to just
13 say that since when we do assess nations and
14 the bilateral relations, the religion and
15 religious leaders are usually not on the first
16 three or four items to discuss or analyze.
17 But with the case of Iran, the religious
18 leaders are in track one, track two and every
19 other track. And it's important to understand
20 the diversity of religious leaders, the
21 diversity of thought, the internal debate, the
22 sporadic skirmishes, theological as well as

1 sometimes physical, and also understand the
2 sort of historical importance of these
3 different debates.

4 Because of time, I'm just going to
5 mention three very important names. I think
6 American policy makers, Americans and
7 generally academics and scholars should know
8 because of their influence in domestic
9 politics and regional politics.

10 The first of course is Montazeri
11 who is one of Khomeini's colleagues and he was
12 appointed to high levels as the Committee on
13 Experts on the Supreme Council and one of --
14 an important thinker who was very much
15 interested in advocating political activists
16 Shi'i Islam. The second, Grand Aytollah
17 Musavi, Ardebili Musavi and a third is Karimi.

18 The reason I picked these three is
19 because we happened to not only meet these
20 different individuals on our trip last year,
21 but we hope to continue with our meetings, but
22 also I think they reflect a great deal of

1 diversity and internal debate. One of the
2 reasons my team at USIP went to Iran was to
3 explore the sort of non-dominant rhetoric
4 internally on how they view themselves, how
5 they assess conflict and war, how do they
6 understand their neighbors, and of course
7 Americans and American Muslims.

8 We found out quickly that there
9 was no consensus. We found out quickly there
10 was more internal debate than we imagined. We
11 found in very quickly that there was a very
12 strong culture of mocking the current
13 president at every level, not just at the
14 Grand Ayatollah level, but at the level of
15 seminary students, professors, human rights
16 activists and so forth. So because I think
17 the image we see and what's manufactured is
18 this one president speaks for the entire
19 nation and there's total agreement with his
20 ideas.

21 A few words on Ayatollah
22 Montazeri. As of now he's under house arrest

1 and he's amongst still a leading thinker. He
2 was arrested in 1997 by the supreme leader
3 himself who arrested him and told him he can
4 no longer have access to the public, but he
5 has over thousands of thousands of students,
6 seminarians, authors, human rights, as well as
7 feminists, progressives and others who think
8 that he has some interesting ideas. And he
9 has made an entire 180-degree shift from being
10 a part of the Khomeini's regime, being part of
11 the Assembly of the Experts, for supporting
12 the idea that there's a (inaudible), a figure
13 that the religious scholars must govern the
14 state. He has said publicly in the '90s that
15 there's no need for a theocracy, the religious
16 scholars do not need to lead, the religious
17 leaders should not direct the destiny of the
18 state. He has said publicly that there has
19 been major political and theological,
20 political philosophical problems with Iran
21 since the revolution. He's retracted his
22 statements in support of Khomeini. He's also

1 retracted his statements about political
2 authority by the religious leaders. Since
3 those statements, he was arrested and even
4 then he has in a sense created a ripple effect
5 of thinking about politics, political
6 philosophy, involvement, activism and
7 relationships with neighbors and the West.

8 So for nine years he was
9 responsible for the academic and personal
10 being of foreign students and he also has --
11 his influence with just Iranian students, but
12 Arab seminarians, and Afghan, Pakistani, South
13 Asian seminarians, Central Asian and Southeast
14 Asians. He was part of the Revolution Council
15 and he was also part of many other supreme
16 leader positions, positions that supported the
17 supreme leader.

18 His house arrest has caused a
19 great deal of others to think about the need
20 of re-shifting Shi'i activism, rethinking the
21 idea of preparing the state for a holy moment,
22 or for the Holy Messiah, and really

1 questioning the authority of apocalyptic Shi'i
2 theology, which has basically been dominant
3 for about 40 years.

4 I will turn to Ardebili, Grand
5 Ayatollah Ardebili who was designated as the
6 head of the supreme court under Khomeini. He
7 was also a major jurist afterwards, very
8 common to come on TV to give his positions on
9 certain issues. And the reason I pick him is
10 because one would think that from the '80s,
11 his time from 1981 to 1991 as the chief of the
12 justice, that one would see him as a very
13 conservative person. But when we met him and
14 interviewed him, we found out he was more than
15 just this figure in history books who has
16 written dozens of books on jurisprudence. But
17 he advocated for women's rights, he advocated
18 for minority rights, advocated for those who
19 are not believers. He called non-believers,
20 or believers who don't know, was his exact
21 quote. He advocated for students,
22 particularly seminary students to study other

1 than theology, to study the sciences. He has
2 set up his own university that does this very
3 thing. He has a liberal arts college. He
4 calls it the first liberal arts college in
5 Iran, and it's based in Qom, the center of
6 religious studies.

7 Another figure I think that's very
8 important in terms of policy is Grand
9 Ayatollah Karimi who is very conservative and
10 probably not as conservative as another figure
11 called Mezbah Yazdi. But the point is I bring
12 these two figures up at the end because they
13 still are probably the same rhetoric from
14 1979, 1980, 1982, and you know, some of the
15 rhetoric we hear today of anti-Western, anti-
16 Zionist and so forth. Imperial West is bound
17 to destroy all of Iran or other states. But
18 what's important to them is the way they're
19 interested in still opening relations. You
20 ask them questions about war, about Iraq, what
21 would it take to prevent war. They say we
22 have to do as much as possible for preventing

1 war. We have to have more dialogue. They
2 speak about diplomatic channels. They speak
3 about track two, of course. They talk about
4 military channels.

5 I think what I wanted to say is
6 that these last two figures, Mezbah Yazdi and
7 Karimi, while their rhetoric is the things we
8 hear, in closed doors they do want relations.
9 In closed doors they do want to find a way for
10 diplomatic relations. And I think even if
11 that doesn't translate in policy or in foreign
12 policy of Iran, it is transferring into their
13 seminary students, thousands of supporters and
14 also the influence it has in the human rights
15 group.

16 I have one more minute left, but
17 one person that cannot be dismissed is Grand
18 Ayatollah Sanei, who is very important. And
19 all of these Grand Ayatollahs have web sites,
20 web sites in about five or six languages.
21 Sanei is the most important I think for
22 progressives. Human rights groups, feminist

1 groups, to reformers all turn to the Grand
2 Ayatollah Sanei for supporting and using
3 religious authority for progressive Iran, for
4 human rights, for reforming education, for
5 women's rights, et cetera.

6 I'll stop there, but the point
7 being I think that the clergy class not only
8 has to be more understood, but has to be
9 engaged. And I think it would be a very
10 important way to opening diplomatic channels.

11 Thank you.

12 MODERATOR WISNER: Suzanne?

13 MS. MALONEY: Thank you,
14 Ambassador Wisner and thank you to the US --
15 the mic's not on.

16 I was going to apologize for
17 giving this talk while seated, because the
18 only thing more daunting than trying to talk
19 about Iranian politics in 10 to 12 minutes or
20 less is trying to do it when you're nine-and-
21 a-half months pregnant. But in any case, I
22 won't apologize, at not least until I lose my

1 breath which should happen relatively soon.

2 But let me just say, I think we're
3 a moment that is sort of a watershed for US-
4 Iranian relations and I'm going to try to
5 relate what I have to say about the domestic
6 scene to this larger framework for engagement
7 that I think we are at least poised on the
8 verge of. That is, here in Washington the
9 debate that we've had over the past eight
10 years about whether or not to engage is
11 effectively over by virtue of the election of
12 a presidential candidate who in fact favored
13 engagement early on in the campaign and with
14 some degree of consistency throughout the
15 campaign.

16 I think in any effect the debate
17 that we've had over the past eight years in
18 Washington about whether or not to engage was
19 a bit of a false one because of course
20 President Bush, the current President Bush as
21 well as his predecessor, every one of his
22 predecessors has engaged or attempted to

1 engage directly with the Iranian regime over
2 the past 30 years. This has been one of the
3 few consistent elements of US policy toward
4 Iran. And so this discussion which I think
5 peaked particularly between 2003 and 2006
6 about whether or not we legitimize the regime
7 by talking to them was a bit of a false one
8 because of course the Bush administration
9 talked to Iran directly between 2001 and 2003
10 on the question of Afghanistan, and once
11 again, starting in 2007 over the past two
12 years over Iraq.

13 But what is interesting of course
14 is that we have the inauguration of a new
15 administration prepared to engage directly
16 with the Iranians at a time when the Iranians
17 for the first time in their post-revolutionary
18 history appear to be at least open to the idea
19 of talking directly to Washington.
20 What has been the fundamental
21 obstacle to any real progress in dealing with
22 the Iranians directly over the past 30 years

1 has been their unwillingness to talk to us.
2 But since 2006 at least, there is for the
3 first time a public authoritative, across the
4 political spectrum, commitment to talking to
5 the US. It was first was expressed in the
6 terms of a willingness to dialogue on Iraq,
7 but very clearly over the past two years this
8 has been repeated, reiterated and we are in
9 this kind of a watershed moment.

10 So as a result, we know what the
11 policy generally from 50,000 feet will be with
12 respect to the US toward Iran. We know the
13 direction; we don't know the details and there
14 are obviously a few things that are going to
15 help us with this policy, particularly the
16 falling price of oil, the diplomatic honeymoon
17 that the new administration should face. But
18 there are going to be enormous challenges and
19 obviously one of those challenges is being
20 discussed in one of the other rooms here
21 today, the situation in Gaza, but as well a
22 number of other issues across the region.

1 I would say that ultimately the
2 biggest challenge for dealing with Iran is the
3 one where our information is the least
4 substantial and where our influence is almost
5 non-existent. And that is Iran's
6 unpredictable and infinitely complicated
7 domestic scene.

8 With some consistency, the US
9 policy community has misread or simply missed
10 every major twist and turn in Iran's post-
11 revolutionary history starting with the
12 failure to anticipate the revolution, but
13 really at every point of critical changes in
14 Iran leading up to the 2005 election of
15 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which we did
16 not predict or anticipate. This reflects to
17 some extent the unpredictability of Iran's
18 semi-authoritarian system of rule. But it
19 also speaks to our own shortcomings in being
20 able to interpret Iran from a distance. From
21 the hostage crisis to Iran-Contra, to the
22 various missed opportunities of the Clinton

1 and Bush administrations, every prior American
2 effort to resolve its antagonistic
3 relationship with Iran has been undermined by
4 this lack of familiarity with Iran's internal
5 political dynamics and how those dynamics
6 impact Iran's strategic calculations.

7 So if any new diplomatic
8 initiative is going to be successful in
9 tempering Iran's policies and dealing with our
10 new challenges, the nuclear program, Iran's
11 effort to extend its influence across the
12 region, any new diplomatic initiative must
13 incorporate a keener interpretation of the
14 implications of Iran's ever-changing internal
15 dynamics and strategies that enable Washington
16 to navigate those perspective pitfalls more
17 effectively.

18 Because our time is limited and is
19 my breath, let me just try to make five
20 general points about Iran's domestic politics
21 that I think are relevant for US policy makers
22 in terms of trying to maximize the prospects

1 that we can be successful this time around.

2 First, as I began to say before,
3 we know that Iran can in fact come to the
4 table. Iran can say yes to negotiations for
5 the first time in its post-revolutionary
6 history. But I'd say we don't know what Iran
7 specifically can say yes to. We know that if
8 we look at Iranian policy over the past 30
9 years, Tehran has in fact reversed its
10 policies on a number of issues, whether it was
11 the decision to accept a cease fire with Iraq
12 after pledging to continue the war until the
13 annihilation of the Ba'athist regime, whether
14 it was the decision to reverse internal
15 policies such as family planning issues, which
16 there was an effective U-turn on during the
17 1980s.

18 Iran has also been proven to be
19 capable of embracing old adversaries. The
20 relationship today with the government of
21 Saudi Arabia is entirely transformed from the
22 relationship that existed for the first 10 to

1 15 years after the revolution. Although it's
2 still tense, it's nowhere near the sort of
3 relationship that left Ayatollah Khomeini in
4 a position to write in his final will and
5 testament any number of epithets about the
6 Saudi regime. There's a great deal of at
7 least workable cooperation between the two
8 governments today.

9 We also know that Iran can in fact
10 engage in selective constructive dialogue with
11 the United States. In particular, this
12 experience in the Geneva and Bonn discussions
13 between 2001 and 2003 on Afghanistan has been
14 said by participants on both sides to have
15 been a viable constructive dialogue. It was
16 not perfect by any stretch of the imagination.
17 There were a lot of frustrations, meetings
18 canceled over unfulfilled promises, and yet it
19 did produce cooperation. It did produce
20 results on the ground in Afghanistan, both
21 terms of strategic cooperation in terms of US
22 Operation Enduring Freedom, but also in terms

1 of the establishment of the post-Taliban
2 government in Afghanistan.

3 We know that there is cross-
4 factional support for a direct dialogue with
5 Washington. I've been stunned frankly in
6 meeting people, whether it's Iranian
7 parliamentarians, clerics, others, really
8 beyond the sort of normal interlocutors that
9 Americans have opportunities to talk to, who
10 were in fact very direct and open and
11 unashamed of embracing policies that at least
12 as recently as 2002 would have gotten one
13 arrested for expressing publicly in Tehran,
14 which is willingness and readiness to talk
15 directly to the United States.

16 But what we don't know, and I
17 think we can't know until we test, is whether
18 the Iranian regime is capable of making the
19 sort of epic concessions that would be
20 necessary to really changing the relationship
21 between Washington and Tehran. And even more
22 uncertain is whether Iran has or will ever

1 attain the level of policy coordination and
2 institutional coherence that would be
3 necessary to really have an overarching grand
4 bargain, as people have talked about.

5 So that's the first point about
6 Iranian domestic politics. Let me speak
7 quickly to several others.

8 One is we need to understand the
9 dominant mind-set today in Tehran. This is a
10 sense that strength is power. Iranian
11 leaders, particularly hard-liners, view
12 assertiveness as equivalent to or an affective
13 substitute for power. It's a kind of
14 Hobbesian world view that ingrains an aversion
15 to compromise. And you see it in the nuclear
16 diplomacy. You see it in the sorts of things
17 that President Ahmadinejad has said over the
18 years along the lines of, you know, today
19 they're looking to us to cede our nuclear
20 rights. Tomorrow they'll be pressing us on
21 human rights. The next day it will be animal
22 rights. Iranian leaders perceive that any

1 beginning concession on their side will only
2 lead to further pressure. And I think we're
3 never going to succeed in getting them to make
4 those concessions unless we are able to create
5 a situation in which they understand there are
6 going to be incentives for cooperation as well
7 as further demands upon them.

8 One point about the timing with
9 respect to any sort of engagement and how it
10 plays out with respect to Iran's internal
11 politics. There's already a discussion about
12 whether or not we talk to the Iranians or
13 launch any overture in advance of their
14 elections, which are to take place in June
15 2009. I think there's a laudable desire to
16 avoid boosting Ahmadinejad's prospects at
17 home, but the presumption that we can tailor
18 our own diplomacy around Iran's notoriously
19 unpredictable elections is somewhat misguided.
20 We have really no capacity to predict or
21 positively influence the outcome. And I think
22 timing any overture to the ballot would risk

1 the perception that we're linking an overture
2 to a change in Iran's leadership, which would
3 effectively taint any successor to Ahmadinejad
4 even if one were to be elected.

5 And in any case, I think that it's
6 a reasonable bet and certainly anyone betting
7 on Iranian elections six months in advance is
8 bound to lose, even six days, but it's a
9 reasonable bet that Ahmadinejad will be in a
10 decent position to get himself another four-
11 year term, if that's what the political elite
12 would like him to have.

13 Two final points. After getting
14 into a bit of the mechanics of the regime and
15 the personalities, I think we have to be
16 careful to avoid over-Kremlinology when it
17 comes to Iran. I remember back in December of
18 2006 there was a feeling of great excitement
19 around the US Government when Ahmadinejad went
20 to a student meeting and several students
21 stood up and burned his picture. There was a
22 sense that the elections for the Assembly of

1 Experts in which Ahmadinejad's slate appeared
2 to do somewhat poorly was a real setback for
3 him. And yet we see two years later that in
4 fact Ahmadinejad remains president. He has,
5 if anything, expanded his influence and
6 expanded his capacity to make policy. We
7 spend a lot of time analyzing who's up, who's
8 down and it's important to understand the
9 personalities.

10 But we also have to recognize that
11 at every point over the past 30 years the
12 Iranian regime has engaged in fratricidal
13 partisanship. Even Khomeini was not able to
14 enforce his will. He had to bargain to get
15 his prime minister put in place. So we have
16 to recall that this is sort of a negotiation
17 within the regime itself and that that will
18 always take place, that there will always be
19 the sort of the critiques that we here,
20 vociferous critiques from within the internal
21 elite against any particular individual who
22 holds the presidency and we have to be careful

1 not to presume too much from them.

2 And finally I'd just end with we
3 need to expect the unexpected when it comes to
4 Iran. If we ever believe we have Iran figured
5 out, we have to think again. Iran's politics
6 routinely defy predictions. We didn't predict
7 Ahmadinejad. We didn't predict his
8 predecessor Mohammad Khatami and the reform
9 movement. We didn't predict the revolution
10 and we're unlikely sitting here in Washington
11 to be able to predict what's going to happen
12 next in Iran. Thanks.

13 MODERATOR WISNER: Avner, would
14 you come up and take the podium?

15 MR. COHEN: Thank you. My
16 comments today would be about the issue which
17 I believe is perhaps the most difficult and
18 the most complex of all the issues that
19 embodies the dilemma whether to engage Iran or
20 to confront Iran, and that's the nuclear
21 issue. I think that the challenge of
22 confronting or engaging Iran on this issue

1 poses the new administration with both in
2 terms of its new Middle East policy, as well
3 as its new non-proliferation policy with
4 enormous amount of problems.

5 It is obvious that the new
6 administration believes, and I think rightly
7 so, that negotiating deal is preferred, at
8 least for the beginning, over confrontation.
9 That's obvious. Is it worth to negotiate
10 political deal that would keep Iran so-called
11 non-nuclear, but non-nuclear, as I'm going to
12 clarify, is a very, very tricky deal. That is
13 to say, we need non-nuclear that will be
14 credible both from political and technical
15 point of view, something that will be
16 ultimately politically acceptable by others,
17 including for example Israel, and also to see
18 that by that kind of deal the Iranian nuclear
19 issue will be resolved.
20 Furthermore, such a deal would
21 probably require to persuade Iran to deal with
22 all sort of linkages on broad political

1 context, security arrangements with Iran, as
2 well as perhaps nuclear issue with the Middle
3 East as a whole. All these create another
4 layers of complexities.

5 My own view is I think that to
6 suggest, to create, to devise such a deal
7 would be extremely difficult; not impossible,
8 but nearly impossible. It would certainly
9 require a great deal of political technical
10 creativity both on the broad agenda and the
11 nuclear non-proliferation agenda.

12 So what I would like to do in the
13 10 minutes that was left is just to try to
14 highlight very briefly ten points or eight
15 points, each a minute, a minute-plus about
16 those difficulties, why I think it's so
17 difficult. I'm not saying impossible, but I
18 think very, very difficult.

19 I start with the example about
20 Japan. We all treat Japan as a non-nuclear
21 weapon state. But in many way Japan, this a
22 political decision. This is a political

1 judgment, this is a political convenience.
2 But in many ways Japan is a nuclear weapon
3 state even though it never tested a weapon, it
4 is part of the NPT. Japan is, according to at
5 least a British Intelligence report, weeks a
6 way from the bomb. Most experts believe it
7 anywhere from weeks to months away from the
8 bomb. So it's very, very close to the
9 position of bomb in the basement and that's
10 within the NPT and within certain (inaudible)
11 that were made between Japan and others,
12 including the United States. But we don't
13 make a big issue out of that because it's
14 convenient for all of us and because we treat
15 Japan as a country that is very much on the
16 line, but not crossing the line and we take
17 its intent to be peaceful in this area, at
18 least for the time being, as long as Japan is
19 in the NPT.
20 Now, coming to the Iranian issue.
21 I think the severity of the Iranian -- that's
22 my second point. The severity of the Iranian

1 nuclear problem today is that Iran is already
2 now and certainly it will take time until that
3 administration will be able to engage Iran in
4 this issue; that is to say, mid-2009. Iran is
5 very, very close to where Japan is. The
6 infrastructure is different, there are a lot
7 of differences, but I think Japan, technically
8 it's very close to where Japan is.

9 And that's my third point, that
10 the severity of the solution is very high and
11 the room for a solution is very somewhat
12 small. There is a tiny room for a good
13 solution, a solution that will be credible,
14 political and technical. Unless Iran would
15 agree to roll back, which I think they would
16 not, because the Iranian point is that we are
17 not going to be discriminated in relation to
18 anybody else. Look at Japan. If Japan is
19 allowed, we are allowed, too. And that's the
20 Iranian argument in its own legalese
21 framework, the way they put it. And Iranians
22 love their legalese issues. So I think there

1 is very limited room for a good solution, a
2 solution that's going to be credible,
3 political and technical.

4 I think one area that it will take
5 enormous amount of creativity is to try to
6 operationalize a notion of so-called timely
7 warning. That is to say, that would give us
8 some time to place firewalls vis- -vis the
9 Iranian nuclear programs. In my judgment it's
10 not obvious, it's not clear at all that the
11 current tools that we have within the
12 safeguard system are enough to create those
13 kind of firewalls. That's another element why
14 I think to create and to produce a solution,
15 negotiate a solution would be so difficult.
16 I'm not sure if we have good devices to create
17 this small landscape with firewalls for this
18 timely warning. So that's my fourth point.

19 Fifth one is Iran's own strategy.
20 As I see it, Iran is trying to remain within
21 the NPT, to push the Japanese case to its
22 limits, but unlike Japan I think Iran would

1 like to blur the difference between possession
2 and non-possession of nuclear weapons to the
3 point that the world and the rumor would go as
4 if Iran is just about having the bomb or just
5 about having a bomb in the basement without
6 Iran's the need to say so openly and clearly
7 and directly. So I think the Iranian's
8 strategy is very much to undermine the
9 difference and distinction between have and
10 have not, a distinction that Japan is
11 important to keep.

12 The integrity of the NPT structure
13 is at stake. There is a certain paradox here.
14 Virtually any deal in terms of the current
15 system would undermine and possibly unravel
16 the system. Any credible deal must, in my
17 view, probably would be something that would
18 lead to restructure or to reinvent the system
19 as it is. That would be extremely difficult.
20 So I think that the dilemma that
21 we're being left is that virtually every deal,
22 its critic would be able to say that Iran is

1 still extremely dangerous because of the bomb,
2 if not just on the line. But the question is,
3 if any deal is going to be inherently
4 problematic, should be called the -- should we
5 call a slide a slide, or just it should be for
6 political reasons accepted. And I think here
7 the dilemma would be very, very difficult.

8 And finally, there is the Israel
9 aspect. Israel is not part of the NPT, it's
10 not accepting safeguard on its nuclear
11 installations and United States many years, 40
12 years ago, has decided that its own interest
13 is to accept Israel nuclear under we call
14 opacity. Israel does not declare anything,
15 has not tested and so forth. Iran would like
16 to push that way. Obviously, we don't want to
17 allow that. So obviously, there would be need
18 to make a certain kind of distinction. I
19 think also Iran would raise the Israeli card
20 at the end. And I think all this raise very,
21 very difficult challenges and questions for
22 any future negotiations.

1 I'm trying to raise issues. I'm
2 trying to make us to think about it. I'm not
3 offering right now any kind of immediate
4 solutions. Thank you.

5 MODERATOR WISNER: Bill Luers?

6 MR. LUERS: Thank you, Mr.

7 Chairman and the US Institute of Peace for
8 organizing this and I'm pleased to be on the
9 panel with this far more professional group
10 than I on these subjects.

11 I guess I would like to just
12 preview an article that Tom Pickering and Jim
13 Walsh and I are publishing next week in the
14 New York Review of Books. And I will give you
15 a preview of it while you wait in great
16 anticipation for this marvelous solution to
17 all problems.

18 I agree with much of what has been
19 said and I must say it's a very professional
20 group. I've got six propositions, which I'll
21 try to get through.

22 First, I agree with what you said

1 that the nuclear enrichment issue is central
2 to how the US deals with Iran. There is not
3 much more time left to get this thing right
4 and the current zero enrichment and sanctions
5 approach will not succeed in changing Iran's
6 behavior on this nuclear program. If we are
7 unable to find a way to talk with Iran without
8 preconditions on how we and Iran can get some
9 of what each side needs out of this
10 relationship, it is unlikely that we can have
11 a constructive discussion with them on any of
12 the other issues in the region that are of
13 great importance to the United States, and
14 frankly, to Iran.

15 So the continuation of current
16 policies on both sides will not only inhibit
17 our possible working with them on other issues
18 of importance to both countries, but I guess
19 most disturbing is this policy leads
20 inevitably to some type of military conflict,
21 which I believe is a completely unacceptable
22 alternative at this stage in our relations

1 with that region.

2 The second proposition is that
3 looking at a nuclear deal, what does it look
4 like. At the outset we believe that given the
5 failing current policies of sanctions,
6 containment and isolation of Iran in order to
7 get them to change their policies on
8 enrichment, that we must accept in principle
9 and in practice with them some level of
10 ongoing enrichment. Of the bad options
11 available to the United States in dealing with
12 this issue, and it has strong resistance in
13 this country, in this city, that you have to
14 find a way to get us and them to talk about
15 what an enrichment program might look like.

16 As far as we're concerned, and we
17 again, Tom Pickering and myself and Jim made
18 a proposal last year in the New York Review of
19 Books precisely on the issue of what you have
20 to do to deal with it. Our belief is that
21 more effective monitoring and inspections of
22 Iran's nuclear program trumps an unsuccessful

1 policy that results in Iran building many
2 thousands more centrifuges. As we have said
3 don't build them, they have built thousands.
4 They have now 4,000 centrifuges or five,
5 whatever it is, what your call is. And I
6 guess we feel that one trade-off that we must
7 have to make in arranging for their being able
8 to continue to enrich at a certain level is
9 extremely intrusive inspections. For us, the
10 inspections issue is becoming critical because
11 we're not stopping the enrichment. And we
12 need to design a strategy which will allow
13 greater enrichment, greater inspections.
14 Our proposal is a multinational consortium on
15 the ground which we've talked about and you
16 can read about in the New York Review of Books
17 last year.

18 Third proposition, rather than
19 approach Iran as a set of problems, it must be
20 dealt with as a nation which has enormous
21 power in the region. We up to now have dealt
22 with individual aspects of the Iranian problem

1 with the United States, all of which give us
2 concern. But we must recognize that in the
3 future Iran's influence will increase and
4 increase significantly when we withdraw our
5 troops from Iraq and we have to find a way to
6 affect a relationship with them and with the
7 region that integrates them as much as
8 possible into a regional solution to problems.

9 Fourth, Iraq's stability as the US
10 forces draw down will depend on Iraqi
11 governing groups reaching agreement on a range
12 of internal issues as we know. On the
13 capacity of the Iraqi forces that are on the
14 ground to maintain some stability. But most
15 particularly, it will depend on the
16 willingness of the countries in the region to
17 cooperate on supporting Iraq's peaceful
18 development. The Iraq Study Group Report
19 organized by the USIP of 2006 got it right
20 when it said that the UN "should form a
21 support group to reinforce security and
22 national reconciliations within Iraq, neither

1 of which Iraq can achieve on its own." But
2 most importantly, it must find a way to
3 associate all of the countries on the border
4 of Iraq, and those countries otherwise
5 interested, in a general approach,
6 multilateral approach over a long-term effort
7 to reach an agreement or set of agreements
8 defining what each country in the region will
9 do and will not do in order to maintain and
10 build stability in Iraq.

11 The US and Iran will be working
12 together and have to be compatible in the
13 future of Iraq. There is no way a continued
14 intense hostile competition for the hearts and
15 minds of Iraqis is going to work to either
16 advantage, and certainly not the advantage of
17 Iraq. We don't see how any withdrawal policy
18 in Iraq can not be done without some agreement
19 on the neighboring powers as what happens next
20 with regard to the power in a country.

21 I have a similar discussion on
22 Afghanistan which I won't give now because I'm

1 close to being out of my time, Frank, I guess.
2 But proposition six. Iran is not an abstract
3 entity which is dealt with on a chessboard.
4 It is a country that has 4,000 years of
5 culture. It has human beings, as was
6 described by the first presenter, all of whom
7 think quite differently. It has a feel, a
8 texture that we have not touched. We don't
9 understand that texture. Virtually none of
10 the people I deal with in US Government or in
11 the academic world, except those who are
12 Iranian-Americans, have any feel for Iran.
13 And unless we have direct contact with that
14 country, we can't begin to calibrate. To
15 answer Suzanne's question, we don't know yet
16 what they are willing to do. We don't know
17 because we have not asked directly. We have
18 asked on preconditions. We don't want to talk
19 to clerics, so we ask a non-cleric. Or when
20 we don't like the non-clerics, like
21 Ahmadinejad, we prefer to talk to clerics.
22 But we have to talk to them as they're

1 structured. It's not longer a regime. It's
2 a nation that has to be part of our
3 experience, or else all of our other issues in
4 the region fall apart.

5 We propose very strictly, very
6 specifically an approach that should be taken
7 by the Obama administration. Early on,
8 probably within the first week, they should
9 begin to give some signals, a flat statement
10 reiterating his position that we will talk to
11 any nation in the world without preconditions.
12 It doesn't have to specifically mention Iran.
13 That would be registered loudly within Tehran.

14 Secondly, some mention of the
15 Algiers Accord, which was in 1981 after the
16 release of the refugees, in which you reaffirm
17 Article 1 of that accord, which says we will
18 not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran
19 would be heard loud and clear and probably
20 wouldn't even be understood in this country.
21 So there's no danger.

22 And I think that the change of the

1 tone -- the term carrots and sticks, for
2 example, suggests that somehow Iran is a
3 donkey and we'll either beat them into
4 submission or feed them carrots and they'll
5 come around, that they can be bought off or
6 beat off. That's not going to happen. And as
7 long as that's in the head of a speaker, then
8 the Iranians say it's the same old message.
9 We can't talk to these people. We've
10 distrusted them for many, many years since the
11 time of Mossadegh and so establishing a new
12 tone is important.

13 We think secondly, early on,
14 almost right away, the US should try to find
15 a way to talk directly officially at a middle
16 level to an Iranian, a real live Iranian. And
17 find that Iranian, whether it's in the UN or
18 Paris, and begin to open dialogues like we did
19 with China and Poland during those years. I
20 myself began, right after the Carter
21 administration came in, I began talking to
22 Cuba. We had informal private talks which

1 were never noticed until we established our US
2 interest section in Cuba. This is done. It
3 has precedence and we shouldn't tell all
4 Americans they don't dare talk to an Iranian
5 wherever they see one.

6 We organized a trip. I know we've
7 set that Secretary Powell would talk to
8 Foreign Minister Kharrazi, a summit conference
9 on Iraq. The organizers of the conference sat
10 the two of them together, right next to each
11 other. And the ambassador of Iran was there,
12 watched it. And they sat back to back during
13 almost three-quarters of the dinner without
14 even recognizing that they were sitting next
15 to each other. And then I heard from
16 Secretary Powell later that he was not
17 authorized to talk, so he talked about the
18 weather. This is ridiculous. We shouldn't
19 continue this.

20 Finally, I guess I'll say one more
21 thing, that once we have established this
22 contact, we begin to take some steps such as

1 establish some steps we would take such as
2 releasing maybe the Iranians under siege,
3 under arrest in Iraq, dealing with the
4 terrorist organization MEK in some different
5 way or announcing we're continuing to treat
6 them as a terrorist group, looking toward
7 talking about increased confidence building
8 measures in the Persian Gulf to avoid
9 conflict, even renewing our talks in Baghdad
10 with the ambassador. And as I've said, there
11 must be some effort internationally and
12 regionally to establish probably under the UN
13 auspices a regional conference, forum,
14 institution that will serve as an overarching
15 effort to bring the countries in the region
16 together on how to deal with Iraq and
17 eventually Afghanistan.

18 Anyway, I'm told to stop, but I
19 appreciate the chance, Frank, to talk a little
20 longer than I was supposed to. Thank you very
21 much.

22 MODERATOR WISNER: Bill, you did

1 well too. You gave us a lot to think about.

2 To begin the questions though, I'd
3 like to go to a core assumption you laid out
4 before us. And that is, if the United States
5 does not find a way to address the nuclear
6 issue, we cannot develop a workable dialogue
7 and a problem solving relationship with Iran
8 on other subjects of vital national importance
9 to us.

10 And with that proposition, let me
11 go to Avner, Suzanne, and to you, Qamar, and
12 ask you if you agree with that proposition?

13 MR. COHEN: Well, I think that
14 accepting Iran with nuclear weapons would be
15 a mistake. I think that --

16 MODERATOR WISNER: Can you try and
17 see if one of these mics work?

18 MR. COHEN: I think ultimately it
19 would be a battle between will, between a deal
20 that ultimately nobody would be fully
21 satisfied, but it would be a deal that would
22 keep Iran within the MPT, not testing bomb and

1 yet it would be Iran that would be very close
2 to capability that some people would be very,
3 very unhappy. I think that kind of deal one
4 would have to scrutinize very closely to feel
5 whether it's worth having because it's going
6 to be flawed almost under any circumstances,
7 but hopefully not flawed too much. So it will
8 be a real, real dilemma that don't have ahead
9 of time any kind of future to handle it.

10 MODERATOR WISNER: Suzanne.

11 MS. MALONEY: I think there's a
12 difference between process and outcome. I
13 think a process that engages a range of
14 different issues, including by not exclusive
15 to the nuclear issue, makes a lot of sense.
16 It's the sort of process that I was part of
17 recommending in a project by the Saban Center
18 at Brookings and the Council on Foreign
19 Relations. We suggest a multi-track non-
20 contingent set of negotiations. The nuclear
21 issue would be obviously one of the most
22 urgent. But frankly, I think one is likely to

1 make more progress in the short term on the
2 issue of perhaps Afghanistan, and secondly
3 Iraq and the near region.

4 The issue with the nuclear
5 negotiations is frankly two-fold. One, that
6 you have a process that already exists and you
7 have to find a way to incorporate that. And
8 two, there's obviously a different time frame
9 attached to the nuclear question and one would
10 have to find a way to get that nuclear
11 negotiation underway and ensure that the
12 Iranians do not just perpetuate the
13 negotiations for the sake of talks, that in
14 fact you have some sort of incentives for
15 actually coming to an agreement on the nuclear
16 question in a relatively short period of time.
17 Because at a certain stage the negotiations
18 themselves will become irrelevant.

19 MODERATOR WISNER: Qamar?
20 MR. HUDA: What I would add to
21 what's already been said is that what's very
22 interesting when you bring up the nuclear

1 issue is how Iranians respond in sort of a
2 moral and ethic sense. They don't really
3 respond in policy. And just as Shirin Ebadi,
4 the Nobel Prize winner said in her speech, why
5 are certain issues allowed to happen when
6 certain issues pressure not to have it? And
7 their response in there is sort of thinking
8 and logical thinking of this issue that they
9 really think in terms of these ethical
10 questions. And so I think we need to also not
11 just sidetrack those ethical questions and
12 also address them with them. And I think
13 that's one way to actually to work out this
14 one particular issue and this process.

15 MODERATOR WISNER: We have time
16 for a couple of questions on condition that
17 they're kept very short.

18 Yes, sir?

19 PARTICIPANT: Thank you very much.
20 MODERATOR WISNER: Why don't you
21 introduce yourself and stand up.

22 PARTICIPANT: Thank you very much

1 for great presentations. My question goes
2 particularly to Bill and to Suzanne.

3 If you sit in the corridors of the
4 UN, the five plus one, the whole new sanction
5 issue is coming up and it has become pretty
6 clear, as somebody said to me recently, that
7 we are at the end of our wisdom with sanctions
8 except if we enter the notion of sanctions of
9 gasoline, refined petroleum. This brings up
10 an issue which you haven't brought about. And
11 by the way, Bill, I sign everything which you
12 propose. That issue concerns the Markov
13 region; let me call it like this, Russia and
14 China, and also India, actually.

15 Where do you see ways to be able
16 to whatever the US and Iran establishes find
17 support or at least not the operation of
18 spoilers to get going in the right direction?

19 MODERATOR WISNER: Good. Bill,
20 hold that answer, would you, for a moment?

21 Yes, ma'am. You right here.

22 PROFESSOR DYSINGER: Professor

1 Carol Dysinger of New York University,
2 documentary film maker working on something
3 that takes on the border of Iran and
4 Afghanistan.

5 And my question is, the
6 relationship to you is the relationship of the
7 Republican Guard to these mullahs and I would
8 love to hear what Bill had to say about
9 Afghanistan and he omitted from his talk.

10 MODERATOR WISNER: Good. Mr.
11 Kathwari?

12 MR. CATHWARI: Yes, Farooq
13 Kathwari. I think Bill Luers referred to it.
14 It appears reading from the newspapers that
15 most of the pressure is from the United
16 States, the European Union or some countries
17 there and Israel. What about Iran's other
18 neighbors, Russia, the Arabs, Turkey? We
19 never hear about them.

20 MODERATOR WISNER: One last
21 question.

22 Go ahead, sir.

1 MR. FULADIUM: My name is Falimuse
2 Frank Fuladium (phonetic), Procurement US
3 (inaudible). I'm a Persia native. My
4 question (inaudible) gentleman who's the
5 Ayatollahs.

6 It's a contrary issue in order for
7 Iran and US to engage. They should be saving
8 the face for Iranians because they have been
9 saying so many things about America, how what
10 a evil it is. What could have saving the face
11 they can do in order to make this transaction
12 happen? And I think that is the what the
13 Ayatollahs could give him a good idea. Thank
14 you.

15 MODERATOR WISNER: Good. I wish
16 we could take more. Let's see if we can have
17 quick answers. Bill, why don't you start?

18 MR. LUERS: On China and Russia,
19 again I have to go back to our proposal which
20 was to create a multinational consortium on
21 the ground which would give international
22 control and observations over their program.

1 And I have talked to a senior Chinese official
2 on that in Beijing and they find it extremely
3 interesting. They obviously don't want to go
4 any further on the sanctions route. And as
5 far as I can see, they would like some other
6 alternative approach. They're less concerned
7 about the issue of a multinational control
8 than some people in this country.

9 Russia has its own set of issues,
10 including the fact that if there's going to be
11 consortium they'd like to run it in Russia.
12 They'd like to have it either in Russia best
13 or possibly dealing bilaterally.

14 With regard to Afghanistan, my
15 sense is that from the very beginning, as
16 Suzanne said, our relationship with Iran was
17 positive. Then we cut them off as a member of
18 the axis of evil. Now, all the contacts we've
19 had with Iranians over the past several years
20 have suggested that increasingly they believe
21 there's a common purpose there. They support
22 the Karzai government as reluctantly as we do.

1 They are against the Taliban but realize they
2 have to deal with them inside the country.
3 They would like help in trying to control
4 transport or drug trafficking. They realize
5 that the problems in Northern Pakistan have
6 presented in the last couple of years at
7 increasingly -- terrible experiences with
8 regard to Al Qaeda, whom they oppose. And
9 they have basically said that they would work
10 with this. And I think probably Suzanne is
11 right that it's so urgent for them it's almost
12 enough to think that they would do that
13 whether we make a deal on nuclear.

14 If there's going to have to be a
15 new election in Afghanistan and there's going
16 to have to be a Loya Jirga to sort of
17 authorize a new form of election, it probably
18 can't be done without Iran. So there are so
19 many things we have in common in Afghanistan
20 that renewing that discussion I think is very
21 important.

22 MODERATOR WISNER: Good. Avner.

1 MR. COHEN: Yes, just two brief
2 points. I like the idea of my colleague from
3 the left. I think it's very much unfeasible.
4 I think that Iran would never truly accept
5 that and I think it's part of the Iran
6 rhetoric. I think they would use it to kill
7 time and to waste time, but truly they would
8 never be interested in that because it's
9 deprived them from what they believe their own
10 right to do enrichment. They believe that
11 they're entitled to that.

12 MR. LUERS: They say they will
13 accept it. Why would they publically --

14 MR. COHEN: The other point is I
15 think that if there is consensus that military
16 option is not on the table. My view is that
17 it should be stated. At the same time, I
18 think the option of naval blockade should not
19 be removed and that should be the ultimate
20 stick, so to speak, and I think that should be
21 on the table. But I think that if indeed that
22 we're coming to the point that it's clear that

1 military option is not there, it will be more
2 credible simply to put it on the table.

3 MODERATOR WISNER: Suzanne?

4 MS. MALONEY: Just a couple of
5 quick points. On the question of sanctions,
6 I think it's been rightly pointed out that
7 obviously other world powers have a certain
8 degree of reluctance about moving much beyond
9 where we're at in terms of multilateral
10 sanctions. And what is going to be important
11 for the Obama administration is to maintain a
12 sense of realism. I hear a lot from folks
13 that once we come into office we're going to
14 be able to bring the Russians on board. We're
15 going to be able to make a grand deal with the
16 Chinese. I think it's relatively unrealistic
17 we're going to get a great deal more from any
18 of these capitols than we've gotten to date.

19 That said, we should also be
20 realistic about the impact of sanctions. They
21 are having some real painful costs for Iran,
22 particularly with the oil price now sinking

1 below \$40 a barrel. At the same time, there's
2 very little historical precedent if you look
3 back over the past 30 years of Iran shifting
4 its position on strategic issues, on issues
5 that were considered existential to its
6 leadership simply as a result of economic
7 pressure. You can look back particularly at
8 the period during the war and some of the
9 pressures that the regime faced at that time.
10 And they actually took some fairly difficult
11 steps internally to avoid ending the war any
12 earlier than they did. So I think we have to
13 be realistic about how much pressure can do in
14 terms of changing Iran's position on an issue
15 that it considers to be central to its own
16 security.

17 One final point just on the
18 question of neighbors. I think again realism
19 is useful. We often send American diplomats
20 out to the Gulf and hear a great deal about
21 their fears about Iran, but we simply need to
22 watch their actions as well as listen to the

1 words. They have a history of accommodating
2 the Iranians, of working with the Iranians,
3 even as they rely on the American security
4 umbrella and I see no reason that that's going
5 to change.

6 MODERATOR WISNER: Qamar?

7 MR. HUDA: The Revolutionary Guard
8 was set up after -- to '79, '80 to protect the
9 revolution, to protect its mandate and was
10 directly connected to Khomeini's vision of a
11 secure government and to secure its particular
12 religious guardian ideology. It grew so
13 bureaucratically. It has its own intelligence
14 agencies, it has army, navy, air force. It
15 has its own training. It's quite
16 sophisticated and also sometimes runs
17 independently of the national army. And
18 sometimes many of the religious figures do
19 move through the Revolutionary Guard to move
20 up in the bureaucracy. The supreme leader
21 himself was a member of the Guard in the '80s.

22 But what is the relationship? I

1 wanted to nuance your question and that was
2 relationship with Mullahs, but relationship to
3 the larger Iranian society because there are
4 a great deal of clerics who think the
5 Revolutionary Guard has run its mile and its
6 done; it has no need for it. One person is
7 Montazeri's student who I mentioned who is
8 under house arrest, Mosun Kavirdar (phonetic)
9 and he's actually spoken against the
10 Revolutionary Guard. In terms of saving face,
11 that's I think actually right and I was trying
12 to present that, that there is a cultural
13 component to everything we're saying. It's
14 not a metrics approach of assessing a country
15 and its issues. Saving face is definitely of
16 importance to all of the religious leaders and
17 non-religious leaders, but I don't think it's
18 primary to assessing their particular move and
19 the policy changes. I think small gestures do
20 go far with particular saving face measures.

21 MODERATOR WISNER: Ladies and
22 gentlemen, Winston Churchill once remarked

1 about after dinner speeches. There's only two
2 things more difficult. One is climbing a wall
3 that's leaning toward you or kissing a woman
4 who's leaning away from you. I feel the same
5 way about trying to sum up discussion that has
6 been set before you today by four really
7 terrific speakers. But I will try in a couple
8 of minutes to make several points that I think
9 it's worth all of us taking away from the
10 discussion we've had.

11 Let me start with Suzanne. You
12 made a very important point. We know the
13 direction; we don't know the details. But I
14 think every one of us in this room feel we've
15 reached a watershed point after this near-
16 quarter century in which we and Iran are fated
17 to find some sort of common ground, some form
18 of engagement, different from anything we've
19 known in the past.

20 I also believe that we've heard a
21 very compelling set of arguments this morning
22 that we have to look at Iran as a nation, not

1 as a basket of problems. A nation that has
2 real interests, that is a regional power. We
3 have to configure ourselves and our diplomacy
4 accordingly. And yes, we've been reminded we
5 know precious little about Iran, having been
6 cut off from it for years.

7 As we step forward there isn't too
8 much doubt in my mind listening to the four of
9 you that we are dealing with an ancient
10 civilization that commands respect, a nation
11 that has real interests that it seeks to
12 defend, but a nation with a deeply divided
13 leadership, a divided regime, a nation with
14 lots of self-doubt, not assuming that all
15 cards lie in Tehran's hands.

16 And so therefore what are our
17 options as we Americans consider this
18 uncertain path ahead? The options you heard
19 not addressed with any particular support
20 today. The option of war, not an attractive
21 strategy. And sanctions, an option the
22 Iranians have seen thrown at them and have

1 figured out how to manage. But if it is to be
2 engagement, how do we proceed? How do we send
3 signals that start a dialogue that begins,
4 signals it from the top and then engages the
5 key issues? And whether we will be able to
6 find in this time the epic concessions on both
7 sides, we all have to be careful and indeed
8 somewhat skeptical.

9 I have to leave the discussion
10 with a bit of a bias. The assumption that as
11 we engage with the Iranians, it's critical to
12 get our hands around the nuclear issue. As
13 difficult and as narrow the room of maneuver
14 can be, we have to find common grounds. Bill
15 Luers has laid out a challenging thought of
16 some level of enrichment plus very heavy
17 inspections. There will be many questions and
18 critics that will address that particular
19 approach, but I don't think one of us can
20 leave the discussion this morning without
21 admitting the importance of it.

22 With those words, let me ask all

1 of you to join me in thanking the four
2 panelists who spoke to you today. Thank you.

3 (Applause.)

4 (Whereupon, the panel was
5 concluded at 12:19 p.m.)

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

A			
AB 1:14	39:24 44:19 47:2	anticipation 34:18	61:11
able 17:22 23:4	50:4,10 52:15	anti-Western 11:17	attached 47:10
25:14 26:12 30:3	53:17,21	anybody 30:20	attain 22:1
32:24 37:8 49:17	agencies 57:15	Anyway 44:20	attempted 14:24
55:15,17 61:5	agenda 28:11,12	apart 41:4	attractive 60:22
abstract 40:2	ago 33:13	apocalyptic 10:1	audio 1:24
academic 9:10	agree 30:17 34:20	apologize 13:18,24	auspices 44:14
40:12	34:24 45:13	apparently 3:21	authoritative 16:3
academics 6:8	agreement 7:21	appear 15:20	authority 9:2 10:1
accept 19:12 33:14	38:12 39:8,20	appeared 25:1	13:3
36:9 54:4,14	47:17	appears 50:15	authorize 53:19
acceptable 27:18	agreements 39:8	Applause 62:3	authorized 43:19
accepted 33:6	ahead 46:9 50:24	appointed 6:13	authors 8:6
accepting 33:11	60:20	appreciate 44:21	available 3:9 36:12
45:15	Ahmadinejad 17:17	approach 35:5	aversion 22:15
access 8:4	22:19 24:3,10,21	37:21 39:5,6 41:6	Avner 1:21 2:16
accommodating	25:4 26:8 40:23	52:6 58:15 61:21	3:21 26:14 45:12
57:1	Ahmadinejad's	Arab 9:13	53:24
accord 41:17,19	23:18 25:1	Arabia 19:23	avoid 23:18 24:18
achieve 39:1	air 57:15	Arabs 50:20	44:9 56:12
actions 56:24	airplane 5:11	Ardebili 6:19 10:4,5	axis 52:20
activism 9:6,22	Al 53:9	area 29:19 31:4	Ayatollah 7:15,23
activists 6:17 7:18	Algiers 41:17	argument 30:22	10:5 11:10 12:20
add 47:22	allow 33:19 37:13	arguments 59:23	13:2 20:3
address 45:5 48:13	allowed 30:21,21	army 57:15,19	Ayatollahs 4:18
61:20	48:5	arrangements 28:1	12:21 51:5,14
addressed 60:21	alternative 35:24	arranging 37:8	Aytollah 6:18
administration 1:6	52:6	arrest 7:24 9:20	a-half 13:23
3:19 15:9,17 16:19	ambassador 13:15	44:3 58:9	a.m 1:12 3:2
27:1,6 30:3 41:8	43:12 44:11	arrested 8:2,3 9:3	
42:23 55:12	America 51:10	21:14	B
administrations	American 6:6 7:8	article 2:19 34:13	back 24:19 30:17
18:1	18:1 56:21 57:3	41:19	43:13,13 51:21
admitting 61:23	Americans 3:18 5:1	arts 11:3,4	56:3,8
advance 23:14 24:8	6:6 7:8 21:10 43:4	Asian 9:14,14	bad 36:11
advantage 39:18,18	60:19	Asians 5:12 9:15	Baghdad 44:10
adversaries 19:21	amount 27:4 31:5	asked 3:4 40:19,20	ballot 23:24
advocated 10:19,19	analyze 5:18	aspect 33:10	bargain 22:4 25:15
10:20,23	analyzing 25:8	aspects 37:24	barrel 56:1
advocating 6:17	ancient 60:10	Assembly 8:12	based 11:5
affairs 5:9 41:20	animal 22:23	assertiveness 22:13	basement 29:10
affect 3:17 38:6	annihilation 19:14	assess 5:14 7:5	32:5
affective 22:13	announcing 44:5	assessing 58:15,20	basic 5:3
Afghan 9:13	answer 40:17 49:22	assessment 5:9	basically 10:2 53:10
Afghanistan 15:11	answers 2:22 51:19	associate 39:3	basis 5:12
20:14,22 21:2	antagonistic 18:2	assuming 60:15	basket 60:1
	anti 11:17	assumption 45:3	BATON 1:5
	anticipate 17:13,18		battle 45:21
			Ba'athist 19:14
			beat 42:3,6
			becoming 37:11
			began 19:2 42:22,23
			beginning 23:1 27:9
			52:17
			begins 61:3
			behavior 35:6
			Beijing 52:2
			beings 40:5
			belief 36:22
			believe 26:4,19 29:6
			35:23 36:4 52:22
			54:10,11 59:22
			believers 10:21,22
			believes 27:6
			best 52:13
			bet 24:6,10
			betting 24:6
			beyond 21:9 55:9
			bias 61:11
			big 29:14
			biggest 17:2
			bilateral 5:15
			bilaterally 52:14
			Bill 3:22 34:5 44:24
			49:2,12,21 50:9,14
			51:19 61:15
			bit 14:21 15:8 24:15
			61:11
			blockade 54:20
			blur 32:1
			board 3:19 4:1
			55:15
			bomb 29:6,9,10
			32:4,5 33:1 45:24
			Bonn 20:13
			books 10:17,18
			34:15 36:21 37:18
			boosting 23:18
			border 39:3 50:3
			bought 42:5
			bound 11:18 24:9
			breath 14:1 18:21
			brief 54:1
			briefly 28:15
			bring 11:12 44:17
			47:24 55:15

brings 49:10	56:17	closed 12:9,10	26:24	41:22 52:9 53:2
British 29:5	centrifuges 37:2,4	closely 46:4	connected 57:11	58:15
broad 27:24 28:11	century 59:18	Cohen 1:21 2:16	consensus 7:10	couple 48:18 53:6
Brookings 46:20	certain 4:18 10:10	3:21 26:17 45:14	54:17	55:4 59:8
brought 49:11	29:11 32:14 33:20	45:20 54:1,15	conservative 10:14	course 6:11 7:6 12:3
BRUMBERG 1:19	37:9 47:19 48:5,6	coherence 22:2	11:10,11	14:21 15:9,14
build 37:3 39:11	55:8	colleague 54:2	conservatives 4:20	court 10:6
building 37:1 44:8	certainly 24:6 28:9	colleagues 6:12	consider 60:19	create 23:4 28:3,6
built 37:3	30:2 39:18	college 11:3,4	considerations 3:18	31:13,15,18 51:22
bureaucracy 57:22	cetera 13:5	come 10:9 19:3	considered 56:5	created 9:4
bureaucratically	Chairman 34:8	26:15 42:5 55:14	considers 56:17	creativity 28:11
57:14	challenge 17:2	comes 24:19 26:3	consistency 14:15	31:5
burned 24:23	26:23	coming 29:22 47:17	17:9	credible 27:15
Bush 14:22,22 15:9	challenges 1:6	49:5 54:24	consistent 15:3	30:14 31:2 32:18
18:1	16:20,21 18:11	commands 60:11	consortium 37:15	55:2
	33:23	comments 26:18	51:22 52:12	crisis 17:23
C	challenging 61:17	commitment 16:4	constructive 20:11	critic 32:24
calculations 18:6	chance 44:21	Committee 6:13	20:17 35:12	critical 17:14 37:11
calibrate 40:15	change 24:2 36:8	common 10:9 52:23	contact 40:14 43:24	61:12
call 33:5,14 37:5	41:24 57:5	53:21 59:19 61:15	contacts 52:20	critics 61:20
49:14	changes 17:14	community 17:10	containment 36:6	critiques 25:21,22
called 10:21 11:12	58:21	compatible 39:13	context 28:1	cross 21:3
33:4	changing 21:22	compelling 59:23	contingent 46:22	crossing 29:18
calls 11:4	35:5 56:15	competition 39:15	continuation 35:17	Cuba 42:24 43:2
campaign 14:14,17	channels 12:2,4	completely 35:23	continue 6:23 19:13	cultural 58:13
canceled 20:20	13:11	complex 4:8 26:20	37:9 43:21	culture 7:13 40:5
candidate 14:13	chessboard 40:3	complexities 28:4	continued 39:14	current 7:13 14:22
capability 46:2	chief 10:12	complicated 17:6	continuing 44:5	31:12 32:15 35:4
capable 19:21 21:20	China 42:21 49:15	component 58:14	contrary 51:6	35:17 36:5
capacity 23:22 25:6	51:20	compromise 22:17	control 51:24 52:8	cut 52:19 60:6
38:14	Chinese 52:1 55:18	concern 38:2	53:3	C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S
capitols 55:20	Churchill 58:24	concerned 36:18	convenience 29:1	2:2
card 33:21	circumstances 46:6	52:6	convenient 29:15	
cards 60:17	city 36:14	concerns 49:13	Convention 1:15	D
careful 24:18 25:24	civilization 60:11	concessions 23:1	cooperate 38:19	daily 5:12
61:8	clarify 27:13	23:4 61:6	cooperation 20:8,21	danger 41:23
Carol 50:1	class 5:2 13:8	concluded 62:5	20:23 23:6	dangerous 33:1
carrots 42:1,4	clear 5:1 31:11	condition 48:18	coordination 22:1	DANIEL 1:19
Carter 42:22	41:21 49:6 54:24	conference 43:9,10	core 45:3	dare 43:4
case 5:19 13:23 24:5	clearly 16:8 32:6	44:14	corridors 49:3	date 55:20
31:23	clergy 2:6 4:17,19	confidence 44:8	costs 55:23	daunting 13:20
CATHWARI 50:13	5:2,8 13:8	configure 60:3	Council 6:14 9:15	day 22:23
caused 9:20	clerics 21:8 40:21	conflict 7:5 35:22	46:20	days 24:9
cease 19:12	40:23 58:4	44:10	countries 35:20	deal 4:8,15 6:24
cede 22:21	climbing 59:2	confront 26:22	38:18 39:3,4 44:17	9:21 20:6 27:8,11
center 1:15 11:5	Clinton 17:24	confrontation 27:9	50:18	27:13,20,22,23
46:19	close 29:9 30:5,9	confronting 1:12	country 29:17 36:14	28:6,10 32:15,18
central 9:14 35:1	40:1 46:1		39:9,22 40:4,15	32:23 33:3 36:3,22

40:11 44:18 45:21 45:23 46:3 53:2,14 55:17,19 56:22 58:4 dealing 15:23 17:2 18:10 36:12 44:3 52:14 60:10 deals 35:2 dealt 37:22,23 40:3 debate 5:23 7:1,11 14:10,18 debates 6:3 December 24:19 decent 24:11 decided 33:13 decision 19:12,15 28:24 declare 33:15 deeply 60:13 defend 60:13 defining 39:9 definitely 58:17 defy 26:6 degree 14:15 55:9 demands 23:8 depend 38:11,17 deprived 54:10 described 40:6 design 3:20 37:13 designated 10:5 desire 23:17 destiny 8:19 destroy 11:19 details 16:14 59:14 develop 45:6 development 38:20 devices 31:18 devise 28:6 dialogue 12:1 16:6 20:11,17 21:4 45:6 61:3 dialogues 42:20 difference 32:1,10 46:13 differences 30:8 different 6:3,22 30:6 44:4 46:15 47:9 59:20	differently 40:8 difficult 26:19 28:8 28:19,20 31:17 32:21 33:8,23 56:11 59:2 61:14 difficulties 28:18 dilemma 26:21 32:22 33:8 46:9 dinner 43:14 59:1 diplomacy 22:18 23:20 60:3 diplomatic 12:2,11 13:11 16:18 18:8 18:13 diplomats 56:21 direct 8:19 21:4,11 40:14 direction 16:14 49:20 59:14 directly 15:1,10,17 15:21,24 21:17 32:8 40:19 42:17 57:11 disadvantage 5:1 discriminated 30:19 discuss 3:15 5:18 discussed 16:22 discussion 3:6,10 15:4 23:12 35:12 39:23 53:22 59:5 59:11 61:10,22 discussions 20:13 dismissed 12:19 distance 17:22 distinction 32:10,11 33:20 distrusted 42:11 disturbing 35:21 diversity 5:22,23 7:1 divided 60:13,14 documentary 50:2 domestic 2:10 6:9 14:5 17:8 18:22 22:6 dominant 10:2 22:10	donkey 42:3 doors 12:9,10 doubt 60:9 dozens 10:18 draw 38:11 drug 53:4 dynamics 3:15,17 18:5,5,17 Dysinger 49:24 50:1 D.C 1:2,16 <hr/> E <hr/> E 1:15 earlier 56:13 early 14:14 41:8 42:14 East 27:2 28:3 Ebadi 48:3 economic 56:6 education 13:4 effect 9:4 14:18 effective 19:18 36:23 effectively 14:12 18:19 24:3 effort 18:2,12 39:6 44:12,17 eight 14:10,19 28:15 either 4:12 39:17 42:3 52:13 elected 24:4 election 14:12 17:15 53:17,19 elections 23:15,21 24:8,24 element 31:14 elements 15:3 elite 24:12 25:23 embodies 26:21 embracing 19:21 21:12 enable 18:17 encounters 4:17 Enduring 20:24 enforce 25:15 engage 14:11,20 15:1,17 20:11 26:21 30:3 51:8 61:12 engaged 13:10 14:24 25:13 engagement 2:11 14:6,14 23:10 59:20 61:2 engages 46:14 61:4 engaging 1:12 26:24 enormous 4:6 16:20 27:4 31:5 37:22 enrich 37:9 enrichment 35:1,4 36:9,11,17 37:12 37:14 54:11 61:18 ensure 47:12 enter 49:9 entire 7:20 8:10 entirely 19:23 entitled 54:12 entity 40:3 epic 21:21 61:6 epithets 20:5 equivalent 22:13 establish 44:1,13 established 43:1,23 establishes 49:18 establishing 42:12 establishment 21:1 et 13:5 ethic 48:2 ethical 48:10,12 ethics 5:5 European 50:18 Europeans 5:11 events 4:3 eventually 44:19 ever-changing 18:15 evil 51:11 52:20 exact 10:22 example 27:19 28:21 42:2 excitement 24:20 exclusive 46:15 existed 19:24 existential 56:5 exists 47:6	expanded 25:5,6 expect 26:3 experience 20:13 41:3 experiences 53:8 experts 6:14 8:12 25:1 29:6 explore 7:3 expressed 16:5 expressing 21:14 extend 18:12 extent 17:19 extremely 28:8 32:21 33:1 37:10 52:2 <hr/> F <hr/> face 16:19 51:9,11 58:11,17,22 faced 56:10 FACING 1:6 fact 14:13 19:3,10 20:10 21:11 25:4 47:15 52:11 factional 21:4 failing 36:5 failure 17:13 fairly 56:11 Falimuse 51:1 fall 41:4 falling 16:18 false 14:21 15:8 familiarity 18:4 family 19:17 far 34:10 36:18 52:5 58:22 Farooq 50:13 fated 59:18 favored 14:13 fears 56:23 feed 42:4 feel 37:6 40:8,13 46:4 59:4,15 feeling 24:20 feet 16:12 feminist 12:24 feminists 8:8 Fifth 31:21
---	--	---	---

figure 8:13 10:17 11:8,11	40:1 44:21 51:2	government 19:22 21:2 24:21 40:11 52:24 57:12	historical 6:2 56:2	inauguration 15:15
figured 26:4 61:1	frankly 21:5 35:15 46:24 47:5	governments 20:9	history 10:17 15:20 17:12 19:6 57:1	incentives 23:6 47:15
figures 11:13 12:6 57:20	fratricidal 25:13	grand 4:18 6:18 7:15 10:4 11:9 12:19,21 13:1 22:3 55:17	Hobbesian 22:15	including 27:19 29:13 46:15 52:11
film 50:2	Freedom 20:24	greater 37:14,14	hold 49:22	incorporate 18:14 47:8
final 20:4 24:14 56:19	frustrations 20:19	grew 57:13	holds 25:24	increase 38:3,4
finally 26:2 33:9 43:22	Fuladium 51:1,2	ground 20:22 37:17 38:15 51:23 59:19	holy 9:23,24	increased 44:8
find 12:10 35:8 36:15 38:5 39:2 42:15,19 45:5 47:8 47:11 49:18 52:2 59:19 61:6,15	fully 45:22	grounds 61:15	home 23:19	increasingly 52:22 53:8
fire 19:12	fundamental 15:22	group 12:17 34:10 34:22 38:20,23 44:6	honeymoon 16:18	independently 57:19
firewalls 31:9,14,19	further 23:2,8 52:4	groups 12:24 13:1 38:12	honor 3:5	India 49:15
first 5:17 6:11 11:4 15:19 16:3,5 19:2 19:5,24 22:5 34:24 40:6 41:9	Furthermore 27:22	Guard 50:8 57:8,21 57:23 58:5,11	hope 3:23 6:23	individual 25:23 37:24
five 12:22 18:21 37:4 49:4	future 33:24 38:3 39:14 46:10	guardian 57:13	hopefully 46:8	individuals 6:22
flat 41:10	<hr/> G <hr/>	guess 34:12 35:20 37:6 40:1 43:22	hostage 17:23	inevitably 35:22
firewalls 31:9,14,19	gasoline 49:10	Gulf 44:9 56:22	hostile 39:15	infinitely 17:6
flawed 46:6,8	Gaza 16:23	<hr/> H <hr/>	house 7:24 9:20 58:9	influence 5:3,8 6:9 9:12 12:15 17:4 18:12 23:23 25:5 38:3
folks 55:13	general 18:22 39:5	handle 46:10	Huda 1:19 2:8 3:13 4:11,14 47:22 57:8	informal 42:24
follow 3:14	generally 6:8 16:12	hands 60:17 61:13	human 7:17 8:6 12:15,24 13:4 22:23 40:5	information 17:3
footnote 5:13	Geneva 20:13	happen 14:1 26:12 42:6 48:5 51:13	idea 8:13 9:23 15:20 51:14 54:2	infrastructure 30:6
force 57:15	gentleman 51:4	happened 6:21	ideas 7:22 8:9	ingrains 22:15
forces 38:11,14	gentlemen 58:24	happens 39:21	ideology 57:13	inherently 33:3
foreign 1:6 9:11 12:12 43:9 46:20	gestures 58:21	hard-liners 22:12	image 7:19	inhibit 35:18
form 38:22 53:19 59:19	getting 23:3 24:14	head 10:6 42:8	imagination 20:18	initiative 18:9,13
forth 7:18 11:18 33:17	give 10:9 31:8 34:15 38:1 39:24 41:10 51:14,23	hear 11:17 12:9 50:9,21 55:13 56:22	imagined 7:11	inside 53:2
forum 44:14	given 36:4	heard 41:21 43:17 59:22 60:20	immediate 34:3	inspections 36:23 37:10,11,14 61:19
forward 60:8	giving 13:19	hearts 39:15	immediately 4:24	installations 33:12
found 7:9,10,12 10:15	go 32:3 45:3,12 50:24 51:21 52:3 58:22	heavy 61:18	impact 18:6 55:22	Institute 1:1,24 34:8
four 3:11 5:18 24:11 59:6 60:9 62:1	going 6:4 13:18 14:4 16:15,20 18:9 23:3,6 26:12 27:12 30:19 31:2 33:3 39:17 42:6 46:5 49:20 52:11 53:15 53:17 55:11,14,17 55:19 57:4	help 16:17 53:3	Imperial 11:18	institution 44:15
fourth 31:20 38:10	good 3:3,24 4:15 30:13 31:1,18 49:21 50:11 51:14 51:17 53:24	high 6:13 30:11	implications 18:15	institutional 22:2
frame 47:9	gotten 21:13 55:20	highlight 28:15	importance 4:6 6:2 35:14,20 45:9 58:18 61:23	integrates 38:8
framework 2:11 14:6 30:23	govern 8:14		important 4:19 5:21 6:5,15 11:9,20 12:20,23 13:11 25:9 32:12 42:13 53:23 55:11 59:13	integrity 32:13
Frank 1:22 2:4 3:4	governing 38:12		importantly 39:2	intelligence 29:5 57:14
			impossible 28:8,9 28:19	intense 39:15
			inaudible 8:13 29:11 51:3,4	intent 29:19
				interest 33:13 43:2
				interested 6:17 11:21 39:5 54:9
				interesting 8:9

15:14 47:24 52:3	42:18,19 43:4 58:3	Japan 28:22,22,23	lack 18:4	longer 8:4 41:1
interests 60:2,12	Iranians 15:18,18	29:2,4,12,17,20	Ladies 58:23	44:22
interfere 41:20	15:24 23:13 30:23	30:5,8,9,20,20	laid 45:3 61:17	long-term 39:6
interlocutors 21:9	42:9 44:2 47:13	31:24 32:11	landscape 31:19	look 19:9 30:20
internal 3:15 5:23	48:1 51:9 52:21	Japanese 31:23	languages 12:22	36:3,17 56:2,8
7:1,11 18:4,15	57:2,2 60:24 61:12	Jim 34:13 36:19	larger 14:6 58:3	59:24
19:15 23:11 25:22	Iranian's 32:8	Jirga 53:18	late 3:22	looking 22:21 36:3
38:13 41:20	Iranian-Americans	join 62:1	laudable 23:17	44:6
internally 7:4 56:12	40:13	judgment 29:1	launch 23:14	lose 3:8 13:24 24:9
international 51:23	Iran's 5:2 17:5,11	31:10	layers 28:4	lot 20:19 25:8 30:6
internationally	17:19 18:4,6,10,11	June 23:15	lead 3:14 8:18 23:2	45:1 46:17 55:13
44:12	18:15,22 23:11,20	jurisprudence	32:20	lots 60:15
interpret 17:22	24:2 26:5 31:21	10:18	leader 8:2 9:18,19	loud 41:21
interpretation	32:6 35:5 36:24	jurist 10:8	57:22	loudly 41:14
18:14	38:3 50:19 56:15	justice 10:13	leaders 5:17,20,22	love 30:24 50:9
interviewed 10:15	Iran-Contra 17:23		8:19 9:2 22:12,24	Loya 53:18
introduce 48:23	Iraq 11:22 15:13	K	58:18,19	Luers 1:21 2:20
introduction 4:11	16:6 19:12 38:5,20	Karimi 6:19 11:10	leadership 24:2	3:22 34:5,6 50:14
intrusive 37:10	38:24 39:1,4,11,14	12:8	56:6 60:14	51:20 54:13 61:17
involvement 9:6	39:19,20 43:10	Karzai 52:24	leading 8:1 17:15	
Iran 1:12 2:14 3:15	44:3,18 47:3	Kathwari 50:12,14	leads 35:21	M
3:21 4:8,22 5:2,10	Iraqi 38:11,14	Kavirdar 58:9	leaning 59:3,4	Mahmoud 17:17
5:12,19 7:2 8:22	Iraqis 39:17	keener 18:14	leave 61:10,22	maintain 38:15
11:5,19 12:13 13:3	Iraq's 38:10,19	keep 27:11 32:12	left 12:18 20:3	39:10 55:12
15:4,10 16:13 17:2	irrelevant 47:20	45:24	28:14 32:23 35:3	major 8:21 10:8
17:15,22 18:3 19:3	Islam 6:18	kept 48:19	54:3	17:11
19:4,6,20 20:10	isolation 36:6	key 61:5	legalese 30:22,24	maker 50:2
21:24 24:19 26:4,4	Israel 27:19 33:9,10	Kharrazi 43:9	legitimize 15:6	makers 6:6 18:23
26:13,21,22,24	33:14,15 50:19	Khatami 26:9	Let's 51:18	making 21:20
27:11,23 28:1 30:1	Israeli 33:21	Khomeini 8:24 10:6	level 5:6 7:14,15,15	Maloney 1:20 2:12
30:3,4,15 31:22,24	issue 2:14 26:18,23	20:3 25:14	22:1 36:10 37:9	3:14 13:14 46:12
32:4,24 33:17,21	26:24 27:21 28:2	Khomeini's 6:12	42:18 61:18	55:4
35:2,8,9,15 36:6	29:14,22 30:4 35:1	8:11 57:11	levels 6:13	manage 61:1
37:1,21 39:12 40:2	36:13,21 37:11	kill 54:6	liberal 11:3,4	mandate 57:10
40:13 41:13,20	45:6 46:17,23 47:2	kind 16:10 22:14	lie 60:17	maneuver 61:14
42:2 43:12 45:8,15	47:4 48:1,9,15	27:20 31:14 33:20	limited 18:20 31:1	manufactured 7:19
45:24 46:1 49:18	49:5,11,13 51:6	34:3 46:3,10	limits 31:24	mapping 5:9
50:3 51:8 52:18	52:8 56:15 61:13	kissing 59:3	line 29:18,18 33:2	Markov 49:13
53:20 54:4,5 55:23	issues 10:10 16:24	know 4:21 6:8	lines 22:20	marvelous 34:18
56:3,23 59:18,24	19:11,17 26:20	10:22 11:15 16:11	linkages 27:24	maximize 18:24
60:5	30:24 34:1 35:13	16:13,14 19:3,6,8	linking 24:1	ma'am 49:23
Iranian 2:6 4:17	35:19 38:13 41:3	20:10 21:3,18,19	listen 56:24	measures 44:9
9:12 13:21 14:4	46:15 48:5,6 52:10	22:20 38:13 40:17	listening 60:9	58:22
15:1 19:9 21:6,20	56:4,4 58:17 61:5	40:18 43:6 59:13	little 44:21 56:2	mechanics 24:15
22:6,11,24 24:8	items 5:18	59:14 60:5	60:5	meet 6:21
25:13 27:20 29:22		known 59:21	live 42:18	meeting 21:6 24:22
29:23,24 30:18,22	J		logical 48:9	meetings 6:23 20:19
31:10 37:24 42:18	JANUARY 1:9	L	long 29:20 42:8	MEK 44:4

member 52:19 57:23	months 13:23 24:8 29:8	31:17	33:14 35:1,6 36:3 36:24 45:5,15	organize 3:5
mention 6:5 41:13 41:15	moral 48:2	negotiating 27:8	46:17,22 47:4,10	organized 38:21 43:6
mentioned 58:8	morning 3:3,6,12 4:15 59:23 61:22	negotiation 25:18 47:12	47:11,17,24 53:14 61:13	organizers 43:10
message 42:9	morning's 4:3	negotiations 19:4 33:24 46:22 47:5 47:14,19	number 5:11 16:24 19:11 20:5	organizing 4:2 34:9
Messiah 9:24	Mossadegh 42:12	neighboring 39:21	N.W 1:2,15	outcome 23:23 46:13
met 10:14	Mosun 58:9	neighbors 7:6 9:8 50:20 56:20	<hr/> O <hr/>	outset 36:4
metrics 58:15	Mount 1:15	neither 38:24	Obama 41:8 55:12	overarching 22:3 44:15
Mezbah 11:12 12:6	move 57:21,21 58:20	never 23:3 29:3 43:1 50:21 54:4,9	observations 51:24	overture 23:14,24 24:1
mics 45:19	movement 26:10	new 1:6 3:19 15:15 16:19 18:8,11,13 27:1,2,3,5 34:15 36:20 37:18 42:12 49:4 50:1 53:17,19	obstacle 15:23	over-Kremlinology 24:18
mic's 13:17	moving 55:9	newspapers 50:15	obvious 27:5,10 31:11	O-F 2:2
middle 27:2 28:2 42:17	MPT 45:24	nine 9:9	obviously 16:15,21 33:18,19 46:23 47:9 52:3 55:8	<hr/> P <hr/>
mid-2009 30:4	mullahs 50:8 58:2 55:10	nine-and 13:22	occasion 4:5	page 3:13
mile 58:5	multilateral 39:6 55:10	Nobel 48:4	offering 34:3	painful 55:23
military 12:4 35:22 54:17 55:1	multinational 37:15 51:22 52:8	non 46:21	office 55:14	Pakistan 53:5
mind 60:9	multi-track 46:21	non-believers 10:21	official 52:1	Pakistani 9:13
minds 39:17	Musavi 6:19,19	non-cleric 40:21	officially 42:17	panel 1:12 3:5 34:10 62:4
mind-set 22:10	Muslims 7:8	non-clerics 40:22	oil 16:18 55:24	panelists 1:18 62:2
minister 25:17 43:9	<hr/> N <hr/>	non-dominant 7:3	old 19:21 42:9	paradox 32:14
minority 10:20	name 3:4 51:1	non-existent 17:5	omitted 50:10	Paris 42:20
minute 12:18 28:17	names 4:19,21 6:5	non-nuclear 27:12 27:12,14 28:22	ongoing 36:11	parliamentarians 21:8
minutes 3:22,24 13:21 28:14 59:9	narrow 61:14	non-possession 32:2	opacity 33:15	part 8:11,11 9:15,17 29:4 33:10 41:2 46:18 54:5
minute-plus 28:17	nation 7:21 37:22 41:2,12 59:24 60:1 60:11,13,14	non-proliferation 27:3 28:12	open 15:20 21:11 42:20	PARTICIPANT 48:21,24
misguided 23:21	national 38:24 45:9 57:19	non-religious 58:19	opening 2:3 4:10 11:21 13:11	participants 20:15
misread 17:10	nations 5:14	normal 21:9	openly 32:6	particular 20:12 25:23 48:15 57:12 58:20,22 60:21 61:20
missed 17:10,24	naval 54:20	Northern 53:5	operation 20:24 49:19	particularly 4:18 10:24 15:5 16:17 22:12 38:17 49:2 55:24 56:8
mistake 45:17	navigate 18:18	noticed 4:24 43:1	operationalize 31:6	partisanship 25:14
mocking 7:13	navy 57:15	notices 5:10	opportunities 1:6 17:24 21:10	PASSING 1:5
MODERATED 1:22	near 20:2 47:3 59:17	notion 31:6 49:9	oppose 53:9	path 60:20
MODERATOR 3:3 13:13 26:14 34:5 44:24 45:18 46:11 47:21 48:17,22 49:21 50:11,22 51:17 53:24 55:3 57:6 58:23	nearly 28:9	notoriously 23:20	option 54:18,20 55:1 60:22,23	Peace 1:1,24 34:8
Mohammad 26:9	necessary 21:22 22:3	NPT 29:4,11,21 31:23 32:13 33:10	options 36:11 60:19 60:20	peaceful 29:19 38:19
moment 9:23 14:3 16:10 49:22	need 8:17,18 9:21 22:9 26:3 27:14 32:6 33:19 37:13 48:11 56:23 58:6	nuance 58:1	order 3:12 36:6 39:10 51:6,12	
monitoring 36:23	needs 35:10	nuclear 2:14,18 18:11 22:17,21 26:22 27:20 28:2 28:12 29:2 30:1 31:10 32:2 33:11	organization 44:4	
Montazeri 6:11 7:24	negotiate 27:10			
Montazeri's 58:8				

peaked 15:5	Poland 42:21	preconditions 35:9 40:20 41:12	problems 8:22 27:4 34:19 37:21 38:9 53:5 60:1	Q
people 21:6 22:4 40:11 42:10 46:2 52:9	policies 18:10 19:11 19:17 21:12 35:18 36:5,8	predecessor 14:23 26:9	proceed 3:20 61:2	Qaeda 53:9
perceive 22:24	policy 1:6 3:17 6:6 11:9 12:12,13 15:3 16:12,17 17:10 18:23 19:9 22:1 25:6 27:2,3 35:21 37:1 39:19 48:3 58:21	predecessors 14:24	process 46:13,14,18 47:6 48:15	Qamar 45:12 47:21 57:6
perception 24:1	political 6:17 8:21 8:22 9:1,5 16:4 18:5 24:12 27:11 27:15,24 28:10,24 28:24 29:1 30:15 31:3 33:6	predict 17:18 23:22 26:6,8,10,12	Procurement 51:2	Qamar-ul 1:19 2:8 3:13 4:11
perfect 20:18	politically 27:18	predictions 26:6	produce 20:21,21 31:15	Qom 11:5
period 47:18 56:9	politics 5:5 6:10,10 9:5 13:21 18:22 22:6 23:12 26:5	prefer 40:23	professional 34:10 34:21	quarter 59:18
perpetuate 47:13	poorly 25:2	preferred 27:8	Professor 49:24,24	question 15:11 33:2 40:17 47:10,18 49:1 50:5,23 51:4 55:5 56:20 58:1
Persia 51:3	poses 27:1	pregnant 13:23	professors 7:17	questioning 10:1
Persian 44:9	position 20:4 24:11 29:10 41:11 56:4 56:15	prepared 15:17	program 3:13 18:11 35:6 36:17,24 51:24	questions 2:22 4:1 11:22 33:23 45:2 48:11,12,18 61:19
person 10:14 12:19 58:6	positions 9:18,18 10:9	preparing 9:23	programs 31:10	quick 51:19 55:5
personal 9:10	positive 52:19	present 58:13	progress 15:23 47:1	quickly 7:9,10,12 22:8
personalities 24:17 25:10	positively 23:23	presentation 3:23	progressive 13:3	quite 40:8 57:17
perspective 18:18	possession 32:1	presentations 49:1	progressives 8:8 12:24	quote 10:23
persuade 27:23	possible 11:24 35:19 38:9	presented 53:6	project 46:19	R
petroleum 49:10	possibly 32:17 52:14	presenter 40:6	promises 20:20	raise 33:21,22 34:1
philosophical 8:22	post 17:11	presidency 25:24	proposal 36:20 37:15 51:21	range 38:12 46:14
philosophy 9:6	post-revolutionary 15:19 19:5	president 7:14,20 14:22,22 17:17 22:19 25:4	propose 41:5 49:13	reach 39:8
phonetic 51:2 58:9	post-Taliban 21:1	presidential 14:13	proposition 36:2 37:20 40:2 45:11 45:13	reached 59:17
physical 6:1	Powell 43:8,18	pressing 22:22	prospects 34:22 23:18	reaching 38:12
pick 10:10	power 22:11,14 37:23 39:22 60:2	pressure 23:2 48:6 50:17 56:8,14	prospect 18:24 23:18	read 37:18
picked 6:20	powers 39:21 55:8	pressures 56:10	proposed 1:24	readiness 21:15
Pickering 34:13 36:19	practice 36:10	presume 26:1	pro-Western 4:20	reading 50:15
picture 24:23	precedence 43:3	presumption 23:19	public 8:4 16:3	reaffirm 41:18
pitfalls 18:18	precedent 56:2	pretty 49:5	publically 54:14	real 15:23 25:2 42:18 46:9,9 55:23 60:2,12
place 1:15 23:15 25:17,20 31:9	precious 60:5	prevent 11:23	publicly 8:15,20 21:14	realism 55:13 56:20
planning 19:17	precisely 36:21	preventing 11:24	provided 1:24	realistic 55:22 56:14
plays 23:11		preview 2:19 34:13 34:17	proven 19:20	realize 53:1,4
pleased 34:9		price 16:18 55:24	protect 57:9,10	really 9:24 17:14 21:8,22 22:3 23:22 48:2,10 59:6
pledging 19:13		primary 58:20	proved 19:20	realpolitik 5:4
plus 49:4 61:18		prime 25:17	provided 1:24	reason 6:20 10:10 57:4
podium 4:12 26:15		principle 36:9	public 8:4 16:3	reasonable 24:6,10
point 11:12 13:6 17:14 22:5 23:9 25:12 27:17 29:24 30:10,18 31:20 32:3 54:15,24 56:19 59:13,17		prior 18:1	publicly 8:15,20 21:14	reasons 7:2 33:6
pointed 55:6		private 42:24	publishing 34:14	
points 18:22 24:14 28:15,17 54:2 55:5 59:9		Prize 48:4	purpose 52:23	
poised 14:8		probably 11:11,14 27:23 32:19 41:9 41:21 44:13 53:11 53:19	push 31:23 33:18	
		problem 30:1 37:24 45:8	put 25:17 30:23 55:2	
		problematic 33:4	P-R-O-C-E-E-D... 3:1	
			p.m 62:5	

recall 25:18	47:18 55:18	rhetoric 7:3 11:14 11:17 12:8 54:6	scrutinize 46:4	61:8
recognize 25:11 38:2	release 41:18	ridiculous 43:20	seated 13:19	sidetrack 48:12
recognizing 43:15	releasing 44:2	right 34:3 35:3 38:21 42:15,22	second 6:18 29:24 36:2	siege 44:2
recommending 46:19	relevant 18:23	43:11 49:20,23	secondly 41:15 42:14 47:2	sign 49:12
reconciliations 38:24	religion 5:15	53:12 54:11 58:12	Secretary 43:8,18	signals 41:10 61:3,4
referred 50:14	religious 5:17,19,22 8:14,17,18 9:2 11:6 13:3 57:13,20 58:18	rightly 27:6 55:6	section 43:2	significantly 38:4
refined 49:10	reluctance 55:9	rights 7:17 8:6 10:19,20 12:15,24 13:4,5 22:22,23,24	secure 57:12,12	similar 39:23
reflect 6:24	reluctantly 52:24	ripple 9:4	security 28:1 38:23 56:18 57:3	simply 17:10 55:2 56:6,23
reflects 17:18	rely 57:3	risk 23:24	see 7:19 10:13 22:17 22:18 25:3 27:19 31:22 39:19 43:5 45:19 49:17 51:18 52:5 57:4	sinking 55:24
reform 26:9	remain 31:22	roll 30:17	seeks 60:12	sir 48:20 50:24
reformers 4:20 13:1	remains 25:4	room 1:14 30:12,13 31:1 59:15 61:14	seen 60:24	sit 49:3
reforming 13:4	remarked 58:24	rooms 16:22	selective 20:11	sites 12:21,22
refugees 41:18	Remarks 2:3,22	route 52:4	self-doubt 60:15	sitting 4:13 26:11 43:15
regard 39:22 52:15 53:9	remember 24:19	routinely 26:6	seminarians 8:6 9:13,14	situation 16:23 23:5
Regarding 2:14	reminded 60:4	rule 17:20	seminary 7:17 10:24 12:14	six 12:22 24:8,9 34:22 40:2
regime 8:11 15:1,6 19:14 20:6 21:20 24:15 25:13,19 41:1 56:10 60:14	renewing 44:10 53:22	rumor 32:3	semi-authoritarian 17:20	skeptical 61:9
region 16:24 18:13 35:13 36:1 37:23 38:8,18 39:9 41:4 44:17 47:3 49:14	repeated 16:9	run 52:12 58:5	send 56:21 61:2	skirmishes 5:24
regional 5:4 6:10 38:9 44:14 60:2	report 29:5 38:20	runs 57:18	senior 52:1	slade 33:5,5
regionally 44:13	Republican 50:8	Russia 49:14 50:20 51:20 52:10,12,13	sense 9:4 22:11 24:24 46:17 48:2 52:17 55:13	slate 25:1
registered 41:14	require 27:23 28:10	Russians 55:15	serve 44:15	small 30:13 31:19 58:21
reinforce 38:23	resistance 36:13		set 3:12 11:2 37:21 39:8 43:8 46:22 52:10 57:9 59:6,23	society 58:3
reinvent 32:20	resolve 18:2	S	setback 25:2	solution 2:18 30:11 30:12,14,14 31:1,2 31:15,17 34:18 38:9
reiterated 16:9	resolved 27:21	Saban 46:19	settle 3:9	solutions 34:4
reiterating 41:11	respect 16:13 23:10 23:11 60:11	safeguard 31:13 33:11	severity 29:23,24 30:11	solving 45:8
relate 14:5	respond 48:1,3	sake 47:14	shift 8:10	somebody 49:6
relation 30:19	response 48:8	sanction 49:4	shifting 56:3	somewhat 23:21 25:2 30:12 61:9
relations 5:15 11:21 12:9,11 14:4 35:24 46:21	responsible 9:10	sanctions 35:4 36:5 49:8,9 52:4 55:5 55:11,22 60:23	Shirin 48:3	soon 14:1
relationship 2:10 3:20 4:9 18:3 19:22,24 20:3 21:22 35:11 38:6 45:8 50:6,6 52:18 57:24 58:2,2	restructure 32:20	Sanei 12:20,23 13:2	Shi'i 6:18 9:22 10:1	sophisticated 57:18
relationships 9:8	result 16:11 56:6	sat 43:10,13	short 47:1,18 48:19	sort 6:2 7:3 14:3 20:2 21:9,21 23:10 25:18,21 27:24 46:18 47:15 48:1,8 53:18 59:19
relatively 14:1	results 20:22 37:1	satisfied 45:23	shortcomings 17:21	so-called 27:11 31:6
	rethinking 9:22	Saudi 19:23 20:6	shortly 4:23	speak 3:12 4:12,13 12:2,2 22:6 54:22
	retracted 8:23 9:1	saving 51:8,11 58:11,17,22	sides 20:15 35:18	speaker 42:8
	reverse 19:15	saying 28:19 51:10 58:14		
	reversed 19:10	says 41:19		
	Review 34:15 36:20 37:18	scene 2:10 14:6 17:8		
	revolution 8:23 9:15 17:13 20:1 26:10 57:10	scholars 6:8 8:14,18		
	revolutionary 17:12 57:8,21 58:5,11	sciences 11:1		
	re-shifting 9:22			

speakers 3:11 59:8	strong 7:13 36:13	tailor 23:19	thank 4:14 13:12,14	thrown 60:24
speaks 7:20 17:21	structure 32:13	taint 24:3	13:15 26:17 34:4,6	THURSDAY 1:9
specifically 4:15	structured 41:1	take 3:8,19 4:1,11	44:22 48:21,24	time 3:8,9 6:4 10:12
19:8 41:6,13	student 24:22 58:8	11:23 23:15 25:20	51:14 62:2	15:18,19 16:3
spectrum 16:4	students 7:17 8:5	26:15 29:18 30:2	thanking 62:1	18:20 19:1,5 25:8
speech 48:4	9:11,12 10:23,24	31:4 43:24 44:1	Thanks 26:13	29:20 30:2 31:9
speeches 59:1	12:14 24:22	51:18	themes 4:2	35:3 40:1 42:12
spend 25:8	studies 11:6	taken 41:6	theocracy 8:17	46:10 47:9,18
spoilers 49:20	study 10:24 11:1	takes 50:3	theological 5:24	48:17 54:8,8,19
spoke 62:2	38:20	Taliban 53:1	8:21	56:1,10 61:6
spoken 58:10	stunned 21:5	talk 4:15 12:3 13:19	theology 10:2 11:1	timely 31:6,20
sporadic 5:24	subject 4:5	13:20 16:1 21:10	they'd 52:12,13	timing 23:9,24
stability 38:10,15	subjects 34:11 45:9	21:15 23:13 35:8	thing 11:3 13:20	tiny 30:13
39:11	submission 42:4	36:15 40:20,23,24	35:3 43:23	today 11:17 16:23
stage 35:24 47:19	substantial 17:4	41:11 42:10,17	things 4:24 5:4 12:8	19:22 20:9 22:10
stake 32:14	substitute 22:14	43:4,8,19 44:21	16:15 22:18 51:10	22:20 26:18 30:1
stand 48:23	succeed 23:3 35:5	50:10	53:21 59:2	59:6 60:22 62:2
Standoff 2:18	successful 18:9 19:1	talked 15:10 22:4	think 4:19 5:6 6:5	told 8:3 44:20
start 28:21 51:19	successor 24:3	37:17 43:19 52:1	6:24 7:18 8:8 9:21	Tom 34:13 36:19
59:12 61:3	suggest 3:9 28:6	42:23 44:8	10:11 11:8 12:5,11	Tomorrow 22:22
starting 15:12 17:12	46:21	talks 42:24 44:10	12:23 13:8,10 14:2	tone 42:1,13
state 8:15,20 9:23	suggested 52:22	47:14	14:8,18 15:4 18:23	tools 31:12
28:23 29:3	suggests 42:2	team 7:2	21:19 23:2,17,23	top 61:4
stated 54:19	Suite 1:1	technical 27:15	24:5,17 26:5,23	total 7:21
statement 41:10	sum 4:2 59:5	28:10 30:15 31:3	27:6 28:5,18,20	touched 40:9
statements 8:24 9:1	summit 43:9	technically 30:8	29:23 30:8,17,24	track 5:20,20,21
9:3	support 8:24 21:4	Tehran 19:10 21:14	31:4,15,24 32:8,22	12:3
states 1:1,24 11:19	38:23 49:19 52:23	21:23 22:10 41:14	33:6,21,22 34:2	trade-off 37:6
20:12 21:17 29:13	60:21	Tehran's 60:17	40:8 41:24 42:14	trafficking 53:4
33:12 35:14 36:12	supported 9:18	tell 43:3	45:1,14,17,20 46:3	training 57:17
38:1 45:4 50:18	supporters 12:14	tempering 18:10	46:12,14,24 48:10	transaction 51:12
step 60:8	supporting 8:12	ten 28:15	48:11,13 50:14	transcript 1:24
steps 43:24 44:1	13:2 38:19	tense 20:2	51:13 53:11,13,22	transferring 12:13
56:12	supposed 44:22	term 24:12 42:1	54:3,4,5,6,17,20	transformed 19:23
stick 54:22	supreme 6:14 8:2	47:1	54:22,23 55:6,18	translate 12:12
sticks 42:1	9:17,19 10:6 57:22	terms 11:9 16:6	56:13,20 58:4,12	transport 53:4
stood 24:23	sure 31:18	18:24 20:23,23,24	58:19,21 59:9,15	traveled 4:22
stop 13:6 44:20	Suzanne 1:20 2:12	27:2 32:15 48:10	61:21	traveling 4:23 5:10
stopping 37:12	3:14 13:13 45:12	55:10 56:15 58:11	thinker 6:15 8:1	5:12
strategic 18:6 20:23	46:11 49:2 52:18	terrible 53:8	thinking 9:5 48:8,9	treat 28:22 29:15
56:4	53:11 55:3 59:12	terrific 4:5 59:8	third 6:19 30:10	44:5
strategies 18:17	Suzanne's 40:17	terrorist 44:4,6	37:20	tricky 27:13
strategy 31:21 32:9	system 17:20 31:13	test 21:19	thought 5:23 61:17	trip 6:22 43:6
37:13 60:23	32:17,18,20	testament 20:5	thousands 8:5,5	troops 38:5
Street 1:2		tested 29:3 33:17	12:14 37:2,3	troubled 4:8
strength 22:11	T	testing 45:24	three 5:18 6:5,20	truly 54:4,8
stretch 20:18	table 19:4 54:18,23	texture 40:9,10	three-quarters	trumps 36:24
strictly 41:5	55:2		43:14	try 14:4 18:21 28:14

31:5 34:23 42:15 45:18 59:8 trying 13:20,22 18:24 31:22 34:1,2 53:3 58:12 59:5 Turkey 50:20 turn 10:4 13:1 17:11 TV 10:9 twist 17:11 two 3:13 5:20 11:13 12:3,6 15:12 16:8 20:8 24:14 25:3 43:11 47:9 54:1 59:1 two-fold 47:5 type 35:22 T-A-B-L-E 2:2	35:14 36:12 38:1 45:4 50:17 university 11:2 50:1 unpredictability 17:19 unpredictable 17:6 23:21 unravel 32:17 unrealistic 55:18 unsuccessful 36:24 unwillingness 16:1 urgent 46:24 53:12 use 54:6 useful 56:21 USIP 7:2 38:21 usually 5:17 US-Iran 2:18 U-turn 19:18	Washington 1:2,15 1:16 14:9,20 15:21 18:17 21:5,23 26:11 waste 54:8 watch 56:24 watched 43:13 watershed 14:3 16:10 59:17 way 11:20 12:10 13:11 28:23 29:6 30:23 33:18 35:8 36:15 38:5 39:2,14 42:17 44:5 45:5 47:8,11 48:14 49:12 59:5 ways 29:2 49:17 weapon 28:23 29:2 29:3 weapons 32:2 45:15 weather 43:20 web 12:21,22 week 34:14 41:9 weeks 29:5,8 welcome 4:4 went 7:2 24:21 West 9:8 11:18 we'll 42:3 we're 14:2 23:2 24:1 26:11 32:23 36:18 37:12 44:5 54:24 55:10,14,15 55:19 58:14 we've 14:10,19 37:17 42:10 43:6 52:20 55:20 59:11 59:15,20,22 60:4 William 1:21 2:20 willing 40:18 willingness 16:6 21:15 38:18 winner 48:4 Winston 58:24 wisdom 49:8 wish 51:17 Wisner 1:22 2:4 3:3 3:4 13:13,15 26:14 34:5 44:24 45:18	46:11 47:21 48:17 48:22 49:21 50:11 50:22 51:17 53:24 55:3 57:6 58:23 withdraw 38:4 withdrawal 39:19 woman 59:3 women's 10:19 13:5 words 7:23 57:1 61:24 work 39:17 45:19 48:14 53:10 workable 20:8 45:6 working 35:19 39:12 50:2 57:2 world 5:9 22:15 32:3 40:12 41:12 55:8 worth 27:10 46:5 59:10 wouldn't 41:22 wrap 3:23 write 20:4 written 10:18	8:1 9:1 10:1 11:1 12:1 13:1 14:1 15:1 16:1 17:1 18:1 19:1 20:1 21:1 22:1 23:1 24:1 25:1 26:1 27:1 28:1 29:1 30:1 31:1 32:1 33:1 34:1 35:1 36:1 37:1 38:1 39:1 40:1 41:1,19 42:1 43:1 44:1 45:1 46:1 47:1 48:1 49:1 50:1 51:1 52:1 53:1 54:1 55:1 56:1 57:1 58:1 59:1 60:1 61:1 62:1 10 3:11 4:11 5:11 6:11 7:11 8:11 9:11 10:11 11:11 12:11 13:11,21 14:11 15:11 16:11 17:11 18:11 19:11 19:24 20:11 21:11 22:11 23:11 24:11 25:11 26:11 27:11 28:11,14 29:11 30:11 31:11 32:11 33:11 34:11 35:11 36:11 37:11 38:11 39:11 40:11 41:11 42:11 43:11 44:11 45:11 46:11 47:11 48:11 49:11 50:11 51:11 52:11 53:11 54:11 55:11 56:11 57:11 58:11 59:11 60:11 61:11 62:11 11 3:12 4:12 5:12 6:12 7:12 8:12 9:12 10:12 11:12 12:12 13:12 14:12 15:12 16:12 17:12 18:12 19:12 20:12 21:12 22:12 23:12 24:12 25:12 26:12 27:12 28:12 29:12
U	V			
ultimate 54:21 ultimately 17:1 27:18 45:20,22 umbrella 57:4 UN 38:22 42:19 44:13 49:4 unable 35:8 unacceptable 35:23 unashamed 21:12 60:20 undermine 32:9,17 undermined 18:3 understand 5:6,21 6:1 7:6 22:9 23:5 25:9 40:10 understanding 5:2 5:3 understood 13:9 41:22 underway 47:12 unexpected 26:3 unfeasible 54:3 unfulfilled 20:20 unhappy 46:3 Union 50:18 United 1:1,24 20:12 21:17 29:13 33:12	valuable 3:8 various 17:24 verge 14:9 Vernon 1:15 viable 20:17 view 7:4 22:12,15 27:17 28:5 32:19 54:18 virtually 32:15,23 40:10 virtue 14:12 vis 31:9,9 vision 57:11 vital 45:9 vociferous 25:22	Washington 1:2,15 1:16 14:9,20 15:21 18:17 21:5,23 26:11 waste 54:8 watch 56:24 watched 43:13 watershed 14:3 16:10 59:17 way 11:20 12:10 13:11 28:23 29:6 30:23 33:18 35:8 36:15 38:5 39:2,14 42:17 44:5 45:5 47:8,11 48:14 49:12 59:5 ways 29:2 49:17 weapon 28:23 29:2 29:3 weapons 32:2 45:15 weather 43:20 web 12:21,22 week 34:14 41:9 weeks 29:5,8 welcome 4:4 went 7:2 24:21 West 9:8 11:18 we'll 42:3 we're 14:2 23:2 24:1 26:11 32:23 36:18 37:12 44:5 54:24 55:10,14,15 55:19 58:14 we've 14:10,19 37:17 42:10 43:6 52:20 55:20 59:11 59:15,20,22 60:4 William 1:21 2:20 willing 40:18 willingness 16:6 21:15 38:18 winner 48:4 Winston 58:24 wisdom 49:8 wish 51:17 Wisner 1:22 2:4 3:3 3:4 13:13,15 26:14 34:5 44:24 45:18	46:11 47:21 48:17 48:22 49:21 50:11 50:22 51:17 53:24 55:3 57:6 58:23 withdraw 38:4 withdrawal 39:19 woman 59:3 women's 10:19 13:5 words 7:23 57:1 61:24 work 39:17 45:19 48:14 53:10 workable 20:8 45:6 working 35:19 39:12 50:2 57:2 world 5:9 22:15 32:3 40:12 41:12 55:8 worth 27:10 46:5 59:10 wouldn't 41:22 wrap 3:23 write 20:4 written 10:18	8:1 9:1 10:1 11:1 12:1 13:1 14:1 15:1 16:1 17:1 18:1 19:1 20:1 21:1 22:1 23:1 24:1 25:1 26:1 27:1 28:1 29:1 30:1 31:1 32:1 33:1 34:1 35:1 36:1 37:1 38:1 39:1 40:1 41:1,19 42:1 43:1 44:1 45:1 46:1 47:1 48:1 49:1 50:1 51:1 52:1 53:1 54:1 55:1 56:1 57:1 58:1 59:1 60:1 61:1 62:1 10 3:11 4:11 5:11 6:11 7:11 8:11 9:11 10:11 11:11 12:11 13:11,21 14:11 15:11 16:11 17:11 18:11 19:11 19:24 20:11 21:11 22:11 23:11 24:11 25:11 26:11 27:11 28:11,14 29:11 30:11 31:11 32:11 33:11 34:11 35:11 36:11 37:11 38:11 39:11 40:11 41:11 42:11 43:11 44:11 45:11 46:11 47:11 48:11 49:11 50:11 51:11 52:11 53:11 54:11 55:11 56:11 57:11 58:11 59:11 60:11 61:11 62:11 11 3:12 4:12 5:12 6:12 7:12 8:12 9:12 10:12 11:12 12:12 13:12 14:12 15:12 16:12 17:12 18:12 19:12 20:12 21:12 22:12 23:12 24:12 25:12 26:12 27:12 28:12 29:12
	W			
	wait 34:17 wall 59:2 Walsh 34:14 Walter 1:15 want 5:13 12:9,10 33:18 40:20 52:3 wanted 12:5 58:1 war 5:5 7:5 11:22 11:23 12:1 19:13 56:9,12 60:22 warning 31:8,20	Washington 1:2,15 1:16 14:9,20 15:21 18:17 21:5,23 26:11 waste 54:8 watch 56:24 watched 43:13 watershed 14:3 16:10 59:17 way 11:20 12:10 13:11 28:23 29:6 30:23 33:18 35:8 36:15 38:5 39:2,14 42:17 44:5 45:5 47:8,11 48:14 49:12 59:5 ways 29:2 49:17 weapon 28:23 29:2 29:3 weapons 32:2 45:15 weather 43:20 web 12:21,22 week 34:14 41:9 weeks 29:5,8 welcome 4:4 went 7:2 24:21 West 9:8 11:18 we'll 42:3 we're 14:2 23:2 24:1 26:11 32:23 36:18 37:12 44:5 54:24 55:10,14,15 55:19 58:14 we've 14:10,19 37:17 42:10 43:6 52:20 55:20 59:11 59:15,20,22 60:4 William 1:21 2:20 willing 40:18 willingness 16:6 21:15 38:18 winner 48:4 Winston 58:24 wisdom 49:8 wish 51:17 Wisner 1:22 2:4 3:3 3:4 13:13,15 26:14 34:5 44:24 45:18	46:11 47:21 48:17 48:22 49:21 50:11 50:22 51:17 53:24 55:3 57:6 58:23 withdraw 38:4 withdrawal 39:19 woman 59:3 women's 10:19 13:5 words 7:23 57:1 61:24 work 39:17 45:19 48:14 53:10 workable 20:8 45:6 working 35:19 39:12 50:2 57:2 world 5:9 22:15 32:3 40:12 41:12 55:8 worth 27:10 46:5 59:10 wouldn't 41:22 wrap 3:23 write 20:4 written 10:18	8:1 9:1 10:1 11:1 12:1 13:1 14:1 15:1 16:1 17:1 18:1 19:1 20:1 21:1 22:1 23:1 24:1 25:1 26:1 27:1 28:1 29:1 30:1 31:1 32:1 33:1 34:1 35:1 36:1 37:1 38:1 39:1 40:1 41:1,19 42:1 43:1 44:1 45:1 46:1 47:1 48:1 49:1 50:1 51:1 52:1 53:1 54:1 55:1 56:1 57:1 58:1 59:1 60:1 61:1 62:1 10 3:11 4:11 5:11 6:11 7:11 8:11 9:11 10:11 11:11 12:11 13:11,21 14:11 15:11 16:11 17:11 18:11 19:11 19:24 20:11 21:11 22:11 23:11 24:11 25:11 26:11 27:11 28:11,14 29:11 30:11 31:11 32:11 33:11 34:11 35:11 36:11 37:11 38:11 39:11 40:11 41:11 42:11 43:11 44:11 45:11 46:11 47:11 48:11 49:11 50:11 51:11 52:11 53:11 54:11 55:11 56:11 57:11 58:11 59:11 60:11 61:11 62:11 11 3:12 4:12 5:12 6:12 7:12 8:12 9:12 10:12 11:12 12:12 13:12 14:12 15:12 16:12 17:12 18:12 19:12 20:12 21:12 22:12 23:12 24:12 25:12 26:12 27:12 28:12 29:12
			Z	
			zero 35:4 Zionist 11:18	
			\$	
			\$40 56:1	
			1	
			1 3:1 4:1 5:1 6:1 7:1	

30:12 31:12 32:12	38:14 39:14 40:14	59:17 60:17 61:17	18:20 19:20 20:20	15:2 16:2 17:2
33:12 34:12 35:12	41:14 42:14 43:14	62:17	21:20 22:20 23:20	18:2 19:2 20:2
36:12 37:12 38:12	44:14 45:14 46:14	16 3:18 4:18 5:18	24:20 25:20 26:20	21:2 22:2 23:2
39:12 40:12 41:12	47:14 48:14 49:14	6:18 7:18 8:18	27:20 28:20 29:20	24:2 25:2 26:2
42:12 43:12 44:12	50:14 51:14 52:14	9:18 10:18 11:18	30:20 31:20 32:20	27:2 28:2 29:2
45:12 46:12 47:12	53:14 54:14 55:14	12:18 13:18 14:18	33:20 34:20 35:20	30:2 31:2 32:2
48:12 49:12 50:12	56:14 57:14 58:14	15:18 16:18 17:18	36:20 37:20 38:20	33:2 34:2 35:2
51:12 52:12 53:12	59:14 60:14 61:14	18:18 19:18 20:18	39:20 40:20 41:20	36:2 37:2 38:2
54:12 55:12 56:12	62:14	21:18 22:18 23:18	42:20 43:20 44:20	39:2 40:2 41:2
57:12 58:12 59:12	14 3:15 4:15 5:15	24:18 25:18 26:18	45:20 46:20 47:20	42:2 43:2 44:2
60:12 61:12 62:12	6:15 7:15 8:15	27:18 28:18 29:18	48:20 49:20 50:20	45:2 46:2 47:2
11:15 3:2	9:15 10:15 11:15	30:18 31:18 32:18	51:20 52:20 53:20	48:2 49:2 50:2
11:15-12:15 1:12	12:15 13:15 14:15	33:18 34:18 35:18	54:20 55:20 56:20	51:2 52:2 53:2
12 3:13 4:13 5:13	15:15 16:15 17:15	36:18 37:18 38:18	57:20 58:20 59:20	54:2 55:2 56:2
6:13 7:13 8:13	18:15 19:15 20:15	39:18 40:18 41:18	60:20 61:20 62:20	57:2 58:2 59:2
9:13 10:13 11:13	21:15 22:15 23:15	42:18 43:18 44:18	180-degree 8:10	60:2 61:2 62:2
12:13 13:13,21	24:15 25:15 26:15	45:18 46:18 47:18	19 3:21 4:21 5:21	20 3:22,24 4:22 5:22
14:13 15:13 16:13	27:15 28:15 29:15	48:18 49:18 50:18	6:21 7:21 8:21	6:22 7:22 8:22
17:13 18:13 19:13	30:15 31:15 32:15	51:18 52:18 53:18	9:21 10:21 11:21	9:22 10:22 11:22
20:13 21:13 22:13	33:15 34:15 35:15	54:18 55:18 56:18	12:21 13:21 14:21	12:22 13:22 14:22
23:13 24:13 25:13	36:15 37:15 38:15	57:18 58:18 59:18	15:21 16:21 17:21	15:22 16:22 17:22
26:13 27:13 28:13	39:15 40:15 41:15	60:18 61:18 62:18	18:21 19:21 20:21	18:22 19:22 20:22
29:13 30:13 31:13	42:15 43:15 44:15	17 3:19 4:19 5:19	21:21 22:21 23:21	21:22 22:22 23:22
32:13 33:13 34:13	45:15 46:15 47:15	6:19 7:19 8:19	24:21 25:21 26:21	24:22 25:22 26:22
35:13 36:13 37:13	48:15 49:15 50:15	9:19 10:19 11:19	27:21 28:21 29:21	27:22 28:22 29:22
38:13 39:13 40:13	51:15 52:15 53:15	12:19 13:19 14:19	30:21 31:21 32:21	30:22 31:22 32:22
41:13 42:13 43:13	54:15 55:15 56:15	15:19 16:19 17:19	33:21 34:21 35:21	33:22 34:22 35:22
44:13 45:13 46:13	57:15 58:15 59:15	18:19 19:19 20:19	36:21 37:21 38:21	36:22 37:22 38:22
47:13 48:13 49:13	60:15 61:15 62:15	21:19 22:19 23:19	39:21 40:21 41:21	39:22 40:22 41:22
50:13 51:13 52:13	15 3:17,24 4:17 5:17	24:19 25:19 26:19	42:21 43:21 44:21	42:22 43:22 44:22
53:13 54:13 55:13	6:17 7:17 8:17	27:19 28:19 29:19	45:21 46:21 47:21	45:22 46:22 47:22
56:13 57:13 58:13	9:17 10:17 11:17	30:19 31:19 32:19	48:21 49:21 50:21	48:22 49:22 50:22
59:13 60:13 61:13	12:17 13:17 14:17	33:19 34:19 35:19	51:21 52:21 53:21	51:22 52:22 53:22
62:13	15:17 16:17 17:17	36:19 37:19 38:19	54:21 55:21 56:21	54:22 55:22 56:22
12:19 62:5	18:17 19:17 20:1	39:19 40:19 41:19	57:21 58:21 59:21	57:22 58:22 59:22
1200 1:2	20:17 21:17 22:17	42:19 43:19 44:19	60:21 61:21 62:21	60:22 61:22 62:22
13 2:12 3:14 4:14	23:17 24:17 25:17	45:19 46:19 47:19	1979 11:15	200 1:1
5:14 6:14 7:14	26:17 27:17 28:17	48:19 49:19 50:19	1980 11:15	20001 1:16
8:14 9:14 10:14	29:17 30:17 31:17	51:19 52:19 53:19	1980s 19:19	2001 15:10 20:14
11:14 12:14 13:14	32:17 33:17 34:17	54:19 55:19 56:19	1981 10:12 41:17	2002 21:13
14:14 15:14 16:14	35:17 36:17 37:17	57:19 58:19 59:19	1982 11:15	2003 15:5,10 20:14
17:14 18:14 19:14	38:17 39:17 40:17	60:19 61:19 62:19	1991 10:12	20036-3011 1:2
20:14 21:14 22:14	41:17 42:17 43:17	17th 1:2	1997 8:2	2005 17:15
23:14 24:14 25:14	44:17 45:17 46:17	18 3:20 4:20 5:20		2006 15:5 16:2
26:14 27:14 28:14	47:17 48:17 49:17	6:20 7:20 8:20	2	24:20 38:21
29:14 30:14 31:14	50:17 51:17 52:17	9:20 10:20 11:20	2 3:2 4:2 5:2 6:2 7:2	2007 15:12
32:14 33:14 34:14	53:17 54:17 55:17	12:20 13:20 14:20	8:2 9:2 10:2 11:2	2009 1:9 23:17
35:14 36:14 37:14	56:17 57:17 58:17	15:20 16:20 17:20	12:2 13:2 14:2	204 1:14

21 3:23 4:23 5:23
 6:23 7:23 8:23
 9:23 10:23 11:23
 12:23 13:23 14:23
 15:23 16:23 17:23
 18:23 19:23 20:23
 21:23 22:23 23:23
 24:23 25:23 26:23
 27:23 28:23 29:23
 30:23 31:23 32:23
 33:23 34:23 35:23
 36:23 37:23 38:23
 39:23 40:23 41:23
 42:23 43:23 44:23
 45:23 46:23 47:23
 48:23 49:23 50:23
 51:23 52:23 53:23
 54:23 55:23 56:23
 57:23 58:23 59:23
 60:23 61:23 62:23

22 3:24 4:24 5:24
 6:24 7:24 8:24
 9:24 10:24 11:24
 12:24 13:24 14:24
 15:24 16:24 17:24
 18:24 19:24 20:24
 21:24 22:24 23:24
 24:24 25:24 26:24
 27:24 28:24 29:24
 30:24 31:24 32:24
 33:24 34:24 35:24
 36:24 37:24 38:24
 39:24 40:24 41:24
 42:24 43:24 44:24
 45:24 46:24 47:24
 48:24 49:24 50:24
 51:24 52:24 53:24
 54:24 55:24 56:24
 57:24 58:24 59:24
 60:24 61:24 62:24

26 2:16

3

3 2:4 3:3 4:3 5:3 6:3
 7:3 8:3 9:3 10:3
 11:3 12:3 13:3
 14:3 15:3 16:3
 17:3 18:3 19:3

20:3 21:3 22:3
 23:3 24:3 25:3
 26:3 27:3 28:3
 29:3 30:3 31:3
 32:3 33:3 34:3
 35:3 36:3 37:3
 38:3 39:3 40:3
 41:3 42:3 43:3
 44:3 45:3 46:3
 47:3 48:3 49:3
 50:3 51:3 52:3
 53:3 54:3 55:3
 56:3 57:3 58:3
 59:3 60:3 61:3
 62:3

30 15:2,24 19:9

25:12 56:3

34 2:20

4

4 1:12 2:8 3:4 4:4
 5:4 6:4 7:4 8:4 9:4
 10:4 11:4 12:4
 13:4 14:4 15:4
 16:4 17:4 18:4
 19:4 20:4 21:4
 22:4 23:4 24:4
 25:4 26:4 27:4
 28:4 29:4 30:4
 31:4 32:4 33:4
 34:4 35:4 36:4
 37:4 38:4 39:4
 40:4 41:4 42:4
 43:4 44:4 45:4
 46:4 47:4 48:4
 49:4 50:4 51:4
 52:4 53:4 54:4
 55:4 56:4 57:4
 58:4 59:4 60:4
 61:4 62:4

4,000 37:4 40:4

40 10:3 33:12

48 2:22

5

5 3:5 4:5 5:5 6:5 7:5
 8:5 9:5 10:5 11:5
 12:5 13:5 14:5

15:5 16:5 17:5
 18:5 19:5 20:5
 21:5 22:5 23:5
 24:5 25:5 26:5
 27:5 28:5 29:5
 30:5 31:5 32:5
 33:5 34:5 35:5
 36:5 37:5 38:5
 39:5 40:5 41:5
 42:5 43:5 44:5
 45:5 46:5 47:5
 48:5 49:5 50:5
 51:5 52:5 53:5
 54:5 55:5 56:5
 57:5 58:5 59:5
 60:5 61:5 62:5

50,000 16:12

6

6 3:6 4:6 5:6 6:6 7:6
 8:6 9:6 10:6 11:6
 12:6 13:6 14:6
 15:6 16:6 17:6
 18:6 19:6 20:6
 21:6 22:6 23:6
 24:6 25:6 26:6
 27:6 28:6 29:6
 30:6 31:6 32:6
 33:6 34:6 35:6
 36:6 37:6 38:6
 39:6 40:6 41:6
 42:6 43:6 44:6
 45:6 46:6 47:6
 48:6 49:6 50:6
 51:6 52:6 53:6
 54:6 55:6 56:6
 57:6 58:6 59:6
 60:6 61:6 62:6

7

7 3:8 4:8 5:8 6:8 7:8
 8:8 9:8 10:8 11:8
 12:8 13:8 14:8
 15:8 16:8 17:8
 18:8 19:8 20:8
 21:8 22:8 23:8
 24:8 25:8 26:8
 27:8 28:8 29:8

30:8 31:8 32:8
 33:8 34:8 35:8
 36:8 37:8 38:8
 39:8 40:8 41:8
 42:8 43:8 44:8
 45:8 46:8 47:8
 48:8 49:8 50:8
 51:8 52:8 53:8
 54:8 55:8 56:8
 57:8 58:8 59:8
 60:8 61:8 62:8

79 57:9

8

8 1:9 3:9 4:9 5:9 6:9
 7:9 8:9 9:9 10:9
 11:9 12:9 13:9
 14:9 15:9 16:9
 17:9 18:9 19:9
 20:9 21:9 22:9
 23:9 24:9 25:9
 26:9 27:9 28:9
 29:9 30:9 31:9
 32:9 33:9 34:9
 35:9 36:9 37:9
 38:9 39:9 40:9
 41:9 42:9 43:9
 44:9 45:9 46:9
 47:9 48:9 49:9
 50:9 51:9 52:9
 53:9 54:9 55:9
 56:9 57:9 58:9
 59:9 60:9 61:9
 62:9

80 57:9

80s 10:11 57:23

801 1:15

9

9 3:10 4:10 5:10
 6:10 7:10 8:10
 9:10 10:10 11:10
 12:10 13:10 14:10
 15:10 16:10 17:10
 18:10 19:10 20:10
 21:10 22:10 23:10
 24:10 25:10 26:10
 27:10 28:10 29:10

30:10 31:10 32:10
 33:10 34:10 35:10
 36:10 37:10 38:10
 39:10 40:10 41:10
 42:10 43:10 44:10
 45:10 46:10 47:10
 48:10 49:10 50:10
 51:10 52:10 53:10
 54:10 55:10 56:10
 57:10 58:10 59:10
 60:10 61:10 62:10

90s 8:15