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MONDAY, JULY 25, 2005
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM

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WAR AND PEACE:
PREVENTING AND ENDING CONFLICTS

+ + + + +

SPEAKERS:

MALCOLM WALLOP, Asian Studies Member,
Task Force on the United Nations

ERIC SCHWARTZ, Council on Foreign Relations
Expert, Task Force on the United Nations

WILLIAM NASH, Council on Foreign Relations
Expert, Task Force on the United Nations

MODERATOR:

GARY MATTHEWS, Associate Director of the
Task Force on the United Nations,
U.S. Institute of Peace

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:00 a.m.

1
2
3 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well, good morning,
4 everyone. Are the acoustics up to the challenge this
5 morning? We had an event last week where there were
6 throughout the period of the same time slot, 10:00 to
7 noon, various stipulations bordering on unmentionable
8 gestures coming from the back of the room, which I was
9 told later did indeed have something to do with the
10 acoustics. So I will rely on you to let us know if we
11 have a problem.

12 I'm very pleased that you could be here
13 this morning, very commendable on a Monday. And I'm
14 Gary Matthews. I was with the U.S. Institute of Peace
15 Task Force that worked on the report and I also served
16 as editor of the Task Force Report which I hope that you
17 have taken a copy of. We have nicely newly recently
18 printed and bound copies out there and I think you will
19 find of interest if you have not already accessed it via
20 the web or otherwise.

21 Let me say just a few words of background
22 for those who might not have taken note of the history
23 of this. The Task Force Report itself was issued in
24 mid-June at an event up on Capitol Hill with Congressman
25 Frank Wolf and others present. And today's program is

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1 one, it's actually the fourth, in a series of follow-on
2 events that is looking at the specific issues and areas
3 covered in the various report chapters.

4 Today our discussion will concern the role
5 of performance of the United States in preventing and
6 ending conflicts, post-conflicts, stabilization and such
7 issues. And I will mention, of course, in a moment the
8 extremely well-qualified Panel that we have to discuss
9 that, not to mention some of our colleagues, those of
10 you present.

11 The other sets of issues, chapters, there
12 are five, are as follows: First, saving lives,
13 safeguarding human rights, genocide, responsibility to
14 protect, R2P as it's being rendered. Secondly,
15 reforming the United Nations in terms of management and
16 accountability, structures, the extreme ills of the
17 United Nations in that regard. Thirdly, deterring
18 catastrophic terrorism and proliferation of weapons of
19 mass destruction. And finally, helping people and
20 nations development and humanitarian assistance.

21 Very briefly, the genesis of the report
22 goes back to December 2004 when a provision in the 2005
23 Appropriations Bill mandated the establishment of a
24 Bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations. The U.S.
25 Institute of Peace was directed to organize the creation

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1 of the Task Force and the legislative initiative was
2 that the -- certainly at the behest and he should be
3 considered the father of it, Congressman Frank Wolf, who
4 is Chairman of the House of Appropriations Subcommittee
5 on Science in the Departments of State, Justice and
6 Commerce.

7 Now, the legislation specified that the
8 Task Force should study and develop findings and
9 recommendations regarding UN efforts to meet or not
10 meet, as the case may be, the goals of the charter,
11 signed in June of 1945, all of now 60 years ago,
12 addressing obstacles to achieving goals, especially
13 international peace and security and the promotion of
14 universal respect for the promotion of human rights and
15 fundamental freedoms.

16 The Bipartisan Task Force consisted of 12
17 distinguished members, co-chaired by Newt Gingrich,
18 former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
19 Senator George Mitchell, former Majority Leader of the
20 Senate. And the work of the Task Force was supported by
21 the efforts of 20 acknowledged experts from six leading
22 public policy institutions, the American Enterprise
23 Institute, the Brookings Institution, Center for
24 Strategic and International Studies, the Council on
25 Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation and the

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1 Hoover Institution.

2 And the emphasis throughout all of this was
3 to provide an assessment, based on American interest,
4 hence the emphasis on that in title, which would focus
5 concretely on what the United States could and should do
6 to help make the United Nations more effective and,
7 frankly, more relevant to the challenges and problems of
8 the 21st Century. That is why you will find, I hope you
9 will agree that you will find, in the report a strong
10 emphasis on actionable recommendations, because we tried
11 to keep it pragmatic and realistic and implementable,
12 rather than, you know, sort of a more ground menu of
13 things that would be nice, but not as pragmatic.

14 Today you will hear from key participants
15 in the Task Force who worked on the issues in this
16 particular Task Group. Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Task
17 Force Member, had a distinguished career in the United
18 States Senate of 18 years and extensive involvement in
19 all of the issues, frankly, that we took up in this
20 segment of the report. Senator Wallop is the senior
21 fellow with the Heritage Foundation and is also founder
22 and the Chair of the Frontiers of Freedom.

23 Next to Senator Wallop is Eric Schwartz,
24 who was the lead expert, the coordinating expert for the
25 particular group and did a lot of the basic drafting,

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1 hence the peerarchy (phonetic sp.) of the pros. And I
2 cannot overstate the degree to which, you know, he
3 worked very hard and delivered a fine product. Eric has
4 had extensive experience in high levels of the U.S.
5 Government, National Security Council at the White
6 House. He was with the United Nations some time ago and
7 was also a consultant for the House Subcommittee on
8 Asian and Pacific Affairs.

9 And I'm very please to note as well that
10 prospectively starting next week, I think, Eric will
11 take up new responsibilities with the position of United
12 Nations Deputy Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. And
13 the Special Envoy is none other than President Clinton.

14 So as I was telling Eric a moment ago, not bad to be a
15 deputy to a President.

16 Major General William Nash, who is also
17 with us this morning and was an expert with the Task
18 Force, is now with the Council on Foreign Relations and
19 brings his outstanding background with distinguished
20 service over three decades in the United States Army
21 with service also spanning Bosnia, Kosovo and earlier in
22 Vietnam, which happens to include places where I also
23 sojourned over the last 30 or 40 years.

24 So I would note very particularly General
25 Nash's experience and responsibilities in peace making

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1 and peacekeeping are part of a group cadre, if I may
2 term it, who work both ends of the gun, which certainly
3 qualifies him to speak to the issues we will be talking
4 about today.

5 We also have with us Ambassador Don Hays,
6 who most recently was Principal Deputy High
7 Representative of the Office of High Representative in
8 Bosnia and no stranger to UN issues, generally, because
9 of the responsibilities he had with the U.S. Mission to
10 the United Nations just seven years ago. And Bob
11 Perito, Bob are you here? Bob, who has many
12 distinctions, is also the author of "Where is the Lone
13 Ranger When We Really Need Him?" I book I recommend to
14 all of you available through the auspices of the U.S.
15 Institute of Peace.

16 And, Dr. Phebe Marr, we're delighted to
17 have you here. She looks at Iraq, but has broadened her
18 interests as well.

19 Let me with that conclude and then when we
20 get into discussion and we'll leave plenty of time for
21 that, I would just ask if you could kindly come up to
22 the microphone and then we'll capture you for posterity,
23 in that regard. Let's see, I think in chatting, Senator
24 Wallop and Eric, well, Eric is the lead expert and will
25 present a summary of the findings and recommendations of

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1 this particular section. And then we will get into
2 remarks by the other colleagues and then move to your
3 comments and questions. Thank you.

4 MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Gary. I'll talk
5 for about 20 minutes and basically summarize our section
6 of this Task Force Report. But I guess I should start
7 by thanking Senator Wallop and General Wes Clark, the
8 two Task Force Members, who led our particular subgroup
9 as well as co-experts, Bill Nash, Bathsheba Crocker from
10 CSIS, Mike McFaul from Hoover and Rick Barton, also from
11 CSIS, all of whom played a role in this exercise. And
12 also Gary who was although a USIP representative, I
13 think we sort of adopted him in our subgroup and he
14 played a critical role in both, I think more
15 importantly, the substantive aspects of our effort, but
16 also in the managerial aspects as well.

17 In our particular section of this report,
18 we address three key areas that relate to the capacity
19 and the effectiveness of the UN or more particularly the
20 capacity of UN member states, acting through the
21 Institution in preventing and ending conflict and
22 building stable societies, United Nations peace
23 operations, United Nations role in conflict mediation
24 and post-conflict peace building and the role of
25 international sanctions and addressing issues of

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1 conflict.

2 We consider a range of other issues in the
3 context of our work, which we are happy to talk about,
4 but those were the issues that ended up in our final
5 product. And to examine an ongoing operation that
6 illustrates many of the most compelling challenges that
7 the UN confronts in this particular area, a group of the
8 Task Force traveled to Haiti in March and a number of
9 our findings were informed by our visit to this
10 beleaguered country.

11 We began with the now, I think, well-
12 recorded observation that beginning nearly two decades
13 ago, both the magnitude and the scope of peacekeeping
14 began to expand dramatically. And while the pace of
15 activities slowed considerably in the mid-1990s, that
16 appears to have represented only a temporary lull. More
17 significant than the magnitude of these missions has
18 been the breadth of their focus and their complexity and
19 the expectations that have accompanied the United
20 Nations' presence.

21 UN peacekeepers and their civilian
22 counterparts have been asked, in essence, to help remake
23 societies coming out of internal conflict, to help
24 negotiate peace agreements, to reform security sectors,
25 to promote political reconciliation and effective and

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1 democratic governance and to rebuild systems of justice.

2 These missions have also come with far more complicated
3 security environments than traditional peacekeeping
4 deployments.

5 And in the absence of indigenous capacity,
6 UN military and police have been asked to ensure public
7 security in post-conflict environments, actually that's
8 a misnomer often environments of continuing conflict.
9 They have been asked to deter and to respond to threats
10 of violence and to mentor and train local security
11 forces.

12 Now, the recent report of the Secretary
13 General's High Level Panel on threats, challenges and
14 change identifies a correlation between increased
15 involvement of the United Nations in addressing civil
16 conflict and an overall decline in civil wars since the
17 early 1990s. And, indeed, many UN peace operations or
18 UN civilian missions supported by green helmeted
19 coalitions of the willing under national or regional
20 command have had to provide stability and to promote
21 economic and political development.

22 But as we all know so well, there have also
23 been tragic failures. The causes of disasters, such as
24 in Rwanda and in Bosnia, have been described in detail.

25 But suffice it to say, those and other cases, local

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1 populations have legitimate expectations of protection,
2 while key UN member states were unprepared to assist or
3 to equip peacekeepers to properly address threats to
4 civilians.

5 Today, informed by the conclusions of the
6 Secretary General's Blue Ribbon Panel on peace
7 operations, the Brahimi Panel, UN member governments
8 appreciate that UN peacekeepers often need very robust
9 capabilities to defend themselves, the mandate of their
10 missions and civilians in their areas of operation. At
11 the same time, peacekeeping doctrine is still heavily
12 relied on the notion that robust capabilities are often
13 the exception. That to quote the Brahimi Report and I
14 quote "Consent of the local parties impartiality and the
15 use of force only in self-defense should remain the
16 bedrock principles of peacekeeping."

17 However compelling the theory and logic of
18 this position, that the use of force is very much the
19 exception to the rule, it does seem to bear less and
20 less resemblance to what member states are actually
21 asking peacekeepers to do on a regular basis. In the
22 case of the current UN deployment in Haiti, for example,
23 where the mission is expected "to ensure a secure and
24 stable environment within which the constitutional and
25 political process in Haiti can take place," the Haitian

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1 National Police, the HNP, is the only formal indigenous
2 institution with an internal security mandate.

3 It is widely regarded by Haitians as
4 corrupt, as brutal in its methods, as ineffective as a
5 law enforcement entity, as unable to operate with
6 success against armed elements of the ex-military or
7 gangs associated with the former president. As a result
8 for peacekeepers and for international civilian police
9 ensuring a stable and secure environment requires
10 authority and willingness to launch attacks on police
11 outposts being occupied by opposition elements, to
12 conduct security sweeps through Port-au-Prince in
13 neighborhoods engulfed in violence and criminality and
14 to take on responsibilities for security sector reform.

15 Now, I think it's significant to point out
16 that the Bush Administration has endorsed this robust
17 role for peacekeepers in Haiti, as it has also supported
18 robust mandates elsewhere in recent years. And this
19 approach has coincided with statements by the
20 Administration and policies in recent years indicating
21 its general view that failed states matter, that
22 poverty, that political instability and that the absence
23 of effective and accountable government abroad can
24 create serious threats to U.S. interests at home.

25 The key question for the Task Force in the

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1 area of UN peacekeeping was whether we are prepared to
2 endorse the current practice of the United States and
3 other members of the Security Council in expecting and
4 demanding that peacekeepers regularly engage in a broad
5 range of robust security activities. If so, if we are,
6 then the United States and other governments must do
7 much more to enhance capacities if we want to ensure
8 substantial or even a modicum of success.

9 The Task Force took the position, which you
10 could debate, that the practical alternatives to consign
11 the United Nations to future failures or to dramatically
12 reduce the United Nations' role in efforts to manage
13 conflict and to build stable societies, those
14 alternatives are not acceptable. And the Task Force
15 identified several areas for enhancement.

16 On planning and strategic guidance, we urge
17 that the DPKO develop doctrine that recognizes the need
18 for capable forces in the new security environments in
19 which peacekeepers are mandated by the Security Council
20 to operate and recommended that the U.S. press for
21 member state acceptance of these new realities and their
22 resource implications. We urge that the UN develop
23 doctrine and strategy for multidimensional peace
24 operations that thoroughly integrate the security
25 dimension with the requirements of economic and

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1 political development, as recommended by a Simpson
2 Center paper. Last year we also recommended that
3 strategic mission plans should precede deployments and
4 should be drafted by senior level mission strategy
5 groups brought together prior to missions.

6 On the issue of sexual exploitation and
7 abuse, which was a major issue of concern to the Task
8 Force, we urge that the UN quickly implement a policy of
9 zero tolerance and that the U.S. strongly support
10 implementation of reform measure designed to ensure
11 uniform standards for all civilian and military
12 participants, to improve training programs, to increase
13 deployment of women in peacekeeping operations, to
14 encourage deployment of established, rather than patched
15 together, units to peacekeeping operations, to impose
16 accountability on senior managers, to support effective
17 data collection and management, to provide victims
18 assistance, increase staff to enhance supervision and to
19 organize better recreational activities for
20 peacekeepers.

21 These measures have recently been endorsed
22 by most UN members, the real challenge would be
23 implementation and, in particular, in funding, because
24 this stuff doesn't come cheaply. We also urge for
25 independent criminal investigative capacity. Most of

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1 these recommendations have been endorsed, but not all by
2 member states. We said that states that prove unwilling
3 or unable to ensure discipline among their troops, the
4 terms of which will be specified in the MOUs, between
5 troop contributors and the UN, that those states that
6 are unwilling to do so, should not be permitted to
7 provide troops to missions.

8 The UN and member states will also have to
9 enhance the capacity, both within countries where
10 peacekeeping missions are operating and elsewhere, for
11 prosecution of civilian members of missions who are not
12 immune from prosecution in the way that military
13 contingents are.

14 On rapid deployment we recommended that
15 member states substantially increase the availability of
16 capable designed forces properly trained and equipped
17 for rapid deployment. We recommended that DPKO prepare
18 and present to member states a plan to assist
19 governments to substantially augment their capabilities
20 in this area. In terms of U.S. support for peace
21 operations, we recommended that the U.S. sustain and
22 strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping
23 initiatives, such as the Global Peace Operations
24 Initiative, that the Department of Defense prepare
25 options for support of capacity enhancements and for

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1 U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with U.S.
2 national interests. In particular, we urge that DoD
3 look at upgrading its participation in the UN standby
4 arrangement system.

5 On information analysis and early warning,
6 we recommended that member states create a single co-
7 located team committed to tracking and identifying
8 conflict trends and anticipating requirements for
9 peacekeeping or peace building and that DPKO identify
10 and that member states generate resources required to
11 ensure that all missions have information gathering
12 capacity to ensure operational success.

13 We urged on Headquarter staffing and
14 funding U.S. support for the creation of a Senior Police
15 Force Management Unit to conduct assessments and assist
16 in the establishment of new operations. We suggested to
17 assess funding for first year Quick Impact Projects and
18 peace operations on a regular basis, as well as for the
19 full range of early disarmament, demobilization and
20 reintegration assistance when those have been identified
21 as critical for success. And the adoption of two year
22 budgets for support of peacekeeping to ensure greater
23 stability and permit more careful planning.

24 Finally, on the organization of DPKO, we
25 reaffirm the recommendation made by another subgroup of

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1 the Task Force dealing with organizational issues in
2 endorsing greater managerial independence for DPKO
3 within the UN Secretariat.

4 Let me move briefly, I think I'm still well
5 within my time. Let me move briefly now to the second
6 are of the study, the UN role in conflict mediation and
7 in peace building. Contemporary peacekeeping
8 deployments are designed to sustain the security
9 necessary to permit political reconciliation and
10 economic development. The likelihood of such
11 reconciliation and development is often affected by two
12 very critical elements: The quality and the character
13 of mediation and resolution efforts of parties to the
14 conflict acting in cooperation with regional and
15 international organizations and the coherence and
16 timeliness of the range of post-peace building, post-
17 conflict peace building activities relating to economic
18 and social development, development of the rule of law,
19 etcetera.

20 In the case of Haiti, on the first side of
21 that, for example, we suggested that earlier re-
22 engagement by UN mediators might have made a difference,
23 it might not, but might have made a difference with
24 respect to the events leading to the crisis of 2004.
25 The issue, of course, is broader than the Haiti case, in

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1 terms of pre-conflict negotiation. For example, in
2 Africa, in particular, there have been several cases of
3 peace processes that yielded, frankly, unsustainable or
4 flawed agreements and circumstances where more
5 intensive, more coherent and more broadly based UN
6 involvement may well have made a difference.

7 Some of us from the former Administration
8 lived through the implications of those flawed
9 agreements when we had to implement or work at
10 implementing the peacekeeping operations. I see Jim
11 Sher (phonetic sp.) smiling. In the area of post-
12 conflict peace building, the UN system has made progress
13 in recent years, witnessed the creation of the Bureau of
14 Crisis Prevention and Recovery, ably led by Julia Taft
15 until very recently, and DPKO missions, field missions
16 in many instances are better coordinated, are better
17 integrated than they have been in the past.

18 Don Hays can talk a lot more about that
19 than I can, but I think most would argue that there has
20 been some progress. At the same time, important
21 elements of the Secretariat that should actively support
22 the peace building components of peace operations have
23 been under resourced and the Secretary is, frankly,
24 without the operational capability to quickly deploy
25 judges, lawyers and other rule of law specialists to

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1 assist in field operations.

2 With respect to electoral assistance, one
3 expert in Haiti put it best probably when he complained
4 to our delegation about the lack of resources for the UN
5 field operations in his area. Using an automobile
6 related simile while reflecting on his own professional
7 transition from the private PDO sector to the United
8 Nations, he said going from the PDO community working on
9 electoral assistance to the UN was like going from a
10 Mustang to a tractor with a flat tire and no gas.

11 In this area, our Task Force recommended an
12 increase in U.S. support for the UN's Department of
13 Political Affairs to enhance the UN's ability in
14 conflict mediation and negotiations, to enhance support
15 for post-conflict peace building, we urge support of the
16 Peace Building Commission, the Peace Building Support
17 Office and the Voluntary Peace Building Support Fund.

18 And we recommended that the U.S. encourage
19 member government with expertise in this area to play
20 lead nation roles, in particular, on rule of law issues,
21 for example, in particular, peace operations, and we
22 supported an increase in funding for the peace operation
23 related activities of the Office of the High
24 Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN's Electoral
25 Assistance Division.

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1 Finally, and this is a very important
2 recommendation, I believe, we called upon the
3 Administration to strengthen the new office, State
4 Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization
5 and we urge Congress to provide it with the resources
6 necessary and requested by the Administration to play
7 its coordination role. I, frankly, can't really fathom
8 why getting this modest level of funding has been such a
9 struggle. It's a mystery to me and I would be very
10 grateful to learn why this office has had such a
11 difficult time getting off the ground, especially given
12 its modest requests.

13 Finally, the Task Force addressed the issue
14 of sanctions. Our findings and conclusions informed in
15 large measure by the Haiti experience are not earth
16 shattering. I don't think any of these are earth
17 shattering. But tend to reinforce lessons that others
18 have found in the past. The Security Council, in fact,
19 has imposed sanctions, I guess about, 16 times in its
20 history, although the numbers are a little squishy, but
21 I think we came up with 16. And most of the regimes,
22 mostly since 1990, and in most cases, in one manner or
23 another, they have been designed to help prevent or end
24 conflict.

25 And the Haiti case yielded several

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1 conclusions of general applicability and relevant to UN
2 action in this area, that sanctions are less likely to
3 be successful when targets perceive mixed signals from
4 the international community, that sanctions by
5 themselves and without a credible threat of the use of
6 force won't be effective especially when targets
7 perceive the conflict in winner-take-all terms, that
8 broad sanctions will be less successful if they cannot
9 target effectively constituencies with influence over
10 the political process, that labor and resource intensive
11 monitoring and enforcement efforts are critical, that
12 broad based sanction regimes are a blunt instrument that
13 can impose dire impacts on the poor.

14 Most of the other sanction regimes imposed
15 over the past 15 years seem to have reaffirmed these
16 lessons and offered some others. For example, sanctions
17 on Serbia and their impact on Macedonia demonstrated the
18 importance of measures to mitigate impacts on third
19 parties. And as the case of Iraq demonstrated the
20 failure to seriously consider war compensation for
21 Jordan then turning a blind eye to Iraqi smuggling and
22 even condoning it, which greatly enhanced Iraq's offers.

23 And finally, beyond the internal management
24 failures and the reports of malfeasance, the offer of
25 food arrangements pursuant to Iraq sanctions

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1 demonstrated broader limitations in the current capacity
2 of the UN Secretariat to administer sanction regimes
3 involving highly complex operational issues. Finally,
4 lack of consensus among key member states regarding
5 implementation, inadequate oversight and member state
6 complicity only compounded these problems.

7 Most debates about sanctions don't pay
8 adequate attention to how the proposed regime would
9 actually impact the actions of the targeted parties nor
10 do they consider sanctions as part of a broader strategy
11 toward promoting change. While UN sanctions resolutions
12 have established Sanctions Committees to monitor
13 implementation, member states bear significant
14 individual responsibility and there is often very little
15 effective coordination.

16 So we found that sanctions, obviously, must
17 be part of an overall strategy that integrates diplomacy
18 and coercion in a more informed and effective manner and
19 must be carefully targeted to avoid unintentional
20 impacts, to punish perpetrators and to create
21 incentives. Member states, we said and the Secretary,
22 must develop dedicated capacities for sanctions
23 analysis, implementation and enforcement.

24 Among the enhancement suggested by the High
25 Level Panel, we supported establishment by the Security

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1 Council and/or Sanctions Committees of more effective
2 monitoring mechanisms, guidelines and reporting
3 procedures for member states, more effective auditing to
4 oversee sanctions administration and improve procedures
5 within Sanctions Committees for consideration of
6 humanitarian impacts.

7 We also said that the Panel's
8 recommendation for the appointment of a senior secretary
9 official to address these issues would only be effective
10 if that official is supported by a strong team of
11 technical experts and diplomats. There is also, I
12 think, the broader existential question about whether an
13 institution like the UN is really capable of a
14 comprehensive effective approach to sanctions and we can
15 discuss that.

16 But we took the position implicitly that if
17 you want to do sanctions more effectively, these are the
18 actions that you would have to take. So those are the
19 three areas of focus of our report, of our section of
20 the Task Force Report. I think in our area there was a
21 remarkable degree of consensus. I think my colleagues
22 may have other views, but my own experience with the
23 full Task Force meetings was that our section received
24 or was subject to the fewest expressions of opposition,
25 subject to, I think, the least amount of very contested

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1 debate.

2 And I think that consensus is significant
3 and I think it's the hope of all of us that our
4 recommendations will form a major part of any reform
5 package that goes forward in the weeks and months to
6 come.

7 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you, Eric, very
8 much. That's a very good comprehensive overview and run
9 down on our findings and recommendations. And just
10 before I turn it to Senator Wallop, I mean, you
11 mentioned the flawed agreements that, you know, somehow
12 you -- those of you responsible in the Government,
13 whatever administration after to try to view it as best
14 you can, but, you know, when it's just struck time and
15 again, I think this will come up in our discussion today
16 of weak, deliberately weak, definitely so mandates from
17 the Security Council, some might have even further
18 watered down by the missions themselves, depending on
19 the leadership or particular UN mission.

20 And then one cannot overstate the degree
21 that there are inadequate resources, even when the
22 mandates are more or less there. But Senator, if I can
23 turn to you, at this point? Thank you very much.

24 SENATOR WALLOP: Gary, thank you, and Eric,
25 thank you for being with us and being our expert amongst

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1 those of us who are relative novices when it comes to
2 the functioning of the UN. And I say that we were
3 relative novices when it came to the function of the UN
4 and I think remain so. That is because it is almost
5 impossible to find anybody in charge or any level of
6 accountability in the areas in which we were tasked to
7 examine.

8 From the Secretary General on down,
9 virtually nobody can be fired, so when you set up, if
10 you do set up, a mission that somebody can actually
11 understand and it's not being fulfilled, it doesn't
12 matter. And there is a level of frustration that was
13 within our group and I think within the whole Task Force
14 for the whole thing that some how or another if UN is
15 ever going to fulfill the dreams and hopes of those of
16 us who believe that such an operation and function is
17 necessary, there's going to have to be major
18 restructuring within the functioning of the UN.

19 In some earlier places in this report,
20 there are suggestions to that effect. One of the things
21 that I thought was most obvious to those of us who went
22 down to Haiti -- is this reaching to the back from here?

23 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Can you hear? Okay.

24 Yes.

25 SENATOR WALLOP: There was no confidence

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1 amongst the locals, that there was a useful purpose to
2 the UN's presence. It wasn't amongst the police. It
3 wasn't amongst the helmeted people. It wasn't amongst
4 those in charge. It wasn't certainly amongst the people
5 who we met, the local civilians. There just wasn't any
6 confidence that there was an achievable purpose in the
7 UN presence, especially when you thought that just
8 before we got there, there was a raid by the bad guys on
9 a police station that was only some 200 yards away from
10 a blue helmeted force.

11 They raided the police station, let all the
12 prisoners out and the blue force sat and watched. And
13 that, of course, gives great confidence to the locals
14 that you might want to get in some kind of cohesion with
15 the UN presence, because by doing so, they are aligning
16 themselves with an element that is too weak to
17 accomplish any level of security for themselves, they
18 themselves. And in a country like Haiti, if you don't
19 have security for yourself, you have to join those who
20 will provide it and increasingly that's the bad guys.

21 We found in talking with the various
22 agencies down there that there wasn't really a sense
23 that they had an undertaking and obligation a mission
24 that they were really required to accomplish or what
25 would be accomplished were it to have been successful.

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1 The commander of the UN force was running for president
2 and didn't want to lose any people at his charge, so
3 that more or less he would refuse to commit them to any
4 kind of a risk in order to ensure some sort of safety
5 for the local population, some sort of challenge to the
6 police, who were generally, and as Eric mentioned quite
7 correctly, viewed as being corrupt and pretty harsh.

8 So you're a Haitian trying to make life
9 work and you find the police are corrupt and you find
10 the UN unwilling and you find the men in charge of them
11 unwilling to make any commitment of them, because they
12 might lose one of the troops under his charge, and you
13 have this unbelievable thing where you see truckloads of
14 blue helmets driving up and down streets and people
15 virtually ignoring them and they virtually ignoring
16 apparently whatever mission they might have been
17 assigned.

18 Part of the thing was to rebuild the
19 systems of justice and there was an attempt with the
20 U.S. presence, but by the time the U.S. left, that whole
21 business of new judges and reliable courts and reliable
22 administration of justice was simply gone. Nobody there
23 believed that it existed nor that it would come to
24 exist.

25 One of the things that we found or I found

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1 particularly distracting is there was a total
2 unwillingness to share any kind of intelligence from
3 local police, the UN police, the blue helmeted folks and
4 certainly the U.S. was not, but we weren't present, we
5 were sort of unwilling to share intelligence. And as a
6 consequence, one local person down there warned the UN
7 that the person that they were about to lease their
8 headquarters hotel from was the biggest drug thief,
9 kingpin in the Caribbean and they leased it anyway.

10 And he, the drug kingpin, sits in there
11 with all the intelligence necessary that the rest of the
12 operations don't have as they talk to each other in
13 operational senses. One of the things that was
14 distracting to me and a little bit heart breaking was
15 that member governments are not committed to the use of
16 force. They were committed to a presence, but a
17 presence without the promise of force, if necessary, is
18 a catastrophe in the minds of those who you are trying
19 to help.

20 They were unwilling to police and they were
21 unwilling to secure the police. There were I think
22 three police outposts within the country that were
23 occupied by the bad people and there was no attempt to
24 retain them. And if you are a Haitian and you see the
25 bad guys occupying your police station, it sends you a

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1 pretty good message that the bad guys are in charge.

2 And that was something that we heard more than once.

3 There is another thing that was very
4 discouraging to me, at least, is that some states,
5 France in particular, because of France's old
6 relationship to Haiti, had promised significant amounts
7 of capital for the rebuilding of and the support of the
8 UN operations and, essentially, that money has come in
9 drips and drabs, but nothing like as much has been
10 promised. And other member nations who had promised
11 resources were equally as recalcitrant in trying to
12 deliver the promised support.

13 So promises unmet was the thing that we
14 heard more than one time from more than one group of
15 people with whom we met. And promises unmet is a sign
16 of total discouragement if you think there is a chance
17 at all that your country may be returned to a safe state
18 where the elections that are scheduled to take place
19 could be held and could be held with some degree of
20 accountability and free and fair, and most of the ones
21 that I talked to were thinking, one, they probably won't
22 take place in August and probably when they do take
23 place, they won't be free and fair.

24 And the discouragement that goes with that
25 begins to make is possible for the big worry that all of

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1 us have is that Haiti becomes the sort of drug center of
2 the Caribbean without a good and solid police force,
3 without a good commitment to the member states, without
4 any encouragement or any promise that their lives will
5 be safe and secure. The drug people will be the ones
6 who deliver whatever safety there is and in order to
7 receive whatever safety there is available, you'll have
8 to be part of that whole operation.

9 Eric talked of sanctions. I have never
10 been an admirer of sanctions. Some of you may know I
11 have never admired the ones in Cuba. I have never
12 admired ones we have done in other places, primarily,
13 because the sanctions seem to hurt the people we say
14 we're trying to go and save and help. And if we could
15 do as Eric suggested, in the report, find a way to
16 target those sanctions so that they hit specific groups
17 and people that you want targeted and not the others,
18 then I would be more than a little bit enthusiastic, but
19 I don't see how you do it.

20 I, frankly, don't see how you do it.
21 Sanctions breed corruption. And we have seen it in
22 almost every instance. One of the other things that has
23 nothing to do with the UN, but has everything to do with
24 the U.S., I'm told that there has never been a year in
25 the history of the United States where we have not had

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1 sanctions against somebody. In the entire history of
2 the United States for some purpose and I'm quite
3 prepared to say that I don't think anyone of them has
4 ever succeeded in the purposes for which it was imposed.

5 So if we can't do that and if we've done it
6 rarely, it's hard to imagine how the UN given the
7 structure that it has, and given the fact that so many
8 people have a say in what is about to take place, it
9 seem almost impossible that we'll have a sanction regime
10 coming out of the UN that will work. Notwithstanding
11 the recommendations of the report which I agree, I'm not
12 optimistic that it will work if were done.

13 I want to say in closing a little bit that
14 it was a tremendous privilege to be down there with Eric
15 and Gary and General Clark and others. I think we
16 learned a lot. I think we had sort of synergistics, had
17 some questions that led us to conclusions that I think
18 in the end will be helpful. But the UN itself needs to
19 be the item of reform before all of these other things
20 begin to take place and begin to take sufficient shape
21 and have character enough to deliver on the promise of
22 peacekeeping peace operations and conflict mediation.
23 Because while there have been modest successes, there
24 have been more tragic and painful failures. And the
25 tragic and painful failures do not give confidence to

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1 the people whose life may be affected by the incoming
2 presence of the United Nations. Gary?

3 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you very much,
4 Senator Wallop. I think that's straight from the gut
5 and I must say resonates a lot. I remember when we were
6 down there in Haiti, as mentioned with General Clark, of
7 course, he and I and you and the others would often
8 times try to relate what we were seeing and hearing
9 there to the experience he and I and others have had in
10 Bosnia and Kosovo and other places. And a lot of what
11 you have said with using the Haiti example has a lot of
12 applicability, and not enough in the nicest sense of the
13 word to other places.

14 And sort of looking back through, as it
15 delivers from evil by William Jack Ross and commenting
16 on missions and problems, so it's appropriate for me to
17 turn to General Nash, at this point, who has also
18 soldiered in the very real sense in a number of these
19 places. Bill?

20 GENERAL NASH: Yes, to begin with, just to
21 state the obvious, of course, with respect to Haiti, if
22 there is ever a rationale and a reason why peacekeeping
23 and intervention operations by the UN and the United
24 States, I would point out, needs to be improved, it is
25 Haiti. You know, the joke is we have had five

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1 successful interventions in Haiti in the last 50 years.

2 We will probably keep doing it until we, you know, keep
3 screwing it up enough that we finally happen into doing
4 it right.

5 So a lot of this stuff I would argue is
6 much more than UN. It's also the United States. If you
7 ever want to look for a solution to a problem, the first
8 place to look is probably in the mirror, as we start
9 this stuff. The most important point I think I would
10 like to make today, I'm just going to hit a couple of
11 highlights, because Eric and the Senator have gone
12 through so well everything.

13 I think one of the most important things is
14 the title and the chapter, War and Peace, Preventing and
15 Ending Conflict, and I would argue with you that
16 prevention, mitigation, ending, and to use modern
17 terminology, the stabilization, reconstruction elements
18 of this that whole is one strategic theme and we need to
19 look at prevention, mitigation and the ending of wars as
20 one whole. And if we do that, then a lot of the things
21 of our policies, both U.S. policies, our policies with
22 respect to the United Nations and some of our bilateral
23 relationships, can lead us to more sensible policies.

24 The second point is just to underline the
25 presence of a uniform does not a military operation

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1 make. And we have fooled ourselves in the last dozen
2 years or so that just because we put a bunch of people
3 with uniforms, that we have got a coherent military
4 operation under way to achieve specific military
5 objectives in turn of which will accomplish the
6 political objective for which we went the force. And we
7 have fooled ourselves on that on a number of occasions
8 and we need to think that through.

9 And to put a force in place or to put a
10 bunch of uniforms in place without the necessary
11 objective design, without the necessary capacity given
12 is just a waste of time. And it may make you feel good
13 for a while, but I guarantee you, and we can start
14 listing the places, it will just cause trouble in the
15 future and we get to do it again or we get to do
16 something bigger or we just have a mitigated disaster.

17 Just before this meeting, I was in another
18 meeting here at USIP and we had a special envoy from the
19 UN talking about some work in Kosovo and lo and behold
20 he began by describing to us the difference of views of
21 the people in the countryside from the people in the
22 capital of Kosovo. Oh my God, what a revelation. And
23 oh, by the way, things look different in capitals than
24 they do in New York. You know, things look different in
25 Sarajevo than they do in Washington. They look

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1 different in Tuzla, in Brcko than they do in Sarajevo.

2 And one of the things is we work these
3 issues, we really need to get in mind to use a military
4 differentiation, the strategic, the operational, the
5 tactful aspects of what we're doing. And as we develop
6 doctrine that the report calls for, we need to make sure
7 that we're establishing doctrine at the right levels
8 strategically, which I would say globally,
9 operationally, regional or countrywide and tactically
10 locally.

11 The genius of the American military when it
12 does it right is it integrates those three in a cohesive
13 coherent plan. It is much more difficult if you try to
14 integrate those things politically, economically,
15 socially as well as security wise. It's hard enough to
16 do it security wise. But that's the challenge. And if
17 we don't do that, we're going to keep having problems.

18 So this whole issue of the levels and
19 thinking through what you what you do in New York, what
20 you do in, if I may, Sarajevo and what you do in Banja
21 Luka, Tuzla, Brcko or the other places and they all kind
22 of have to go together.

23 Standards of conduct. The report
24 emphasized the personal standards of conduct that we
25 expect of UN forces, that we expect of U.S. forces, we

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1 expect of any outside intervention forces. I would say
2 there is a professional standard of conduct that has to
3 be equally important. Now, my experience working for
4 the UN and being in a leadership position in a regional
5 environment, in a tactical environment in Kosovo was
6 that the people that go to work for the UN are just as
7 responsive to hardship and leadership as soldiers are.
8 But it requires the organization, management and
9 leadership to draw all that out.

10 So I don't think it's an impossible task by
11 any means. But it does require standards of
12 professional and personal behavior and it has to
13 provide, and just to pick up on something that the
14 Senators commented about Haiti on is that the focus of
15 all this effort has to be value added to the process.
16 And if you are not there to add to the process, then
17 there is no support that will come from the populous for
18 your endeavors. And that is as true economically or
19 politically as it is on the security side.

20 If you can't do something to improve jobs,
21 then tell me again why I need you. I could be poor
22 without out. And lastly, measures of success are
23 essential, but gosh it's hard to figure out the proper
24 measures. And to have measures that are again
25 integrated in a political, economic, social, security

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1 wide sense is very difficult. And if there is ever an
2 area that we need to look at, I'm just looking -- I
3 spent the weekend going through the recently released
4 report to Congress on measuring stability and security
5 in Iraq and looking at the metrics, if you will, of
6 success.

7 It's so hard to define. Okay. And it's
8 easy to count each's. It's really hard to count
9 successes and finding those right measures. And I think
10 that's an area that the next great Task Force needs to
11 spend more time on just to give USIP another something
12 else to do. Thank you.

13 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you. I'll have
14 to think about that last thought there. I need a little
15 time, recovery time before we commence another Task
16 Force. But, at this point, we really would welcome your
17 comments and questions. And if you could kindly, as I
18 say, use the mike and then just mention who you are and
19 your affiliation and we'll have a good discussion.

20 MR. HUGHES: Hello, Gary, Eric, General,
21 I'm Paul Hughes from USIP. I'm struck by the comment
22 about DPKO having to develop doctrine. Military force
23 capability is actually a function of doctrine,
24 organization and equipment.

25 So when DPKO develops doctrine, what kind

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1 of force structure do you envision members having to
2 pony up to the task and how do you get the world to
3 accept a doctrine that would impact equipping and the
4 force structure, especially in the area of constrained
5 defense budgets, your thoughts?

6 MR. SCHWARTZ: Good question. Why don't I
7 leave the force structure answer to General Nash since I
8 have been called a bathtub admiral when I was in
9 Government and don't want to risk being subject to that
10 same accusation, well, actually a bathtub general.
11 What's the --

12 GENERAL NASH: I'm thinking, I'm thinking.

13 MR. SCHWARTZ: It may have been Jim Sher
14 who called me a bathtub admiral. I don't remember, but
15 let me -- when I research and write and I come upon a
16 term or a notion that sounds right, but I sort of don't
17 really -- but sort of raises more questions than
18 answers, I find myself stopping.

19 And in this instance, it was my
20 conversations with Jane Holl Lute where she insisted
21 that this is a critical issue for DPKO, and I got to
22 thinking, I mean, what is it we're talking about? So I
23 stopped and I went through. I found myself doing
24 research on what is doctrine, you know, because I'm not
25 a military guy and I wanted to understand what I was

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1 endorsing.

2 And so you see in the report, it's only a
3 phrase, but I thought it was an important phrase, to
4 define what the hell it was I was talking about,
5 tactics, operations, etcetera. And the term I used in
6 the report, this is all by way of emphasizing this
7 wasn't a throwaway notion, was an effort to identify,
8 and this is not my own term, an effort to identify the
9 roles, the missions and the force employment principles
10 that you're going to ask military to embark upon in
11 pursuit of the broader political objectives of the
12 peacekeeping mission.

13 And one thing that's very clear is there is
14 not consensus among UN members on this issue, and the
15 one effort to try to push the envelope on this to
16 identify roles, missions and force employment principles
17 to the more difficult operating environments that the UN
18 member states are finding themselves in was not
19 successful.

20 The General Assembly or the member states
21 did not endorse all of what Brahimi wanted them to
22 endorse, and so there is not consensus, but we're out
23 there asking them to do sorts -- take actions that would
24 imply roles, missions and force employment principles
25 that have not been formally endorsed. So that's what I

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1 was talking about.

2 Now, what kind of force structure? Let me
3 turn to the expert.

4 GENERAL NASH: Well, I really jerk when
5 anybody says constrained defense spending when I look at
6 the budget of the United States on defense spending, but
7 I think the Pentagon is the 12th or 13th largest, has the
8 12th or 13th largest GNP in the world. I mean, it's
9 ahead of Brazil.

10 The key is defining what you want to be
11 done, usually most of the time, okay, and then putting a
12 call for the forces that member states can provide,
13 usually most of the time. And so the doctrine is the
14 great leveling process where you try to establish a
15 standard of employment, a standard with respect to
16 roles, mission and normal employment principles that you
17 want member states to develop the capacity for.

18 It's very, very important that that not be
19 done in a vacuum, that it be done in a political,
20 economic, social broad security context, not just
21 military. And one of the problems is we talk too much
22 military and not enough security, because we got to
23 bring in a much larger environment that starts the
24 process towards the rule of law. It's not rule of law,
25 but it's the process towards the rule.

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1 And so you stay to force and the fact of
2 the matter is is usually most of the requirements are
3 well within the capacity of a large number of nations to
4 provide if you define it. And then you have to specify
5 some high end requirements that maybe only a half a
6 dozen to a dozen nations of the world can provide.
7 Okay? Fortunately, all of them are members of the P-5,
8 you know. So there is a capacity then to have your high
9 end requirements and your other end requirements.

10 The other thing is as you establish this
11 doctrine, you establish standards of conduct, standards
12 of operational capacity, standards of behavior for all
13 these forces. I mean, if we have to -- okay, I mean,
14 think of the international community going to a country
15 and we have to get member state agreement that Thou
16 Shalt Not Rape. I mean, why are we intervening? I
17 mean, where is the value? Where is our added value,
18 value added, if that's not a given, if that's not a
19 principle of behavior that we think?

20 So I don't think anything we have talked
21 about is too hard. The hard part is just deciding to do
22 it.

23 MR. HUGHES: As always. Thanks.

24 MR. WALLOP: I just had one quick little
25 thing to mention. It seems that one of the elements

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1 that is missing in this that is needed around which
2 principles of deployment must be devised, missions, and
3 that is a rapid deployment force. You have to have
4 something in hand to do something quickly, if that need
5 exists, and go with the kind of force structure that the
6 General is talking about for the longer term, but to be
7 able to go quickly would seem to me to be the one thing
8 that the UN needs more than anything right now.

9 MR. HUGHES: Which I would suggest that
10 most nations in the world cannot afford to do.

11 GENERAL NASH: If I could. You know,
12 somebody challenged me one time as we were coming back
13 from Bosnia with the Great First Tank Division on
14 whether we would be ready to go off to do Desert Storm
15 II, you know, because we had spent all this time
16 peacekeeping, and I kind of made the point that we'll be
17 ready before you can get the ships there.

18 MR. HUGHES: Absolutely.

19 GENERAL NASH: Okay. We have not yet
20 caught somebody short in their ability to deploy by
21 rapid political decision making.

22 MR. HUGHES: I consider this murderous row
23 out there against the wall.

24 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes, it is, it is.
25 All right. Let me just note, well, I better before Mike

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1 comes up with, I'm sure, his very good points, that we
2 had a very interesting discussion on doctrine at one of
3 the two full Task Force meetings. There were two day-
4 long sessions, and I recall that General Clark certainly
5 had quite a bit. Speaker Gingrich and Senator Mitchell,
6 everybody kind of got into that, and it was the process
7 thing, which you note appropriately, Bill, including the
8 integrative thing with rule of law. It wasn't just
9 military, but it was -- so that did figure. The high
10 and the mighty gave that one quite some attention.

11 MR. HUGHES: Can I just before Mike --
12 Peter in his peacekeeping update I think circulated to
13 recipients, most of them probably get that email, a new
14 story about UN peacekeepers in the Congo, Guatemalans
15 and Pakistanis going after rebels.

16 And if you think the issue of doctrine
17 isn't of relevance, just read that news article and try
18 to figure out, you know, how would they define the
19 doctrine that guides their actions? I mean, you know,
20 they are war-making. They are going after -- you know,
21 and I just, you know, think that it's an issue that we
22 have to come to grips with.

23 MR. JAGES: Mike Jages (phonetic sp.) from
24 the U.S. Institute of Peace, and I really have to
25 commend the Panel not only on a set of very constructive

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1 and incisive recommendations that really ought to be
2 implemented, and that's what I want to ask about, but I
3 think the medium is a very, very important part of this
4 message. You have people representing the full spectrum
5 of political viewpoints in the United States coming to a
6 consensus about what needs to be done, and so I would
7 like to ask about that.

8 How is this going to be done? How are we
9 going to get this done? General Nash said something
10 very important. You know, we ought to look at, you
11 know, ourselves in the mirror here. Why does the United
12 Nations find itself in such a shambles in a place like
13 Haiti, and the need for U.S. leadership to play a role
14 in ensuring that the UN is reformed and that then when
15 the UN undertakes a mission where there is a need for
16 robust forces, can we expect that to happen effectively
17 without a very central U.S. role?

18 It doesn't mean that we're doing all the
19 heavy lifting, but the trend right now, when you look at
20 UN peace missions, is for reduction in the U.S. and
21 European involvement. These are the very countries that
22 are needed to provide, you know, the galvanizing force.

23 Your recommendations are spot on. How do
24 we get them implemented? What needs to be done to make
25 it happen? The role of the U.S. in providing the

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1 leadership in this, when we have an office at the State
2 Department that can't even find the support within the
3 U.S. Government that it needs, what needs to be done to
4 make this happen both at the strategic and the
5 operational level?

6 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well-noted and, Eric,
7 what is the number of American military assigned to the
8 peacekeeping mission in Haiti?

9 MR. SCHWARTZ: I think less than five, I
10 think.

11 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes, I think it's
12 four, and they are very deliberately put that way and
13 kept that way, as I recall.

14 MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, let me respond first,
15 if I may. I would be doing General Clark a disservice
16 if I did not mention his continual observation about the
17 importance of the lead nation in peace operations. And
18 I think at the end of the day, history provides
19 considerable support for the notion that a
20 multidimensional peace operation with a high degree of
21 security requirements will not succeed unless there is a
22 lead nation or one or two lead nations.

23 I think that's probably a pretty powerful
24 observation. I mean, I think it probably would stand a
25 lot of scrutiny, and that was General Clark's -- one of

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1 his hobbyhorses, and I think it's very important and
2 maybe it's not fairly enough reflected in the report.

3 Now, so moving from that general
4 proposition to the specific. I think the only thing
5 that is lacking from current U.S. policy in support of
6 UN reform and reform and strengthening of UN
7 peacekeeping is a willingness to put our money, not our
8 money, but put our -- you know, making meaningful, yet
9 not overwhelming, commitments in this particular area.

10 The Secretary General clearly wanted a
11 modest deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti. The U.S.
12 Ambassador to Haiti, it's not a secret and that doesn't
13 come from any inside information, apparently felt that a
14 modest, yet not trivial, deployment of U.S. forces to
15 Haiti would have made a real difference.

16 I think we should have done it, and it
17 would be a powerful demonstration to the rest of the
18 world that we care and it would have given real meaning
19 to our rhetorical expressions of support for peace
20 operations.

21 SENATOR WALLOP: I would like to make one
22 observation there, too. These are always sort of
23 chicken and eggs kinds of concepts, but until we get the
24 UN down to the point where it can function as an
25 operational entity, which it does not at the moment, you

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1 know, by mentioning my remarks that nobody can be fired,
2 one of the recommendations is that there be created the
3 equivalent of a chief operating officer whose job it is
4 to begin to direct the construction of missions,
5 doctrines, purposes and other things.

6 And one day when he finally decides on
7 something, it will be his obligation to see to it that
8 it happens while the Secretary General goes and does
9 what the Secretary General does and travels around and
10 makes nice noises. But he cannot, at this moment in
11 time, literally cannot direct anybody to do anything and
12 hope to see it happen, except by serendipity.

13 And so my own view is that until the UN
14 finds a way to reform itself to the point where it can
15 describe, project and implement missions, then all this,
16 what might follow that, is not going to take place until
17 it's a little clearer and more a subjective function
18 than it is today.

19 We just don't seem to be able to find a way
20 to get the UN to engage member states. I mean, it's
21 lucky if the U.S. does and it's lucky if France does and
22 it's lucky if somebody else does. But if we had
23 somebody in there whose job it was to push a little and
24 say so out loud, there's a chance that we might do it a
25 little more quickly and get to the general point. If we

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1 had a rapid deployment capacity, it might nudge the
2 decision process along a little faster. In order to get
3 that capacity, somebody has to be in charge and say
4 what's needed.

5 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes, that's -- I'm
6 reminded, speaking of the American military presence,
7 that when we met with the Haitian Prime Minister,
8 Monsieur Latortue. He was very explicit that one
9 platoon, for us guys who were in the Army this is going
10 to be painful, but one platoon of U.S. Marines would
11 have taken care and would still take care of all of
12 Haiti's problems. He felt that very much.

13 SENATOR WALLOP: Well, he felt that they
14 would be credible.

15 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes, that's right.

16 SENATOR WALLOP: The force that's there now
17 is just simply not.

18 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: That's right and
19 that's why, yes.

20 SENATOR WALLOP: Excuse me.

21 MR. GANTZ: Peter Gantz, Refugees
22 International and Executive Coordinator of the
23 Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. So I guess a
24 couple of comments before my question, which are short
25 luckily. I think by way of answering part of Mike's

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1 question is, hopefully, the Senate will take up a more
2 productive approach to UN reform than the House has, and
3 I think that this report is a tremendous basis for that.

4 So I hope that that's part of the answer.

5 With Haiti, we, Refugees International,
6 visited in February. I think it was interesting to note
7 when we visited Cite Soleil. I mean, first of all,
8 Haitians are not necessarily the fondest of the U.S. We
9 have had a rough relationship for 100 years with Haiti
10 at least. But the Haitians in Cite Soleil, which is one
11 of the slum areas in Port-au-Prince where a great deal
12 of violence is taking place, the UN, when we were there,
13 would only visit -- they would just drive through the
14 main street very rapidly in an armored personnel
15 carrier. They didn't get out and they didn't do
16 anything.

17 But when the U.S. was there when we first
18 went in last year, the Marines set up camp right in the
19 middle of Cite Soleil and the Haitians loved it, because
20 there was security and what they were upset about was
21 the fact that the U.S. left and nothing took their place
22 for six months.

23 So my question has to do with the Peace
24 Building Commission. One of the concerns that we have
25 noted is that there are so many actors that are involved

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1 in UN peace operations, now, that's large beyond
2 peacekeeping, the economic, political, security sector,
3 everything, and I'm wondering whether in the discussions
4 about the Peace Building Commission with the Task Force,
5 whether the point came up about lines of authority,
6 because the Peace Building Commission just becomes
7 another group to talk about these issues, rather than
8 actually have the authority.

9 I mean, you have all these UN agencies.
10 You have the World Bank. You have bilateral donors,
11 different countries. It's like herding cats and it's
12 interesting that this question sort of dovetails with
13 your comment about the Office of the Coordinator for
14 Reconstruction and Stabilization. I completely agree.
15 It's a mystery why it hasn't got funded.

16 But one of the skepticisms from Congress
17 that I have heard is that they don't believe that an
18 office in state can herd the Department of Treasury,
19 Department of -- you know, DoD, State, Justice and all
20 the different U.S. Government. So it's sort of an
21 interesting parallel there.

22 MR. SCHWARTZ: I will take it by default.
23 I said to myself after the last one, I'm not going to
24 answer, I'm not going to speak up first this time,
25 because I don't want to, but I think your question is --

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1 first of all, the issue never got discussed in the
2 context of the Task Force. It was far too down in the
3 weeds, but I certainly -- we certainly -- in putting
4 together the paper, I certainly thought about it and
5 I'll give you my personal view.

6 I don't think there is an easy answer,
7 especially given the competing, what's likely to be some
8 competition between the Security Council and the General
9 Assembly in EcoSoc in terms of where responsibility lies
10 for this Peace Building Commission.

11 The only answer I could give you is that
12 right coordination has to take place. Management has to
13 take place and right now, there is no obvious
14 headquarters location where that happens. And so even
15 though the answers to your question aren't clear, that,
16 in my view, doesn't mean -- that doesn't obviate the
17 need for a Peace Building Commission and, more
18 importantly, a Peace Building Support Office where the
19 work will get done at the staffing level.

20 The alternative, the practical alternative,
21 is to do it through one of -- either do it through DPKO,
22 just, you know, throw in the towel and say DPKO has got
23 to be the super manager of all of this. And I think
24 most people believe that's probably not a great idea,
25 including people who need to pay up, but you could take

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1 that view.

2 Richard Wilcox (phonetic sp.) who worked
3 for me at the NSC, when we were doing Brahimi reform and
4 he was trying to pack as much stuff into DPKO as humanly
5 possible, but I think the wisdom is that that's not the
6 way to go. The other alternative is to try to use one
7 of the standing secretary-based interagency coordinating
8 mechanisms. The ECP, what is it, the Executive
9 Committee for Peace and Security, you know, a unit of
10 that.

11 But I think people feel like a Peace
12 Building Support Office with a dedicated staff would be
13 a more hands on way to manage this. So all I can do is
14 say the problem you identify is real, but I think a
15 Peace Building Support Office is still a step in the
16 right direction.

17 GENERAL NASH: I would, if I could. I got
18 the impression when the Peace Building Commission first
19 -- the idea first rolled out, some very senior people in
20 DPKO looked at it as somebody getting into their
21 business.

22 SENATOR WALLOP: You bet, you bet.

23 GENERAL NASH: And I can't blame them, but
24 in a separate conversation you can have with those same
25 people, they will also talk to you about their inability

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1 to get UNDP under control or get World Health, you know,
2 and all the different things. And I have sympathy for
3 their problem of getting more advice and guidance, which
4 DPKO gets a lot of advice and guidance, at the same time
5 their frustration at not being able to influence the
6 other things.

7 So the Peace Building Commission is a
8 potential that gets above everything and DPKO, it's kind
9 of like, not to offend any supply officers or
10 intelligence officers but, you know, the operations
11 officer on the staff is sort of the first amongst
12 equals. Well, DPKO can still be the first amongst
13 equals with a lot of other agencies that play in the
14 peace building business, but you need an executive
15 agent, if you will, to lead the overall effort.

16 Whether the Peace Building Commission and
17 the Peace Support Office will become that executive, you
18 know, I mean, that's a different issue and that's one of
19 execution and leadership and personalities, etcetera,
20 etcetera.

21 MR. SCHWARTZ: But they can't have -- I'm
22 sorry.

23 SENATOR WALLOP: I was just going to say
24 that's going to come from within the Administration, any
25 administration and Congress is not very well-suited to

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1 organizing particularly organized things and they won't.

2 They will follow if led on that, but it's very unlikely
3 that you will get somebody in Congress actually pushing
4 to have this thing materialize or grow or get further
5 presence.

6 MR. SCHWARTZ: Another thing is DPKO can't
7 have it both ways. Jane Holl Lute, who I mentioned
8 before, who is the Assistant Secretary General for
9 Peacekeeping, is eloquent when she says, as she says
10 publicly and privately, we in DPKO, what we do is we
11 create space. We create space, so that all these other
12 political/economic development activities can take
13 place, but that's all we do. That's all we can do.

14 Well, if that's all you can do, then you
15 need a Peacekeeping Support Office. If you want to do
16 everything else, then turn it into a department of, you
17 know, peace operations and peace making and post-
18 conflict peace building and have a very different
19 construct, but you can't argue that all you're doing is
20 creating space and then say we don't want them to take
21 our turf.

22 SENATOR WALLOP: If that's all you can do,
23 then maybe the best thing to do is to reduce it to a
24 party of one and let her make speeches.

25 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well, yes, I cannot

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1 fail to observe the executions and everything picking up
2 on the Peace Building Commission, which we have a nod
3 toward in the report, but it's no secret that
4 practically the lowest regard within the UN is extended
5 by DPKO to the Department of Political Affairs.

6 So the last thing in the world DPKO would
7 want to see is another kind of thing like that or worse
8 yet, you could say a group that basically is kind of
9 useless, because it's not sufficiently effective.

10 MR. SCHWARTZ: That's right.

11 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Don?

12 AMBASSADOR HAYS: Well, first of all, Bill,
13 I would like to commend you on a number of the comments
14 that you had made. Eric and I actually worked on the
15 Brahimi report trying to get it through the ubiquitous
16 5th Committee and the special committees and whatnot,
17 and they gave us 90 positions the first year and then 60
18 more positions the second year, I think raising the
19 tremendous capacity of DPKO by 50 percent.

20 The budget notwithstanding, I think that
21 the entire UN spends about a week's worth of Iraq's
22 funding per year, so it really is marginal at best.
23 What we need to do is capacity building to do it, and
24 one of the thoughts we had was to initiate or sponsor or
25 somehow organize regional training centers, so we could

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1 have level competence.

2 And even if you attach that to, say, a
3 university in Latin American, one in Africa, one in
4 Eastern Europe, one in Asia, where you could bring the
5 peacekeeping component, the nation building or the
6 stability building into the military training program at
7 the right point, you could then have a level playing
8 field when you said okay, I want two battalions from
9 Latin America, I want a battalion from Africa, I want a
10 battalion from Nepal and India and Pakistan.

11 How likely is anything like that to happen
12 and how do you think the United States could sponsor it?

13 SENATOR WALLOP: Well, it would be likely
14 to happen if a suggestion came from some committed
15 higher up that knew about it. One of the big problems
16 that most of us have with the UN and with other kinds of
17 things is that there are far more acronyms than there
18 are people who understand where those little sheaves
19 belong.

20 It could happen. It would be relatively
21 cheap for the United States to subsidize the training
22 operations in universities if somebody were to tell them
23 what was to be trained, who was to be trained and to
24 what purpose would the trained people be assigned.
25 That's just a matter of luck. I mean, at some moment in

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1 time, somebody like the Secretary of State or the Vice
2 President or somebody like that could get behind it and
3 it would happen, but it's the whole UN thing is such an
4 amorphous business and it's politically rather
5 unpopular.

6 People like the UN, but they don't like to
7 talk about it and so, somehow or another, you're going
8 to have to get an impetus out of some high level within
9 the U.S. Government for such a thing to take place.
10 Were you to get the new UN Secretary General and get the
11 reforms, some of which we have recommended in this
12 report, you might be able to get somebody to come down
13 and say this is what we need and have some credibility
14 to that request.

15 GENERAL NASH: Let me ask Bob a question on
16 this. Where do we stand on the police training? We
17 were going to do the thing in Spain or --

18 MR. SCHWARTZ: No, actually, rather ask
19 Mike.

20 GENERAL NASH: Okay. All right.

21 MR. SCHWARTZ: Mike just got back from
22 Italy.

23 SENATOR WALLOP: Yes, Mike.

24 MR. SCHWARTZ: In terms of the creation of
25 constabulary units --

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1 GENERAL NASH: Right.

2 MR. SCHWARTZ: -- Mike just was in Italy
3 last week with this whole thing.

4 GENERAL NASH: Well, my point is, you know,
5 are we pushing that? How are we doing it? To try to
6 answer your question is the police the one that's on the
7 table now to try to do some centralized training, some
8 international training to raise overall capacity.

9 MR. JAGES: The concept that you're
10 proposing, Ambassador Hays, is part of the overall
11 Global Peace Operations Initiative, although you are
12 absolutely correct. They don't really have a well-
13 developed operational concept of how training trainers
14 is going to result in any actions or complaints on the
15 (inaudible). But the center of actions for stability
16 police (inaudible) Italy began offering its first course
17 in September. So this is highly between the military
18 and the police.

19 GENERAL NASH: Right. No, my point is we
20 can do that, okay, and we have got a great capacity to
21 train that. I mean, we talk about General Clark's use
22 of the word lead nation. I would also talk about the
23 key enabler initiatives that could be done in a lot of
24 areas, one of which is training centers of a variety of
25 kind, and we have had a number of initiatives that the

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1 U.S. has sponsored in Africa, most notably, the ACRI
2 thing like that, and then there's other enablers that
3 can make things happen.

4 If the United States were to sign up to
5 provide all the airlift necessary to move the required
6 level of force to Darfur, we would take a level of
7 burden off the UN and individual nations that would take
8 away almost any excuse for not going, you know, if we so
9 came. We will deploy the force, okay, and we'll send
10 two C-130s a week in for resupply or, you know, I mean,
11 just something like that.

12 Now, that's not -- you know, that's a
13 significant commitment, but it's also a significant
14 enabler, like I say, to take all the other excuses away
15 for not doing it, but that's what we need more of.

16 MR. SCHWARTZ: I would have made the point
17 about the Global Peace Operations Initiative, but I
18 would have made another point. I think it's appropriate
19 for me to say that a couple of recommendations that I
20 put into the draft, but which were kicked out, I can
21 mention now. They don't represent the views of the Task
22 Force, but they certainly represent my own views, and I
23 think would go a long way to achieving the objective
24 that Don has alluded to.

25 I suggested, number one, that the

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1 Department of Defense get this directive on peace
2 operations out the door. A Task Force member objected
3 to inclusion of a draft document, reference to a draft
4 document, in the Task Force Report. I didn't share the
5 member's view, but I understood it, so we didn't put it
6 in. But I think that draft directive would empower a
7 very powerful agency of the U.S. Government to do the
8 sort of thing that you're talking about and that would
9 make a big difference.

10 I also think it wouldn't be a bad idea to
11 have an NSPD on peace operations, which would talk about
12 this, as well, because agencies take those things very
13 seriously. And so I think how do you get this sort of
14 thing put in place, have very high level directives,
15 which include in a roster of activities this sort of
16 thing and, you know, it happens. So I think those would
17 be two worthwhile additions.

18 MR. PERITO: Hi. I'm Bob Perito. I'm from
19 the U.S. Institute of Peace. I want to talk about rule
20 of law. That phrase has been used a couple of times
21 this morning either as a goal to be achieved or as an
22 essential component of creating peace and stability.

23 As I think we're all aware, the U.N. has
24 extremely limited capacity in this area. I was involved
25 in Haiti in the early days and we did make some progress

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1 in the area of creating a police force, but our efforts
2 to create courts, prosecuting attorneys and prisons were
3 unsuccessful almost from the start.

4 So I wanted to ask about what the Task
5 Force felt about creating a rule of law capacity in the
6 UN and just how it occurred as a side when we talk about
7 lead nation. In Afghanistan there was an attempt to
8 create or to designate a lead nation in the rule of law
9 area. It turned out to be Italy. It has not been a
10 very successful experience.

11 So anyway, I'll ask. The question will be,
12 you know, what did the Commission think about
13 establishing the rule of law capacity in the UN?

14 SENATOR WALLOP: Let me just briefly touch
15 on that, because I think we all think that that's a good
16 idea and, again, we come back to the one principal
17 feeling that almost everything that we're talking about
18 is nobody has really defined what it takes to have that
19 functional.

20 The Haiti thing, as you say, started and
21 there was some reporting to us when we were down there
22 that they were optimistic to begin with and despairing
23 to end with, and that there was no chance that you could
24 get out of jail if you ever got put in jail and if you
25 were really bad, there was hardly any chance you would

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1 get put in jail.

2 So the key to all of this, somehow or
3 another, is to begin to define what constitutes a
4 functioning rule of law, and then you can begin to fill
5 the slots. It doesn't mean you will always succeed, but
6 you will have a whole lot better chance of succeeding if
7 you figure that you need a police department, a
8 prosecuting department and a rehabilitation or confining
9 department. But just to say the rule of law is a
10 comforting sound, but nobody knows exactly how many
11 people to deploy and who those people ought to be.

12 MR. SCHWARTZ: My own view, I don't think
13 the Task Force had a very fixed position on what
14 specific additions needed to be made within the
15 Secretariat. But what I would say is that I will make a
16 couple of observations.

17 First of all, depending on the nature of
18 the peace building operation in a particular country,
19 there are going to be a variety of models that will be
20 appropriate. If you have a transitional administration,
21 then you're going to be more likely to have sort of a
22 blue helmeted rule of law operation. I don't mean
23 military, but I mean civilian blue helmet, if you will.

24 If you have an operation that is not a full
25 dress transitional administration, then it's more likely

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1 that you're going to have a rule of law operation that
2 may be contributed by a member state and not funded
3 through an assessed contribution. And I think my own
4 instincts are that it would be difficult, you know, to
5 avoid the reality of a variety of a different models in
6 post-conflict operations.

7 So what does that mean? Well, that means
8 that you need to be very serious about a Peace Support
9 Office and a Peace Building Commission, because what you
10 then need is a place within the UN system where the buck
11 stops, where responsibility lies, to help make
12 determinations of how the system is going to respond
13 effectively, but there is a place where responsibility
14 lies, where if it's not happening, you turn to that
15 office and say how come it's not happening? And you
16 know, even though it's not going to be a UN-funded,
17 civilian operation, you are the Peace Support Office.
18 You have got to make sure that, you know, that
19 capability is being addressed.

20 And I think what comes with that is going
21 to have to be some increased skeletal requirements to
22 respond to rule of law needs even if you're not
23 creating, you know, a 400 member rule of law team
24 sitting in the Secretariat.

25 GENERAL NASH: A word of caution about lead

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1 nations, if I could. A lead nation cannot be an excuse
2 for other folks to ignore the issue. In other words, if
3 Italy is responsible for rule of law in Country X, that
4 doesn't mean everybody else doesn't worry, is free from
5 its obligation to be concerned about it.

6 A lead nation for drug issues in
7 Afghanistan is one where it has been assigned to a
8 nation, but other nations, some of which's initials are
9 U.S., then abrogate responsibility for being concerned
10 with that, you know, and that's a very dangerous thing.

11 So the lead nation concept in an overall sense is one
12 thing.

13 Lead nations in specific areas is another,
14 but there has to be an entity that is the "über alles"
15 here and working at that. And I think that that's one
16 of the areas that, as we go down the road, we have to be
17 careful, because a lead nation assignment is not an
18 abrogation of responsibility for others.

19 SENATOR WALLOP: Could I just make one
20 brief comment about one rule of law, which has been
21 implemented in an uneven manner at best, but one should
22 note that in the case of Bosnia, the UN's role in rule
23 of law programs, which was there, often was amidst
24 considerable rivalry with similar rule of law programs
25 by OHR and other organizations, European Union and

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1 others, and in Kosovo there was, indeed, some tension
2 between the UN's efforts to advance rule of law
3 activities and programs as compared or opposed, can I
4 use that word, to OSCE.

5 So in trying to do these programs, which
6 are difficult already, you get into bureaucratic things
7 even amongst the international community.

8 MR. SCHWARTZ: But if I can just -- an
9 example of the point I was making about increasing the
10 skeletal capability of the UN without necessarily having
11 to put in full dress capabilities is our recommendation,
12 which echoes I think the high level Panel, for the
13 creation of a senior police force management unit to
14 conduct assessments and assist in the establishment of
15 new operations. It's that sort of capabilities that I
16 think you have to be talking about.

17 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Please.

18 MR. GETZ: I'm Ralph Getz (phonetic sp.).
19 I am a former International Organization employee who
20 worked in the areas of economic and social development.

21 I have a two part question. One is directed to General
22 Nash whom I commend for his brevity and if you would
23 permit me a side question time to Senator Wallop, fellow
24 westerner.

25 Borrowing from Senator Wallop, my question

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1 to you, sir, is which comes first, the development
2 chicken or the security egg? What I want to know is
3 does working as hard as we have on providing electricity
4 and clean water in Iraq, I have to be careful with Phebe
5 Marr in the room what I say about this, but working on
6 electricity and clean water in Iraq have anything to do
7 with reducing the insurgency?

8 To Senator Wallop, my fellow westerner, I
9 wanted to ask -- I had a professor at LSE who said the
10 further you push down work into the depth of an
11 organization as far as you can make it stay, and
12 wouldn't you go along with increased peacekeeping
13 responsibilities and action at the level of regional
14 international organizations, because the Brazilians
15 provided forces, and my feeling is that more countries
16 of the western hemisphere would have.

17 And just an aside to you, Senator, you
18 know, as far as virtually no one can be fired, I think
19 that international organizations, Civil Service is
20 somewhat like U.S. National Civil Service. I'm not
21 aware of any intelligence people having been fired for
22 certain difficulties with regard to the war in Iraq
23 either. I rest my case and look forward to hearing from
24 the General.

25 GENERAL NASH: Do you want me to go first?

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1 SENATOR WALLOP: You just made the case.
2 No. The thing is there is no excuse for not trying.
3 There's plenty of reasons, I suppose, that it's going to
4 be difficult and it may not work, but by finding what
5 doesn't work you may find what can be made to work later
6 on down the road. But I was thinking of an idea that
7 one of the rule of law things is to put in place a
8 police force, which is of absolutely no use if there
9 isn't a place to benefit from the police work, in other
10 words, a prosecuting system and a confinement system and
11 --

12 MR. GETZ: Well, there are some pretty
13 clean police forces in Colombia at the moment.

14 SENATOR WALLOP: Well, I mean, you can look
15 all around the world and find plenty of cause for
16 cynicism but, I mean, if that's the basis upon which we
17 try to hang our hat, there will be plenty of places to
18 hang our hat, but nothing will happen. There will be no
19 shade.

20 MR. GETZ: My feeling about the venality of
21 the UN and other international bureaucracies is if you
22 insisted, if the full faith and credit of the United
23 States' obligation were directed toward merit hiring,
24 there would be less of the difficulty, which you cited,
25 sir.

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1 SENATOR WALLOP: I'm not quite sure where
2 you're going with that and I think I probably won't
3 travel down that road.

4 GENERAL NASH: The analogy of the
5 development chicken and the security egg is, I think,
6 appropriate, because the answer to your question is yes,
7 they are related and one does not come first. It
8 happens. I mean, the old joke in the Army, okay, all
9 leaves and passes are canceled until morale improves
10 applies. You cannot say we're not going to have any
11 development until security is good.

12 My number one priority in April of 1996 in
13 Bosnia was the Jobs Program. Okay. I had 200,000
14 demobilized soldiers. It was a security problem when
15 they sat around and drank all day and I needed jobs. I
16 needed a Jobs Program. I needed, you know, economic
17 work. And so whether it be Iraq or Bosnia or Haiti, the
18 establishment of law and order and the opportunities for
19 alternative forms of employment are essential and they
20 have got to go together.

21 MR. GETZ: I thank the Panel.

22 MS. MULLEN: My name is Mary Mullen and I
23 work with the Bosnia Support Committee. I heard some
24 phrase by Europeans on the reform of the UN, and I was
25 wondering, it seemed to me that they wanted some things

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1 that were a little bit different and I was wondering are
2 there a lot of differences amongst other countries, even
3 in the west about how the UN could be reformed?
4 Especially like with mounting our own decisions and so
5 forth, seems to be a little bit different.

6 And the last time, the last UN forum I
7 asked a question and nobody would answer it, because
8 they said that it wasn't -- didn't have anything to do
9 with management or whatever they were discussing. But
10 that was -- it said reforming the United Nations, so
11 when I asked a question, I thought, you know, that was
12 an appropriate question.

13 Mr. Schwartz said he would answer any
14 questions. Well, at the beginning he said he would
15 answer questions that were directly related?

16 MR. SCHWARTZ: Sure.

17 MS. MULLEN: I was wondering about I did
18 read in the UN book, our reform book, about the Human
19 Rights Commission and human rights, the Human Rights
20 Council, you were thinking of, but you also said in that
21 book, if I'm not mistaken, that you thought human rights
22 should be outside of the UN, that the UN shouldn't be
23 handling human rights. And I was wondering how the
24 Europeans would accept that. I was just wondering how
25 even Americans would accept it. And also about the UN

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1 Council on Human Rights, how do you expect that to work?

2 MR. SCHWARTZ: You have got several
3 questions. Let me start with what I see as a very
4 interesting question, the primary difference between an
5 American perspective on UN reform and a European
6 perspective, and when I say European, I think European
7 developed country perspective. And what I'm saying is,
8 basically, what I would surmise. It's not based on any
9 study.

10 I think many of the recommendations in our
11 report would be supported by Europeans who know the UN
12 and care about the UN. The primary difference between
13 the Europeans and this report, I think, would probably
14 be they would have greater patience with the one nation,
15 one vote democratic nature of multilateral decision
16 making than our Task Force had patience for.

17 So for example, they would probably resist
18 recommendations that our Task Force would have made,
19 which urged that decisions on budget at the UN more
20 closely reflect the level of contribution of member
21 states. The Europeans would take the position probably,
22 I think, that decisions about how much you give is based
23 on how rich you are. It's not based on your inherent
24 worth and it shouldn't necessarily give you a
25 predominant voice in, you know, decision making on

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1 multilateral issues.

2 So I think if there is a philosophical
3 difference between the Gingrich/Mitchell Commission and
4 probably a European perspective, it would be on those
5 sorts of issues, I think.

6 In terms of the human rights perspective, I
7 think it's interesting that the Task Force ultimately
8 endorsed the notion of pursuing human rights through the
9 UN system and, by implication, accepted the notion that
10 we would operate in a multilateral institution, which
11 will be compromised in terms of promotion of human
12 rights, because in a multilateral institution, all
13 nations have a say and some nations that have a say on
14 human rights issues are nations that violate human
15 rights.

16 So it was interesting to me that the Task
17 Force didn't basically say to hell with the UN human
18 rights system. It didn't go that far, but I do think
19 there was a strong, a considerable strain of opinion
20 within the Task Force, which basically says we should be
21 less inclined to compromise our human rights principles
22 through the UN system and if we don't get satisfaction
23 through the UN system, we need to have the option of
24 going outside the system, if need be, and I think that
25 probably -- and my colleagues may have a different

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1 perspective, but I think that probably reflects the
2 perspective of the Task Force.

3 Now, your final question. The implication,
4 I think, of your final question is how would the Human
5 Rights Council be different than the Commission and it's
6 a good question. And it has never been completely clear
7 to me how we're going to guarantee that the Council will
8 be a more pristine body in terms of promotion of human
9 rights than the Commission has been, because, after all,
10 membership will still be determined by UN members.

11 But the hope is that by increasing the
12 scrutiny on the institution, number one, number two,
13 requiring a two third vote for membership and, number
14 three, limiting the number of members, you would
15 increase the impetus, the momentum for a body whose
16 membership would really be composed of governments that
17 respect human rights, but there is no guarantee that
18 that will be the case.

19 SENATOR WALLOP: Yes. Could I just note
20 that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had a
21 hearing last Thursday, nine senators from the committee
22 present. There was a very good discussion with our co-
23 chairs over two hours, two plus hours, and it was
24 Senator Biden, I think, who put it this way, speaking
25 generally, but it certainly is applicable to the point

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1 you made.

2 Your second question, that the United
3 Nations is necessary, but it is not sufficient, meaning,
4 and that's Eric's point, that you must go beyond,
5 particularly if you run into problems with members who
6 do not share our democratic agenda. Let's see, we will
7 have to begin to move toward --

8 MS. MULLEN: When you go beyond, what do
9 you mean beyond? That's what I don't understand.

10 SENATOR WALLOP: Well, I mean, the United
11 Nations is one organization. There are other forums.
12 There are other, you know, groups, whether it's
13 regional, bilateral measures, other international
14 institutions. So it could be OSCE, it could be, you
15 know, Organization of African Union, Organization of
16 American States, that kind of thing. In other words,
17 there's a lot of diversity out there in the
18 international community. It's not by any means confined
19 and should not be to the United Nations, per se.

20 MS. MULLEN: And the UN Council would be in
21 the United Nations?

22 SENATOR WALLOP: Yes, yes. Sir?

23 MR. SAWYER: John Sawyer with the St. Louis
24 Post-Dispatch. I just have a practical question as to
25 where we are in the reform process. I mean, the UN in

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1 its own reform effort has been geared toward the summit
2 in September and something happening then.

3 What is your sense as to the possibility of
4 something happening on that schedule in terms of the
5 Task Force recommendations or the other recommendations
6 that are before the United Nations? And secondly, how
7 high a priority is this for the Administration right
8 now, in the next couple of months doing something?

9 SENATOR WALLOP: Well, I think the priority
10 is quite high and risking being peppered with rotten
11 tomatoes in one thing or another. One of the reasons
12 why the Balkan appointment was important to the
13 Administration was that you would get a tough person in
14 there to oversee and push for these reforms and where
15 that goes and how that goes remains to be seen.

16 But the UN has talked about reforming
17 itself and even made some noises about what those
18 reforms might be, but it has not been notably successful
19 in reforming itself. And at the moment you have got all
20 the wars and turmoil surrounding the Secretary General,
21 so it's hard for me to see that they get a whole lot
22 done until various of those charges and countercharges
23 and other events take place.

24 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes.

25 SENATOR WALLOP: And I think, clearly, the

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1 Congress is interested in pushing for reform and may do
2 it through a variety of ways, some of which would be
3 wise and some of which would be less wise, but all of
4 which would surround funding.

5 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes. I might say at
6 the hearing, Under-Secretary of State for Political
7 Affairs, Nick Burns, also gave testimony and he had
8 prepared a statement and, basically, he stated the
9 Administration support for the Coleman, Lugar Bill,
10 which was up before the Senate a couple of weeks ago,
11 but certainly there is a lot of intense, you know, focus
12 on it because of the upcoming Big Union General Assembly
13 Summit Meeting in September.

14 PARTICIPANT: But the goals for the
15 (inaudible).

16 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well, but the
17 Secretary General, you know, he has his game plan, but,
18 I mean, it can't just sort of be left to, you know --

19 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible).

20 AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes. I mean, we had
21 the U.S. storm push and we had here last Wednesday, was
22 it, the new UN Under-Secretary for Management, Chris
23 Burnham, who just took up that position a few weeks ago
24 and he has been -- he was the Acting Under-Secretary of
25 State for Management, and then there was the Chief

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1 Financial Officer for the State Department for three
2 years, so he is the guy who is really pushing at least
3 on the management and accountability side.

4 But I think on these broader issues, too, I
5 gathered from the quite extensive discussion at the SFRC
6 hearing that the Congress is going to remain very
7 mightily engaged here, as will the Administration.

8 We're right on the cusp, if I may put it
9 thus, and would like to thank everyone for what was I
10 think a really good discussion, and we'll have this
11 rendered in due course in a special report. But I
12 really do appreciate it all the more on a Monday morning
13 and on a hot July day. So thank you very much and we'll
14 looking forward to following these issues, as I'm sure
15 we will, in the weeks and months to come. Thanks.

16 (Applause)

17 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at
18 12:00 p.m.)

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